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OUTLINES
OF
MEDIEVAL HISTORY

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OUTLINES
OF
MEDIEVAL HISTORY

BY

C. W. PREVITÉ ORTON, M.A.

Fellow of St John's College, Cambridge

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1916

TO
MY WIFE

PREFACE

I N writing an outline of European history, much of the labour of the writer must be employed in brevity of statement and in rigorous selection of matter, in omissions of what is interesting in itself and valuable for the science of humanity. In the choice of events to narrate I have been guided by their far-off results, rather than by their immediate *éclat* in their own time, and have tried to indicate how in the Middle Ages were accomplished the growth of modern man and the life and attitude to life of modern times. A sketch, too, must of necessity be sketchy, on the one side positive and over-clear where discreet shadows should be infused in a larger picture, on the other summary where the complexities of character or institution deserve a minuter etching. I trust, however, that the story has not wholly lost the interest of its theme, of the human strivings and the wild but purposeful convulsions by which modern Europe was made.

The maps have been designed to illustrate, first, as in 2, 3, 4 and 7, the main political features of the period, and secondly, as in 1, 2, 4 and 6, the factors in civilization and nationality which had so great a share in forming its history. By kind permission of the Syndics of the University Press and of Archdeacon Cunningham, Map 6, Trade-routes in the XIV Century, is taken from *Western Civilisation in its economic aspects (Mediaeval and Modern Times)*.

C. W. P. O.

August 1916.

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INTRODUCTION

The Middle Age of European history, *i.e.* the period which extends between the years 395 and 1492 A.D. roughly speaking, has been so named because it lies between the history of the Ancient World of Greece and Rome and that of our own time. It takes its beginning in the dissolution of the Roman Empire of the West, and comes to its close with the discovery of the New World of America. These terminal dates are indeed conventional enough. It is hard to decide which was really the most critical year in the destruction of the Western Roman Empire; it is harder to say when a decisive breach occurred with the civilization which that Empire guarded. And the voyage of Columbus to the further shore of the Atlantic was but one among many events and phenomena which effected the transformation of the politics, the commerce and the thought of Europe from their older to their present-day form. But if the boundaries of the period are conventional, the Middle Age itself is no arbitrary chronological division of history. It has definite characteristics of its own which distinguish it both from Antiquity and Modern Times. Its ideals, its methods of action and government, its conditions of life, and still more its views of life and the world, are startlingly divergent from ours and divergent also from those of ancient Greece and Rome.

The most comprehensive terms, which can be used to describe the Middle Age of Europe, are those of youth

and barbarism. It lies not only between Greco-Roman civilization and our own day, but also between the primitive peoples, German and other, of North Europe and our modern nations. But it does not show the unending infancy of Australian blackfellows who repeat the life of prehistoric times with little change, not an unteachable or uninventive barbarism. The youthful peoples of Europe were busy in learning and making civilization. They started with small, if far from negligible, assets in civilization; but they turned their one talent into ten, and that under enormous difficulties. In one aspect we find the medievals with infinite pains and throes evolving order and law out of anarchy, and from law and order the state and citizenship. In another we see them progressing from the merest rudiments of economic life to material comfort and even luxury. In another we see the growth of intellectual life; they learn and train themselves how to think, how to reason, how to criticize; they leave us a great inheritance of thought, of art and of literature. In short, it is due to the medievals that our life can rise above the life of savages. It is on their foundations that we build.

The main factor of this youth and barbarism and this subsequent maturing and advance lay in the character of the population. Saving the Eastern Roman Empire, which remained as a fragment of the ancient world, Europe came into the hands of a race of fine, healthy barbarians. They were far from hostile to the civilization they overthrew, but they could not understand its essence. Their own tribal system broke down during their settlement. Their clumsy efforts at imitation of the Roman state broke down too, though not without ineffaceable and profitable results. Nor could the Roman population they found in their new lands help them much. The mass of it was only half-civilized and but little superior to them in

culture. Such of the Roman upper classes, who remained, already decadent and barbarized, rapidly descended to the level of the conquerors, too often without learning their virtues. In spite of vigorous efforts to preserve the state and the law, disorder had the upper hand. It worked, indeed, its own cure, and was succeeded by a steady advance in all departments of civilization. But the Middle Age was long in putting off this barbaric character. It is an age of fierce untameable passions, of indiscipline and ignorance, wherein consisted the chief obstacle to the renewal of civilization which nevertheless the medievals brought about.

The material difficulties in the way were also great. The population was sparse and dwelt in isolated villages for the most part. The roads, of Roman origin, were few and badly kept. The natural arteries, the rivers, were long ill-tended, though far more serviceable. And everywhere there was woodland, where we now see cultivated fields. The woods, it is true, were a necessary element in the life of the self-sufficing village, which existed on its own produce almost solely, and they formed a refuge and defence for the villager in invasions; but they were also a screen to the outer world and to advancing culture. All through the Middle Age, they steadily decreased, and contemporaneously every step made in the direction of order and security increased wealth and intercommunication together. An ever-widening commerce imparted the culture of the more favoured lands to the more backward, while the authority of the state could more easily reach its subjects.

One striking fact of the Middle Ages, which is at once borne in upon the student of the period, is the vast difference between men's theory and their practice. Charters and legislation seem to give us an orderly state

and a settled jurisdiction of the laws; the facts show us a slowly-vanquished anarchy. The Church theory declares an orderly hierarchy and strict canons passed by sacred assemblies; in fact we find often irregular action and a mutinous clergy. Nor is this all. Men delighted to spin further theory as to the world and mankind and their government with little regard to existing law, let alone existing practice. And the more ambitious the theory, the more absolute and extreme the doctrine, the more likely they were to gain acceptance. We can trace the habits of the semi-civilized mind, its ignorant, unexperienced and unscientific character, its love of the highly-coloured and grandiose, in this credulity and disregard of facts: but there was a further cause which gave rise to the exceptional development of the theorizing of the Middle Age, and its indifference to the contradiction between its theories and the facts of life.

The barbarian invaders, it has been said above, had no intention of destroying the civilization they found in the Roman Empire: the conquered Roman provincials had no wish to lose it. But for the most part it was lost, while remaining the ideal. For centuries, therefore, attempts at the amelioration of existing circumstances took the form of attempts to hark back to older idealized institutions. The Kings of the Germans, who now ruled the lands of the Western Empire, now took the place of the Emperor, and in theory exercised a centralized rule which was no longer possible. The culmination of this movement was the revival of the Western Empire by Charlemagne in 800 A.D. But the whole tendency of events was against it. The subjects of Charlemagne were not Roman provincials of the time of Constantine: neither were they German tribesmen of the time of Clovis. They were local nobles and barbaric peasants,

not citizens or chiefs of tribes. Thus, under the fierce pressure of the attacks of Northmen, Saracens and Magyars, the hollow structure went to dust, and was succeeded by a wilder anarchy than the West had yet known.

By the time the period of prostration was ended about the year 1000 A.D., much more of the older world had gone irrevocably; but its memories still remained. The Roman Empire still remained the ideal government for Christendom, but its conception had grown far more legendary. Western Europe believed in a theoretical lay ruler of Christendom, and practised a system of petty local states which grew up from the actual conditions of life. Internally, too, those local states had little of the statelike about them. They were loosely compounded of yet smaller units; chiefly, landowning nobles; that is, their government was feudal.

But ideals, universally believed in, and consciously striven for, do not remain without result, however impossible it may be to translate them into fact. On the one hand, the conceptions of the state and its authority, transmitted from the past, helped to shape the new kingdoms that were gathering strength during the feudal period; on the other, the special belief in the Holy Roman Empire governed the politics of Germany and Italy, and not only prescribed the conditions of the development of those two countries, but also gave birth to the strife and interaction of the Empire and the Papacy, which exercised a dominant influence over the later Middle Age.

In the Papacy we meet another inheritance from the Roman Empire. The medievals, looking back on the past, believed firmly in the unity of Christendom, and in its government by a single chief; looking on the present, they believed in the ascetic life as the only truly Christian.

The course of the history will make plain the dispute as to whether Pope or Emperor was the divinely-ordained supreme head, or whether they were co-ordinate authorities, one superintending the lay rulers, and one the ecclesiastical rulers of the Christian Commonwealth. Why the Papacy vanquished its rival is not hard to say. The Empire rested on dreams of the past, and met present needs unsatisfactorily: the forces it could command were inadequate to prolonged exertion. The Papacy, on the other hand, drew strength from the immense reservoir of its spiritual authority, the keys of Heaven and Hell. The typical medieval, living in a disastrous present, was all the more anxious concerning the life beyond the grave. The Papacy, like the Empire, might meet present needs inadequately; but then there was always the belief in its power over the after life. And it required much ill-doing and much decadence, and much prosperity as well, to exhaust that trust. Nor did the Papacy, stronger in its nature than the Empire, fail to accomplish more durable results. The Church first showed medieval Europe what organization meant; it was not a distant puzzle like the East Roman Empire, but was ramified through the West. Its influence, too, whether through Pope or local bishop or monastery, was for good in the main. They upheld, on the whole, a juster, a more civilized and self-restrained, a more humane and righteous way of acting. It was under the guidance of the clergy that orderly government was again created, that the wild medieval passions began to feel some restraint, some force working against them; that a higher ideal of common life began to replace the unbridled egoism, which in the anarchy after Charlemagne had thrust in the background all ideals, whether Christian or imperial Roman or healthily primitive and barbaric.

It will be seen how the natural feelings of regret for the good old times and of reverence for existing customs were raised by the circumstances of the Middle Age to the highest pitch. The better times did lie far behind them. Their theory implied that an ancient form for human society had been instituted divinely. It had been put out of joint, but not rescinded, by man's evil-doing. Hence the world, really advancing, seemed to them in proved decay. What was old was lawful; what was novel was unlawful. Thus lawful institutions existing must be old. Reformers were always restoring and defining the old, and therefore right, customs, or at least they had to try and seem to do so. It was a view fatal to scientific history, but not to advance in civilization. Precedents were developed, misunderstood and sometimes invented.

The belief which the medievals equally held, that this life was merely a time of trial and temptation on the way to a worse or better, might seem to paralyse all effort. But those vigorous generations were too alive, too full of passions and desires, to lapse into fatalistic inaction. And the Church came to the rescue: it taught asceticism, not apathy. For those who fled the wicked world, a hard path was prescribed. Hermits, monks and friars were energetic folk. True it is that the Orders, one after another, soon lost their first fervour and easily admitted corruption. The ascetic task was too hard often enough. Yet they retained their leaven. New Rules, at any rate, attracted the same devotion and industrious self-sacrifice. It was not till the thirteenth century that ascetic enthusiasm really declined, and at that time we may note that the world had become a far more tolerable place to a strongly religious nature. Riotous and furious as the age of Dante may seem to us now, the rule of the strong kings

and popes, the sturdy perseverance of the townsmen had not gone for nothing. It was far easier than before to play an ordinary part in the world, and yet not to prey or be preyed upon. Louis IX of France could reign as a strong king and be a saint as well.

If we seek for the weightiest secular factors in this slow regeneration we find them in feudalism—the rule of each district by the owner of its land—and in town-life. Feudalism was, it is true, a wretched makeshift for state-government. But it was the best that could be had in the earlier Middle Age. It meant the immediate presence of some one to keep order and ward off attack, of some one who had definite customary rights and duties. The greater the baron, the more likely was he to have some semblance of kingship about him; he would have some public state-authority and have subjects, not mere dependants; and he would, as we shall see, tame the petty feudalists, the worst of their order, around him. The feudal relation, too—fealty and homage—had a strong binding force, in spite of countless and glaring breaches of it. The medieval conscience was tender on the point of oaths, which called in the terrible powers of the other world, if it often took the risk of their displeasure on temptation. Society was almost held together by obligations and evidence taken on oath. This meant in feudalism the greater coherence of the feudal units, the greater authority of the feudal superior and the securer rights of the feudal inferior. At worst a baron would not willingly make himself hated by everybody; numbers told.

The second factor in early medieval progress was furnished by the towns. The country villages were isolated; their inhabitants gained little more than a subsistence, and were ruled by rigid feudal masters. But the townsman was a trader; as soon as the worst

anarchy after Charlemagne had passed, it is wonderful how soon commerce and even manufacture revived. And trade meant travelling and a wider outlook: the good things of other countries could be introduced and imitated; a healthy rivalry between town and town, country and country could spring up. Like the Church trade formed an international civilizing agency. We shall see how in the creation of wealth and culture the towns everywhere played a foremost part. Politically they occasion the rise of a middle class between noble and peasant, the influence of which took the most varied forms.

On these foundations certain forces were at work, forces which were themselves also primitive factors in medieval society, but which are more conspicuous as agents shaping, manipulating and transforming feudalism and town-life. Christianity has been already touched upon. Next to be remarked is the Kingship. Apart from the theory of the universal Christian Commonwealth, but drawing like that its strength chiefly from the remnants of Roman civilization, the belief in the Kingship continued potent in the Middle Age. Men realized that they were members of a state, dimly in the royal entourages and among the clerks, still more dimly in other classes of society. It was a belief incompatible with the true genius of feudalism, which was based on private contract, the relation of landlord and tenant. But it never died out, it intermingled with feudalism, and finally conquered it. The great barons were royal representatives, as well as suzerains of vassals and masters of serfs; and, while they resisted the king, they enforced the royal powers which they had been granted or had usurped. By the efforts of Kings and barons, a state-authority and a state-administration were re-created.

Then another force, that of nationality, came to the aid of the state. Nationality, that is the sense of solidarity produced by a common speech, a common history and a common country, shows itself first, after the disappearance of the tribal bond, in the age of anarchy succeeding Charlemagne. It grew rapidly in strength and by the close of the Crusades was fully developed. In France, in England and in Spain, this feeling of nationality coalesced with the belief in the kingship and the state, and the kings of the national states carried all before them. The spiritual thunders of the Papacy, the revolts of the feudal barons, and the independence of the towns, were all in the end helpless to resist.

It was not an invariable process, however, that the sentiment of nationality should coalesce with loyalty to the king and obedience to the state. In Italy the towns rose to be states, and a common nationality was a bond of culture merely. In Germany, the actual government fell into the hands of many local authorities, of whom the chief were the great vassals of the crown; but these dominions in medieval times had hardly acquired the full dignity of states. They were overshadowed by the nearly nominal authority of the Holy Roman Empire to which they belonged. Still their day had come, and the later Middle Age, which saw Western Europe consolidated into powerful national states, saw Central Europe parted among a host of rulers. In both, however, feudalism was on the wane; privileges and much jurisdiction, much political power, remained to the local nobles, but in essentials they were subordinate parts of the administration even of a petty sovereignty.

The historian of the Middle Ages perforce takes the standpoint of the Germanic and Romance peoples of Western Europe. It was among them that the develop-

ment which led to modern times took place. Our civilization was born of their efforts and national characteristics. In comparison the eastern races of Europe have joined only recently in their progress. Russia entered into its modern period with Peter the Great in the eighteenth century, the Balkan peninsula during the last hundred years. Even in medieval times the Slavs were backward and apart. Handicapped by their rigorous climate and scanty coast-line, oppressed by nomad tribes of the Mongolians, the yellow race of the Asiatic steppes, they remained primitive and isolated. The Eastern Empire had another fate. It slowly orientalized Greco-Roman civilization, and as it yielded to the attacks of the Turks a dry-rot, born of the moral exhaustion of its remaining territories, set in. Its bureaucratic organization was unable to influence the West, the needs of which were better met by home-grown institutions. The schism of the Churches raised an insurmountable obstacle to intimate connexion, and together with the deep divergence of racial temperament made East and West, so to say, non-conducting media to one another. A kind of bastard Middle Age appears in the East, as a result of decadence and consequent barbarization, not from parallel development with the West. None the less the Byzantine Empire formed a buffer between Western Europe and the aggressive powers of Nearer Asia, as did the Slavs against the Asiatic nomads; and thus both were necessary conditions of the progress of the West. The Byzantines did more. Elements of material culture kept filtering through as the West grew ripe for them and trade increased. Finally, just before Constantinople fell to the Turks, the West was able to acquire from her the priceless remnants of Greek literature.

With the acquisition Western Europe was within a

few stages of the close of her long medieval pilgrimage. Organized in bureaucratic states, and linked by commerce, she was reaching at last the level of that Greco-Latin civilization, which had come to its fall with the Western Empire. The discovery of the New World and the re-awakening of the scientific critical spirit, this time turned to the investigation of Nature, were to lead her on to a culture and mastery of life never before attained. Social evolution and religious revolution were at work to alter the conceptions of the state and the Church, and man's views of himself and of Nature. It was a bursting into maturity and full manhood of the adolescent peoples of Europe.

CHAPTER I

THE BARBARIAN MIGRATIONS

SECTION I. THE ROMAN EMPIRE IN 395 A.D.

The Middle Age of European history begins in a vast and long revolution, which changed at one and the same time the distribution of the races which inhabited Europe, the civilization they possessed, and their political organization. The Roman Empire which fell to pieces in that revolution, so far as Western Europe was concerned, had summed up the progress made round the shores of the Mediterranean Sea during many preceding centuries. Greece had brought to the account her thought and art and literature, Rome her law and government, the Near East the Christian religion. The Empire might well claim to be universal, for it contained the whole sphere of a civilization. Other civilizations, like that of China, existed indeed, but apart in a separate stream of history.

Now the crumbling of an old civilization and the transformation of its elements into a new, is a long process, and it is difficult to point to any precise moment when we ought to begin the new series of historical events. Christianity, for instance, the greatest of all the forces which shape the Middle Ages, takes its rise long before the Ancient World showed marked decay. In fact we cannot take any event as our starting-point without forcibly snapping the chain of cause and effect. Where,

then, for our purposes shall we break the chain? The best answer, among several, is perhaps in 395 A.D. at the death of Theodosius I, the last Emperor who ruled the Roman Empire in its full extent. The date is more important for the West than for the East; but it is in the West that the new developments of European history arose. And in the West the death of Theodosius marks the last stable moment. Hitherto the Roman Empire had steadily declined, but it had weathered its dangers, and had adapted itself to the changes in progress. Henceforth in the West it was to lose that power of adaptation, to go to ruin, and be succeeded by new states and new forms of political organization.

The new states of the West were compounded of the Germanic conquerors and the conquered Roman provincials. The civilization they created was equally a compound of German and mangled Roman elements. Meanwhile the surviving Empire of the East was an unbroken development from the Ancient World. To both the united Empire as it existed in 395 forms a common ancestor. That vast dominion completely surrounded the Mediterranean. Britain south of the Solway and Tyne, Gaul from the Rhine to the Atlantic, the Iberian peninsula, Italy and Illyria stretching south from the Danube to the Mediterranean, together with the northern coast-land of Africa from Morocco to Tripolis, formed its western division. The Balkan peninsula, Asia Minor, Syria and Palestine, Egypt and Cyrenaica, formed the eastern. In the latter the boundaries were formed by the Danube, the Black Sea, the mountain-land of Armenia, the river Khabur intersecting Mesopotamia, the Arabian and African deserts and the first cataract on the Nile. It is immediately noticeable how the whole territory is bound together by its water-system. The Mediterranean links

almost every province with every other: the Spanish, Gaulish, Italian great rivers, and the Nile are so many natural arteries of communication. Rivers, like the Rhine and Danube, often frozen through part of the year, can at least form frontiers. Mountain-ranges seem to have little importance politically or commercially; they are merely obstacles, overcome by the great roads which traverse the Empire. The boundaries and extent of the Roman Empire, in short, were decided not by racial and political so much as by climatic and commercial conditions. It was not an artificial conglomerate, but the natural out-push of a localized civilization. Where traders from the Mediterranean shores could continuously traffic along the water-ways, where the winter or the summer climate was not intolerable for Mediterranean settlers, the Empire spread, and with it spread its civilization¹. On the edge of the colder zone by the Rhine and Danube were plains where armies could be stationed: flotillas could patrol them; and even in winter it was easier to keep a watch over the frontier there than in the numberless valleys and passes of the mountains to the south. They were thus the natural boundaries of a civilization which from the time of Marius was always somewhat in a state of siege, as well as of aggression.

With all its advance towards a unity of government and civilization, the Empire never attained a linguistic or national homogeneity. In all corners of the Roman world there lingered, of some we may say thrived, languages of the multifarious peoples united under the

¹ As is well known, the January isotherms of West Europe run from north to south. There is a rough coincidence of the northern boundary of the Empire with a mean January temperature near freezing-point. The southern boundary has a similar approximate coincidence with a mean July temperature of 86° Fahr.

imperial sway. Some of these tongues, like Armenian on the head-waters of the Euphrates, or Aramaic in Syria, or Coptic in Egypt, possessed a literature, others like the speech of British and Gaulish Kelts, the Vascones (now Basques) on the Pyrenees, or of the Illyrians (now Albanians), or the Berbers in North Africa, only preserved poems and tales by oral tradition. But these survivals, whatever their degree of importance, all had one characteristic in common; they point to the incomplete absorption of their speakers in the Greco-Roman civilization. They point to elements of disunion, sometimes of barbarism and semi-barbarism, ready to burst out and increase as the power which depressed them itself declined. And they are but the most marked instances of wider circles of the population, chiefly peasants and suchlike, who had indeed abandoned their original tongues, but who had as yet made small progress in acquiring the imperial civilization. One of the misfortunes of the Empire was that the chief makers of its culture, Greeks and Italians, were worn out, and even the best sections of their pupil races were not quite equal to carrying on the traditions of their effete masters. A perpetual leakage of civilization went on in the Empire; art and literature and eventually thought decayed, during the very period of the extension of Mediterranean culture over the Roman world.

The Imperial civilization, however, was itself a duality. It was divided into two halves, East and West, each with its dominant language, Greek in the East, Latin in the West, with two divergent tendencies of mind and culture. Rome had had a free field in civilizing the West; but the East had won civilization long before under Greek guidance. The Latin West was legal and administrative in temperament, eminently skilled in combining elements of government into an organized system. There the Empire had

been made. The East was far more subtle and speculative, more acute and inventive, but also less able to assimilate and leaven. There Christian dogma was thought out. The division of the Empire, corresponding to its dual nature, between two Emperors, which had existed for the greater part of a century off and on and became permanent in 395, although due to the needs of defence against external foes, helped to increase the divergence between its two separated halves.

The *de facto* separation of East and West into two states took final effect, when the sons of Theodosius the Great divided their inheritance in 395. Arcadius ruled the East from Constantinople, Honorius the West from Ravenna, which had supplanted the inconvenient and less defensible Rome as the court residence. The boundary of the two Empires lay through the midst of Illyricum from the strong fortress of Sirmium on the Save southwards to the coast of the Adriatic. In Africa Cyrenaica belonged to the East, Tripolis to the West. Although the belief in a common empire, and a permanent alliance and interaction continued, the cleft between the two grew deeper, and showed itself after 438 in separate legislation. From the first the central administration had existed in duplicate. Henceforth laws issued by each Emperor were only binding for his own territory.

The constitution of the Empires was simplicity itself. The Emperors were autocrats; their will was law. And they were assisted, and often controlled, in their rule by a numerous, highly-organized, highly-trained, and withal extremely corrupt, bureaucracy with great traditions. Strongest of those traditions was the respect for the law, which the Emperors could make or alter at pleasure, but which they could not decently infringe *ad hoc*. This was the hall-mark of the Roman Empire, which no subsequent

cataclysm could wholly efface from Europe. The central organ of government was the Consistorium or Emperor's Privy Council composed of high officials corresponding to modern ministers. Such were the *praefecti praetorio*, two for each empire, who in their immense territorial spheres¹ were ministers of the interior, of finance and of justice: the Quaestor or minister of law: the Count of the Sacred Largesses or treasurer; the Master of the Offices, head of the secretariat and the secret service: the *magistri militum* or army-commanders: and the *praepositus sacri cubiculi* or Eunuch-Chamberlain.

Some of these functionaries are evidence for the decay of the Empire. In especial the Chamberlain testifies to the fatal orientalizing of the government. The Emperors now lived secluded in their palaces under the guard of eunuchs, only issuing forth to their subjects' view in unapproachable pomp. This splendour doubtless served its purpose of impressing the soldiers and the populace; but emperors bred in the palace tended to be weaklings or tyrants, or at best found it difficult to see what was actually happening beyond the screen of swarming officials. In an evil day for the Empire the chief eunuch became one of its most powerful personages.

The secret service throws light on another evil which it exacerbated. There were about 120 provinces, each under a governor, for justice and civil administration, and the provinces were grouped in dioceses, of which there were thirteen, under Vicars to supervise the governors and hold courts of appeal. But neither the Vicars nor the *praefecti praetorio* were able to prevent oppression, and the secret service was employed as a remedy. It was, however, as corrupt as the regular officialdom and only

¹ The East and Thrace—Illyricum (the rest of the Balkans)—Italy and Africa—Gaul, Spain and Britain—roughly speaking.

helped to increase oppression and to subdivide responsibility.

These civil officials were carefully separated from the command of the troops in the vain hope that revolts would be less frequent. But the army-commanders without civil authority proved no less dangerous than the former governors who had ruled great provinces and their garrisons together. As lieutenants of the Emperor there were at least two *magistri militum*¹, and further *magistri* were named on occasion. The military force under their command was divided into frontier-troops and a field-army. Along the frontiers were the garrisons of the fortified camps and the *limitanei*, peasant-soldiers who held their farms on condition of military service. The field-army or *comitatenses* were available for a campaign in any direction. Some 500,000 men served in the army. The best of them came from barbarian tribes without or within the Empire, and their commanders were most frequently barbarians too. The soldiers knew their power and were as unruly as of old; and the barbarian extraction of the most and best of them produced a new form of the ancient antagonism between the civil and the military population. Hitherto the strife had been between Roman and Roman. Roman civilization, Roman organization continued through wars and revolution. Now each military revolt tended to place barbarians at the head of affairs. The new rulers might have the best will in the world to continue the imperial system. They tried so to do for a century, but the attempt was bound to fail. Roman civilization was beyond the learning of the barbaric races.

The army was not the only portion of the population

¹ In the East: in the West there was usually only one, commanding all the forces in chief.

which held an exceptional position. The whole Roman world was graded into hereditary ranks and subdivisions which had acquired the rigidity of caste. The officials formed one, the most favoured; the great landowners, whose enormous domains spread far and wide, another. Most trades and professions were formed into hereditary local corporations, the membership of which could be very burdensome owing to their public duties. Most restricted and most burdened of all, perhaps, were the *curiales*. These were the once well-to-do citizens of the provincial towns, who carried out the local government and local tax-collecting of their cities. They were small landowners for the most part, and, in addition to the public duties which they performed compulsorily and *gratis*, they were bound to make up any deficiency in the quota at which their town was assessed for taxes. Impoverished and miserably tied to their native place and often odious duties, they were almost serfs of the government. Men might be forced into their class from the lower ranks of society; but escape there was none: they were too necessary. To remedy their incompetence or oppression of the smaller folk, all that could be done was to invent a new official, by compulsion too in the end, the *defensor civitatis*, who should restrain them and the other imperial agents. The decay of the Empire cannot be better shown than by the perpetual watch the government was forced to keep in order to make its obsolete machinery work.

The *curiales* stood at the head of town-life, and the Empire was largely a coagulation of cities. It had been founded by the city-state of Rome; the city was its typical administrative unit. But it had proved inapplicable as a universal system, and on the countryside other forms of local government were growing up. The prevalence

of great estates was the dominant feature of Roman agriculture. Amid the stress and disasters of the times a new form of working them had come into use. Culture on a large scale was more and more difficult. There were home-farms tilled by slaves, but the greater part of an estate was split up into small holdings tenanted by the half-free class of *coloni*. These men were bound to the soil, sold with it and inalienable from their holdings, which they occupied under fixed hereditary conditions. Beside them was another class of farmers, who held their lands in *emphyteusis*, *i.e.* by an hereditary lease at fixed rents from the great landowner. All together would be under the magisterial authority of the landowner, whose domains thus formed a governmental district called a *saltus*. In this way the annexation of local government to the ownership of land, which was to culminate in feudalism, had already begun.

The supersession of agriculture on a large scale by small holdings accompanied the decay of commerce in general. Great tracts of land exporting their produce were succeeded by small farms which consumed the most of what they produced, *i.e.* were self-sufficing. Only Italy still drew its corn-supply from Africa and Constantinople from Egypt. The dangers of the times and the increasing poverty of the Empire were stifling trade, which had more and more to depend on the very wealthy classes, and the not always desired requirements of the government. It did not of course die out, but grew scantier in amount and more restricted in its range. More and more the various portions of the Empire resumed their pre-Roman isolation, and were the readier to fall apart when the tax-gatherer was the chief emblem of unity. The needs of the State were enormous. The Court, the army and the civil service were all costly; but

the corruption of the officials, and a clumsy system of taxation made the burden exhausting, and hastened the Empire's fall. Throughout the fifth century the peasant-rebellions of the Bagaudae were endemic in Gaul and Spain.

In the midst of increasing poverty and disunion and decreasing efficiency and culture, two living healthy elements were preserving progress and vigour, the Law and the Christian Church. The best days of the growth of Roman Law, indeed, were over,—we have reached the age of codifying—but it remained a magnificent reasonable system and a civilizing agency. The Church, on the other hand, now that the remaining Pagans were negligible, was gaining strength day by day, nor did all the fierce doctrinal dissensions and greedy ambitions of its members materially impair its efficiency. The arbitration of the Bishops was preferred to the corrupt law-courts, and the clergy were everywhere the defenders of the poor and oppressed. Their organization was growing apace by the side of the State. The ecclesiastical unit was the city with its bishop elected by clergy and people. These city-dioceses were grouped into provinces, mostly identical with the secular provinces, under the metropolitan bishop of the provincial capital. By 395 a further larger grouping was becoming perceptible. The chief cities of the Empire naturally gave a special importance to their bishops, and, when apostolic foundation or the possession of illustrious occupants of the sees was added to secular rank, they were able to assert a wide primacy or patriarchate over their neighbours. First of all the patriarchs was the Bishop of Rome, the Pope. He was bishop of the Eternal City, successor of St Peter and St Paul and of many saints; his hybrid Church was the interpreter of Greek and metaphysical Christianity to the less cultured West. His

province, disregarding secular subdivisions, extended over all Italy south of the Rubicon, and beside him the great Bishops of the West, of Milan, Carthage, Arles and the like, were never able to acquire a complete patriarchal position. A similar rank was reached by four oriental Bishops, those of Constantinople or New Rome, Alexandria, Antioch, and, latest so to rise, Jerusalem. Together the five patriarchates by the middle of the fifth century parcelled out the Roman world, wielding an authority none the less venerated because it was moral and vague.

More important, however, as yet for the government of the Church were the Synods of Bishops which frequently met, whether for single provinces or for larger circumscriptions. Constantine the Great at Nicaea had already assumed for the Emperors the prerogative of calling Ecumenical Councils of the whole Church to decide questions of doctrine and discipline, and in the Canons of these and other synods a code of Church Law was in existence beside the laws of the State. It was not, however, uniform. The East only recognized the Canons of ecumenical and eastern Councils. The West added Canons of western Councils and further the decretals which began to emanate from the Popes of Rome. Thus early, though only in an uncertain way, the Popes began to exercise in their patriarchate, which covered more than half the Empire, an authority more pronounced than that of the Eastern patriarchs. The Emperors were weaker in the West, the Bishops more independent: Rome had no such rivals in the Latin-speaking world as Constantinople in the Greek: and in the deserted capital, amid its hybrid population, the ancient Roman genius could again arise to shape a new world-monarchy.

To the guidance of the unhappy state, in danger without, decaying within, there succeeded two youths,

equally contemptible in character and abilities. Both were under the rule of others, but with a difference. Honorius was controlled by Stilicho, the Vandal *magister militum*, and from this time the West never got loose from the grip of its barbarian commanders-in-chief. Arcadius, on the contrary, was in the hands of Romans, his *praefectus praetorio*, his chamberlain or his sister, and by dint of the strength of Constantinople, of the sea which divided Asia from Europe, and of skilful diplomacy, they were able to prevent the barbarian troops from dominating the monarchy.

SECTION 2. THE FOES OF THE EMPIRE

Around the Roman Empire, encircling it completely, were its foes. They fell into two main divisions fixed by geography and climate, rather than by civilization and race. There were the southern division, who inhabited the lands of tropical summers from the source of the Euphrates to the Sahara, and the northern division who held the lands of frozen winters beyond the Rhine and Danube and Black Sea. Both divisions held much waste or nearly waste land, the southern sandy or grassy desert, the northern dense forest: and, as population grew, the fertile cultivated Empire became more tempting to invasion.

In the southern division there comes first of all the ancient empire of Persia, the frontier of which marched with that of Rome from the Caucasus to the Euphrates. Persia was far from barbaric: she was the heir of the venerable civilization of the region of the Persian Gulf, last successor to Assyria and Babylonia. That civilization had been overlaid by Hellenism after Alexander the Great's conquests, but only in Syria and on the

Mediterranean lands was Alexander's work at all permanent. A reaction took place to the east of the Euphrates, led first by the Parthian, then by the Sassanian Persian kings, who continued, although in a decayed form, the ancient tradition. The Persian monarchy was a despotism, somewhat checked by an aristocracy of powerful land-owners and priests. The religion, to which the Persians fanatically adhered, was their native one of Zoroastrianism, a half-way house between monotheism and dualism. Their speech was Indo-European, ancestor of modern Persian. But in Persia's Mesopotamian provinces Semitic Aramaic was the common tongue, and the Aramaic communities were largely Christian, Christian, however, of a type, which was rapidly falling apart from that of the West. Persia was the only power which could at all rival the Roman Empire. Her heavy cavalry was a formidable force, and there was in progress an age-long dispute over the boundary. But Persia, like Rome, had other foes as well. On the north-east, beyond the Oxus, the nomads of Turan, the Altaians of the steppes, perpetually threatened to overwhelm her. On the south-west lay Arabia.

Still the Arabs as yet were not dangerous to either great power. Organized in a primitive tribal fashion, and always at feud among themselves, they showed little sign of overflowing their deserts. Their land was getting more barren, and their numbers were growing; but otherwise they had changed only slightly for centuries. Two border kingdoms existed, one on the edge of Syria, vassal to Rome, the other on the edge of Irak, vassal of Persia. They were useful buffer-states between the great powers.

Along the African frontier also there seemed little for Rome to fear. The Ethiopians were passive; and

throughout North Africa, it was more the gradual dissolution of authority and order that was coming about than anything else. The population was mainly composed of the native tribes of Moors or Berbers. There had always been unruly independent tribes outside the frontier, and other tribes, subdued but little civilized, within. Now religious heresies were causing disaffection in the towns, and the vassal tribes were slipping out of control. But troops could still be levied amongst them, who formed some of the best cavalry in the Empire. Like the Arabs, they were only potentially formidable.

Very different was the danger from the north. All along that frontier were settled wild tribes amid their forests and mountains seizing every occasion to burst into the Empire. Farthest to the west, the diocese of Britain was harassed by the plundering raids of the Scots from Ireland and the Picts of Caledonia. Of these the Scots were certainly Kelts, living in tribes and tribal kingdoms, and the Picts, if somewhat behind the Scots in civilization, resembled them generally. Their attacks were shaking Roman rule in Britain and causing a steady retreat of Roman culture; but they did not threaten the Western Empire as a whole. Their civilization, barbaric as it was, however, was markedly original, and contributed its quota to the development of medieval literature.

The chief enemies of Rome, and the destroyers of the Western Empire, were the Germans. In the reign of Augustus their tribes dwelt, roughly speaking, between the Rhine, the Danube, and the Vistula. Since then they had spread widely. Over-population, a thing easy to happen among tribes which only practised hunting, herding and a primitive agriculture amid enormous forests, was probably the first cause of their migrations, and, whether expanding tribes in the rear merely pushed

on their neighbours in front to invade Roman territory, or themselves pierced through the intervening lands unsettling their inhabitants as they passed, the result was the same—a continual effort to settle within the Empire in their own way and under their own laws. In the course of the four centuries since Arminius routed the legions many changes had taken place in their grouping. Some Germanic peoples, like the Goths, had migrated as a whole to new lands. Others, keeping approximately the same settlements, had formed new political federations and had taken new names. Other tribes again had splintered into fragments which wandered far apart and often gathered alien fragments to them.

About 395 A.D. they may be arranged under three heads, (1) tribes in the interior of Germany, (2) tribes threatening the Western Empire, and (3) tribes threatening the Eastern Empire. (1) The Frisians held the North Sea coast from the Rhine to the East; south and east of them as far as the Elbe were the Saxons; in the present Schleswig-Holstein dwelt the Angles; neighbours of both were the Jutes. All four were formidable by sea, and the coast of Britain was subject to their piracies and raids. To the south of the Saxons were the Thuringians, all west of the Elbe, while to the east of the Elbe a portion of the Suebes still kept their ground as well as a remnant of the Vandals. Next neighbours to these on the east was the main body of another folk, the Langobards or Lombards, who had moved from their former home on the left bank of the Elbe.

None of these peoples pressed on the Rhine frontier. They were tribes of the interior, and on them Roman civilization had not even the small effect it had on the outer ring of tribes. It was different with their neighbours on the west. (2) Along the right bank of the Rhine, from

the Zuyder Zee to the Main, was stretched the people of the Franks, composed of tribes long settled there. They still formed anything but a political unity. A portion of them had pushed across the Rhine and seized the land, already Germanized in part, between the Scheldt and the Meuse, which they thoroughly Germanized. These Salians, as they were called, were not, however, a compact body: they fell under several petty kingships, all vassal allies of Rome. Beyond the Rhine the principal group was that of the Ripuarians, foes to Rome and straining at the leash to cross the river. By the Main we meet two smaller German peoples, the Burgundians, who play so renowned a part in medieval epic literature, and the chief section of the Siling Vandals. Both of these were to migrate, but their neighbours to the south, the Alemanni, remain to this day and have given its French name to Germany. They held a square-shaped territory between the Neckar, the Rhine and the Lech. East of the Alemanni and north of the Danube came other tribes of which the Quadian Suebes and the Asding Vandals, settled between the Danube and the Theiss, were the most important. But after Vienna the Roman frontier was broken through: in Pannonia there were already settled the German Ostrogoths and the Mongolian Alans as vassal allies of the Empire. The Ostrogoths had once ruled the wide steppe-land to the north of the Black Sea. Now, a portion of them, ruined by the Huns, had obtained lands within the Empire. (3) Their kinsmen, the Visigoths, under the same pressure of the Huns, had burst the line of the lower Danube and in 395 lived as vassal allies and once-victorious enemies north and south of that river in Moesia and Dacia. Beyond them in modern Transylvania were settled their kindred, the Gepidae.

The economic life of all these German peoples had

been nearly identical, and was still much the same. They were cattle-rearers and huntsmen; they also practised a primitive agriculture. The influence of Rome, however, and the pressure of their own increasing population were leading them to adopt a more advanced agriculture, and, at least where they had settled within the Roman Empire, they already appear as lords of serfs who tilled their fields for them. Their institutions as yet showed far more conservatism. The most solid unit was still the sub-tribe or *gau*, which had its own assembly of free-warriors and its own chief. Within the *gau* the most important element was the kindred (*sippe*, *maegth*). Without it was the wider bond of the tribe or national confederation. Permanent kings of the nations were rare, although the Ostrogoths had formed a national monarchy on the Black Sea. But usually the tribal leaders had only a temporary or partial authority, due to a war in progress or personal achievements, whether they bore the title of king or not. Leaving out the serfs and slaves, the tribesmen consisted of ordinary free-warriors and of nobles. The latter, who furnished the *gau*-chiefs and other great men, kept up, when they were wealthy enough, the most remarkable of Germanic institutions, the *comitatus*. Like an Homeric king, these German chiefs maintained in their halls in peace and led with them to war a number of sworn companions, *antrustions*, *thanes*, as they were variously called. The fidelity of the companions to their lord was scarcely ever broken, and the relationship powerfully modified Germanic institutions in the direction both of monarchy and of aristocracy, besides being one of the ancestors of feudalism. In other matters, also, German society was organized on primitive lines. Every freeman belonged to a group of kindred, his *sippe*, and each *sippe* carried on blood-feuds in case of the slaughter or injury of any of its members. Such

feuds, however, could be compounded for by the *sippe* of the offender by a payment fixed according to the circumstances of the case. Here was the function of the public courts, which were merely the *gau* and other assemblies meeting for purposes of justice. The assembly declared the customary penalty and over-saw the proof or disproof of the charge made according to a barbaric ritual.

To sum up, the Germans were a race of warlike barbarians, full of mental and bodily vigour. They had fortunately escaped premature efforts to civilize them, and, now that their own slow evolution had brought them to a point when more rapid change was profitable, the defences of the Empire were falling before them.

Behind this mass of tribes lay other peoples, whose existence requires a bare mention at this period. South Scandinavia was held by Germanic folks, which were perhaps temporarily exhausted by the migration of their overflow to the south of the Baltic centuries before. East of the Vistula and steadily rolling in towards the Elbe were the Indo-European tribes of the Balts on the Baltic and the Slavs, inland races of peaceful barbarians, lacking in any organizations other than the simplest village-community, and long doomed to be serfs of fiercer peoples. The Slavs were by far the more numerous and had already reached, in patches at least, the Danube and the Black Sea.

Two races of Altaian or Mongolian nomads complete the list. The Alans had in part migrated westward with the Ostrogoths to Pannonia, but another section remained in their former haunts to the east of the Don. There they were subject to the redoubtable conquerors who had sent the Goths flying before them, the Huns. The latter's hordes had spread between Vienna and the Don

and were lords of a number of Slav settlements as well as suzerains of bordering German folks. This race of horsemen, though of dauntless courage and formidable in war, was in every way inferior to the Germans. They were mere destroyers, incapable of anything beyond their own low-grade civilization which they had brought from the Asiatic steppes. Agriculture they left to their wretched serfs: they themselves were shepherds in peace time. In war their splendid cavalry was all but invincible: it was only the loose, primitive organization of their tribes and kindreds which had hindered them from making far wider conquests by 395.

The greater part of these diverse barbarians were heathen, ranging from an imaginative polytheism among the Germans to the cruder spirit-worship of the Huns. But a change was rapidly coming about. The missionary Gothic bishop, Ulfila, had introduced Arian Christianity among his fellow-tribesmen, and conversion was proceeding apace. Arianism¹ was not merely the result of Ulfila's personal influence, for Vandals, Burgundians and Lombards as they one after another adopted the Empire's religion embraced the Arian creed. They found it easier and more intelligible than the Trinitarian doctrine. The results were unfortunate for their civilization and kingdoms, since they were kept apart from the least corrupt element in the Roman world, the Catholic clergy, and further, when they formed kingdoms within the Empire, their Roman subjects were divided from them hopelessly by religion. The social cleft was not to be bridged.

¹ The belief, maintained by Arius, that the Son was not co-eternal with the Father in the Trinity. Nestorianism, the next important heresy, tended to minimize the union of the Divine and Human Natures of Christ.

SECTION 3. THE FALL OF THE WESTERN EMPIRE

The task which was undertaken by Stilicho and Rufinus, rulers of the West and East in the name of the young and incapable Emperors, was in any case a heavy one. The Empire was depopulated and exhausted by taxation. The better part of the army was composed of barbarian mercenaries or vassal allies. The barbarians were not contented, and the Romans were not resigned. But ambition and policy added to the difficulties of the rulers. Illyricum, divided between East and West, was the bone of contention: each wanted the whole. The designs of the Vandal, Stilicho, went further. He was not hostile to his own race, and rather wished their continuance in the Empire, to which they furnished soldiers. In consequence, there was a constant mixture of necessary defensive alliance and of tortuous enmity in the relation of the two Empires, which redounded to the disadvantage of both. Stilicho's views would, perhaps, have been justified, could they have been carried out successfully for a century and the barbarian tribes amalgamated with the provincials, but as it was he only hastened the Western Empire's ruin.

Troubles began almost immediately with the revolt of the Visigoths in 395. They made the young chief Alaric king of their whole tribe. While he harried the Balkans, and a body of Huns crossed the Caucasus and ranged devastating as far as Antioch in Syria, Stilicho came to the rescue with the Eastern army which had accompanied Theodosius to the West a year before. But he was justifiably suspect at Constantinople, and was ordered to despatch the troops to the East and himself to leave Illyricum. He obeyed, only to return with a Western army in 397 on the pretext of combating Alaric. Still he acted so as to compel the Visigoths to become his

allies rather than to conquer them; and the Eastern Court, then under the control of the eunuch Eutropius, encouraged a revolt of the Moors to get rid of him, and then made peace with Alaric by creating the king *magister militum* of Illyricum.

The Gothic danger, however, was not thereby over for the East. In 399 an Ostrogothic colony in Asia Minor rebelled, and the Goth Gainas, who was then *magister militum* of the Eastern prefecture, joined the revolt with the Gothic troops who served in the army. But a soldiers' mutiny was a different thing from a national war. There was no unity in it or definite object. Constantinople, impregnable between Asia and Europe, also effectually barred large combinations. Gainas was overthrown in a popular outbreak there in the midst of his success, and his forces were overcome by the loyal troops under another Goth, Fravitta. Thus a second Stilicho did not arise in the East, and at the same time Alaric was turning his thoughts westward.

Stilicho had made short work of the Moorish rebels in 398. Now he had to meet a greater peril. Alaric in 401 left the barren mountains of Illyricum and invaded Italy, while a swarm of his northern neighbours, Vandals, Goths and Alans, moved west under Radagaisus with the same purpose. Stilicho had barely time to defeat Radagaisus in Rhaetia, and hurry south to check Alaric at Pollentia. The rebuff did not last long. Stilicho was always anxious to use the Visigoths against the East, and kept up an uncertain alliance with them. Meanwhile the Western Empire was dissolving. Stilicho succeeded in crushing a new invasion of Radagaisus at Faesulae, but the Vandals, Alans and Suebes then took a new route. They migrated from the Danube to the Main, joined there the Siling Vandals, and all together crossed the Rhine on

31 Dec. 406. For three years they ravaged Gaul: and the Alemanni, Burgundians and Ripuarian Franks took the opportunity to occupy the left bank of the Rhine. The frontier was broken in permanence, and so was the unity of the West. Rebellion followed invasion. A certain Constantine became Emperor in Britain and rapidly acquired Gaul and Spain. No wonder that in Italy the same Roman reaction was felt, and showed itself in the murder of Stilicho in a rising of the legionaries. It had been Stilicho's misfortune to prove the unwisdom of the policy begun by the Emperor Valens in 376, the settlement of the Germans tribally and *en bloc* within the Empire. The independence of the Visigoths in the interior had made it impossible to prevent the immigration of other Teutonic folks.

Stilicho had warded off the attacks of the Visigoths by a combination of generalship, bribery and joint Eastern schemes. The new minister, the eunuch Olympius, was incapable of any of the three means. In 408 Alaric finally entered Italy. For two years he marched up and down the land, meeting little resistance: twice he besieged Rome and held the city to ransom for a while: he even set up a mock-Emperor, Attalus. Nothing, however, induced Honorius to peace, safe as he was in impregnable Ravenna. At last Alaric attacked Rome a third time in 410 and stormed the city. Then he proposed to cross to Africa, but died in 410 before accomplishing his design. He had founded a national kingship, but his greatest achievement was in shaping men's opinions. Henceforward Rome and Italy had been the booty of a German chief, and the disappearance of the Western Empire was a mere matter of time.

He was succeeded by his brother-in-law, Ataulf, who for a time lingered uncertainly in Italy; but Honorius

was reinforced by an Eastern army, and in 412 the Visigoth decided it was better to plant his state in Gaul. That country was in mere anarchy. In 409 the bands of Vandals, Alans and Suebes had passed into Spain to settle there. The usurper Constantine had two rivals, and Britain, from which he had withdrawn the garrison, had become autonomous. Even Honorius had been able to send a really Roman general, Constantius, who in 411 captured Constantine and overthrew one of his rivals. When Ataulf arrived with his host, he at first coquetted with the third usurper, and then overthrew him in alliance with Honorius. But Ataulf by this time had formed a policy. He was determined to follow Stilicho's method and bolster up the Empire by means of his Gothic nation, and would himself marry his captive, Placidia, the Emperor's sister and heiress. This the Roman party in the West, led by Constantius, would not allow, and war broke out again in 413. The marriage of Ataulf and Placidia in 414 made no change. The able Constantius cornered his adversary and forced him into Spain, to be murdered there next year. Ataulf's place in history, like Alaric's, was prophetic. He first conceived the union of a German kingship with the Roman Empire, in place of the Empire's subversion. Constantius, on the other hand, represents the older policy of Rome which was to be successful in the East. Barbarians could furnish mercenaries—his army was largely Hunnish—on necessity small vassal-states should be allowed; but the Roman Empire should be predominant.

Constantius managed events with skill. Wallia, the new king of the Visigoths, came to terms. He restored Placidia, and warred in Spain for his new allies. By 418 he had destroyed the Silings and driven the remnant of the Alans to join the Asding Vandals, who, like the

Suebes, held out in Galicia. Then came his reward; the Visigoths were settled as vassal-allies round Bordeaux and Toulouse. Thus Gaul and most of Spain, though the frontier of the Rhine was lost, remained to the Empire; and, though the barbarian kingships existed on the Atlantic, the Mediterranean was still a Roman lake. Constantius was at the height of his good fortune. An African revolt had failed in 413 and the corn-supply of Italy was safe; he had married Placidia, and in 421 was created co-regent Emperor. But in the same year he died, and was followed to the grave by Honorius in 423.

The seeds of civil war had been sown before Honorius' death, when in 422 his sister Placidia had fled to Constantinople. Castinus, the *magister militum*, now set up a puppet-Emperor at Ravenna, but his chances were not great. Theodosius II, the Eastern Emperor, sent an army to enthrone Placidia and her infant son, Valentinian III, and the governor of Africa, Boniface, was on the same side. Placidia was easily victorious, but she was soon plunged in fresh difficulties by her own supporters. In 427 Boniface headed an African revolt, which ended in a reconciliation, when a new enemy appeared on the scene. For into the rich and disaffected province, essential for the Italian corn-supply and the command of the Mediterranean, the Vandals had entered, invited, it appears, by the combatants, in 429. They had moved to the south of Spain, some years before, defeating an imperial army. Their new king, Gaiseric, had a grasp of international politics and a wide horizon unequalled among his barbarian contemporaries. In a few years he defeated both the Western troops and their Eastern allies—for the feud of the two Empires was now closed. In 439 he captured Carthage and quickly made the Vandals a sea-power. His folk began a new existence as landlords: the Catholics

were depressed and persecuted by their Arian rulers, for the Vandals were harsher than their kindred tribes. Meanwhile the greater part of Spain had fallen a prey to the scanty people of the Suebes.

At about the same time another country was lost to the Roman world. It seems that the Saxons, Angles and Jutes made definite settlements on the coast of Britain shortly after 440. Many years of slow conquest were before them, but the native Britons who opposed them were cut off from Rome and soon wholly absorbed in the indigenous Keltic civilization.

Gaul had fared better under its commander, Aëtius. This general was a genuine Roman, who had passed much of his life among the Huns, and had therefore much influence among his former hosts, now the best recruiting-ground of the West. Between 424 and 430 he checked the aggressive Visigoths, Franks and Alemanni. He then murdered the commander-in-chief, Felix, and became himself *magister militum* and real ruler of the Western Empire. For a while he prospered with his Hunnish mercenaries. Africa and Spain were let go: Italy, thrown on its own corn-supply, must have passed through an economic crisis. But Gaul was kept, and the Empire was formidable. Then the ground was cut away under Aëtius' feet by events among the Huns.

The Huns had long shown signs of amalgamating in one monarchy, and the process was completed by the genius of Attila, who became sole king of the chief portion of them, that settled in modern Hungary, in 445. Many Altaic and German tribes were vassals, many Slav tribes serfs of him and his people. The empire he inherited and created extended from the Caucasus to the Danube, the German forest and almost to the Rhine. The Burgundians who resisted on the Main were utterly overthrown,

and their remnants took refuge in Gaul round the Lake of Geneva. At first Attila remained at peace with the West, he only blackmailed and harried the Eastern Empire. But in 450, incited, perhaps, by Gaiseric and seeing his opportunity, he turned towards Gaul. In 451 with his host of Huns and Germans he crossed the Rhine. Aëtius could only bring part of the Roman army into the field, Huns being naturally unserviceable; but the Visigoths under Theodoric I and the Salian Franks came up in full force. The two armies joined battle near Troyes, and the Huns were forced to retreat across the Rhine. This victory really put an end to the migrations in Gaul. Henceforward the peoples already lodged there fought for its possession. It showed, too, as did the life of Ataulf, that the immigrant German tribes had realized that Roman civilization was theirs to inherit and defend. They stood side by side with the Empire to ward off the unteachable Huns.

Attila had time for one furious raid into north Italy before he died in 453. Without him the Hunnish Empire at once broke up. The Huns themselves were divided, and their German vassals revolted. Of the latter, the Ostrogoths still held Pannonia where they were reinforced by kinsmen emigrating from Thrace; the Heruli, Sciri and Rugians held the north bank of the Danube where the Suebes and Vandals had once been; further to the east the Gepidae still dwelt. Meanwhile, as the invasion of the Vandals had been fatal to the Vandal Stilicho, so the invasion of the Huns was fatal to their friend, Aëtius. He was murdered in 454 by his jealous master, Valentinian III, whose one decisive action was followed in 455 by his own assassination.

Whereas in the East growing particularism showed itself in provincial heresies, in the West its upheaval

took a political form. Britain had fallen away; the Romans of Gaul and Italy strove with one another for the Empire. Their dissensions fell to the profit of the Germans. Visigoths and Franks interfered and made progress in Gaul. The German mercenaries, now levied from the Herulans and their neighbours, dominated Italy, of which they formed the army. Their decisive supremacy was due to the Vandal invasion. Gaiseric aimed at the naval command of the Mediterranean, and he had not outgrown the predatory instincts of his forefathers. He took the opportunity of the defenceless position of the Italian Emperor Maximus who succeeded Valentinian III. In 455 the Vandal fleet appeared on the Tiber and Rome underwent a peaceful but complete sack. Gaiseric then sailed away with the heiresses of Valentinian among his captives. The Gaul Avitus next seized the imperial throne, and, while his ally, King Theodoric II of the Visigoths, conquered the greater part of Spain from the Suebes, the Emperor organized war against the Vandals. But his own measures were fatal to him. His successful commander, Ricimer the Suebe, revolted, defeated him in 456 and seized control. Ricimer was a pure barbarian and was more independent than Stilicho had been. He begins an approximation to the status of a German king. He remained himself, however, only an Emperor-maker. From the Eastern Court he received the title of *patricius*, patrician, which from the time of Honorius had almost implied the regency of the West. In his modest beginnings he raised his best Roman subordinate, Majorian, to the Empire in 457. But Majorian showed alarming energy in Gaul and Spain, and, when he was defeated in an attack on Gaiseric, Ricimer revolted and overthrew him. This was the signal for disruption. The Roman generals-in-chief of Gaul

and Dalmatia, Aegidius and Marcellinus, at once revolted, and were never subdued. The Visigoths could complete their conquest of Roman Spain and contest central Gaul with Aegidius and Ricimer. Burgundians, and Ripuarian and Salian Franks could all expand.

Ricimer, on his side, bent all his powers to the maintenance of his own rule in Italy. He was hostile to the very Emperors he set up, especially when he was obliged to receive them from the East in order to keep the alliance of the sister Empire. Thus in the reign of Anthemius (467-72) he allowed the Visigoths to reach the Rhone in Gaul and watched the ruin of a joint attempt of the two Empires to destroy Gaiseric. His death, however, in 472 seemed to promise better things, for his nephew and successor, Gundobad, was a Burgundian king and preoccupied in southern Gaul. Julius Nepos, heir of Marcellinus of Dalmatia, could become Emperor with Eastern help in 474.

Nepos was not the nominee of the German soldiers, and his reign was short. In 475 the commander-in-chief, Orestes, a Roman this time, revolted, drove Nepos back to Dalmatia, and placed his own son Romulus, nicknamed Augustulus, on the vacant throne. But Orestes was not a German, and was therefore weak. The soldiers envied the lot of their kindred, Vandals, Visigoths and Burgundians, who had stepped into the place of Roman landlords. In 476 they demanded a third of the soil of Italy. Orestes had no hope of being a German king and refused. In reply the soldiers declared one of themselves, Odovacar, their king. Orestes was slain and the boy-Emperor pensioned. The hopeless game of juggling with barbaric tribes and soldiery was over, and the Roman Empire of the West had expired.

Odovacar, however, at the head of his motley soldiery

could not take the independence of a tribal king. He acknowledged the Eastern Emperor Zeno as his sovran and obtained from him the title of patrician or regent. If the lands were divided, and the army lived under its tribal laws, the Roman administration survived intact. Neither it nor the law was mangled or semi-barbarized as in Gaul or Spain. None the less a barbarian king was the real head of the state. His kingdom stretched to the Danube on the north, from across which his fellow-tribesmen flooded Noricum and Rhaetia. On the east he conquered Dalmatia after Nepos' death in 480. On the south he received Sicily from the now satisfied Gaiseric. On the west the Alps were his boundary. The Visigoths annexed Provence, and the rest of the land between the Rhone and Saône and the Alps had been absorbed by the Burgundians. Aegidius' son, Syagrius, ruled the remains of imperial Gaul from Soissons. The Alemanni and Franks held the banks of the Rhine and the districts of Belgica. The Visigoths and Suebes shared Spain. The Vandals reigned in Africa. The proportions of twilight civilization might differ, but the shadow of the Dark Ages already rested on the West.

SECTION 4. THE TEUTONIC KINGDOMS, FIRST STAGE

The Roman Empire of the West disappeared in 476. It was succeeded by Teutonic kingdoms. But this did not mean that Teutons and Romans amalgamated in any way. The Germans had hitherto lived under their own laws and their own chiefs in the midst of the Roman communities. They continued to do so, only now they controlled the state and all its resources. The Romans, even in Italy so far as facts went, were a class of subjects.

Above them, and severed from them utterly by religion, race, civilization and language, were the tribal oligarchies of their German masters. Thus these early Teutonic kingdoms rested on the narrowest foundation and none of them possessed stability. There was as yet no fusion of institutions and races that might make for permanence.

The religious chasm between the Arian Germans and the Romans was at its widest in the Vandal kingdom in Africa. Gaiseric had repulsed Majorian in 460, and the combined attack of East and West in 468. By means of coast-raids he compelled the Eastern Emperor Zeno to conclude peace in 476, and the fall of the Western Empire in that year realized his schemes. He was now dominator of the west Mediterranean. Around him were Teutonic states: the islands belonged to him, save Sicily which Odovacar held as his tributary. The kingship of the Vandals became an absolute hereditary monarchy, the eldest male of the royal house succeeding to the throne. In their military aspect the Vandal nation furnished the cavalry, and the marines of the fleet; in their civil they were tax-free landowners great and small, grouped in their ancient thousands and hundreds. Beside them and under them were the vanquished citizens and *coloni*; but these were governed in the Roman fashion. Beyond their districts were the Moorish tribes, growing ever more independent after Gaiseric's death in 477. From that date the kingdom steadily declined; the Vandals grew rapidly enervate in their new life; the Moors revolted and the boundaries contracted. Internally, savage persecution of the Catholics under Huneric (477-84) alternated with mildness, which gave an opportunity for East Roman influence. Thrasamund (497-523) wisely leagued himself with the Ostrogoths of Italy to maintain the ring of German states round the Mediterranean. But this

policy was reversed by the incapable Hilderic (523-30) whose deposition by the next heir, Gelimer, gave the opportunity for the reconquest of Africa by the East Roman Empire. Failure marked the whole progress of the Vandal kingdom. Consolidation, vigour and political organization were all wanting in the effete generations that followed Gaiseric.

The Vandal persecutions seem almost prudent when we see the fate of the tolerant Burgundians. They were the mildest, least numerous and most easily Romanized of the barbarians. Gundobad, Ricimer's nephew, succeeded in uniting all of them under his sceptre. He weathered Frankish attacks, and drew up codes of law for both sections of his subjects. But nothing availed to bridge the gulf between Arians and Catholics. Even the conversion of King Sigismund (516-23) to Catholicism produced no union. It only made both sides disloyal.

While intermarriage of Germans and Romans was permitted in Burgundy, the Visigoths kept themselves racially distinct. Their organizer was the contemporary of Gaiseric and Gundobad, King Euric (466-84). It was Euric who extended their dominion to its full measure, Gaul between the Loire and the Rhone, with Provence, and Spain, with the exception of the Suebes in Galicia and some insignificant fragments. His system was more Roman than the Vandalic, less Roman than Odovacar's. Each once-Roman province was placed under a Gothic duke, supreme in war and justice, each city and its territory under a Gothic count. Beneath these grades the difference in race made itself felt. The Romans in the city were controlled by their *defensor*: but among the Goths, the count's lieutenant was the *millenarius*, the thousand-commander. Like the Vandals, the Goths had become landlords. Between Bordeaux and Toulouse they held

two-thirds of the cultivated land, with the *coloni* and slaves thereto belonging. Elsewhere their settlements were sparser. Like the Vandals, too, their new life and luxury were not long in causing decadence. They borrowed Roman vices. But they did not borrow Roman religion. Staunch Arians, they remained at variance with their Catholic subjects, nor could an easy method of government make the latter less disloyal. Roman influence, however, affected their laws. Euric was the first German sovran to codify the national customs and bring them up to date. His son Alaric II (484-507) went further. He issued a simplified Roman code for his Roman subjects, which replaced the too complicated and too civilized imperial jurisprudence. Like the political institutions of the Visigoths, it was an acknowledgment that the world was going back and that its ancient elaborate life could not be kept up.

Between the Loire and the Somme lay the Roman state of Syagrius. On the west were the independent Keltic-speaking Bretons. Beyond the Somme and the Meuse were the two divisions of the Franks. Of these the Ripuarians were under one king; but several *gau*-kings still ruled the Salians. Both differed from the Visigoths in their compact all-German settlement, and in the fact that they were still heathen. They were, in fact, less allured by Roman civilization than the Goths had been, and therein, perhaps, possessed a safeguard against rapid decay. It was the genius of a Salian Frank which changed the history of Gaul and Europe. Clovis (Lewis) the Merovingian of Tournay was the most powerful of the Salian *gau*-kings. On the death of the Visigoth Euric his opportunity came: Alaric II was in no way fitted to dominate Gaulish politics. At the head of all the Salians Clovis attacked and overthrew Syagrius at Soissons.

The Roman fled to Alaric II, but was soon surrendered by his pusillanimous host. Meanwhile Clovis was subduing his kingdom. The Frank was giving proof of an insight and shrewdness such as no other German king displayed. From the secure vantage-ground of his impartial heathenism, he saw that the loyalty of the Romans could not be won by an Arian caste, who had partially confiscated their property. From the first he wooed the Catholic bishops, and hopes of his conversion grew rife. No division of lands was made; the Frankish settlers were placed on *ci-devant* imperial or vacant property. And strong in the general content Clovis could venture on levying Roman soldiers and make a beginning of amalgamation.

The extraordinary strength of Clovis' position enabled him to turn his arms on all sides. With the Alemanni he soon came into collision. In a first war in 496 he put an end to any expansion, north or west, of his foes. In a second (505-7) he overthrew them completely; they were driven out of the districts round the Main, which became Frankish, and, in the territory left them between the Vosges mountains and the river Lech, they were his tributaries. The first war had already given the completing touch to an epoch-making event, the conversion of Clovis. He had long seen the importance of an understanding with his Catholic subjects. His policy had aimed at coöperation of both races, Germans and Romans. He had married a Burgundian princess, Clotilda, who was Catholic, not Arian, and their children were baptized. Now he overcame his last reluctance to embrace Christianity, and was baptized at Christmas 496. He knew that thereby he was shutting himself out from the great circle of Arian German states, but for conflict with them he was made immensely stronger. His Franks followed

him obediently to the font. The Romans accepted him cordially as their king. The Catholic subjects of the Burgundians and Visigoths became immediately his partisans and longed for his victory. Nor was his influence on the future less beneficial. Strange Christian and strange exponent of Latin civilization as Clovis was, sorry as were the effects of Merovingian rule on religion and culture, he had put his people in organic connexion with the most living force which maintained the remnants of the old and could beget new civilization. At last there could arise a Germano-Roman people which could re-create society, not two separate layers of Germans and Romans, both doomed to continual decay.

Clovis at once took the aggressive against his Arian neighbours. He gained the alliance of the short-sighted Burgundian, Gundobad, and advanced against the Visigoth Alaric II. At Vouglé, by Poitiers, in 507 he was completely victorious, slaying his adversary in the *mêlée*. Within a year his kingdom reached the Pyrenees. It is true that Theodoric the Ostrogoth intervened in 508 with success, taking Provence for himself and giving back Septimania, the coastland from the Rhone to the Pyrenees, to the Visigoths; but the Burgundians were the chief losers; their hoped-for spoils were snatched from them, while Clovis had little need of a Mediterranean port. Arianism rapidly disappeared in Aquitaine which he kept—probably many Goths migrated to Spain—and Clovis left the land-settlement there as it was.

It was now easy for Clovis to consolidate his authority. In 508 the Eastern Emperor Anastasius conferred on him the obsolete title of proconsul, and the Gallo-Romans hailed him in a triumphal procession through Tours as now in every sense their legitimate ruler. To unite the Franks under his sway, Clovis adopted the compendious

method of assassination. He murdered the remaining *gau*-kinglets of the Salians, and seduced the heir of the Ripuarians to murder his father, King Sigebert. Then Clovis came in as the avenger, and acquired the kingdom. At the same time he appears as a legislator, codifying the laws of the Salian Franks. In 511 he died.

Clovis' personal character, barbarous, treacherous, and greedy, can only inspire aversion, but the epoch-making character of his work is undeniable. His only failure was an abortive attack on Burgundy in 500. His influence on medieval civilization has been already noted. He also founded the Frankish monarchy and the French nation. The German Franks and the Gallo-Romans after his time formed one monarchy, held together by a common religion, a common dynasty and common political institutions. The Franks migrating to northern Gaul—hence called Neustria, their *new* land—together with the previous German settlers in the south, brought new life into the country, where they rapidly mingled with the Gallo-Romans. At the same time their kinship with the purely German districts, soon to be named Austrasia, the *east* land, seconded the efforts of the Church to diffuse a common ecclesiastical Roman civilization as far as the Rhine. The necessary point of contact had been at last established, and the current of thought could flow from the Romans to the Germans and back again. For the time, however, the level of civilization, long sinking, was immeasurably lowered. The new Gallo-Franks, the French of the future, descended very nearly to the level of the barbarians, without retaining the primitive virtues of the Frankish side of their ancestry.

Meantime an exactly opposite experiment, on the old lines of Arian racial schism and of cultural preservation, was being carried on in Italy. Clovis, in preparing the

way for racial fusion, had degraded a civilization which he did not understand. Theodoric the Ostrogoth appreciated Roman culture, and attempted vainly to preserve it by a barren racial segregation.

The kingdom of Odovacar was the weakest of all the German states. He was king not of a tribe, but of an army only, which besides was none too numerous. He and his soldiers were Arians, a separate caste to the Italian population. The confiscations, by which they were provided with lands, though not in practice oppressive, could not be agreeable to the landowners. And not only was the Roman administration in full working order, but the nominal sovran, the Roman Emperor Zeno, was close at hand and influential. If he turned against the patrician, and sent a force which could cope with his army, there was little doubt what the action of the Italians would be. They would disown their German master, although, now that they were quite disarmed, their disaffection could not do more than make his overthrow easier.

It was not, however, enmity to Odovacar, but desire to free himself from a formidable general, which led Zeno to authorize an attack upon him. Since 483 Theodoric the Amal had united the different sections of the Ostrogoths under his rule, both those of Pannonia and Dacia south of the Danube, whose original settlements had been much extended by recent immigrants after Attila's death, and those who had become vassal-allies of the Eastern Empire *c.* 430 and had been planted by the mouth of the Danube. He had been brought up as a hostage in Constantinople and there been imbued with that admiration of things Roman that never left him. He succeeded to the kingship of the Pannonian Ostrogoths in 474, and since then, as imperial soldier and tribal king, had been alternately a dreaded ally and terrible foe of the Empire. Zeno, as

we shall see, could at length dispense with these dangerous tribal armies, and the union of all the Ostrogoths made Theodoric the more formidable. So an arrangement was come to, and in 488 Theodoric, Gothic king and Roman patrician, moved with all his people into Italy.

The war lasted five years, for Odovacar and his men fought well. But the Ostrogoths were stronger, and the imperial command rendered the Italian cities favourable to them. In 493 Odovacar surrendered Ravenna where he had been besieged for three years. He was to share in the government, but Theodoric murdered him with revolting treachery, and from that time was sole master of Italy and Pannonia. He succeeded to Odovacar's position and policy, but with far greater strength and genius. He was king of the Ostrogoths and regent of Italy. He would, perhaps, have wished to be more, a co-Augustus; it was, however, with difficulty that he obtained from the Emperor Anastasius in 497 an acknowledgment of his *de facto* position.

The Ostrogoths in name were not a ruling folk, like the Visigoths, but vassal-allies of the Empire, whose king was Roman governor of Italy. They were settled on the confiscated thirds of Roman estates, and lived as wealthy barbarians under their own counts and their own laws. They were the army. The Romans, on the other hand, filled the central administration which, like the local, remained unaltered from what it was before 476. Italy was ruled as an Empire of the West. The Gothic king surrounded himself with Roman councillors; he appointed the Western consul, and showed a particular deference to the Roman Senate, which was indeed a useful index of public opinion. While remaining an Arian, he not only observed a toleration, otherwise unknown in his day, but intervened as sovran in the Catholic Church with

singular tact and discretion. Just, humane and civilized, the king's amiable character fitted him to attempt anew the project of the Visigoth Ataulf, to revivify the Empire of the West. For years he attained signal success. Italy once more became prosperous; literature and art revived; the king was arbiter of all the new German states. But the original defect of the kingdom remained. The Goths could not climb up to cultural equality with the Romans; while the Italians were never reconciled to the Arian strangers billeted among them. Theodoric was the only link of the two races. When the Eastern Emperor began to persecute the Arians in 523, a breach between Theodoric and his Roman subjects at once took place. They openly sympathized with the Eastern persecution. The king took alarm, and turned on the leaders of the Roman nobility. Boethius, the author of the *Consolation of Philosophy*, famous throughout the Middle Ages, fell victim to his suspicion and resentment. The Pope, John I, who perhaps willingly failed to mediate satisfactorily with the Emperor, died in prison. Theodoric was about to decree the expulsion of his Catholic subjects from their churches when he died in 526. His scheme of co-partnership of Goth and Roman, of Arian and Catholic, had broken down.

As successor to the Western Emperors, Theodoric made it his business to maintain the ancient frontiers of Italy. Pannonia was largely occupied by the Gepidae, Noricum by the Rugians. Theodoric at least recovered southern Pannonia and re-annexed its capital of Sirmium. But he aimed at a general alliance of the new German kingdoms. By marriage he became allied to the kings of the Vandals, the Visigoths, the Burgundians, the Franks, and even the Thuringians who had erected a transitory supremacy in the interior of Germany. It cannot be said

that the scheme was successful. Clovis became a Catholic and turned his arms against the Visigoths, while Theodoric was preoccupied by an attack of the Eastern Emperor in retaliation for his aggression south of Sirmium, and was only in time to secure Provence for himself, and Septimania for the Visigoths. Although his personal power, indeed, as distinct from the success of his plans, increased, since he was accepted as regent of the Visigoths in the name of his grandson Amalaric, his wider influence was failing. The Burgundians had joined Clovis and remained out of hand. Their Catholic king, Sigismund, murdered his own heir, Theodoric's grandson. The Vandal king, Hilderic, also, broke with the Ostrogothic alliance soon after his accession in 523, and courted that of the Empire. Theodoric was at the point of making war when he died in 526. Here, too, it is clear how his policy failed in the end. He had done his best to keep the German invaders separate from the Romans and allied among themselves, and at the same time to shield Roman civilization. But the Germans were too few to remain a separate caste, and too primitive to be suddenly transmuted by a declining and corrupt culture.

They were, however, advancing in civilization, although at great cost of their picturesque barbaric virtues, and in a slow uncertain way. To begin with, if the greater part of Vandals, Goths and Burgundians were an idle militia, they were yet landowners with estates worked on the advanced system of intensive agriculture, while the Franks in their native Salian land as far as the Somme, were mostly small proprietors and themselves worked the intensive method. This change implied fixed homes and a real agricultural life. Intensive agriculture, the tilling of the same ploughlands year after year, meant steady, provident labour, even though it was only an elementary

matter of manuring and the alternation of crops and fallow. It may be considered the boundary-mark between civilization in the narrower sense and barbarism. Settled life and growing civilization were also responsible for the codes of barbaric laws promulgated at this time. Hitherto oral tradition had been sufficient to hand down their customs. It is significant that the separatist Theodoric issued none; his *Edictum* was a handbook for Romans only or for Goths in relation to Romans; he left the Ostrogoths to their traditional customs. But Euric, Clovis and Gundobad published Latin codes of their national laws, which may have changed little, yet opened the way for revision and further legislation. The power, which formulated the law, could alter and add.

The codes of laws were also a sign of the incoming of written literature and written tradition among the Germans; and both were Christian. A faint tincture of Latin literature soon becomes observable among their clergy. And those clergy, though for the most part semi-barbarous, whether German or Roman, were yet in touch with the remnants of Latin civilization and with Christianity. And this was an immense advantage. The Franks especially, although their Christianity was of a debased type, were earnest in their new religion, were in some degree made less ferocious by it, and, more than all, were laid open to influences, which were to be the most potent in the future.

The most noticeable symptom and means of the new influence is the increase of the power of the bishops. If the Romans had long preferred episcopal arbitration to the expensive judgments of corrupt imperial officials, they preferred it all the more to the wayward unintelligence of a Frankish count. Even in Italy the bishops in a way represented their flocks and exercised political influence


— Boundary of Western Empire.
 - - - - - " " Eastern Empire.

Latin etc. = Languages spoken within the Empire, c. 395 A.D.

The names in cases, e.g. **SAXONS**, show the final settlements of the migrating barbarian tribes.

SAXONS etc.,	Teutonic	tribes, c. 395 A.D.
ALANS etc.,	Altaian	" "
scors etc.,	Keltic	" "
Slavs etc.,	Slavonic and Balt	" "

NOTE. The Bavarians are not recorded under that name till later than 395 A.D.



BARBARIAN INVASIONS

over Theodoric. In Francia they undertook civic duties which the counts and *defensores* were unable to transact. And, with all allowance made for the semi-barbarism which overtook them, they and their assistant clergy yet took a higher standpoint than the rest of the population, and possessed vestiges of civilization, of literature and of life by law, ungrasped by the lay powers around them. They were the Kings' counsellors. In their charge, as the only lettered class, as clerks, were the redaction of the law, and, as time went on, a share in its revision and development.

CHAPTER II

THE EASTERN EMPIRE AND THE SARACENS

SECTION I. THE REPULSE OF THE GERMAN TRIBES

That the Eastern Empire was able to escape the fate of her Western sister was due to a combination of favourable circumstances. Her capital, Constantinople, was practically impregnable, and, in conjunction with the dividing arm of the sea, enabled her rulers to isolate the disturbing elements in either Asia or Europe. She was always able, therefore, after Alaric had showed the way, to pass on the consolidated Gothic tribes to the West which offered a freer field to them. She also learned, and had time to learn, by experience, not to take only German mercenaries, still less their consolidated tribes, into her service and territory. She learned to levy troops from the wilder races in her own territory, to whom her civilization was not an alien thing, and to form a mixed army, which was incapable of combining against her. Her rulers were almost always, more by luck than by judgment, natives of the Empire with no dangerous sympathies for the barbarians. And, lastly, the East was less exhausted than the West, both in men and means: she had not borne the burden of the Empire so long as the western provinces which had hitherto taken the leading part; and her government was able to remedy some of the worst abuses in time.

None of the merit of the Empire's survival belongs to Arcadius. We have seen¹ how Alaric went westward with the Visigoths, and Gainas was overthrown. From 404 to 414 the government was in the hands of the praetorian prefect, Anthemius, who has the best claim to have rescued the foundering state. He reformed the administration and the defence, and made a beginning of a mixed mercenary army to replace the Goths. His successor was Arcadius' daughter, Pulcheria, whose brother, the Emperor Theodosius II, was then a minor and always insignificant. Her rule was a feebler and worse continuation of that of Anthemius. Extortion and corruption were renewed, but ruin no longer impended. She did, indeed, take steps in legal reform, which culminated in 438 in the Theodosian code, but her real success was in her foreign policy, both in East and West. Theodosius the Great had permanently eased the relations of the Empire with Persia by dividing the long-contested kingdom of Armenia and taking the smaller share. Still there remained the religious difficulty. The Empire contained no Zoroastrians to persecute, but many Christians were subject to Persia. Bahram V, who ascended the Persian throne in 420, began a violent persecution of them, and Pulcheria intervened. In the war the Roman arms were signally victorious, till Bahram was glad to drop the persecution and make a hundred years' peace. The fact was that the frontier was now satisfactory to both powers, and both powers were on the defensive against the Altaian barbarians.

The same tendency towards peaceful coöperation was shown by Pulcheria in the West. Although hostile to the accession of Constantius, she took up the cause of her aunt, Placidia, on Honorius' death, and placed the

¹ See above, pp. 33-4.

child Valentinian III, Placidia's son, on the Western throne in 425. Henceforth the estrangement between the two Empires, begun by Stilicho, completely ceased, and, if their joint war with the Vandals ended in failure, their defeat was due to the sympathy their mercenaries felt for German kinsmen.

Financial maladministration, the Vandal failure, the growing danger from the Huns, and perhaps the theological dispute over Nestorianism, all together gave the impulse to Pulcheria's fall. By 435 she was supplanted by Theodosius' wife, Eudocia. Eudocia was a literary Athenian lady brought up as a pagan, and converted on her marriage; but her rule was in no way remarkable. In 441 she fell from power, and retired to Jerusalem, while the eunuch Chrysaphius took charge of affairs. Under him the Empire went from bad to worse. Gaiseric held Africa. A short Persian war ended without loss only because the Ephthalite Huns were attacking the enemy. Attila ravaged the Balkans and held the Empire to ransom. Raids of barbarians took place all round the frontiers, while the Isaurian mountaineers of Asia Minor, always unruly, began anew to plunder their neighbours. But the Empire's fortune remained predominant. In 450 Theodosius II died from an accident, and the eunuch's misrule came to a close.

A new period of extreme danger, but not of defeat or degenerate government, now commenced. Pulcheria possessed the loyalty of the Romans: Aspar the Alan controlled the mercenaries. Aspar was an Arian and was inevitably inclined to strengthen his power by alliance with the barbarians. Still he could guard the frontier, although admitting fresh bands of Ostrogoths and Huns within it. Attila he defied, and the Hunnish king's western projects and death removed the immediate danger. The

Emperor, meanwhile, was a nominee of Pulcheria, Marcian, who governed well and sturdily. On his death in 457 Aspar promoted the Illyrian Leo to the Empire, and thereby contrived his own fall, for Leo had the fate of the Western Empire before his eyes, and was determined to avoid it. Aspar depended principally on the tribe of Ostrogoths settled for thirty years by the mouth of the Danube, whose chief was his relative, Theodoric son of Triarius. To counteract them and furnish an army whose loyalty and Roman feeling could be relied on, Leo turned to those hardy mountaineers of Isauria whose bands had been the scourge of Asia Minor. He married his daughter Ariadne to an Isaurian chief who took the name of Zeno and brought with him troops of his own nation. The race for power between Zeno and Aspar soon began, and ended in 471 with Aspar's murder.

The danger of a barbarian commander-in-chief in control of compact masses of his fellow-barbarians was thus averted. It remained to manage the two Ostrogothic settlements in the Empire. Leo succeeded in buying off for the time both the Pannonian Theodemir and the son of Triarius; but the main problem was left to be settled by Zeno who succeeded his father-in-law in 474. There was also left the Vandal war, begun in 468, which perhaps was luckless through Aspar's influence. There were the complex Isaurian questions, for Zeno and his countrymen were hated by the Greeks, and he was not the only Isaurian chief. In all these matters the mean and odious Zeno did yeoman's service to the Empire. The Vandal war and the Vandal piracy he ended by an equal peace in 476, and the death of Gaiseric next year freed the Romans from further danger on that side. The Ostrogoths were harder to deal with. Zeno played off the Pannonian section, now under Theodoric, son of Theodemir, against

the Thracian section under Theodoric, son of Triarius. One at least of the two was always in rebellion, and in these wars the Balkans were again and again devastated. At last they both seemed in permanent hostility to Zeno, when the son of Triarius died in 481. Theodoric, the son of Theodemir, was gained over in 483, by the permission to murder his rival's heir and to unite the Ostrogothic nation. He was made patrician with larger territories. When he became hostile again Zeno had a new bribe to offer him. The Emperor had recognized Odovacar's rule in Italy, but he was dissatisfied with his eastern policy, and considered Italy an imperial province which it was his own to give. In 487 he authorized Theodoric's march into Italy, and the Eastern Empire was freed from the German tribes for good.

Zeno's salvation in the long turmoil was due to the fact that he had other, native troops in the Isaurians. Yet the Isaurians were responsible for a whole series of broils. Zeno had to face two outbreaks in Constantinople owing to the hatred the Greeks felt for them. The first in 475 even drove him for a time from the throne. Then he had a rival among his countrymen, the general Illus, whom his jealousy in the end provoked to a revolt, only put down in 488. When Zeno died in 491 fresh troubles arose. His widow nominated an Illyrian, Anastasius, as his successor, and the Isaurians promptly revolted. Several years passed before they were finally subdued in 498. Many of them were transplanted to Thrace, and thenceforward the nation was merely a good recruiting-ground for the Eastern army.

The reign of Anastasius marks a fresh turning-point in the history of the Empire. The West had finally dissolved; the German danger was over in the East; the Emperors were again efficient rulers; the East,

relieved by economic reforms, was recuperating for fresh efforts. But there is also the beginning of fresh dangers. On the Danube there appear the Bulgarians and the Slavs who were to conquer the depopulated Balkans. The Arabs grow more troublesome. And, worst of all, there occurs the first religious rebellion in the Eastern Empire, a sign that the Monophysitism which was severing Egypt and Syria from Asia Minor and the Balkans in belief, was taking a political form and reinspiring the provinces with separatist national feeling.

At the time, however, the affairs of Persia and the Ostrogoths must have seemed almost more important. Grudging recognition alternated with open hostility in the relations of Anastasius to Theodoric. As to Persia the Emperor was strong enough to take an independent attitude. His repeated refusal to be blackmailed by King Kobad led to hostilities in 502 which lasted till 506. Peace restored the frontier as it was before the war, though Anastasius succeeded in building the new and all but impregnable fortress of Dara to guard Mesopotamia.

More to be feared eventually were the new foes on the Danube. The fiercest were the nomad Bulgarians, a Hunnish tribe which moved west from the Volga in Zeno's reign. Beside them were the less warlike Slavs, long filtering south. Both plagued the already enfeebled Balkans with their invasions, and both furnished useful mercenaries.

Anastasius conferred a great benefit on the Empire by financial reforms which were at the same time social reforms. The ruinous oppression suffered by the *curiales* ceased in his reign by the transference of the tax-gathering to a new class of officials. Nothing, however, could make the Emperor popular north of the Taurus mountains. His

religious opinions were Monophysite, and Monophysitism was the burning question of the day. At last the Thracian army revolted and had not been really restored to its allegiance when Anastasius died in 518. In spite of his misfortunes his reign had been profitable to the Empire, which at his death was stronger than it had been for a century.

SECTION 2. JUSTINIAN

On Anastasius' death, another new man, the Illyrian Justin I, was raised to the throne. His incompetence for his position resulted in his founding a dynasty, for his nephew Justinian soon acquired real control and in 527 succeeded to the Empire. Justinian has been called the last real Roman Emperor. His native tongue was Latin. He conceived of the Empire as the great Christian world-state. His chief aim was to reconquer the lost provinces of the West; his next to exalt the imperial absolutism as the expression of the Roman state. War and peace, law and architecture, religion and commerce, were all to illustrate and increase the splendour of Rome, and to be guided by his hand. In many ways he was fit for his conception of his office. His ideas were grand; his policy was comprehensive; his industry was untiring, and he could choose and control men. But, though overbearing and tenacious, he was liable to occasional panic and open to adroitly-used influence. His megalomania induced him to take up schemes far beyond his resources. His devotion to his Roman ideal made him misinterpret the trend of events. Hence his reign is full of misspent energy and he squandered his inheritance. He missed the opportunity of adapting the Empire to the new Greco-Byzantine conditions, and left the work to be

done by successors with exhausted resources and the enemy at the gates. Yet the same megalomania, which wasted the best breathing-time of the Empire politically, left priceless legacies in culture, St Sophia and the Justinianian code.

Justinian was susceptible to personal influence and especially to that of his wife. He had made a startling choice. Theodora, whom he married in defiance of Roman prejudice and associated with him as Empress, had been a notorious courtesan. It may be that her share in the government until her death in 548 has been overrated. Her love of luxury and splendour chimed in with Justinian's policy if not with his personal habits. Her decision and courage, which were greater than his, made him firmer and less procrastinating in his actions than he was as a widower. In religious matters she came nearest to striking out a line of her own. She favoured the Monophysites, while her husband was orthodox. But even here her prepossessions were not adverse to the trend of his policy.

The rising national particularism of the provinces had taken shape in doctrinal divergencies, which in origin were not provincial. The true East, Egypt and Syria, declared for Monophysitism, *i.e.* for the single Nature of Christ. Asia Minor and the Balkans, on the other hand, held to the two Natures, and with them the whole West, led by the Papacy, agreed. Now Justinian was working under three political conditions. To keep his throne stable, he must satisfy the anti-Monophysite heart of the Empire, Constantinople and Asia Minor. To maintain the extent of the Empire, he must restore the concord of that heart with the chief members, Egypt and Syria. To recover the West, he must be anti-Monophysite. In the long run the task was impossible, for racial aversion would find new causes to rally round if the old were done away

with. But Justinian naturally tried to abolish the existing grounds of quarrel. His belief in his imperial authority over church and state, his Caesaro-papism, made him use the most absolutist procedure, and he tried the most varied solutions. To accept Monophysitism was against his personal convictions, would lose the West, and set the throne rocking in Constantinople. Syria and Egypt, then, must be converted. He tried persecution, he tried concession and toleration; all in vain. Finally, he tried the ancient device of the red herring trailed across the path, which was to be as ineffectual. He persuaded a Council (the Fifth, at Constantinople) and dragooned Pope Vigilius, whom he made captive, into condemning three dead Nestorian theologians whose heresy was at the opposite pole to Monophysitism¹. But the Monophysites would not be reconciled by this or later expedients; and, although the Papacy was temporarily subdued, the West was alienated. The sub-conscious national cleavages were not to be effaced.

The splendour of Justinian's internal government rested on his belief in his greatness and its duties. He was a builder throughout his reign. Magnificent palaces and churches, including the glorious St Sophia, bridges, aqueducts and reservoirs arose over the Empire. The roads were improved, and a network of fortifications covered the frontiers. But these expenses, conjoined with the interminable wars, could ill be borne by the state, much of which had suffered from barbarian inroads, and which was honeycombed by official corruption. No efforts of the Emperor could cure the plague of extortion. His own perpetual need of money for his vast undertakings made him the worst accomplice of greedy officials who could satisfy his demands. Early in his reign the effect

¹ Called the "Three Chapters" controversy. Cf. above, p. 31, n. 1.

of governmental extravagance and corruption was shown in revolt. Constantinople had been modelled on Old Rome in most things, she had her Forum, her Senate and her Eastern Consul, her paupers fed on state-doled corn; but she also had original elements, her population was stirring and excitable, and her games, the chariot-races of the circus, had divided it into two furious factions, the Blues and Greens. Whenever possible these deadly rivals took different sides in religion and politics. The Greens were for Anastasius, the Blues for Justinian. It says ill for the Emperor's government that in 532 they joined forces against him in the Nika riot. Had it not been for Theodora's firmness Justinian would have fled. As it was, his barbarian mercenaries quenched the revolt in blood.

Justinian attempted many and wise remedies, with the exception of retrenchment, for the evils of his government. He tried to abolish the sale of offices and to remove the temptation to oppress the subject. He reversed the system of innumerable officials and divided authority. The Vicars¹ disappeared, small provinces were joined together, often military and civil functions were reunited as in the older Empire. Intermediate courts of appeal were set up to replace the Vicars, and to prevent recourse to Constantinople. It was a new and beneficial policy. Byzantine trade, too, owed much to Justinian. He introduced the silk-worm, and developed a new trade-route by the north from the Black Sea to China. By these means the Persian monopoly of the eastern trade was broken, and Constantinople's commerce assured for centuries.

The greatest of Justinian's achievements was the

¹ See above, p. 18. Justinian also abolished in 541 the useless and expensive, but venerable consulate.

reorganization of Roman law, which was carried out under the direction of his brilliant, unprincipled quaestor, Tribonian. The Roman law consisted of two complex masses, (i) the multifarious laws decreed by state-authorities,—statute-law we may call it,—(ii) and the equally multifarious text-books, opinions and expositions of famous jurists—analogue to English judge-made or common law. However admirable the whole structure might be in its principles and development, its practical use became yearly more difficult. Its sources were too numerous, the opinions of the jurists often differed, parts were obsolete, local law lived on in spite of formal suppression, the whole was uncombined. It might require abstruse, prolonged research in many authorities to decide a case. Justinian resolved to bring the law, as it stood, within the reach of every lawyer at least, if not of every educated man. He aspired also to amend it, but not to give it principles or logical development; that had been done by the jurists long before. His idea was not wholly original. Theodosius II, during Pulcheria's ascendancy, had already issued the *Codex Theodosianus*, a classified compilation of the imperial laws issued from Constantine's day to his own, and had prescribed a rough-and-ready method of choosing between the opinions of the more famous jurists. Now Justinian effected a final and completer codification. In 529 he issued the *Codex Justinianus*, a complete classified collection of imperial laws, which excluded obsolete and contradictory elements. In 534 the final edition of his *Digest* was made law. This was a compilation from the treatises of the jurists, which put the "common law" into certain and easily accessible form. A third work was the *Institutes* or lawyers' manual, for teaching and study; and finally from time to time the Emperor issued *Novels*, new laws, which may be considered

an appendix to his *Codex*. Four consistent manuscripts, instead of forty rivals, preserved the body of the law.

The intrinsic excellence of Roman Law is due to generations long anterior to Justinian, but the convenient and easily-preserved form he gave it laid posterity under a debt which cannot be cancelled. The law-schools of the medieval West were nurtured on Justinian. Reasoning and thought, theory political and religious, practical justice and civilized procedure, were learnt under the guidance of his decrees. The later Canon Law was his careful imitator. The Civil Lawyers shaped their national or local laws under his influence. His megalomania had its fit reward, for his ghost presided over later constitutional and legal history.

To defend the Empire Justinian possessed a formidable, if none too numerous, army. It had changed much since the days of Theodosius the Great. Instead of the masses of German foot-soldiers, its main strength consisted of the cataphracts, the heavy-armed and mail-clad horse. They were mercenaries drawn from any and every nation, and mutinous and greedy; but, heterogeneous as they were, they had no power to grasp at or overthrow the Empire. Their military qualities, however, were superb, and their successes would have been greater, had not Justinian's poverty, due to his extravagance and corrupt officials, paid and fed them badly. Beside them were the less important foot, also heavy-armed and too few for the Empire's needs. The new system had been evolved apparently in the eastern wars, for the Persian armies had been so equipped and composed for centuries. It also heralded the warfare of the Middle Ages, when the mail-clad horseman was the decisive factor.

It was on the cavalry that Justinian relied for the reconquest of the West. Africa was his first objective.

The deposition of the Catholic Hilderic and the accession of the anti-Roman Gelimer gave him a pretext, and in 533 his best general Belisarius landed near Carthage with 15,000 men. The military qualities of the Vandals had withered in their luxurious life, and they were no match for Belisarius' veterans. Two victories wrecked the Vandal kingdom. The Roman inhabitants joyfully accepted the imperial rule, but the independent Berbers were defiant. It was not till 548 after long, dangerous and exhausting wars that they were subdued or rendered harmless. In sum, Justinian had recovered for the Empire the coastland from Tripolis to Algiers.

Years before the African troubles were over, the Emperor had attacked the Ostrogoths. Their breach with the Vandals had hastened the conquest of Africa. Now it was their turn. Theodoric had been succeeded by his grandson Athalaric under the regency of his daughter Amalasantha. The regent had rapidly alienated the Goths, by her wholly Roman attitude, and, when on the young king's death in 534, she became queen, with her cousin, Theodahad, as joint-king, it was not long before she was deposed and murdered by her knavish partner. Justinian could at once intervene to revenge his ally. In 536 Dalmatia was occupied, while Belisarius, marching from the south, took Rome. But the Goths were not enervated like the Vandals, though, like the Vandals, they had the whole Roman population against them. The miserable Theodahad was deposed, and the warrior Witigis was made their king. He bought off Justinian's allies, the Franks, with the cession of Provence, and threw the whole strength of his nation against Rome. But Belisarius held out heroically for a year; Byzantine armies invaded Italy on all sides, and, though the Goths made a splendid resistance, the first phase of the war

ended in 539-40 with the surrender of Ravenna and of Witigis. Justinian thought the war over and recalled Belisarius. He was soon undeceived. The yet unconquered Goths renewed the struggle under a brilliant leader, King Totila, in 541. The Italians had been disgusted by Byzantine misrule, and Totila secured most of the country. Troops and money were not to be had from Justinian clogged with a Persian war. In spite of Belisarius' return Totila twice captured Rome; and by 551 ruled all Italy but four towns as well as Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica. But Justinian was now free for a supreme effort. Belisarius had been again recalled in 548. In 552 the eunuch Narses, amply supplied, invaded Italy from the north; Totila was overthrown and slain in a decisive battle in the Apennines, and the Goths finally crushed near Mt Vesuvius in 553. It remained to turn out the Franks and Alemanni who had come ravaging into Italy, and to extinguish the last embers of Gothic resistance in the surrender of Verona in 563. The Ostrogoths thereafter vanish from history. Unhappy Italy, ravaged and depopulated, was left to the tender mercies of the Byzantine tax-gatherer. Here, too, the segregating policy had failed. The Goths had always been strangers. No amalgamation or new growth had been possible, only a romantic conservatism.

Scarcely was Italy rewon than Justinian began the reconquest of Spain. Civil war among the Visigoths and the hatred felt for them by the persecuted Catholics gave him the occasion, and in 554 his troops obtained possession of south-east Spain as far as Cordova. There, however, they were stopped by the reunion of the Goths. Justinian's conquests were over. Africa at any rate turned out a solid gain.

It was only in these reconquests of lost Roman

provinces that Justinian was a warlike prince. Not that he was unaggressive, but his policy was one of "pacific penetration." One means, which was especially congenial to the theologian Emperor, was missionary enterprise. Even the Monophysite heretics were encouraged so far. Christianity was extended all round the African, Asiatic and Black Sea frontiers, and more dependence could be placed on the friendship of the converted tribes. Bribery and balancing were the other methods of Justinian. The whole ring of barbarians outside the Roman state were subsidized and flattered, as vassal-allies of the Emperor. And their rivalries were sedulously fomented: each pair of neighbours was kept at odds. This policy was successful, so long as it was backed by a sufficient armed force. But when the Roman army declined owing to the exhaustion of the Empire, the bribes given to the barbarians only served to stimulate their desire to invade, and Justinian's policy broke down.

The northern neighbours of the Empire had changed much since the times of Attila. North of and among the eastern Alps, which in 565 formed the frontier of imperial Italy, were the German Bavarians, apparently a coalition of those fragmentary tribes who had furnished troops to Odovacar. Next to them, in Pannonia, which they had occupied during the Ostrogothic war, came the Lombards, untouched as yet by Roman civilization. East again, on the north bank of the Danube, the Gepidae, the sluggards of Gothic tradition, still maintained their settlements. Their immobility is probably to be ascribed to the amplitude of their lands compared with their numbers, and probably also to their possession of serf-like tribes of Slavs. This latter advantage was shared by their next neighbours, the Hunnish Bulgars, who extended along the Black Sea to the Dnieper. There must,

however, have been free Slav tribes as well on the north of the lower Danube. Goths were still to be found in the Crimea, and Hunnish tribes to the east of the Dnieper; but among them a more terrible race of Altaian nomads had already appeared. These were the Avars, an Altaian tribe which came fleeing westwards in 558 from the yet more powerful Altaians, the Turks. The Turks by that year were masters of a vast empire stretching from China to beyond the Caspian. They had crushed the old enemies of Persia, the Ephthalite Huns, and they drove out the remnant of the Avars. The exiles moved rapidly. By 565 they had left their first settlements north of the Black Sea and were, perhaps, north of the Carpathians. Like Germans and Huns before them, they made the Slavs of their new lands their serfs. Around them was a ring of Hunnish or German semi-vassals.

All these non-German tribes were troublesome alike. About every four years of Justinian's reign, one or other of them would cross the Danube and devastate the Balkans. The frontier-troops were too few to keep them out, although they were always repulsed at the end. When Justinian died the country was relapsing into waste, and the new-come Avar danger near.

It was no wonder that Justinian was unable to provide properly for the defence of the Danube, for, besides his western wars, he also had to defend his eastern frontier against Persian attack. His own "pacific penetration" at first provoked enmity, and the ambition of the Persian king, Chosroes I Nushirvan, prevented any permanent settlement. War first broke out in 527 while Kobad was still reigning in Persia. After alternate victory and defeat, in which Belisarius made his name, it was closed in 532 by a treaty which left Dara and Lazica to the Romans, who on their side renewed the tribute paid under the

pretence of fortifying the Caucasus. Chosroes, however, wished his frontier to reach the Black Sea at Lazica and was anxious to alter the balance of power in the East in favour of Persia. In 540, when Justinian was in the thick of the Ostrogothic struggle, he made war again with all his power. He won great successes: he conquered Lazica; in one raid he levelled Antioch to the ground. But, in spite of the stinted numbers of the Roman troops, solid gains he did not make. The Christian population favoured the Empire, and the largely feudal Persian army had not that discipline and permanent character which were necessary for extensive conquests from a civilized, well-fortified state. In 545 he accepted a truce in consideration of a money-payment. In Lazica the war could go on, and continue it did for ten years. Here Justinian gained the day with the help of the Christian population. By the final peace of 562 he retained possession of it, paying the annual blackmail to Persia. He abandoned his Christian missions, in return for the toleration of the existing Christian bodies in Chosroes' dominions. As a whole the long war had merely exhausted the combatants.

Exhaustion was indeed the most striking fact of the close of Justinian's reign. Italy and Africa had been exhausted by the Ostrogothic, Vandal and Berber wars, the Balkans by barbarian ravages, Syria and Roman Armenia by the Persians, Asia Minor and Egypt by corruption and extortion. The army was undermanned, trade burdened, the government corrupt. But, leaving aside these transient miseries, we notice chiefly in a general view the symptoms of change, an epoch in European evolution. In the East the Roman Empire is falling asunder. Monophysite Egypt and Syria, Berber Africa are slipping from the Roman world and soon to be ready

for the Saracen conquest. The Balkans are half-vacant and already invaded by their future population of Slavs and Altaians. Grecized Asia Minor remains the heart of the Empire, furnishing its most trustworthy troops and controlled by a landed aristocracy. Constantinople, with new trade-routes open, is becoming more and more the world's emporium, the link of Asia and Europe. Even the Latin Justinian issues his later laws in Greek. In short the Byzantine period has begun.

In Italy, the old imperial administration, in spite of Justinian's attempts to keep it unchanged, has been fatally weakened by the long wars. Roman civilization too is rapidly decaying, and the Middle Ages are drawing near. The Lombards will in a few years bring it to ruin, while the fragmentary territories, retained by the Byzantines, will renew the inner divisions of Italy, and allow the temporal sovranity of the Popes, both of which will outlast the Middle Ages. Throughout the West, we see that the German states, based on the segregation of the dominant races, Ostrogoths, Vandals and Burgundians, from the Latins, have broken down. Only the Visigoths survive for lack of powerful foes in their secluded peninsula. On the other hand, the monarchy of the Franks, with its barbarism, its Catholicism and its fusion of races, points at the same time to the mental abyss into which the West was falling, and to the steep-cut paths by which it was to climb again to order and civilization.

SECTION 3. PERSIAN WARS: SETTLEMENT OF THE SLAVS

The weakness of the Empire became apparent on Justinian's death. His nephew, Justin II, who succeeded him, was dazzled by the military successes of the last reign, and further showed signs of mental disease. Disaster

followed disaster on the frontiers largely owing to his headstrong rashness, and after an attempt at conciliation he alienated the Monophysites by a new persecution. The Avars were at once made enemies by the refusal of their subsidies. They soon turned south from their German campaigns. With the help of the Lombards they exterminated the Gepidae and moved into modern Hungary, issuing whence they had the best of a war with the Empire. Meanwhile the Lombards migrated from Pannonia and invaded Italy in 568. By 584 only fragments of Italy were left to the Empire.

At the same time Justin II had fallen out with Persia. He objected to the blackmail; he hoped much from an alliance with the Turks whose dominion had reached the river Dnieper, and he was lured on by the revolt of Persarmenia, where Chosroes had begun a persecution of the Christians. War began in 572, but Justin did not direct its course long. The loss of Dara, the bulwark of the frontier, overthrew his reason, and in 574 the Thracian Tiberius II, a cool capable soldier, was associated with him. The war, meanwhile, dragged on inconclusively, interrupted only by a truce from 576 to 578, and marked by alternate victories on either side. During the struggle a complete change of actors occurred. Justin II died in 578, Chosroes in 579, and Tiberius II in 582. Tiberius has been called the first Byzantine Emperor. He gave up the thought of continuing the Latin tradition, and definitely rested on the support of the Asiatic provinces, for the sake of which he wisely protected the Monophysites. The change, indeed, was forced upon him; for Italy was a dead limb, and so were the depopulated Balkans. The only possible basis for the Empire was in Asia. Maurice, the next Emperor, was a Cappadocian, an able general and administrator, economical and rigid by

temperament. Thus his successes were in war and general policy, his reverses in matters of tact and diplomacy. In the Persian war, the tyranny of the new Persian king, Hormizd IV, and the admirable recruiting-ground furnished by Armenia gave him advantages, of which his ill-advised economies at first prevented him making full use. Victories were neutralized by mutinies of the soldiers whose pay he reduced. At last, a revolution in Persia put the game in his hands. Hormizd's tyranny had provoked a revolt in 589, and he called in the Turks to his aid. A series of dramatic changes followed. The Turks attacked Hormizd, but were completely routed by his general Bahram Chobin. Shortly after Bahram was defeated in Albania by the Romans, and thereupon disgraced by his master. In his turn he revolted in 590 and marched on the capital Ctesiphon. Hormizd had already been murdered, and succeeded by his son, Chosroes II, but the young king was unable to make head against the rebel, and came flying over the Roman frontier. Against all advice Maurice snatched the chance. He made terms with Chosroes, and furnished him with troops and money on condition of the retrocession of Dara and the surrender of Iberia and some half of Persarmenia. In 591 a brilliant victory in Adherbeijan replaced Chosroes on his throne.

The fact that the forces of the Empire were absorbed for nearly twenty years in the Persian war was decisive for the ruin of the Balkans at the hands of the Avars and Slavs. In 580 Baian, the Avar Khagan, saw that the Empire was at his mercy, and began the siege of the frontier-town of Sirmium, which he took by treaty with Tiberius two years later. The loss of the city was serious, but far worse was the fearful devastation which the Slavs perpetrated in the meantime up to Constantinople and

Thermopylae. Even after the surrender of Sirmium intermittent Avar and Slav raids continued till 592 when the Persian war was concluded. Then Maurice thought he might secure the Danubian frontier. In spite of some reverses, considerable success had been attained by 602. The Khagan, Baian, was perhaps hampered by the extent of his unorganized dominion, which may have reached to the Baltic, and by the restricted numbers of his Avars. The strongest tribe of Slavs, too, the Antae, had revolted to the Romans. But Maurice's economy brought about his own fall. He ordered the army to winter beyond the Danube and so live on the enemy. The troops mutinied, and, led by a centurion, Phocas, marched on Constantinople. The faction of the Greens revolted, the Blues were apathetic. In a few days Phocas had been enthroned and the unpopular Maurice and his family murdered.

The reign of Phocas, a vulgar criminal, was filled with disasters on all sides, in which the Empire was almost ruined. He was able, indeed, to buy peace of the Avars, but the Persian peril assumed unexampled dimensions. Chosroes II at once made the murder of his benefactor Maurice the pretext of a war of revenge, and designs, which may at first have been limited to a rectification of the frontier, soon grew into a determination to conquer the Asiatic provinces of the Empire and to restore the ancient dominion of Cyrus and Darius. The Empire was in anarchy under the wretched Phocas, the whole system of defence gave way, and the Persian armies ranged at will over the East. Only the walled cities proved real obstacles, and even they were captured one by one. In 607 Syria was partially conquered, in 608 Cappadocia.

Organized revolt, however, had already begun. Heraclius, son of the exarch of Africa, made war on the tyrant.

Egypt was seized by his lieutenants, while he himself took Thessalonica. In 610 he occupied Constantinople without a blow, executed Phocas and mounted the throne. But Heraclius had little hold on the mass of the troops, and soon the Persians, momentarily checked, renewed their advance. Syria was conquered in 613, Jerusalem was captured in 614, and with it the most sacred relic of Christendom, the Holy Cross. In 615 a Persian army marched through Asia Minor to Chalcedon, and encamped opposite Constantinople. In 619 Shahrbarâz, the ablest general of Chosroes, achieved the conquest of Egypt. Nor was Persian conquest the only danger. The Avars had recommenced their attacks, accompanied by hordes of Slavs. In 617 they all but captured Constantinople. Myriads of captives were carried beyond the Danube: Slavs were settling thickly in their stead. There were but few grounds of hope left; they were the rout of the Persians by sea, the stubborn resistance of orthodox Asia Minor, and the character of the Emperor.

Heraclius was by this time firmly seated on the throne. He was capable of a spasmodic heroism and splendid generalship. At first he had thought of retiring to Africa, but the Byzantines, whose only hope he was, forced him to take an oath to stay. He bought off the Avars for a while. The Church yielded up her treasures for a new campaign. In 622 the Emperor crossed with his army to unsubdued Asia Minor, and passing by the Persians under Shahrbarâz made straight for Armenia. Shahrbarâz was obliged to follow to defend Persia itself, and his army was annihilated in a single battle by the Byzantines. Next year Heraclius resumed his campaign. He crossed Persarmenia and routed Chosroes himself at Ganzaca in Adherbeijan. Indecisive fighting in Armenia and Cilicia followed the victory, but then the storm in which the

Empire laboured rose to its height. The Avars and Slavs came sweeping down in 626 and besieged Constantinople, while the Persians could march once more to the Bosphorus. The Byzantine supremacy at sea, however, kept them apart and helpless. After eleven days the Avar Khagan raised the siege. It was his last invasion. The Bulgarians, we hear, rebelled. Perhaps, too, his Slav vassals had become too enured to war and refused to submit to the Avars any longer. To them fell the gains, for from this time we find the Croats and Serbs settled in Illyricum.

Heraclius' hands were free, and he at last obtained allies, the Khazar Turks to the north of the Caucasus. With his usual bold strategy he entered Persarmenia and made a semi-circular march through Adherbeijan, over the Zagros to Nineveh. The Persian levies pursued him to be signally routed. In January 628 he could approach Ctesiphon, to which Chosroes had fled. Heraclius felt it best not to press too far; but when he had retreated to Adherbeijan, he heard of Chosroes' murder. Persia was exhausted and mutinous, and Siroes, the new king, was glad to purchase peace by a return to the older frontier. The Persian army still in Asia Minor turned out an asset to the Byzantines, for Shahrbarâz, its leader, revolted and returned to Persia to inaugurate a period of civil war.

The Persian peril was over; the Avars had retreated; but the Empire was exhausted and crumbling. The Spanish conquests of Justinian were all lost to the Visigoths. Loyalty had vanished in Monophysite Syria and Egypt; the Balkans were either Slav or half-desert. Heraclius himself was worn out and incapable of new exertions. The next foe, if he came soon, would have an easy victory over the Basileus, as the Byzantine Emperor styled himself henceforth.

SECTION 4. THE SARACEN CONQUEST

The restoration of the Empire by Heraclius' victories was hollow from the first. Not only Coptic Egyptians and Aramaic Syrians, but the warlike Armenians had little sympathy with Greek-speaking Asia Minor and Byzantium. National feeling had become dominant. Heraclius was well aware of the danger, and hoped to produce a coöperation within the Empire by slurring over the religious subjects of dissension. He only succeeded in producing a new heresy, Monotheletism. All the non-Greeks held varieties of the Monophysite creed, and abjured the Council of Chalcedon¹. Heraclius, counselled by Sergius, Patriarch of Constantinople, hoped at first to restore unity by the acceptance of a Single Will (Monothelema) in the Two Natures of Christ. Some success was obtained shortly after the Persian war was ended. Copts, Armenians and some Syrians were gained over; even the Pope Honorius seemed favourable. Then the scheme broke down. Sophronius of Jerusalem, leader of the Greek communities in Syria, held out stoutly for the Two Wills, Human and Divine. To appease the Orthodox, Heraclius and Sergius made a vain attempt to burke the controversy, which they had occasioned. They forbade by the *Ekthesis* the expression of either One or Two Wills, while favouring the One. But it was too late. The Syrians were unreconciled; the Copts were infuriated by the persecution, by which Cyril, the Patriarch of Alexandria, attempted to enforce the successive compromises. Both were heavily taxed by the needy Emperor.

A new invader was at hand to gather the ripe fruit. At the beginning of the seventh century, Arabia, so long

¹ The Fourth General Council, held in 451, in which Monophysitism was condemned.

quiescent, was ready anew to send forth hordes of emigrants as she had done centuries before when successive waves of Semitic invaders had spread over Mesopotamia and Syria. The prosperous kingdom of Sheba or the Sabaeans had broken up, and the diminishing fertility of the southwest combined with increasing population to make an outpush on the debilitated civilized realms of Byzantium and Persia a certainty. At this moment the new religion appeared which could give the Arabs unity, the core of a special civilization, and common aims. The prophet Mahomet was a merchant of the town of Mecca, midway down the western coastland of Arabia, and belonged to the tribe of the Kuraish which held the town. Mecca was a holy city. Its sanctuary, the Ka'ba, was yearly visited by pilgrims from all Arabia. Its people were all traders; their caravans went north and south. No spot could be more apt for a national formation, or the rise of a new and national religion.

Mahomet was born about 570 and became his own master about 594 by his marriage with the well-to-do widow, Khadija. But years passed before the contemplative, neurotic trader became convinced that he was the prophet of God, and years more before he embarked on a public propaganda. He had all the dead-weight of natural incredulity against him. The majority of the Arabs were easy-going heathen. Their morality and civilization were altogether tribal; the strongest bond was that of kinship. Mahomet proclaimed a stern monotheism and a future life of rewards and punishments. His religion from the first was a universal one with universal duties which were strange to men whose chief social obligation was blood-revenge. No doubt the stray Arab monotheists, and the Jewish and queer Christian communities, scattered here and there, which influenced him,

also prepared his way; but on the whole his task was uphill and his success due to a potent and attractive personality. By that the new faith of Islam, "surrender," and the community of Muslims, "self-surrenderers," were formed.

Mahomet's progress continued to be slow until he succeeded in converting a number of pilgrims from Yathrib, later called Medina, "the city." Their town was torn by tribal dissensions, a portion of them were Jews by religion, from whom perhaps monotheistic beliefs filtered through to the heathen majority. In any case a large section of the latter not only became Moslems, but after a while invited Mahomet to live among them as their guide and clansman. The prophet was weary of the unbelief of his own tribe and city. In 622 he migrated with his followers to Medina. This was the Hegira (hijra), "the Emigration," which forms the starting-point of the Moslem era.

It was not long before the prophet became unquestioned temporal lord of Medina, nor long before he commenced a war against his former clansmen of Mecca. Plundering raids ended in petty victories. He resisted triumphantly an attempt of the Kuraish and their allies to storm Medina. He drove out the unbelieving Jews. A truce with Mecca allowed conversions to come thick and fast. In 630 Mahomet could take possession of the town and convert his kinsfolk. In a short time he was despot of a considerable territory, and Islam was spread widely among the Arab tribes. He disposed of thousands of fighting men. A collision with the Byzantine Empire already appeared likely, for a raiding force of Moslems had been defeated at Mu'ta near the Dead Sea in 629 by the imperial troops and clients. Mahomet made ready for invasion, when he died in 632.

The prophet's designs were only momentarily suspended by his death, for the Moslems immediately elected his father-in-law, the prudent Abu-Bakr, as his representative or Caliph (Khalifa). Very quickly the new sovran put an end to all tendencies of the new realm to break up, and achieved the complete conquest of Arabia. Then he followed, tentatively enough, the irresistible impulse for expansion and emigration. The task was rendered easier by the fact that the two Arab kingdoms of the north, one vassal of Persia, one of the Empire, had dissolved some time earlier. So small forces of Moslems began to raid Palestine and Irak. Heraclius despatched his brother Theodore with a large army to drive the Arabs out of Palestine. But Khalid, the greatest Moslem general, had crossed the desert from Irak and united with his fellows. In 634 at Ajnadain in Judaea they won a complete victory over the Byzantines. The conquest had begun, and the new Caliph, Omar, saw its possibilities. Whole tribes were sent forward to the frontier. Monophysite Damascus capitulated in 635; so did Emesa. Heraclius, too ill to command, made a last effort. Another Theodore was sent forward with a motley army. In 636 he was entrapped in the valley of the Yarmuk beyond Jordan, and his force annihilated by Khalid. No resistance was now possible. As far as Mt Amanus Syria fell to the Moslems; Jerusalem surrendered in 638 and Caesarea in 640; Byzantine Mesopotamia was all conquered by 646. The bounds of Christendom had permanently retreated.

Nor was Omar less victorious against enfeebled Persia. In 637 Irak, the Semitic Aramean land, was conquered, and in 641 the victory of Nihawand opened the way to true Persia. The Persians, however, fought hard for their religion and racial independence. It was not till 652, with the death of the last Sassanian, Yezdegerd III, that

the Arab conquest was assured. But the conquest was complete, and the ancient Persian monarchy disappeared.

Before the conquest of Persia was ended, Egypt had been annexed to the Moslem dominions. Here the difficulty was to enter the country. Once the Delta was seized, the rest of Egypt was an easy and willing prey. Thus it took over a year's fighting before Egyptian Babylon, the key to the Delta, fell into the hands of Omar's other first-rate general, Amr in 641. Next year Alexandria capitulated, and in spite of a transient recapture by the Byzantines was henceforth lost to Europe. It was still too Western for the Moslem capital: that was fixed at the new town of Fustat near Babylon.

Africa's turn then came. Cyrene was already conquered in 643, and Africa proper was entered first in 648, but the real conquest did not commence till 664 when the civil war among the Moslems was over. Then Ukba founded Kairawan as a successor to Carthage. The war was long and stubborn; for there were not only the Byzantines to drive out, but the Berbers to convert and subdue. Thirty years of chequered warfare were needed before Carthage at last surrendered to Hassan, son of Nu'man, in 697. It had to be recaptured in 698, and only after 708 did Musa make the Caliphs' rule secure as far as the Atlantic. The Moslem invasion here was as epoch-making as in Egypt. All Africa was removed from a Latin to an Oriental civilization. The Berbers, so long encroaching and barbaric, took easily to the low culture of their new conquerors, and became devout Moslems. Christianity and Roman life faded out. The towns were often deserted; the Romans emigrated to Europe; civic government disappeared. The seven hundred years of Western rule seemed to have passed away without a relic save ruins and legends.

Meanwhile the heart of the Empire fought sturdily for existence. The death of Heraclius in 641 had, after a period of violent intrigues, been followed by the accession of his grandson Constantine, commonly called Constans, a tyrannic but able character. He had to face imminent danger from the Moslems. Armenia and the upper Euphrates were long attacked and then conquered by them, when Constans' breach with the Armenian Monophysites occurred in 652. Asia Minor was exposed to serious raids, but the worst peril was by sea on which the Empire had been supreme since the destruction of the Vandals. The Arabs readily became sailors, and the dockyards of Alexandria and Syria provided them with a numerous fleet. In 655 they inflicted a crushing defeat on the Emperor Constans himself. Had not civil war broken out in Islam, Constantinople might have been besieged.

It was in this period that the new organization of the Empire was completed. Justinian had already seen the necessity in certain districts of recurring to the old Roman system of putting the military commanders in control of the civil government. Maurice had placed Italy and Africa under military viceroys with the new title of exarch. The Persian and Saracen wars required a thorough transformation. The Empire was henceforth parcelled out in Themes, a name which applied both to the district and to the army-division which garrisoned it; and each theme was ruled by a *strategos*, or general. The *strategos* of the Aegean commanded the fleet. Thus the administration was reformed for warlike purposes. The peaceful, jealous hierarchy of the days of Theodosius the Great had gone and was replaced by a simplified military government.

The restoration of religious unity was also prosecuted

by Constans in his rough fashion. There were still the religious and the national questions, the creed to be defined and Armenia to be kept. There was also the rivalry between the Monothelete patriarchs of Constantinople and the Popes of Rome. In 648 Constans abrogated the *Ekthesis*, and proclaimed his own *Type*, by which all discussion on the subject was strictly forbidden. At the same time he tried to force the Armenians to renounce their Monophysite doctrine. But he only produced the permanent schism of the Armenian Christians and the loss of their country to the Empire. Meanwhile the Popes held out. In vain Constans imprisoned and deposed Pope Martin. The controversy dragged on, till the disappearance of the Monophysites from the Empire, and the weakly condition of the genuine Monotheletes induced the Imperial government to give way. In 680-1 the Sixth General Council was held at Constantinople and Monotheletism was condemned. The Popes had triumphed.

Constans had then been long dead. Murderer of his brother and hated by his subjects, he sailed to Italy to defend and restore the Empire there. His attempts against the Lombards failed, and in 668 he himself was murdered in a transient insurrection. His co-regent son, Constantine IV Pogonatus, succeeded amid the usual family squabbles to a legacy of war and peril. The peace of Constans' later years had been due to civil war among the Arabs. Caliph Omar had been followed in 644 by Othman, the Umayyad, of the ancient Meccan aristocracy. His weakness and nepotism had led to his murder in 655, when Ali, cousin and son-in-law of the prophet, became Caliph. But Ali never ruled all Islam. He secured Arabia and Irak, where he fixed his capital at Kufa. Syria, however, under its governor, the Umayyad Muawiya, refused to acknowledge him, and in the civil war he was

outwitted. It became a struggle between the two divisions of Islam. The Arabs settled in ancient Persian territory supported Ali, those of once Roman Syria and Egypt stood by Muawiya. In result, Ali was no match for the veteran governor of Syria, nor were his Arabs of Irak equal to the Syrians. In 660 he was murdered, and Muawiya I became unquestioned Caliph and founder of the Umayyad dynasty.

The attack on the Byzantine Empire at once recommenced. In 665 the Moslem raids reached the Aegean. In 668-9 their command of the sea enabled them to cross to Thrace, and deliver a vain assault on Constantinople itself. They occupied Rhodes in the Aegean and Cyzicus in the Propontis, and thence during four years (674-7) made attempts to storm the capital. From imminent destruction the Empire was saved by a new invention. A Syrian architect, Callinicus, discovered the marvellous Greek fire. Various preparations, among them gunpowder, were included under the name. They all had the property of exploding or bursting into flame as they hit their mark. Gunpowder was also used to propel the missile combustible. It was only the idea of a solid missile which did not occur to the Byzantines who thus fell short of inventing fire-arms. As it was, their fire was sufficient to annihilate the great Saracen armament.

The death of Muawiya in 680 was followed by a fresh outbreak of civil war among the Moslems. The Syrians were for the Umayyad house, the Arabs of Irak for the son of Ali, Husain, the non-migrating men of Arabia for an old-fashioned elective Caliph, like Omar. And, though Husain was soon slaughtered, the struggle between the other two parties continued for years till 692 when Abd-al-Malik, the Umayyad Caliph of Damascus, finally crushed his rival at Mecca, and re-established the Syrian supremacy.

Naturally the Empire profited from the dissensions of its foes, all the more because it had allies in the Mardaites, a Christian people of the Lebanon range, who tormented the Caliphs in the heart of their dominions. Yet lasting advantages were not gained. The descendants of Heraclius, although able and energetic, were degenerates one and all, and their race ended in a madman. Their family dissensions were rendered worse by the practice, by which all sons of an Emperor succeeded as joint-rulers, and miserable fratricidal intrigues degraded the reigning family and weakened the state. Constantine Pogonatus succeeded in stopping the practice, it is true; but the cure he adopted, the perpetual celibacy of cadets of the imperial house, made a lasting dynasty difficult to found. His son, Justinian II, who ascended the throne in 685, was a mad imitator of his great namesake, extravagant, cruel and restlessly active, and was both hated and feared. None the less, his fierce vigour at first carried all before it. He recovered Armenia and the Caucasian lands from the crippled Abd-al-Malik in 689, and transferred the Mardaites to Asia Minor. One foe he could only check. The Bulgarians had crossed the Danube in 679 and made lasting settlements north of the Haemus range. They defeated Justinian in 689, but yet he was able to transport thousands of Slavs, largely, no doubt, serfs of the Altaian Bulgars, to Asia Minor.

Thus strengthened, Justinian determined to force on war with Islam, where the civil strife was just over. In 693-5 he had the worst of a frontier conflict, partly because his Slav colonists joined the enemy. The general hatred felt for him then led to his deposition, mutilation in the new barbarized fashion, and his exile to the vassal Greek town of Cherson at the mouth of the Dnieper. The new Emperor, Leontius, however, was a failure.

Not only did the Arabs conquer Lazica in 697 and gain a footing on the Black Sea, but the fleet he sent to recapture Carthage in the same year, although momentarily successful, fled before the superior Moslem armament in 698. Carthage and Africa were lost. That was the Emperor's doom. On its return the fleet revolted under its vice-admiral Apsimar and raised him to the throne as Tiberius III, Leontius being mutilated and made a monk. But the not unsuccessful defence of Asia Minor did not save Tiberius. The exile Justinian, reckless as ever, conceived a new design. He had fled to the Khan of the Khazar Turks, whose sister he married. Still unsafe, he crossed to Bulgaria, bought the aid of its Khan, and at the head of the Bulgarians attacked and stormed Constantinople in 705. Tiberius and Leontius and their various friends were put to death.

Justinian II had reacquired the Empire, but he could not protect it. He fell out with his Bulgarian allies and was defeated; the Arabs made steady progress on the edge of Asia Minor. Soon the Emperor's frantic tyranny led to his second downfall. He wrecked Ravenna in vengeance for its opposition; he meant to do the same to his place of exile, Cherson; but during the operations his own fleet revolted and set up a new sovran, Philippicus, in 711. Justinian, deserted by all, was speedily murdered. It seemed a profitless change, for Philippicus was an idler, whose one public interest lay in an out-of-date Monotheletism. Meanwhile the Arab raids pierced deeper into Asia Minor, and the Bulgarians again reached the gates of Constantinople. Philippicus was replaced in 713 by the honest and able Anastasius II, who only had time to prepare for the impending Arab siege of Constantinople, before he too was deposed in a mutiny in 716. The new usurper, Theodosius III, never obtained the allegiance of

the greater part of the Asiatic troops. The Anatolic theme set up their *strategos*, Leo the Isaurian, as Emperor; he was distinguishing himself in the desperate defence against the Arabs, and justified their choice. Theodosius abdicated on the approach of his rival, who assumed the diadem in 717 as Leo III.

Under the Caliph Walid I (705-15) the Moslem empire had expanded on all sides. Even distant Spain was conquered by his lieutenants Musa and Tarik between 711 and 713. The time seemed come for a grand effort to overthrow the Byzantine Empire, now exhausted by continual raids and disorganized by the mad Justinian. Sulaiman (715-17), Walid's successor, prepared for the conquest. His brother, Maslama, at the head of a vast host made his way through Asia Minor and crossed the Hellespont in 717. While he invested the land side of Constantinople, the Moslem fleet sailed to the Bosphorus. Anastasius' preparations, however, had not been fruitless. The fleet was destroyed by Greek fire. Next spring a second armada came, only to experience a like fate, and Maslama's starving troops, whose supplies had been in the fleet, were defeated by the Bulgarians, whom Leo bribed to his aid. At last, after thirteen months, the new and peaceful Caliph Omar II ordered a retreat in 718. The Empire and Europe had been saved.

SECTION 5. THE SARACEN CIVILIZATION

Although the Saracen civilization belongs essentially to Asia, it yet has had too important an influence on, and too close a relation to, Europe to be passed over. The Arabs emerged from their deserts barbarians, but they were barbarians of nimble wit, and the circumstances of their expansion enabled them to make a speedy, if

partial, advance in culture. At first, they by no means sought to spread their new religion. The migrant tribesmen settled as a military aristocracy on the state-lands made over to them: something like the Ostrogoths in Italy. They filled the chief administrative posts, and let the East Roman administration continue in subject hands. They were tax-free, the Christian landholders were taxed. A change, however, soon began. The Christians and Zoroastrians were converted to Islam in swarms, while Arabs would buy taxable land, and so reduce the revenue from another side. The Umayyads found a financial remedy. They levied a general land-tax without distinction of creed, whereas non-Moslems were liable to a poll-tax in addition. Naturally these measures did not prevent conversions, nor did the increasing fervour of belief among the Moslems allow them to display their former apathy towards proselytism outside Arabia. In the end, practically all Persians, all Berbers, and most Syrians and Copts embraced Islam. Thereby the Persians were perhaps forced into a mental mould unfitted for them; but the Monophysites, who eliminated the Human Nature of Christ, would find the Moslems' worship of a transcendent God no alien thing.

The result of Arab settlement and native conversion was the resurgence of the older racial and cultural divisions, however disfigured and changed. Islam fell into two halves. The converted Persians, besides adopting a special creed, the belief in the divine right of the descendants of Caliph Ali to the Caliphate, carried on the tradition of the ancient Oriental culture of the Sassanids. Yet they formed one body with western Islam, and from the West they made fresh borrowings, which in a far weaker form repeated the Hellenizing of the East under Alexander. In the West, and especially in Syria and Egypt, the Arabs

learnt from their Christian subjects much of the Byzantine culture. They learnt it chiefly from Semitic Easterns, in whose hands it had already declined, and they orientalized it yet further. Still, this new western Arab culture was Greek in origin, and, although the Arabs were incapable of taking inspiration from classical literature, they were eager students of the Byzantine arts and crafts and practical sciences. Engineering, building, medicine and botany were zealously practised. Material civilization reached among them the same high grade as it did among their Byzantine teachers. The Mosque of Damascus was a worthy successor to Justinian's St Sophia. Even Greek philosophy and the works of Aristotle found Arabic translators and imitators. If they had not the lucid rationalism of ancient Greeks or of Byzantines, they indulged a freedom of speculation and originality of outlook of which the Byzantines were incapable. Averroes in twelfth-century Spain could declare his adhesion to doctrines of materialism and pantheism which included the mortality of the soul.

The growth of this Moslem civilization was naturally slow. The start was taken under the Umayyad Caliphs, under whom Islam came into close contact with the Byzantine world in war, in government and in trade. Circumstances, however, prevented the more western Syrian form remaining predominant. The Umayyads controlled Persia imperfectly; they were weakened everywhere by the great Arab feud between the tribal factions of Kais and Kalb which permeated all Islam. Meanwhile the Persians had adopted the new faith and transmuted it. They were Shias, as opposed to the orthodox Sunnis of the west. The Shias believed in the divine right of Ali and his descendants to the Caliphate and looked on all Caliphs of other families as usurpers. Nor was this

the only point of difference. A mystical pantheism grew up in Persia under Moslem forms, and developed into the opinions of Sufism, to which most Persian thinkers and literary men of the Middle Ages belonged. A political revolution, however, first came about. The disaffected Persians revolted against the declining Umayyads in the middle of the eighth century, and they won the day with the defeat and death of the last Caliph of Damascus, Marwan II.

With the Umayyads fell the supremacy of the Arabs in Islam. The subjected races were coming to their own again. By a curious fate the leaders of the Persians were not descendants of Ali, but of Abbas, the prophet's uncle, and hence were called Abbasids. They removed the capital to Bagdad, close to the ancient Ctesiphon, in Irak, where Persian influences were dominant. They attempted to be cosmopolitan, but not long could they hold Islam together. From the first Spain was lost. A fugitive Umayyad, Abd-ar-Rahman I, made himself independent Amir of Cordova, and united Arab, Berber and Spaniard under his rule. During the reign of Harun Ar-Rashid (786-809), the fabulous hero of the *Arabian Nights*, Morocco was lost to a native sovran. After Ar-Rashid's son, Al-Mamun (813-33), the whole empire began to break up. We may distinguish henceforth four groups of Moslem states. There were the princes of Persia east of the Zagros mountains; the Abbasid Caliphs and dynasties founded by their Turkish mercenaries from Bagdad to Egypt; there were the far more barbaric Berber-Arab states of North Africa, given to fantastic oddities in religion; and the highly-civilized Umayyad Caliphate of Cordova.

All these sections of Islam, save that of Persia, were in constant contact with Europe, and they exercised a

civilizing influence, which in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was, perhaps, more fruitful than that of the Byzantine Empire. Like the Byzantine Empire, they were intermediaries of the Oriental trade, which came from Persia by land or over the Isthmus of Suez by sea. Their own material civilization, their medical science and philosophy, aided in the education of Western Europe. The pilgrimages to the Holy Sepulchre and the Crusades produced a closer contact between them and the Latins, than the Constantinopolitan commerce did between Latins and Greeks. Perhaps they were nearer the level of the barbarized West. While Byzantine arts could filter to Italy and beyond, the spirit of Greek civilization and government seemed unable to migrate westwards. It was Al-Mamun of Bagdad and his contemporaries in Spain, who could assimilate, as we have seen, Byzantine culture. Under their successors the resulting product began to reach Western Europe. Aristotle was known in the thirteenth century by translations from the Arabic.

At first, however, and for long the effect of the Moslem conquest was purely harmful to Christendom. Africa was barbarized; Syria and Egypt were orientalized. In the ninth and tenth centuries, the Arab-Berber piracies and raids went far towards extinguishing the commerce of the Mediterranean, and added their quota to the miserable anarchy of the darkest age of Medieval Europe.

CHAPTER III

THE FUSION OF RACES IN WESTERN EUROPE

SECTION I. THE TEUTONIC KINGDOMS, SECOND STAGE

From the time of the Emperor Heraclius the older unity of Europe entirely disappeared. The Mediterranean had long ceased to be a Roman lake and the chief link which bound the imperial provinces together. But after Heraclius the Mediterranean was surrounded by antipathetic and mutually hostile nations. Greeks and Saracens and Germans were the more estranged by the sea which parted them. The trade and intercourse between province and province, which had long been decaying amid the troubles of the Roman Empire, decreased still further, and depended wholly on a few intermediaries, Greeks and Italians for the most part. It did not cease, of course—there were still Syrians to be found in Francia—but its volume was small, and its influence in the transmission and assimilation of culture more partial and slow than it had been for centuries.

This separation and estrangement made the more clear-cut the differing development which East and West were perhaps bound to go through owing to their diverse racial elements and diverse past history. It was not that the Byzantine Empire was unable to assimilate new elements. It assimilated Asiatics and Slavs with great success. But its work was performed on individuals

who were taken up into the East Roman state. On compact races and kingdoms outside the Empire's borders its civilizing power was slight. In its turn it was little affected by foreign influences, and the development and adaptation to new conditions, which went on, scarcely departed from the basis of the ancient civilization. It was in the main an island of the past steadily crumbling before the waves of hostile barbarism. In the West, on the contrary, the spade-work for the eventual construction of a new civilization was busily and blindly proceeding. The end was unguessed at. So far as a conscious purpose existed, it was a harking back to the past; and the external aspect of the preliminary process bore mostly the appearance and the character of degeneration. But no advance was really possible till the two elements peopling the West, Roman and German, were fused together, and their fusion required first the obliteration of the incompatible parts of their differing heritages. The Germans had to lose their organization by tribes and kindreds and to adopt a settled life. They had to be converted to the Roman form of Christianity which would put them in vital connexion with the remains of ancient culture and with the conquered population. The Romans had to lose the greater part of their civilization and the elaborate structure of their artificial society, to descend towards a barbaric level of thought and organization. They had to undergo a return to racial boyhood. Both these processes, in Germans and Romans alike, were the result of the Dark Ages between 500 and 1000 A.D.; and the dissolution of society, the snapping of the ties which bound either state or tribe together, the degradation of religion till it could work fully on a barbarized people, and the descent to a low grade of culture, could not but present a gloomy picture. But enough of civilization

remained in the fused peoples, on which, with their marvellous virility and energy, they could build anew untrammelled by the ancient forms. Nor are great men lacking to guide and create.

As the circumstances of each barbaric kingdom which arose on the ruins of the Roman Empire varied, it necessarily followed that they worked out their common destiny in varying ways and with varying success. The fusion of Germanism and Romanism takes place in each former province of the Empire, but the method differs in each. The new unity, too, has a double aspect, the fusion of blood and of existing culture, and the new growth which took place under the pressure of practical life.

The intermixture of blood was not, indeed, a necessary factor in all cases. Besides Scandinavia and Germany between the Rhine and the Elbe which entered the new movement comparatively late and at second hand, the Anglo-Saxons also played a leading part in its evolution with only a slight blending of Roman provincial blood. The German invaders had had little to do with Rome before their settlement in Britain, and their settlement had been accomplished with unusual ferocity. A great part of the provincials were exterminated, others fled west and were soon lost among the non-Romanized Britons, with whom they formed the Welsh nationality. Only a minority were enslaved by the conquerors. The struggle was long and hard, but by the year 600 A.D. the first and decisive period of conquest was over. Thenceforward at least, no fresh Angles and Saxons came from the Continent. The struggle was between those already settled in east Britain, and their Welsh neighbours to the west. The nature of the war changed, too, with the end of the migration. While the east had been mainly Germanized in blood, the slow conquest of the west

resulted in an intermixture of Anglo-Saxons and Welsh. It was accompanied also by inter-tribal warfare between the Anglo-Saxons themselves. They had not formed one people, but many separate kingships, which have been called by the inaccurate name of the Heptarchy¹. In reality their number was seldom seven. Originally more numerous, it dwindled to three or four. Among them the most important were Kent, Wessex, Mercia and Northumbria. In all four, no doubt, there was an admixture of Welsh blood, but it was stronger in the three last which were border-kingdoms and steadily absorbing Welsh districts. As border-kingdoms, too, with the possibility of expansion and need of defence, they fell under the operation of a well-known historical law by which a border-kingdom takes the lead among its more protected neighbours and dominates them. Wessex was the first to inaugurate the new milder warfare and rapid expansion. Under their king Ceawlin (560-92) the West Saxons spread from the valley of the Thames to that of the Severn. The extent, however, of their conquests dissipated their strength, and the Severn districts, Hwicce, soon separated from the original Wessex which was itself weakened by its lax organization under local branches of the royal house. The Athelings, as the princelets were called, prevented common action. From this excessive subdivision Northumbria was free, although it had the more lasting defect of being composed of two separate kingdoms, Deira and Bernicia, which were uneasy yoke-fellows. Athelfrith of Bernicia first united the two realms about 605, and launched them on a career of conquest. Chester fell before him, and the northern Welsh of Strathclyde and Cumberland were thus cut off from their kindred of Gwynedd or the north of modern Wales.

¹ "Seven kingdoms."

Athelfrith was overthrown and succeeded by his rival Edwin of Deira, who continued his advance. More and more the Welsh were conquered or driven back. Meanwhile, however, new questions were coming to the fore in the rise of Mercia and the introduction of Christianity which changed the course of English history. Athelbert, king of Kent (c. 560–616), in his prime the most powerful of the English kings, had married a Frankish and Christian wife, and a mission to convert him and his people was the natural sequel. By a fortunate coincidence Gregory the Great was then seated in the papal chair. He was filled with zeal to convert the heathen English, and was the first Pope to assume, however tentatively and partially, the effective guidance of the Western Church. The mission to the English under Augustine came direct from Rome. It was a unique advantage for the island people. For a while their isolation and lack of Roman elements were more than counterbalanced, for the finest product of early Latin Christianity was planted among them, and their progress in civilization was maintained by the close connexion of the daughter-Church with Rome.

Augustine, first Archbishop of Canterbury (597–605), converted Kent with tolerable completeness, in spite of a later set-back. Elsewhere, the efforts of his lieutenants did no more than create an influential Christian minority. He was unable, partly by his own fault, to obtain the coöperation of the Christian Welsh, and the heathen English were everywhere indignant. One consequence was the fall of Edwin who accepted Christianity in 627. The Christian Welsh under Cadwallon of Gwynedd and the heathen English, headed by Penda of Mercia, together overthrew him in 633. A new development followed the reaction. Oswald of Bernicia defeated Cadwallon in 635 and re-formed the Northumbrian kingdom. He

also permanently restored Christianity, but under different auspices. His bishop was Aidan, a Scottish monk from Iona, and with Aidan was introduced the Irish type of Christianity, where the monastic organization was more important than the episcopal. The missionaries, whether Scottish or Roman, met with success outside Northumbria, and in most districts Christianity gained the upper hand. But Penda put a stop to Oswald's progress by his victory at Oswestry in 642, and, although he was himself slain in the defeat of Winwaedfield by Oswy of Northumbria in 654, the abasement of Mercia was not for long. Penda's two able sons, Wulfhere and Athelred (658-704), established her as the dominant power south of the Humber. Recalcitrant Wessex, if she made conquests from the Welsh towards the south-west, was shorn of the districts, once hers, north of the Thames. Meantime Northumbria was defeated by the Picts (685), and slowly sank into disorderly insignificance.

The Church was the chief progressive force, making for civilization and for national unity in the barbaric divided land. But for her mission she required organization and connexion with the Roman see, and both were endangered by the Keltic character of much of the conversion. A loose confederation of monasteries and nomadic bishops might have been the rule. The battle between Rome and Iona took place under Oswy over their differing usages, and in the Synod of Whitby, held in 664, Wilfrid, the unattractive Roman leader, won the day. Thenceforth England belonged to the Western Church. The connexion might be lax, but it was sufficient to give England a share in the heritage of antiquity. The fruits of the Whitby Synod were gathered when the Greek Theodore of Tarsus became Archbishop of Canterbury by Pope Vitalian's selection. Theodore (669-90) organized

and increased the dioceses, making York a metropolitan see; he held the first synods of the English Church; with him Roman learning entered the land. He was thus a founder of the English nation, hitherto split into petty tribes, and of English learning, which with the Venerable Bede took the lead in the West. Anglo-Saxon literature, too, was not only Latin, but native; laws and poems were written, as well as remembered, in the native tongue.

It is true that within a century the English Church was growing secularized and decadent. None the less the beneficial influence of the clergy was shown in the codes of law which the tribal kings, following the example of Athelbert of Kent, the first convert, promulgated from time to time. Custom was written down; innovations were made to meet new conditions; legislation by the state had begun. This progress was seconded by economic change. The wild Anglo-Saxons settled down as farmers. It followed from the nature of the conquest that there was a high proportion of peasant-proprietors, although wealthier men, with dependants, were not uncommon, especially when fresh fragments were torn from Wales. Commerce, indeed, was small in a land of self-sufficing villages, but pilgrims and ecclesiastics kept open the road to Rome.

In political life there was less advance. There was perhaps little to build upon, and Mercia, even under its greatest king, Offa (757-96), was unable to weld together the jarring tribes. On his death its decline came rapidly. This was the opportunity of Wessex. That land had slowly been consolidated, and the extinction of the rival lines of Athelings placed Egbert (802-39), long an exile at the Frankish court, on an unchallenged throne. Egbert benefited both by his Frankish experience and the weakness of his competitors. In 815 he conquered Cornwall, the

last remnant of West Wales; in 821 he routed the Mercians, whose vassal-states soon revolted to him; in 829 he was overlord of all England, including anarchic Northumbria. He ended an era. Wessex was left the one strong English realm, ready to meet the onslaught of the Danes.

The fact that the English were subdivided into small tribal kingdoms has tended to obscure the similarity of their history to that of the Germanic states on the Continent. In all we find the struggle for power between the king and the landowning nobles with destructive results to the state; in all, the continuance of the kinship-group and the blood-feud, an equally destructive element; in all, the civilizing growth of written Germanic law, which at one and the same time submits in greater or less degree to Roman influence, and tends to exclude Roman law; in all, the clergy and their councils are, with the king, the chief centralizing agency, making a state out of a tribe or tribes, and are a most powerful factor in developing the law. Where the English were exceptional, was in the fact that they neither benefited by the admixture of a Roman population nor were harmed by the difficulty of assimilating such and constructing a new composite nationality. The Welsh, themselves but little Romanized, remained largely a race apart. On the Continent, we have already seen how the incompatibility of Germans and Romans could ruin a new state. We shall see it again, and how the expedients adopted to remove it could prove themselves dangerous in turn.

On the death of the great Theodoric in 526 the Visigoths recovered their independence, but for many years they continued on the old lines. Goths and Romans were separate peoples, one Arian, the other Catholic in religion, one under Gothic law, the other under the simplified

Roman law of Alaric II. The centre of the Visigothic power now lay in Spain, though as yet they possessed Spain only in part, for the Suebes ruled the north-west, the non-Romanized Basques the north coast, and in the centre and south great Roman nobles, miniatures of Syagrius, still held sway. In 554 a fresh element was introduced by Justinian's reconquest of the southern coastland for the Empire. Over these jarring fractions, however, the Visigothic supremacy was secured by a great king, Leovigild (568-86). In his long reign he made the Basques his vassals, he conquered the independent Romans, and finally (585) extinguished the kingdom of the Suebes. Only Byzantine Spain remained outside his dominion. The defects of his state were none the less clear. The Visigothic nobles never willingly submitted to the royal authority; they feared an hereditary dynasty, and revolted whenever they could. Then the Catholic Spaniards were permanently disloyal to their Arian sovran; and Leovigild attempted vainly to heal the breach by persecution. His son Recared (586-601) sought the only possible solution. In 589 he became a Catholic, and, although the Arian party continued for a while, the change was eventually successful; Visigoths and Spaniards became one people, cleft by social divisions, but not by religion. The unruliness of the Gothic nobles, however, continued unabated; and Recared leant mainly on the Church, which, while doing much for conciliation, in general favoured the king who acted as its head. The Church, in consequence, guided the Visigothic state. Its Councils at the capital Toledo were, with the addition of a lay element, the legislative assemblies of the realm, and Spain became thus early the most ecclesiastical of European kingdoms.

As unity, however, was furthered in one direction, it

was checked in another to the irreparable loss of Spain. King Sisebut (612-21), who conquered all the Byzantine possessions in the south with the exception of Algarve from the Emperor Heraclius, also began the age-long persecution of the Spanish Jews. They were numerous and wealthy, and had always stood apart from the Roman population. Now Sisebut, anxious perhaps to complete the work of unification and a zealot in temperament with a bias towards persecution, determined forcibly to absorb them. Those Jews who refused baptism were to be beggared and exiled. For a time the bishops, led by the learned Isidore of Seville, were less intolerant than the king. His edict was not everywhere carried out, and in 636, after his death, was repealed by a council at Toledo. Next year, however, it was restored, and thenceforth secret or persecuted Jews were a perpetual danger to the monarchy.

Meanwhile Algarve had been conquered in 629, and the struggle between king and nobles persisted. The nobles strove for a purely elective, the kings for an hereditary kingship. Faction-wars and revolts were frequent, and the strongest kings by the harshest measures were unable to quell the spirit of rebellion. But they did succeed in assimilating Goths and Romans. King Receswinth (649-72), a grim persecutor of the Jews and favourite of the Church, abolished the legal distinction of the two races and the Roman code of Alaric II. He issued a general code of blended Gothic and Roman law, known when revised by subsequent kings as the *Forum Judicum*, which formed the basis of Spanish law in the Middle Age, and, along with the earlier Gothic customs, was a powerful influence in shaping the later Spanish nation.

From the death of Receswinth the power of the kings, and with it the Visigothic state, declined. Feuds among

the nobles, and their opposition to the transitory, elective kings, prevented all consolidation. It became difficult, more from disloyalty than cowardice, to enforce service in the host. The serfs and slaves of Roman times had profited little or nothing by the change of masters. The townsmen were disaffected to the country-loving Goths. And the injured Jews were actively hostile, and intrigued with the Moslems when North Africa fell under the Caliphs' rule. After one or two unsuccessful invasions by the Arabs, the final crisis came when in 711 the Moslem general Tarik landed at Gibraltar, which still bears his name¹. The Gothic king was then Roderick (710-13 (?)), about whose name a concealing forest of legend has grown. He was overthrown on the shores of Lake La Janda. His rivals betrayed him; the Jews rose in joy; the cities surrendered. In 713 the king disappears in battle near Salamanca. Five years later the Moslem dominion reached the Pyrenees. Yet all Spain was never theirs. Peasants and towns, nobles and clergy submitted easily, but in the Cantabrian mountains to the north a remnant of the Visigoths maintained a brigand-like independence.

Whereas the Visigoths in their Iberian isolation, when once Arianism was extinct, became remarkably dependent on their national Spanish Church for order and organization, the Lombards in Italy, in spite of their conversion to Catholicism, never found the Church other than a deadly enemy. The international position of Italy was part cause of this difference. The Byzantines were never wholly expelled, nor could the Popes be reduced to mere Italian prelates. Both East and West Rome were bound to oppose the Germanic monarchy which threatened their supersession, and they championed the two forms of Roman civilization. The circumstance, however tragic for Italy

¹ Gebel-al-Tarik, Tarik's Mountain.

at times, was of immense benefit for the whole West. Here were outposts of the older world among a population which was well capable of learning and re-learning. The Lombards were, to all seeming, a more gifted race than the Visigoths; their intermixture with the Romans they barbarized made them more susceptible to civilizing influences in the long run; and, in spite of the degradation of life that we find in Italy, the renewed advance was marvellous in vigour.

Such a prospect was far distant when King Alboin at the head of the fierce Lombard clans invaded Italy in 568. In the debilitated state of the Empire under Justin, the main hope of resistance lay in the lax tribal structure of the Lombard folk and the strength of the walled cities. Even so, a secure lodgement in the north was easily effected by the invaders. The murder of Alboin in 572 and of his successor two years later made little difference. Without a king the Lombard *faras* under their dukes—the *gaus* and *gau*-chiefs of other tribes—were able to defeat the Byzantines. The method of settlement was simple. Roughly speaking, each duke and *fara* took possession of a Roman city and its territory. The Roman land-owners, small and great, were killed or enslaved if they did not succeed in escaping to Byzantine territory. The Lombard freemen took their places, some with less, some with more property. The Roman *coloni* took the similar position of Lombard *aldiones*. The lands of the state went to the dukes, those of the church were divided like lay-possession. In a few years the Roman polity was extinct in the conquered districts; even the towns, with their sparser Lombard settlers, continued their government and institutions in a barbarized form. The country, thus conquered, included Tuscany and almost all north Italy within the Alps and the Apennines, where

the Lombards settled most thickly, giving it the name of Lombardy, which its central portion keeps to-day. Two dukes at the head of composite bands conquered the south, which they formed into the two states of Spoleto and Benevento. In this way, during the kingless time, there originated the modern division of Italy into north and south, which does not correspond to the ancient division at the Rubicon. The Greek revival and the Norman conquest only bit in the lines then engraved.

The dukes of Spoleto and Benevento, lords of many cities, could found petty states in the centre and south, where they had only the Byzantines to contend with, but the dukes of single cities in the north, exposed to disastrous Frankish attacks, were forced to unite under a king. The new monarch, Authari (584-90), set to work to found a central power. He was endowed with half the state-domains in the hands of the northern dukes, which he placed under royal stewards or *gastalds*. The centre of his dominion was in Milan and Pavia, while the dukes of west Lombardy, or Italian Neustria, stood in closer dependence on him than those of the east, or Italian Austria. By war and bribery he succeeded in putting an end to the Frankish invasions, and his successor, Agilulf (590-616), was able not only to complete the conquest north of the Po, but to force the Byzantines to an armistice and the payment of tribute.

By this time the government of imperial Italy was settling down in a new form. The Exarch of Ravenna was still the supreme authority. Under him the several districts, such as the Venetian lagoons, Romagna, Naples, Rome and Liguria round Genoa, were under military dukes. Together they formed a disconnected fringe of coastland, with a line of fortresses, such as Perugia, which linked up Rimini with Rome. But the power of the

imperial officials was limited by the native forces of Italy. On the one hand, the landowners, or tribunes, commanded the militia of their districts, and exercised a magisterial authority. On the other, the bishops, disposing of the influence and wealth of the Church, intervened in government both with the law and outside the law. Naturally the Popes, the wealthiest, ablest and most sacred of their order, the chiefs of the entire Western hierarchy, became rapidly more powerful than the foreign exarchs, and championed the Latin population. It was in the days of Agilulf that Gregory the Great laid the foundations of the Medieval Papacy.

Meanwhile the Lombards themselves were gravitating towards Catholicism, and preparing the way for the formation of the new Italian people. For a time, however, the Arians held the upper hand, while admitting Roman influences. King Rothari (636-52), who conquered Genoa, was an Arian, but he also issued the first Lombard code of laws, the *Edictus* (643), thus following the example of other Germanic kings under Roman influence. After him Catholicism, even if in a schismatic form under the influence of the Three Chapters controversy¹, gained apace. When Grimoald, duke of Benevento (662-71), obtained the throne, the supersession of Arianism was assured. His possession of semi-independent Benevento enabled him to curb the dukes and exalt the royal power. He checked the last attempt at Byzantine reconquest under Constans II², and thus, after his death, King Perctarit could (c. 680) for the first time conclude a peace with the Emperors and secure recognition from them. The final move was made under King Cunincpert, when about 698 even the Three Chapters Schism was ended, and the Lombards entered

¹ See pp. 62 and 123-4.

² Cf. above, p. 83, and below, p. 126.

the congeries of Germanic states in touch with Rome and in heirship to the Roman past.

The conversion of the Lombards to Catholicism did not win for them the support of the Papacy. In the decline of the Empire, the Popes had tasted the sweets of independence and of the liberty of action over the West which independence conferred. It was increased by a revolution which took place in imperial Italy when Leo III the Isaurian attempted to enforce his iconoclastic edicts¹ in 727. The Exarch and imperial officials were driven out, and elected officials placed in their stead. The Venetians first chose their duke or doge: in Rome the Pope took the reins, and the new authorities, although they recognized the Emperor's sovranity, acted as independent rulers. It is true the revolt was put down: exarch and nominated dukes returned²; but their authority was far less than before. Thus the Popes were all the more determined not to sink into provincial Lombard prelates, and all the efforts of the Catholic and civilizing Lombard king Liutprand (712-44) only resulted in the acquisition of some Byzantine towns. He could not touch his real foe, the Pope whom he revered.

Internal weaknesses of the Lombard folk also hindered this, their greatest king, in his work. The separatist duchies of Spoleto and Benevento could only be kept submissive by main force. While the intermixture of races steadily proceeded, and the Lombard tongue was giving place to Romance, the ordinary freeman was growing more dependent on the scanty unruly class of great nobles. If the kings counteracted the magnates

¹ See below, p. 126. The iconoclasts were "image-breakers" who attempted to stem the universal tendency to adore the Saints and their images.

² Cf. below, pp. 126-7.

by employing their sworn vassals in administration, the endowment of these *fideles* diminished dangerously the royal domain. Further, an evil of primitive Germanism remained and increased in spite of the continual civilizing of the law. While the larger clan divisions disappeared, the custom of blood-feud retained its strength. Wherever the Lombards penetrated, and even beyond, save in Venice, it was to be the curse of medieval Italy. The close-knit Lombard families acted as political units and waged relentlessly their private wars. All nobles followed their lead and even the burghers were infected with this disease. It was in curious contrast to far more Germanic England, where the family bond loosened and the blood-feud tended to die out.

While the Lombards were showing how little personal ability could avail in an ill-organized people among untoward outward circumstances, the Franks were proving how wickedness and folly could not ruin a well-founded state which was happily situated. The four sons of Clovis divided between them the realm he had won by the sword, and inaugurated a miserable period of contention and civil war which lasted from 511 to 613, in spite of transient reunions under a single king. At first the kingdom expanded: Burgundy was conquered in 534 and Provence in 536. But later attempts to conquer Italy from the Lombards and Septimania from the Visigoths were failures. Some territories in Gaul were lost; for fugitive Britons founded the Welsh confederation of Brittany in the ancient Armorica, driving out or re-barbarizing the Latin population; and the non-Romanized Basques between the Garonne and the Pyrenees obtained their independence. It would be fruitless to narrate the civil wars of this period and the lurid crimes of the reigning family, which culminated in the thirty years' feud of two

furious queens, the Visigothic Brunhild of Austrasia and the low-born Fredegund of Neustria. But two facts stand out of the confused story. First, the Romanization of the Franks made steady progress. The settlers in Romanized Gaul began to adopt or at least to know the primitive Romance idioms of their fellow-subjects. They made some acquisition of Latin arts and crafts and institutions. The great nobles were largely of Latin descent. And even in German Austrasia the same influences were visible: Franks of the east and Gallo-Franks of the west stood together as one people. Secondly, although the earlier divisions were founded on convenience, the realm fell gradually into three main sections, of which two were the embryos of the future French and German states. There was Neustria between the Channel and the Loire, with its dependency of Aquitaine; there was Austrasia, roughly speaking, between the Scheldt and the Main; and there was Burgundy with Provence from Langres and Nevers to the Alps and the Mediterranean. When Chlothar (Lothair) II became sole king on the death of Brunhild in 613, he was compelled to recognize a triple administration of the three sections, directed in each by the Mayor of the Palace.

Chlothar II's son, Dagobert (629-39), was the last Merovingian who really ruled the Franks. The crimes and debauches of the house had had their natural effect. Early-dying and effete, the boy kings became the *rois fainéants* of Frankish history and presented the mere pageantry of sovereignty. The real power was in the hands of the Mayors of the Palace, who fought out the struggle of the rival provinces. The Mayor of the Palace, an official (at this time) only met with among the Franks, was the chief administrator of the royal domains and the royal household. Since the central administration was

carried on by the members of the royal household and the main part of the income of king and state was derived from the royal estates, the Mayor of the Palace became the prime minister of the monarch. The decadence of the Merovings not only threw more power into the Mayor's hands, but also enabled the great nobles, after Dagobert's death, to choose the Mayor from their number. Neustria, Austrasia and Burgundy, in the divisions of the kingdom, had each obtained their own Mayor; and each Mayor attempted to dominate or replace his two rivals, and to transmit his office to his own family. The successful competitors in this rivalry were the Mayors of Austrasia, later known as the Carolingian dynasty of the Franks. Pepin of Landen in Brabant, its founder, was Mayor under King Dagobert. His son Grimoald (643-56) even attempted, though without success, to place his own son on the Austrasian throne. His failure eclipsed his house for thirty years, during which Ebroin, Mayor of Neustria, attempted to unite Francia under his own rule.

Then the second Pepin "of Heristal," Mayor of Austrasia, came to the fore. He was the heir of the great Austrasian bishop, St Arnulf of Metz, in the male line and of Pepin "of Landen" through his mother. Ruling with full authority in his native land, he conquered Neustria in 687 in the decisive battle of Tertry near St Quentin. Henceforward he ruled the whole Frankish realm. From one point of view Pepin's victory was the victory of mainly Germanic Austrasia over mainly Gallo-Roman Neustria; with him the Teutonic districts take the lead in West Europe for five hundred years. From another he marks the supersession of the old absolute Germano-Roman kingship, with its rights founded on prescription and conquest, by a monarchy based on aristocratic support. He himself naturally endeavoured to secure the

old royal rights in practice for his new dynasty. The old royal prestige came by prescription later.

The effect of Pepin's Austrasian Teutonic origin was at once seen in his policy. He left Gallo-Roman Aquitaine in independence, and bent his efforts east of the Rhine. He subdued once more the long-revolted Alemanni, and made the duke of the Bavarians his tributary. At the same time he encouraged the more lasting conquests of Christian missionaries. The missionary bishoprics of Utrecht among the Frisians, and Salzburg among the Bavarians date from his reign. The movement for the spread of Christianity across the Rhine was indeed due to far wider causes, but Pepin furthered it, and thus, as in his conquests, has a small claim to be one of the founders of the modern German nation.

In the disorders that followed Pepin of Heristal's death in 714 his illegitimate son, Charles Martel ("the hammer"), from whose name the appellation Carolingian is derived, won the upper hand. By 719 he had overthrown all resistance, even that of Aquitaine, and was undisputed ruler of the Franks; he divided Alemannia into Frankish *gaus* or counties; for some years he could govern without a royal Merovingian figure-head. His work was done just in time, for in his days the Moslem danger threatened Francia. Once Visigothic Septimania was in Saracen hands; and in 732 the Arab governor of Spain, Abd-ar-Rahman, invaded Aquitaine and reached Poitiers on his march against St Martin's city of Tours¹. In that neighbourhood, the predestined battle-field between north and south Gaul, he met Charles Martel at the head of the Frankish host. In October 732 the Austrasians justified their leadership of the Franks; the Arabs at last broke before them, and

¹ Hence the erroneous name of "Battle of Tours," by which Charles Martel's victory has been commonly known.

the hopes of a Moslem conquest of Gaul were over. As a check to the Arab expansion, the import of the Battle of Old-Poitiers can be exaggerated. The Saracen wave had nearly spent its force by 732, and internal dissensions, between Arab and Berber in the West, and between rival Caliphs and factions and races in the East, were to paralyse its onset. As a rescue of Christendom, Leo the Isaurian's defence of Constantinople in 717 was far more decisive. But Charles Martel's victory saved the characteristic development of Western Europe. With Saracens securely lodged in the heart of Gaul, it is difficult to see how the Carolingian renaissance, the alliance of Francia and the Papacy, and the conversion of the Germans between the Rhine and Elbe, could have taken effect as they did, and Western history would have had but a maimed growth without them.

By the time of his death in 741 the hard and practical Charles had restored and increased the power of the Frankish monarchy he controlled. Francia had sped faster than the other Germanic states in the direction of social change. The aristocracy was over-powerful, the Church over-rich, the ordinary freeman too depressed, the kingship too poor. At first, the Kings, after the dispersal of their tribesmen over the new realm, were unfettered masters of the state. At the head of their *antrustions* or *fideles* (the thanes of the Anglo-Saxons) they moved from district to district consuming the produce of the royal estates. The counts, who governed the *pagi* or *gaus* (which in Gaul mainly corresponded to the Roman *civitates*), were royal nominees taken from any race or class. The King was chief of the Frankish Church. The bishops, with their immense influence and wide lands, were either named or approved by him. He was centre of the national life. But the process of amalgamation and the civil

wars soon induced a change. Although for several centuries men kept their national laws, Salic, Ripuarian, Roman, Visigothic etc. according to their descent, the local tie became predominant; the new and old local nobility took root and led their districts. The weakness of the kingship was intensified by the disuse of Roman taxation; there remained only tolls and customs and the personal services, called later the *trinoda necessitas*, service in the host, the repair of roads and the maintenance of fortifications. To reward their followers and to bind them to themselves, the kings could only make grants of land. Such grants, which received the name of benefices (*beneficia*), implied service and loyalty, but they soon resulted in the establishment of fresh hereditary landowners and the depletion of the royal demesne. Their holders naturally were commonly *fideles*, sworn followers, of the King, and thus an embryo of the later fief made its appearance. It was but an instance of a general process. The Church granted *precaria*, i.e. temporary land-grants, which also made the new tenants its dependants and rapidly became in practice hereditary. The nobles granted benefices even more profitably. In the disorders and the disruption of the kindreds, the small landowners required protection. They surrendered therefore their land (*allod*) to local noble or church, and received it again as a benefice. And, with or without the surrender of their land, they would *commend* themselves to a great personage, who thereby became their *senior* (seigneur, lord), while they were his *vassals* (*vassi*). It was a development of the system of *fideles* among the lower ranks of society. While the mutual services of lord and vassal were at this time not rigorously defined, their mutual bond was strong enough, and by the nature of the wide heterogeneous monarchy it was next to inevitable that it should be

stronger than the bond between king and subject. The kings and mayors took the obvious counter-step. They increased the number of their own *fideles* and in the end bound most of the magnates and a crowd of smaller landowners to them in this fashion.

The growth and potency of these private relations of vassalage and benefices did not destroy, though it warped, the public administration. The count still held the law-court (*placitum*) of his *pagus*, and his vicar the hundred court, which all free landowners were bound to attend. The king or mayor held his supreme court of justice as he moved about. But the personal relationships which existed played their part within the formal procedure, and a new development was tending to set aside the public courts. The ruler was extending the privileges of the royal demesne to private land by grants of "immunity." Immunity meant various degrees of exemption from the authority of the local public officials, whether in their judicial or administrative functions. Instead, the "immune" landowner held a court of his own and saw to the performance of public duties by his tenants. Thus, sporadically, something like the later feudalism was growing up. In fact, the weakened state had begun to call the local magnates to its aid in the task of keeping order and transacting public business.

The process was favoured by the depressed condition of the peasantry. Where the Roman system had remained dominant, the peasant did not by any means always lose by the Teutonic conquest. Each normal township or *villa* consisted of the home-farm of the landlord and a number of peasant-holdings, *mansi* as they were called. The Roman *coloni* held the least burdened, *mansi ingenuiles*, the freedmen or *liti* were worse off, and the settled slaves, *servi casati*, owed most dues. All were tied to the soil

as before, and the slaves tended to merge in the other two classes from the similarity of their holdings. But in the original Salic and Ripuarian land, where the Franks were settled *en masse*, the peasant-proprietor was losing status; more and more he was losing his landownership and sinking to the position of a *colonus*. In all cases the self-sufficing, isolated village, little connected with the outside world and dependent on its lord, was a stronghold of aristocratic power. Even king or mayor trusted largely to his position as a lord of land.

Enough authority and prestige, however, remained to the kingship for a strong man, head of a great aristocratic federation like Charles Martel, to restore and fortify the monarchical power. Everyone admitted the rights of the state in spite of exemptions, privileges and the general disorder. Charles took firm grip of the administration. His officials took the lead. His hand was felt throughout the land. He solidified the three assemblies of Austrasia, Neustria and Burgundy into one annual Field of March (later Field of May), where he kept in touch with nobles and bishops, vassals and subjects, and promulgated his commands. He needed vassals sworn to his service and provided with benefices. Since the royal demesne would not bear further cessions, he seized on the vast church lands for the purpose. From them he granted benefices to his *fideles*, and, as they provided a certain number of horse-soldiers (*militēs*) in return, he thus secured a formidable and mobile army. Nor did he stop there. He conferred bishoprics and abbeys on his captains, and, by degrading the Church, obtained further endowed lay dependants. At his death he left the monarchy restored to power and master of the aristocracy.

Francia had advanced further in the direction of feudalism than the other Teutonic states, but the germs

of feudalism were in all. In England, too, we find the continuous decline of the lesser landowners, or *churls*, and the grants to thanes and churches of royal demesne and immunities by *book*, or charter. There, too, we find the new nobility of royal thanes counterbalancing and eventually coalescing with the older nobility of birth: there, too, the conflict between the kingship, with its prestige and claim on men's consciences, and the great landowners, strong in local claims and social advantages. In Lombardy likewise we can trace the depression of the small landowner, the *arimannus* or member of the host, by the larger landowner who served on horseback. In all the kingship, though the most enduring element in the state, was failing before the strength of the nobles. The Carolingians were to rescue it awhile and endow it with a new theocratic halo of the utmost value; but Western Europe had to undergo complete anarchy before the kings could gather round them once again a convinced and irresistible loyalty.

SECTION 2. THE WESTERN CHURCH

The Church, ruled by the Papacy, was preëminently the guide of Western Europe in its quest of order and civilization. The Church enshrined the remnants of the Roman past; she possessed at the worst of times some tincture of learning and law and political, not tribal or barbaric, government. She preserved, too, in the main, the ideals and morals, the motives and mental attitude which were definitely Christian, and preserved them in forms which were peculiarly suited to combine with and elevate those derived from a Roman or barbaric source. She may be blamed indeed for yielding too much to those secular influences, for taking up too much that was non-Christian into her thought and practice, and, on the

other hand, for an unhealthy development of those sides of her Christian heritage which appealed most powerfully to the barbaric mind; but these failings, after all, supplied forms in which her mission could be understood and be effective in an anarchic and barbaric world.

Much of the internal transformation, which Christianity underwent to obtain its medieval characteristics, had taken place before the Roman Empire in the West became a mere memory. The creation of a new pantheon of departed Saints, the adoption of uncompromising asceticism as the essence of the Christian ideal, and the conception of the Church as itself a divinely-founded state in the midst of the evil, human world, were all blocked out in the rough, so to speak, if not universally accepted, by the time of Justinian; and even the rule of the West by the monarchical Papacy was foreshadowed but a few years later. Of these developments, the adoration of the Saints combined earlier Christian elements with the tendencies most akin to them in the Roman world. The recourse to the intercession of the Virgin and Saints and the reverence paid to the relics of Martyrs had increased as the emphasis laid on the Divinity of Christ became more pronounced in the contest against Arianism, and men thought of Him more as a Judge than as an Intercessor. Then came the inrush of pagan converts under Constantine, and not only were the honours and attributes of local heathen deities transferred frequently to analogous patron-saints, but Christianity as a whole was affected by a wave of polytheism. The Saints, with their local sanctuaries, images and relics, were more attractive than a strict monotheism to the semi-Christianized populace. And the tendency was increased by the Christianization of ancient festivals and ceremonies, by which the general conversion was made easier. Stubborn

pagans remained both among Romans and barbarians, but in the sixth century they disappeared among the educated classes, Justinian striking the death-blow when he closed the schools of the Athenian Academy. It was only in remote country districts that the old gods retained their worshippers, called henceforth pagans, *i.e.* country-folk¹.

While paganism was dying, the corporate conception of Christianity was reaching its full growth in the writings of the great African bishop, St Augustine of Hippo (*ob.* 430), whose doctrines formed a principal mould of medieval thought. In his *De civitate Dei* he traced the origin and growth of the Church, the commonwealth of the Blessed, in heaven forming the New Jerusalem, on earth the Church militant and pilgrim amid the evils and imperfections of transitory human politics. The Roman Empire was a mere earthly state, *civitas terrena*, a man-made, permitted polity. This was indeed a belief ancient in Christianity, but St Augustine brought it to logical completeness, giving it an almost quaint, and perhaps narrow, legal complexion, and his doctrine formed the kernel of the extreme ecclesiastical and papal claims in the Middle Ages. By its side, however, flowed another stream of thought according to which the secular Christian state was itself a function of the City of God on earth. All through our history we shall see how the two conceptions clashed, amalgamated and made mutual borrowings, while the Saint's original views were lost to sight amid the accretions which gathered round them.

Meanwhile asceticism, the renunciation of the illusory enjoyments of this world, and the practice of devotion and of work as a form of devotion, had become the true aim of human perfection. Here again a belief, ancient

¹ Compare "heathen," *i.e.* heath-dwellers.

in Christianity, had received fresh and startling development. Hermit-life was the earlier form. It was definitely an Eastern product, which reached its greatest extension in Egypt. From it monasticism proper took its rise. About 305 the Egyptian St Anthony founded his first monastery which was really an association of hermits. Similar communities spread in Syria and Mesopotamia, and flourished vigorously until the Moslem conquest. Towards 315 another Egyptian, St Pachomius, had already commenced monasticism proper, the *cenobitium* or life in common, where daily labour, as well as spiritual exercises and the practice of austerities, was essential to the ideal. So far the lead in monastic life had been taken by the truly oriental provinces of the Empire, but the progress of the monastic impulse further west soon produced a Western leader, the Greek St Basil. About 360 St Basil made a new departure in his Pontine monastery. Life under his Rule became completely cenobitic, with a common dwelling and common meals as well as common worship. Daily labour and works of charity were not only insisted on, but fantastic oriental austerities were discouraged in their favour. Yet St Basil was not permanently successful in shaping monachism in the Eastern Empire. Though its centre shifted from Palestine to Constantinople after the Arab conquest, and then again to Mt Athos about 1100, it became purely contemplative in character. St Basil's true successors were to be found in the West.

Monasticism, if not the ascetic life, seems to have been introduced in the West by St Athanasius about 340. It spread rapidly even beyond the bounds of the Western Empire, and there were soon to be seen large numbers both of Antonian hermits and of Basilian monks. The ever-increasing anarchy and misery, no doubt,

increased its hold on devout minds, who sought the only way of a Christian life in flight from the world. Two innovations appeared. In Italy Bishop Eusebius of Vercelli (*ob.* 371) placed his cathedral clergy under monastic rule, and in this St Augustine imitated him in Africa. Thus a beginning was made in the taking of Holy Orders by monks, and further the later institution of Canons Regular, priests who lived as monks, received its precedent. Meanwhile in tribal Ireland monasticism took a tribalized form; the Abbot was the chief, the monks his clansmen, and the non-tribal bishop was merely a monk told off to special duties. In all, however, hermit-life and extreme austerities were the ideal, although, especially in Ireland, learning and manual labour were by no means neglected.

Various disorders and abuses in monastic life had already become apparent both in East and West. There were the fanaticism and insubordination of the ascetics which in the East became a public danger. More disastrous in the long run was the strong tendency to degeneration. Monks after a while might compare badly with their unascetic neighbours. And then there was fraud. Sham-hermits of rascally character were common; in Spain there were even sham-monasteries, where an ordinary householder lived safely under the halo of his pretended devotion. The first remedy adopted was to place monks under episcopal jurisdiction, but the results were not really satisfactory. True reform came from within. One great centre of spiritual activity lay in Ireland, where the fervent zeal of the monks led to an emigration partly missionary, partly ultra-ascetic in its nature. St Columba (563-97¹) founded his famous monastery of Iona and converted the Picts. St Columbanus

¹ The dates are those of his emigration and death.

(595-615¹) crossed to Francia. There he re-inspired the already decadent monasticism founded by St Martin of Tours, introduced his Irish rule, and brought about a splendid revival. He and his disciples were missionaries as well as monks, working among nominally Christian Franks or professedly heathen Alemanni. Their abbeys were homes of learning and labour; St Gall in Alemannia and Bobbio in Lombardy were typical foundations which retained their reputation for centuries.

St Columbanus, however, though he gave a Rule, made little attempt to create an organization. He depended on a kind of clannish tie and personal goodwill. For a system which could guide monks without a perpetual succession of genius and could knit together a lasting corporate society, the West was indebted, as in politics and the ecclesiastical hierarchy, to the native land of government-building, Italy. St Benedict of Nursia (480-547 (?)) was an Umbrian noble. As a youth he fled from the world and became a hermit in his cave by Subiaco. But companions soon flocked round him, and he became the founder of many monasteries, including the famous Monte Cassino where he died. There his ruler's genius asserted itself. He gave the first successful and the most lasting monastic Rule, which subsists to-day in its integrity and has been the parent of all its rivals. St Benedict provided his Black Monks, as they were called from their garb, with a rule of life which at the same time gave them a reasonable ideal and an easy-running, well-composed organization. Permanency, moderation and energetic industry were the keynotes of their life. The Benedictine took vows of chastity, poverty and obedience for life. Ultra-asceticism and useless austerity, both out of place in the West, were discountenanced. The monk was to

¹ The dates are those of his emigration and death.

live for the community in incessant occupation in the church, in the fields and in devotional study. His life was hard, but humility and usefulness in a carefully-devised scheme were aimed at, not an anchorite's notoriety. The government of the Abbey, as might be expected in a Roman institution, was a monarchy bound by law: the elected Abbot was supreme under the Rule; but provision was made that he should hear the opinions of his brethren. Continuity was obtained by the Rule itself and the common life it prescribed, but still more by the obligation which the Black Monk was under of remaining in his first monastery. Thus a living autonomous corporation was formed in each Benedictine house with its own traditions and characteristics, varying the more as the Order spread beyond the Alps. Learning was soon added to the Black Monks' accomplishments. With the disappearance of paganism, the devout horror of profane literature gradually died down. King Theodoric's minister, Cassiodorus, set the example of literary work when he retired from the world, and the busy Benedictines were not long in imitating him and inaugurating one of the most beneficent achievements of medieval monasticism. The wreckage of ancient learning survived among them, to be used in a new structure of thought and knowledge.

It was a Benedictine monk and a Roman noble who acted on the claims of his predecessors, and by his great qualities of courage, wisdom, adroitness and single-hearted uprightness became the true founder of the medieval Papacy with all that it implied for the development of the Middle Ages. St Gregory the Great had been Prefect of Rome, then a papal official, and Abbot of S. Andrea, before he was elected Pope in 590. As the occupant of the chief patriarchal see and successor of St Peter, former Popes

had marked out for him a wide prerogative, and Gregory was determined to translate his rights, or rather his duties, as he conceived them, into actual fact. Over the ancient Italy south of the Rubicon, with its dependent province of Sardinia, he exercised the full powers of a metropolitan. Decrees of the Western Emperors, in especial one of Valentinian III to Pope Leo the Great, had made him a court of appeal and of discipline for all Western Bishops, and this power, though nominal and silently contested, was expressed by the institution of papal Vicars in some provinces, and by the honorific grant of the vestment called a pallium, to some metropolitans or a favoured bishop. Beside this extended patriarchate, and hardly to be distinguished from it, was the primacy which the Popes claimed over the whole Church. In a honorific sense it was acknowledged, but as an effective control it was not conceived—denied cannot be said when the exercise of it was not attempted—by the other patriarchs, and was not admitted by the more powerful Western metropolitans. Gregory himself seems to have considered that his primatial rank made him, firstly, the custodian of the tradition of the Church—his consent, he thought, was necessary to the Canons of General Councils—and secondly, the corrector of abuses in the Church, which made him a court of appeal from the Bishops, and the inquisitor into their conduct in case complaint was made to him. As patriarch of the West, it was in his view his office, if feasible, to arrange the election of the metropolitans and to confirm it, as well as to exercise a somewhat more precise hortatory authority than elsewhere. Gregory indignantly disclaimed any direct administrative power—all bishops, he said, were equal—and any powers outside his diocese that were not corrective and defensive; but it is obvious how a constant and effectual system of

appellate correction could give rise to a constant supervision and eventual monarchical rule.

Curiously enough, it was not in the matter of his appellate jurisdiction, in which on an isolated occasion he successfully reversed a decision of the Patriarch of Constantinople, but over a mere question of titles that Gregory's attempt to convert his titular primacy into fact failed. To his great wrath the Patriarch of Constantinople, John the Faster, claimed the title of Ecumenical or Universal Patriarch. Gregory thought the claim meant the reduction of other bishops to mere delegates of the Patriarch's powers, and declared him the forerunner of Anti-Christ. This interpretation the Greeks denied, but clearly an Ecumenical Patriarch was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Roman See, save by occasional consent, and perhaps the Pope, whose own favoured style was the famous *servus servorum Dei*¹, perceived what he did not say. In any case, the other patriarchs, with whom he did not interfere, did not share his grievance, his protests passed unheeded, and his own successors soon adopted the offensive phrase as a bye-title. It was the beginning of the later schism.

In the narrower sphere of his Western Patriarchate, however, Gregory worked on securer foundations and set lasting precedents. Over the great provinces of Milan, Ravenna, and Illyricum, he made good his claims with tactful moderation. In Africa he insinuated his influence, if the provincial bishops maintained their independence. In Gaul he obtained a kind of respectful recognition, if no real power outside Provence. In Visigothic Spain he wisely confined himself to compliments which were gladly received. Only in the titular patriarchate of Aquileia he made little impression, and that was because the local

¹ "Slave of the slaves of God."

bishops refused to accept the Fifth Council and its condemnation of the Three Chapters, therein upholding the conservatism of the West and the original opinions of Pope Vigilius¹.

Gregory's greatest triumph was due to the missionary zeal towards the barbarians, in which he marks so dramatically his breach with the old narrower Roman feeling, and his parentage of the Middle Ages. The City of God, not the Roman state, determined the boundary of his sympathies. He saw with joy the abandonment of Arianism by the Visigoths, and the small beginnings of Catholicism among the Lombards. But the conversion of England was his best achievement as it was his darling object. St Augustine of Canterbury was his emissary, and, in spite of all set-backs and Keltic co-operation, the English Church remained the daughter of the Roman See². There at any rate the primatial claims of the Pope, as understood by Gregory, were acknowledged, and the pallium confirmed the metropolitan's authority. The English Church was to form the leverage by which the papal primacy was raised to be the keystone of the Western Church.

Gregory was far from being absorbed in great schemes. He was a zealous and humane administrator of the vast papal estates, the patrimony of St Peter. He revised church-music. He was engaged in a constant endeavour to uproot simony, to enforce clerical celibacy and to raise the standard of clerical life. He was a theologian, the not always understanding popularizer of St Augustine. For him, more definitely than for St Augustine, the Church militant was the visible Catholic organization; and he insisted on the exemption of its officials, the clergy, from the ordinary lay tribunals. Unlike the African, however,

¹ Cf. above, pp. 62, 105.

² Cf. above, p. 96.

the Emperor in his conception was divinely called to rule: the state had its sanctity. He acknowledged fully the duty of obedience to his sovran, even in his uncanonical actions, a duty coupled with the right of energetic protest. This feeling forms the best palliation of his indecent joy at Maurice's murder and the accession of the possibly pliable Phocas, an unhappy action which still stains his memory. At the same time he played a great political rôle. He incessantly intervened in the government of Italy to redress injustice or oppression. Paying as he did the troops from the papal treasury, he ruled Rome far more truly than did its imperial duke¹. For Rome he pursued an independent, though loyal, foreign policy which saved the City from the conquering Lombards. With him the Temporal Power in fact, if not in law, began. There was an embryo national spirit in him. However he might think of the non-national Church, he disliked both Greek and barbarian. He spoke Latin only, in spite of years spent in Constantinople, and only Latin-speakers were in his service. Here again he gave precision and effective activity to the tendencies of the Papacy. When he died in 604 he left the Papacy and the Church with a mission, as the enforcers of justice and peace, the conservators of Latin civilization, the guides of the barbarians, foreshadowing the organized monarchical hierarchy which permeated and shaped the West.

Gregory had been but a subject, although a most powerful one, and it was long before the Popes escaped from this position. Their dependence was a little slackened when the Exarch began to confirm their election in the Emperor's name, for thus the long interregna during

¹ The disappearance of the Senate in Old Rome after Justinian, and its replacement by a merely local nobility, left the Pope without a native rival in the City.

which the imperial duke could really rule were avoided. But Constans II could still banish and depose Pope Martin I in 654 to punish him for his resistance to the Monothelete heresy. A victory, however, for the Papal See soon followed when the Sixth General Council of 680 condemned the Monotheletes¹; and a further step in the alienation of Eastern and Western Christianity made manifest how the world was changing. The Trullan Council at Constantinople in 691-2, among other disciplinary canons, forbade the separation of subdeacons and the higher clergy from the wives they had married before they received Holy Orders, and declared the Patriarch of Constantinople the Pope's equal. When Pope Sergius I refused to ratify these canons which were at once received as Ecumenical in the East, Justinian II attempted to imprison and depose him after the fashion of earlier Emperors, but his envoy was glad to escape unharmed from the angry Romans. A generation later came the Iconoclastic Schism. Leo the Isaurian in 726 commanded the destruction of the venerated images of Christ and the Saints in Italy in pursuance of his reforming policy, and at the same time he increased taxation². His edicts, devised for the conditions of Asia Minor, could only produce an outburst in the imperial districts in Italy to which the Greeks were more and more foreigners. The statesman Pope Gregory II (715-31), a native Roman, took the lead. Without rejecting the Emperor's sovereignty, he and his allies seized complete autonomy, and in the confused years which followed he tacked between Emperor, Lombard King, and Dukes of Benevento and Spoleto with more than secular skill. He had the advantage that the Lombards were now Catholics, and that even the Three Chapters Schism had

¹ Cf. p. 83.

² Cf. below, Chap. VI, Sect. I.

come to an end in 698. The results, if temporarily unfavourable, were pregnant with future success. The Emperor, indeed, recovered the direct rule of imperial Italy; and not only the remnants of imperial Illyricum, but also southern Italy and Sicily were severed from the Roman patriarchate and united to that of Constantinople, while at the same time the bulk of the papal estates were lost. But the imperial restoration had no life in it. The Exarch henceforward held a precarious rule at Ravenna only. Rome and south Italy with Sicily became separate provinces, and in Rome the Pope far outweighed the imperial patrician, who nominally ruled it and who soon lapsed altogether. The temporal power of the Popes had appeared openly for the first time, and was not to be set aside. Their claims to the spiritual primacy, too, were obtaining a surer standing-ground. The East, which would never submit to them, was now at open schism with the West, and the Lombard Liutprand was setting an example to the Germanic kings of submissive deference to the Successor of St Peter. It was at this very time that St Boniface was introducing into Francia the high views of papal prerogative held by the English Church in regard to its mother-Church at Rome¹.

While the results of the Iconoclastic Schism hastened the disappearance of Greek literature and thought from the West, where even the appreciation of the native Latin literature was at a low ebb, it was otherwise with Greek art. Many mosaic-workers, whose occupation was gone in Constantinople, migrated to Italy, and, while in the Byzantine Empire the tradition of the Greek Christian art which produced St Sophia faded, these colonists gave a powerful stimulus to its developments in the West. On Byzantine models and under the hand of Byzantine

¹ Cf. for the Italian revolution above, p. 106.

workmen Romanesque building and decoration and with them the beginnings of the architecture of the Middle Age and the painting of the Renaissance took their first growth in Italy. The influence begun by Theodoric the Ostrogoth and the Exarchs at Ravenna was now continued by the independent Italian powers and especially by the Church, and acted throughout the West as a civilizing leaven.

One result of the settlement of the barbarians in the West had been the rise of Churches which, in default of a better word, we may call national. They all accorded a common reverence to the Papacy, but beyond that reverence their attitude differed. The Visigothic bishops, allied with their kings, held aloof completely from Rome and were quite autonomous. In Francia, a somewhat higher view was taken of the papal prerogatives, but here too the Church acted in complete independence of the Apostolic See, and in steady subordination to the Frankish king. In England the kings, though supreme, were never wholly able to dispose of their Churches in so untrammelled a fashion as the Franks, nor did they rest on their support so much as the Visigoths. Christianity there was due to a Roman mission, a stream of pilgrims flowed to Rome, and the Roman claims, as advanced by Gregory the Great, were unhesitatingly accepted. The Keltic Churches on the other hand maintained an attitude of distant and critical respect. In the three Germanic nations the view of Church and state was far other than St Augustine's and not much dissimilar to Gregory's¹ or Leo the Isaurian's. The King was God's vicegerent in the earthly City of God. He held a sacrosanct power and rightfully ruled his fraction of the Christian commonwealth in secular things and shared in its government in things

¹ Cf. above, pp. 117, 124-5.

ecclesiastical. It was the beginning of a theocratic doctrine which was to reach its culmination under Charlemagne and form the chief element in the theory of the Holy Roman Empire and in the more modern opinion of the Divine Right of Kings and of the supremacy of the secular state.

The English Church in the seventh century was much superior in character to the Frankish and Visigothic. It had been formed by voluntary conversion for the most part, and possessed therefore a greater zeal. Its prelates were neither so wealthy, nor so occupied with political functions as those of its neighbours, and it was comparatively free from the promotion of unfit men. Its discipline was stricter, its monks more fervent and, partly from Keltic influence, more learned. From England in consequence came the movement which revived the Church in Francia, converted eastern Germany and, in so doing, exercised a decisive influence on the whole Western Church. Missionary tendencies, natural in a mission-founded Church and inspired by Keltic example, showed themselves towards the close of the seventh century, and, unlike the Keltic monks, the English missionaries were eager for papal authorization and direction. The first impulse was towards Friesland, but the obstinate paganism of the Frisians was hard to conquer. Then came the mission of Winfrith or St Boniface, to give him the Roman name he preferred. After a brief failure in Friesland he journeyed to Rome. Gregory II recognized his great qualities and the opportunity they gave, and became his personal friend. In 715 Boniface was ordained priest and sent as papal missionary to Germany. His success in Thuringia and Hesse led to his consecration as bishop at Rome in 722. First of transalpine prelates he took an oath of obedience to the Pope and worked as a papal

suffragan, a practice which was followed by the bishops whom he consecrated in his turn. He became papal legate, the first to be truly sent with full powers from Rome. In a few years Bavaria and transrhene France, where previous missions had made but little impression, had become integral portions of Christendom. The death of Charles Martel opened a fresh sphere of activity. The new Mayors, the brothers Carloman and Pepin the Short, were eager to amend the disastrous condition of the Frankish Church, and turned to the zealous Boniface, the confidant of three Popes, Gregory II, Gregory III and Zacharias, to carry out their will. In 742 a Council was held in Austrasia. Discipline, morale and organization, all of them decadent, were to be restored; yearly synods were to meet, bishops were nominated for cities where the office had lapsed, and Austrasia with its dependencies was formed into a vast province, over which Boniface, Archbishop and papal legate, presided. The same reforms were undertaken for Neustria at the Synod of Soissons in 744. Here the three provinces of Rheims, Rouen and Sens were restored, and by an innovation the pallium was begged of the Pope for the new archbishops. In 747 a general Frankish synod went further. The assembled bishops, who were not many, declared their unity with, and obedience to, the Apostolic See. Thus, in addition to the reform and reinvigoration of the Frankish Church, the papal claims in their yet moderate extent were fully recognized.

No abrogation of the national character of the Frankish Church, however, was thereby intended. The secular ruler of the nation was still its head, in spite of the reverence professed for the Successor of St Peter. This headship was fortified a few years later, when Pepin the Short in 752 deposed the last Merovingian and took the crown.

To replace the ancestral prestige of the Merovingians, he had himself anointed by the hands of Boniface in St Peter's name to be king of his people by the grace of God. Thus the theocratic rights of the Frankish kings were heightened. They ruled their section of the earthly City of God by Divine appointment, as David¹ had before them. The bishops were their officers in things spiritual, the Pope the venerated referee in doctrine and discipline. In some circles of the Roman Curia, in the mind of St Boniface perhaps, the exacter theory of St Augustine might live on, by which Our Lord was the last and perpetual *Christus Domini* and the City of God on earth was distinct from man-made states and ruled by its own ecclesiastical hierarchy, while obedience was due to the secular monarch only in secular things for the maintenance of peace; but the theocratic idea of the kingship was yet predominant, and was to be carried yet further by Charlemagne.

Boniface's own work had been done before 752. The missionary impulse was still strongest in him. In 753 he resigned his see to attack once more the impenetrable Frisians, and by them was martyred in the following year.

SECTION 3. CHARLEMAGNE AND THE WESTERN EMPIRE

When Charles Martel died in 741, his territories were divided in old Frankish fashion between his two sons. An incipient nationalism was again visible in the partition; Carloman took Austrasia and the lands east of the Rhine, Pepin the Short Neustria and Burgundy; but nothing came of it, for Carloman abdicated in 747 to become a monk, and Pepin reunited the Frankish realm. Pepin saw the times were ripe for seizing the crown, and in 751

¹ *Christus Domini*, "the Lord's anointed." St Augustine had held that the anointed Israelite kings had so ruled the City of God.

his momentous embassy was sent to Pope Zacharias. He propounded a political and moral question, was it good that one man should bear the name of king and another really rule? The Pope's answer was "No." The same year the last *fainéant* Meroving was deposed, and Pepin elected and anointed king in his stead.

Pepin could have had no doubt of the Pope's reply, for the affairs of Italy were making the Papacy eager for a Frankish alliance. Pope Gregory III (731-41), who held his own easily against the Emperor, was in mortal dread of the Lombard Liutprand, and once had vainly begged the aid of Charles Martel against him, thus pointing the way to future developments. Pope Zacharias (741-52) was in greater danger still. The disappearance of the imperial duke had left him full ruler of what we may now call the Papal State; but the Lombards, led by King Aistulf (749-56), were more aggressive than ever. Ravenna had fallen to them about 751 and the Exarchate had come to an end. Aistulf made no secret of his intention to annex Rome and reduce the Pope to the position of one of his bishops. Under Stephen II (752-7) the crisis was reached. Aistulf, on making his attack, found Rome hard to conquer, and a series of negotiations, in which the Emperor played a futile part, ended in Stephen's departure to France to entreat King Pepin to come to his rescue. He may have had imperial authorization, but doubtless he far outstepped it. He conferred on Pepin the title of Patrician associated with the highest rank of imperial officials, and, in his priestly capacity, he anointed anew the King and his sons, and bound the Franks by a promise to elect their kings in perpetuity from Pepin's descendants. Pepin on his side engaged to "restore" the conquests of Aistulf and Liutprand to the Roman republic and—here was the novelty—to St Peter. The autonomy, which

under the Emperor's high suzerainty the Pope already exercised in Rome, was to be extended to Ravenna and the other once-imperial towns when they were reconquered. Already a legend was growing up to justify the papal usurpation. It was said that the Emperor Constantine on his conversion had granted to Pope Sylvester the rule of all Italy and the West, and the famous Donation, by which the grant was made, was probably at this time forged in Pope Stephen's entourage. Imperial pomp was decreed to the Popes by this forgery, and the *de facto* papal autonomy within the Empire was fantastically declared and enlarged.

The treaty of 754 seemed a safe one for both King and Pope to make. Neither wished for Frankish domination in Italy. Mutual security and alliance seemed guaranteed. Pepin would have increased the permanency of his house, prevented the centre of Christendom from falling into the hands of a rival power, and provided for his soul's welfare by a pious war. Stephen II would see himself freed from dependence on either the Lombards or Constantinople, and had increased his influence in Francia. Such secular guarantees appealed to the first really political Pope. The results were unexpected: a new secular master was introduced into Italy with rights and claims no less formidable than the old, and a papal state was erected ever in conflict with its secular neighbours and too often taking precedence of the spiritual functions of the Papacy.

The history of the intervention shows clearly the superiority of the Franks over the Lombards in politics and war. In a first campaign Aistulf was forced to agree to the surrender of Ravenna and other towns to "the Roman republic." He broke his oath and besieged Rome. Yet, when Pepin and his host again descended through the Vale of Susa, the Lombard defence almost at

once collapsed. The frontier was restored which existed at the death of Liutprand, and in consequence the once Byzantine coastland from the Po to Sinigaglia recognized the Pope as its ruler. Only Venice and the southern fringe of Italy remained loyal to the Emperor, who vainly protested his rights to King Pepin. He had to be content with the dating of papal documents by his regnal years.

The rest of Pepin's reign was occupied with the continuance of the reform of the Frankish Church under his direction, and the thorough conquest of the autonomous vassal-state of Aquitaine, to which he added the hitherto Moorish coastland of Narbonne. In 768 the devout, ambitious king, the maker of momentous innovations, died. In his will he made a further change which betokened the renewed unity of the Frankish realm. Instead of separating Neustria and Austrasia, he left nearly all true Francia to his elder son Charles. To Carloman, the younger, was bequeathed the vassal southern borderland with Burgundy and Alemannia for its kernel. The meaning of this, to us strange, partition must be that the national consciousness of the Franks had much revived, and that national consciousness did not then run on linguistic or geographical lines. The arrangement, in any case, working badly while it lasted, did not last long. In 771 civil war was averted by the death of Carloman, and Charles, the Charlemagne of historic and legendary fame, reunited his father's dominions.

Charlemagne was resolved to dominate the West as no Frankish king had yet done. The affairs of Italy gave him a magnificent opportunity. On Aistulf's death in 756 Stephen II had ingeniously utilized the war of succession which followed among the Lombards to extort a promise from the successful competitor, Desiderius (756-74), to surrender Liutprand's conquests. The Lom-

bard, indeed, only gave up a part of what he promised, but he continually hankered after its recovery, and was tempted to fresh aggression by the altered circumstances of the Papacy itself. The secular policy of Stephen and the temporal power had begun to degrade the Apostolic See. It became an object of ambition to Roman nobles, who had grown barbaric in character during the Dark Age since Gregory the Great. We come to a time of faction-fights for the tiara, in which the factions have political leanings for the Franks, the Lombards, or a Roman isolation. Nor was the new state strong enough to manage its own affairs, for the Archbishop of Ravenna exercised full powers over the remnants of the Exarchate, and interference of the Lombard king or dukes was hard to ward off. Paul I (757-67), Stephen II's brother and successor, contrived to weather the danger for a time, but on his death Desiderius took advantage of the ensuing faction-fight to intervene in Rome. He was temporarily outmanoeuvred by the party he supported, who raised their own nominee, not his, to the papal throne. Stephen III (768-72), however, proved a broken reed. He joined the through-going Lombard partisans and deserted his old friends. Then on his death the anti-Lombards again predominated, electing to the Papacy a Roman noble of high character, Adrian I (772-95).

Stephen III had had good reason for his tergiversation: an alliance between Franks and Lombards, by which Charlemagne married Desiderius' daughter, seemed to give him little hope of independence. Yet Adrian's manly policy of resistance proved at first sight successful. Charlemagne divorced his political bride, and, when Desiderius started reannexing his own and Aistulf's cessions, he invaded Italy at the Pope's call. This time there was no thought of a distant protection. When

the decrepit Lombard kingdom collapsed in 774, and Desiderius was consigned to a Frankish monastery, the conqueror himself ascended the vacant throne. Only the duchy of Benevento kept its independence, a further and decisive step in the separation of north and south Italy.

There remained the question of the papal state. Adrian had thrown off the Byzantine suzerainty, and nominated Charlemagne patrician of the Romans. But the title rapidly began to mean more than it had meant previously, now that there was no rival power to dispute the Frankish supremacy. Soon over the entire papal territory, which he both confirmed and enlarged, Charles was exercising the rights of a suzerain. The Papacy had found the new master it dreaded.

Meanwhile Charlemagne was achieving epoch-making conquests elsewhere. From 778 onwards he intervened in the intestine wars of Moslem Spain with the result of the conquest of the Spanish March round Barcelona. From this conquest, in itself of little worth, the later kingdom of Aragon derived its Languedoc language and some of its national elements¹.

This was a bye-activity. From 772 to 804 Charlemagne's main efforts were bent towards the incorporation of all Germany with Francia. To him it must have appeared a necessary step in the completion of the great Christian monarchy of the West. No trace of heatlndom or independence was to be left among the kindred Germanic races. This conscious aim partly succeeded: Christianity was extended to the Elbe. But the eventual result was to create modern Germany. The pure German races to the east combined with the German-speaking Franks of

¹ In the first unsuccessful campaign of 778 occurred the rearguard disaster of Roncesvalles, where Roland, a real Frankish noble, was slain; it furnished the most famous subject of medieval literature.

Austrasia, whom they drew away from their connexion with the Romance-speaking Franks of later France.

The great foe was the Saxons, who stretched from Austrasia to the Elbe and North Sea. They were the most primitive and conservative of the continental Germans. Obstinate heathen, they were in the main a people of free peasants, a lax federation of *gaus* without a king or central government. A fiercer, more dogged struggle than their conquest never was. Time after time Charlemagne used against them the whole resources of his realm. Time after time they were conquered and Christianized, and revolted again, untamed as ever, under their leading chieftain, Widukind. With ferocity the Frankish king insisted on their submission and conversion—once in 782 he massacred 4500 prisoners—and in the end he won. Saxony was divided into Frankish counties and bishoprics, the most obstinate rebels were transported to other regions, and the whole land settled down as a Christian Frankish dependency.

The annexation of the Christian vassal-state of Bavaria was a simpler matter. In 787-8 its duke Tassilo was deposed, and the land divided into Frankish counties as an integral part of the realm. The conquest brought, however, a serious war with it. The Franks now became the neighbours of the decayed nomad kingdom of the Avars in modern Hungary. Those barbarians had changed little, save in some degeneration, from the uncivilizable invaders of the Eastern Empire in the seventh century¹. Charlemagne resolved to put an end to their marauding tyranny. In 795-6 their kingdom was overthrown and blotted out. Its western portion was formed into the district of Carinthia and rapidly Germanized. The Slavonic tribes further east became Frankish dependents.

¹ Cf. Chapter II, Sections 2 and 3.

Even to the north, between the Elbe and the Oder, the Slavs gave some sort of submission to the invincible Charles.

The government of this vast realm was a secular theocracy. St Augustine's conception of the City of God on earth, opposed to man-made monarchies, was now finally and fully transferred to the actual organization of Christendom. The Christian commonwealth was the City of God. But here a difficulty, which was the plague and inspiration of the remaining Middle Ages, manifested itself. The Christian community was first of all spiritual, organized for spiritual purposes, *i.e.* as a Church, and governed by an ecclesiastical hierarchy. What was to be the relation of this hierarchy to the Christian community organized as a state for temporal purposes and governed by lay officials? St Augustine had been little disturbed by this dualism. For him the lay state was man-made and secondary, and the City of God on earth was not rigidly locked up in the organization of the Church. The unphilosophical Gregory the Great had cheerfully accepted the Divine commission of the Emperor, maintaining at the same time his own claims, professing obedience and liberty of action together. The later Middle Age was to give examples of almost every degree between these two opinions. But Charlemagne and his followers went far beyond Gregory in emphasizing the Divine commission of the kingship. The King, the new David, anointed by the grace of God, was head of the Christian State, and also of the Christian Church in his dominions. The Pope and other bishops were his assistants and sacred guides in spiritual matters.

Charlemagne's conception of government was personal in a high degree. The increased share taken in state-affairs by the free landowners under the earlier Carolings

dwindled rapidly into consultations with the greater nobles. The fields of May became reviews of the host so far as lesser folk were concerned; and only a portion of the lesser folk attended. Military service year by year was a ruinous burden to small farmers in a vast realm with remote frontiers. Charlemagne lightened it by a system of coöperation, but the day was not far distant when the great landowners with their vassals would be the only armed force in most of the West.

The nobles, however, themselves were quite kept in check by their heroic king. Charlemagne's will penetrated to every corner of the realm. The peace of the realm was the King's peace. In spite of the increase of private vassalage and immunities, the obedience of the subject was due in the first place to him. But for the exercise of this royal authority the means were elementary. The central power resided merely in the monarch, who utilized for his councils and commands the members of his household; even the germs of a bureaucracy were absent. The realm was dual, consisting of the Frankish and the Lombard kingdoms; and each was split up into counties, governed by a nominated count who held judicial courts, levied troops and kept order in the king's name. Beside the count stood the bishop who superintended ecclesiastical affairs. On the frontiers were the marches, the rulers of which may be called margraves or marquesses: their authority was greater than the ordinary count's. To control the counts Charlemagne invented a new type of official, the *missi dominici* or royal envoys. The counties were grouped into districts called *missatica*, to which every year *missi* were allotted to remedy abuses and to inspect the conduct of officials and the state of the counties. They were the king's agents, and under Charlemagne's autocratic genius worked well. But they were only

selected magnates, not a body of bureaucratic officials, and under a weak king immediately showed their aristocratic and feudal nature. In fact, the Franks of the eighth century were incapable of conceiving the central power of the state as other than the personality of the patriarchal king.

The same undeveloped character was shown in legal matters. Charlemagne entertained vague schemes of issuing a general code of law like a second Justinian, but he never got further than ordering the writing down of such tribal codes of law as were yet unwritten, and issuing a number of *ad hoc* decrees, capitularies as they were called, in modification of, or in addition to existing laws. No amalgamation was attempted. Each freeman continued under the tribal law, Salic, Lombard etc., into which he was born.

Charlemagne understood his theocratic monarchy in the widest sense. Not only did he keep up the authority over the Frankish Church which his predecessors had exercised, nominating bishops, controlling church property and summoning synods, but he took a predominating share in the Church's administration and in the definition of doctrine. He pressed on the reform of the Church after its Merovingian decadence, never ceasing in his admonitions to bishops and clergy. He encouraged the gradual spread of the Benedictine Rule, as the normal Rule for monks. He enforced the regular payment of tithes, and extended the grants of immunities to church lands, while at the same time controlling the bishops and other tenants of those immunities. If the bishops played an important part in secular government, it was because they were the king's subordinates in their ecclesiastical functions also. Charlemagne acted practically as their and the Pope's superior in the settlement of doctrinal problems.

In the last controversy on the Nature of Our Lord, he obtained in 794 at a synod at Frankfort the condemnation of the Adoptionist¹ view held by Spanish bishops. When in 787 image-worship was renewed in the Byzantine Empire with the Pope's assent, the Frankish Church indignantly repudiated it, allowing images and pictures in churches as reminders and illustrations only. And the Pope had to keep silence. Finally Charlemagne insisted on the retention of the Frankish addition to the Creed, *Filioque*, in spite of the Pope's wish to the contrary². The king must be reckoned one of the furtherers of the eventual schism of East and West.

This theological activity was rendered possible by the literary and artistic Renaissance which was coming about in the West under Charlemagne's aegis. The king, who loved learning and art though he could not read, spared no pains to revive them. He collected the miserable remnants of classic knowledge which existed in Italy, and the wider and deeper learning of England. The Lombard Paulus Diaconus and far more the Northumbrian Alcuin were his chief aiders. Alcuin founded a school of Frankish *littérateurs* and theologians, who could write the corrected Latin of the West. Even handwriting was reformed and improved. At the same time a revival of the arts took place, which is most noticeable in architecture. Churches, elaborately built and adorned with mosaics, of which the most famous is the cathedral in Charlemagne's favourite residence of Aix-la-Chapelle, began to arise, in which native Frankish genius was stimulated and prompted by

¹ By which Christ in His human Nature was only the adopted Son of God.

² That is the Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father *and the Son*, and not from the Father only. The Pope agreed in substance with Charlemagne, but wished to keep the old formula.

Italo-Byzantine and oriental influences. They thus started that northern "Romanesque" style which was to end in "Gothic."

Charlemagne's theocratic monarchy was by no means without its difficulties in theory and sentiment, difficulties which bulked larger in imagination than in reality, but which still obviously threatened the permanent hold of his dominion on men's consciences. He set up the ideal of a universal civilized Christian monarchy. Yet every one looked back to the universal monarchy of Rome, and to its continuation, obviously civilized and Christian, at Constantinople. Beside the Emperor Charles perhaps might feel the danger of appearing a mere powerful barbarian king. This may account partly for the angry self-assertion of Frankish theologians in the image-worshipping controversy. They were determined not to be accounted as mere appendages of Christendom by the arrogant Byzantines. In the same way Charlemagne exercised domination over the Pope, the primate of Christendom. Yet he held his rank of Roman patrician by the Pope's nomination, and there was yet a lurking feeling that it was not right that a German king should bear rule in Rome to the exclusion of the Roman Emperor and the subjecting of the Roman Pope. Charles and his friends seem to have met this feeling by the strong assertion of the God-given dominion of the Franks, contrasted with the heathen origin of the Empire, and by the practical use of their supremacy. When Pope Leo III succeeded Adrian I in 795, he adopted Charlemagne's regnal years in his documents, and thus submitted expressly to the Frankish suzerainty. A little later he was the prime mover in a symbolic and epoch-making event.

Leo, though a Roman, was unpopular and weak. In 799 he was mutilated and imprisoned by his enemies.

He fled to Francia to the king's protection. Charlemagne decided to take the Pope's side, and next year brought him back to Rome, where he was allowed to clear himself by a voluntary oath from the accusations which his enemies made against him. Then on Christmas Day 800 the Pope endeavoured to requite his rescuer. While Charles knelt in prayer in St Peter's, he placed a golden crown on the king's head; the concourse acclaimed him as Emperor and Augustus; then the Pope adored his sovran in Byzantine fashion.

It was an attempt to make a revolution in legal form. Rome was still a capital of the Roman Republic, and could choose her Emperor; and by Byzantine custom an Emperor, elected in the vacancy of the throne and not nominated by his predecessor as co-regent, was crowned by the Patriarch. The act was tumultuary, but it was rather the long severance of Rome from the Empire and the actual position of Charles as a Frankish king which gave it its unreal character. Facts could not be changed. The real Roman Empire subsisted in the East; Charlemagne's monarchy remained what it had been before. The name was a little changed, and that was all.

Yet Charlemagne's imperial coronation was the concluding scene in one series of events, and contained the germ of much later history. First, it was the seal of the fusion of barbarians and Romans, so long in process. Now a German mounted the throne of the Caesars. It was the symbol of a general blending by which a new, though yet inchoate, type of civilization had been created. Secondly, it gave shape to conceptions of the State and of government, which in their turn, by their compelling force as articles of belief, moulded medieval history. Henceforward, the City of God on earth—Christendom—was conceived of as the Roman Empire. It was the

divinely-constituted government, since Christ Himself paid tribute to Caesar, and by Augustus all the world was taxed. It was to last as long as the world itself to secure peace and law and righteousness for Christians. Thus the theocracy of Charlemagne coalesced with the prestige of Roman civilization to form a new theoretical world-monarchy, by turns the inspiration and the *ignis fatuus* of medieval politics.

But what were the prerogatives of that theocracy? Charlemagne looked on it as the complete leadership of Christendom. That could not be the view of all. The general belief in the superiority of the priesthood with their spiritual functions over lay magnates with their temporal functions made it impossible in the long run to assert the rule of a layman over Christendom viewed as a Church as he ruled over Christendom viewed as a State. And the place of ruler of the Christian Church was filled by its primate, the Pope of Rome. Thus a dualism was present from the start. Christendom was directed by two bodies of officials, each with its chief, the Holy Roman Emperor and the Holy Roman Pope. At first the Emperors kept up their complete theocratic claims. It was not till after 1100, as we shall see, that they consented to be merely the lay protectors of the Church. To the last they maintained their direct commission from God to rule the lay state. The theory of the two swords¹ was adopted, by which Pope and Emperor were each independent in their own sphere. Meanwhile the Popes enlarged their claims; scarcely had they gained independence than they claimed superiority. Spiritual things were greater than temporal things. Therefore the Emperors were merely their temporal

¹ Derived allegorically from Luke xxii. 38. "Lord, behold here are two swords. And he said unto them, It is enough."

lieutenants. The theocratic creed was transferred to the Papacy from the Empire, and Christendom in their view was wholly under the direction of the Successor of St Peter. The claim was supported by the fact of the surprise coronation of Charlemagne by the Pope. Within a century it was the conviction of all, that an Emperor could only be created by his coronation in Rome by the Pope's hands; and the Popes quickly asserted that he was only Emperor by their creation. Here again lay resistance was inevitable, and found expression in a further general belief that a certain monarch, the German King, was by rights ruler of the Empire and entitled to the papal coronation. It is strange now how these diverse theories and beliefs could so drag events after them, but they had the thrust of the desire for peace and law and right and for eternal salvation behind them, and were the justification for insatiable ambitions and the pride of race and class.







To Charlemagne the immediate practical difficulty was to find a Roman Empire over which to rule. He remained King of the Franks and the Lombards. His Roman lands consisted of the papal territories, where up to 800 he had ruled as patrician, and perhaps a few towns in Istria seized from the Byzantines. In 802 he more or less included his kingdoms in the Empire by a new universal oath of allegiance. But the main problem was to get recognition from the Byzantines, among whom the real Roman Empire persisted. He wished them to acknowledge him as co-regent Emperor, a task rendered harder by the fact that the never-forgotten unity of the Roman Empire made his new title seem a claim to the Byzantine throne itself. Indeed his friends declared that in 800 the imperial throne was vacant, for a woman possessed it, the infamous Irene who had blinded and

deposed her own son. Charles himself was ready to marry Irene, and so settle the question, till she was happily dethroned in 802. Eventually an agreement was come to. Charlemagne ceded the suzerainty of Venice, which he had failed to annex, to the Eastern Empire, and was himself acknowledged as Western Emperor by the Byzantines. They soon withdrew their recognition, but it did not matter. A new Roman Empire, in a way the medieval legend of the old, had been set up in the West, and ran its separate course.


Charlemagne was still dubious how to assort his new dignity with his Frankish kingdom. Still more than Pepin the Short he disliked divisions of the old type. To his younger sons, Pepin and Lewis, he gave frontier kingdoms, Italy and Aquitaine. To his eldest son, Charles, he reserved Francia and the general suzerainty. For the Empire, he made no arrangements till the deaths of his two elder sons solved the problem. Then at Aix-la-Chapelle in 813, following Byzantine precedent, he associated the survivor, Lewis, with himself as Emperor. Pepin's son, Bernard, was appointed vassal-king of the district of Italy, not, be it noted, of all his father's share. Shortly after in 814 the great Emperor died.

Charlemagne was personally first and foremost an Austrasian Frank; he spoke German; he dwelt by preference in German-speaking lands along the Rhine; he was fond of German sagas and songs; one chief effort of his life was to unite Germany under the Franks. Few men have possessed the ruler's genius to the same extent as Charles. Power to organize (an anachronism then) was not his in any high degree: but power to lead men and to secure obedience, to shape and guide a policy, to attend to and understand the most various pursuits, all these were his in rare perfection. And he had the

- Boundary of lands ruled by Pepin the Short.
- - - - Boundaries of Charlemagne's annexations.
- „ „ lands tributary to Charlemagne.
- ++++ Boundary of East Roman Empire.

- Teutonic speaking peoples 
- Romance speaking peoples 
- Roman speaking population mixed with Moors 
- Mixed Romance and Slavonic speaking population 
- Slavonic speaking peoples 
- Keltic speaking peoples 

NOTE. The Northmen did not settle in Ireland till the X century.



EUROPE IN A.D. 814

qualities which enabled him to use his powers, a giant form and strength, a tireless energy, a penetrating judgment, resolution, perseverance, and courage physical and moral. He was an amiable autocrat, generous, kindly and candid, and the darker shades of his character, ambition, occasional cruelty and incontinence, could not destroy the nobility of the main traits. No saint, but a hero, in a way he deserved his later canonization.

The most part of his influence on the later Middle Ages, his theocracy, his Holy Roman Empire, his renaissance, have already been described. To the rise of feudalism he added no new ingredients. But in other directions he made epoch-making progress. He united the German tribes in his Frankish realm, and thus made a German kingdom possible, when Latin and Teuton fell asunder. And in the second place he bound together Italy and the transalpine lands. On the one hand, the wars for Italy were to dominate European political development: on the other, the close connexion of the Popes with the North in the unity of the Frankish empire allowed the growth of the greatest power of medieval times, the centralized, civilizing, all-pervading Papacy.

CHAPTER IV

THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEUDALISM

SECTION I. THE TIMES OF ANARCHY

The maintenance of Charlemagne's theocracy, impossible as the task was in any case, fell to a man most unfit. Lewis the Pious was devout and weak, and rapidly the control of the real forces within the Empire—most of them disruptive in tendency—slipped from his hands. A cardinal principle of the theocratic monarchy was the subordination of the Pope and the Church, the strongest ties of the ill-compacted realm and the most formidable rivals to the secular Emperor. Here Lewis soon lost ground. The Pope recovered part of his independence; the bishops, headed by their metropolitans, grew freer in their action and influence; and a clerical party, which looked to Rome for leadership, was formed. Meanwhile the great nobles, among whom the bishops are also to be reckoned, were getting out of hand in their offices and immunities. The *missi dominici*, who had kept them under control and surveillance, were chosen from among the magnates of the very district which they oversaw, and the imperial supervision was thus in a way to become a dead letter.

Lewis began his reign with a desire to safeguard the unity of the Empire after his death. In 817 he associated his eldest son Lothair with him in the Empire, and allotted

to his younger sons, Pepin and Lewis (the German), subordinate kingships only in Aquitaine and Bavaria. Shortly afterwards Bernard of Italy was deprived on the ground of rebellion, and blinded so roughly that he died. His kingdom was given to Lothair, who took energetic steps to assert the imperial authority in the Papal State. But the Emperor's schemes were upset by his own second marriage to the Welf Empress Judith, and the birth of a fourth son to him, Charles (the Bald). Henceforward his chief object seemed to be the endowment of Charles. In 829 he began the feuds which were to break up the Empire by allotting him Swabia out of Lothair's share. A series of revolts followed, in which sometimes all, sometimes one or other of the elder sons joined. Scheme after scheme of inheritance was brought forward. Twice the Emperor was deposed and restored. When he died in 840, Pepin was dead, Charles the Bald ruled in Neustria, Lewis the German east of the Rhine, and Lothair in Austrasia, Burgundy and Italy, all three faithless and greedy for more. The quarrel was fought out in 841 at the battle of Fontenay where Charles and Lewis combined against Lothair and defeated him with fearful slaughter. Two years after in 843 the three came to an agreement at Verdun. Charles the Bald took Neustria, Aquitaine and the Spanish March; Lothair took Friesland and Austrasia as far as the Rhine, Burgundy, Provence and Italy; Lewis the German received Austrasian Francia east of the Rhine, Bavaria, Swabia and Saxony. The treaty of Verdun marks the end of the Frankish Empire; Lothair kept indeed the title of Emperor, but his brothers were independent sovereigns. So, too, the Frankish nation was finally divided. The great monarchies of modern Europe have their first beginning in 843. They were already roughly distinguished by difference of language.

Charles' subjects mainly spoke Romance, Lewis' German¹. Lothair's intermediate strip between the two was obviously artificial—it was devised to give him the two capitals of Rome and Aix-la-Chapelle and a portion of Francia—and was soon to break up.

The division of the Empire brought neither peace nor order nor prosperity. The depletion of the royal demesne in each kingdom went on apace, and, as the kings grew poorer, their vassals whom they endowed grew more insubordinate. Within forty years after the treaty of Verdun, a further consequence of royal weakness and aristocratic strength was clear. The benefices, both offices and lands, of the king's vassals had become hereditary, and descended from father to son like allodial, *i.e.* non-feudal, property. And chief among the royal vassals were the counts, who thus reigned as petty princes over their counties. But disintegration did not stop there. The bishops and the greater immunists established their independence of the counts, and even the lesser proprietors, the vassals of the various *grandees*, exercised a free authority, which was little trammelled by that of their overlords. In short anarchy set in. The public authority, whether of king or count, was not quite in abeyance, but it was inefficient to check the private government and the endless private wars of the struggling atoms into which the Empire had dissolved. The chief force making for order which was left was the tie of vassalage. This, although not yet crystallized into true feudalism, yet provided a framework and local centres round which the anarchic military, or knightly in later language, class of

¹ It will be most convenient henceforth to speak of Charles the Bald's dominions—West Francia—as France, Lewis the German's—East Francia—as Germany, using the modern names, in spite of the slight anachronism. Lothair's Mid Francia, as apart from Burgundy or Italy, was called after him Lotharingia or Lorraine.

landowners grouped themselves, and unknowingly re-created the government of the state in a localized and particularist form. While the tie of the subject to the sovran slipped gradually all but out of sight, and the tie of the royal vassals, who did not live at court, to the king grew feebler and feebler, the tie of a vassal to his private lord, reinforced by local connexion and economic and social dependence, grew stronger and became the main bond of society.

The decadence of the kingship and the state was hastened by the fratricidal folly of the Carolingian princes. Regardless of their own true interest and that of their kingdoms, they intrigued and warred against one another in the vain ambition of increasing their nominal dominions. When one was in difficulties the others would attack him. At the same time they still practised the division of their realms between all male heirs, and so increased the general weakness and confusion. When Emperor Lothair died in 855, his eldest son, the Emperor Lewis II the Young, took Italy, while, of the younger sons, Lothair II took Lotharingia and northern Burgundy, and Charles Provence. Charles died young, leaving his kingdom to his brothers. Lothair II, after a disgraceful reign, died in 869, when his uncles Lewis the German and Charles the Bald divided Lotharingia between them. The death of the gallant Emperor Lewis the Young in 875 gave Charles the Bald an opportunity to seize the imperial crown, with Italy and Provence; Charles' own decease in 877, followed by that of his son Louis II, the Stammerer in 879, allowed the three sons of Lewis the German to annex the rest of Lotharingia, and Boso Duke of Provence to set up an independent kingdom. Finally, by the deaths of his relatives Charles the Fat of Germany, the most incompetent of all, was enabled in 884 to reunite for three unhappy

years the Empire with the exception of Provence. On his deposition in 887, the constituent kingdoms fell apart again. Germany chose Arnulf, an illegitimate Carolingian; France Eudes the valiant Count of Paris; Provence Lewis, later called the Blind, son of King Boso; Jurane Burgundy, between the Saône and the Alps, the Welf Rudolf; while Italy was disputed between Berengar Marquess of Friuli and Guido Marquess of Spoleto. Most of these kings acknowledged Arnulf as their suzerain, but the separation of the European nations was an accomplished fact, although national self-consciousness was a plant of slow growth.

The decadence of the royal power, the civil wars, and the perpetual feuds were sufficient causes of ruin, but they were intensified, and the wreck of Western Europe was made complete, by fresh barbarian inroads. The new enemies were three, the Northmen, the Saracens and the Hungarians, all terrible in war.

Northmen was the general name for the three Scandinavian nations, Swedes, Norwegians and Danes, all dwelling approximately in their present territories. They were Germanic peoples of a backward type, differing little from the German tribes which had invaded the Roman Empire four centuries earlier. Like the Anglo-Saxons they were seafarers. Their raids and migrations were all accomplished by sea in their shallow open boats, half-rowed, half-sailing, which might contain some sixty fighting men. In these they sailed up the estuaries and navigable rivers, ravaging the land in horrible fashion. If they were few, they could easily elude the slowly-gathered native forces; if many, they could fight with good chance of success. Walled cities gave but little security: they were taken and sacked. The Northmen's arms were those of the period, chiefly lance, sword and battleaxe, with shield, helmet, and a coat of linked mail;

only they were better provided with them than their victims were. They readily took to horse and were skilful in all the tricks of war. Their religion was still the old Germanic heathenism, and their favourite prey was the wealthy churches and monasteries. Why they began their attacks so late is hard to say, but it seems that by 800 they were become far too numerous for their native land and its barren soil.

The Swedes had a sphere of activity apart from their kindred tribes. Under the name of Varangians or Russians they moved down the trade-route from the Baltic to Constantinople, conquering the native Slavs, and founding towards 860 the Russian monarchy at Novgorod and Kiev. They soon became assimilated to their Slav subjects, and for centuries the descendants of Rurik the Swede ruled the state he created.

Russia, however, throughout the Middle Ages belongs entirely to East European history. In western lands the Northmen were mainly Danes and Norse, although many Swedes were mingled in their bands. Danes and Norwegians, too, had their favourite plunder-grounds. The Norse moved round the coasts of Scotland and Ireland, the Danes preferred the English coasts, while both together assailed the Western Empire. At first the attacks of all these freebooters were mere raids, immensely destructive, but yet sporadic and not pushed home. This phase lasted from *c.* 800 to *c.* 850. Then about the latter date a fresh impulse was given which turned the raids into invasions. The intestine feuds of the Northmen had a singular ending. Harold Fairhair in Norway, Gorm the Old in Denmark, and Eric in Sweden succeeded in conquering the rival chiefs and founding national monarchies. A swarm of malcontents was thus let loose on the West, this time in search of new homes. Henceforward the Northmen came

to settle, beginning as was natural at the estuaries and harbours.

The importance and permanence of these settlements varied greatly. In the Keltic kingdom of Scotland, once the Pictish kingdom, Orkney and the adjacent coasts were conquered for good; yet with no wide-reaching effects. The Norse, who founded an island state from the Hebrides to Man and Dublin, were able to ruin the elder Irish civilization, but were hard to absorb and added no fresh life to the country. Their aggressions were put an end to in 1014, when the high-king of Ireland, Brian Boroi-mhe, overthrew them at the battle of Clontarf. The anarchic tribal government of Ireland only deteriorated under their assaults.

In kindred England, on the other hand, the Danish conquest was effective in two ways. The east of the country from the Tees to the Thames fell into the Danes' hands, and a vigorous element was added to the population. The reaction against them caused the growth of a united English kingdom. Under the leadership of her heroic King Alfred (871-900) Wessex at last repelled the invaders, and, when in 878 the peace of Wedmore surrendered the east to them, the Danes there became Christian, and western Mercia was annexed to Wessex. Alfred's successors resumed the war and finally subdued the Danelaw, as the Danish land was named, so that Edgar the Peaceable (959-75) could reign as unquestioned king of all England. But the England Edgar ruled was making quick strides towards feudalism with its weak impoverished king and overpowerful local nobility. This made room for a new invasion and a further Danish influence. During the reign of Athelred the Redeless (978-1016) the new Danish kingdom turned to foreign aggression. Both Norway and England were conquered by its fierce heathen king Sweyn,

and England was subdued by long years of merciless harrying. In the end Canute (1016-35), Sweyn's son and successor, ascended the English throne and became a Christian along with his people. Norway, which he reconquered towards the close of his reign, had been also forcibly converted to Christianity by her native king, St Olaf (1015-31). Thus England formed part of a Scandinavian realm, Christian indeed, but otherwise much severed from those continental connexions which had so powerfully worked for her good since St Augustine of Canterbury. The loss was to be made up strangely by new half-Scandinavian invaders.

The whole coast of the Western Empire as far as Tuscany suffered under the horrible scourge of the Northmen, but the West Franks, or French, were their chief objective. Germany escaped easily in comparison. The unattractive Saxony was but once or twice invaded. Friesland, however, was temporarily wrecked and the island of Walcheren at the mouth of the Rhine and the Meuse became the headquarters of a colony, whence the Northmen ravaged Lotharingia and sacked its cities. Years of devastation were ended at last by the German king Arnulf who in 891 captured the Northmen's camp at Louvain and reconquered Walcheren.

France, also, was a prey to the Walcheren colony while it lasted, but still more terrible to her were the Northmen settled at the mouths of the Loire and the Seine. Those of the Loire harried Aquitaine and the centre till Charles the Bald succeeded in reducing them to submission at Angers in 873. Those at the mouth of the Seine were reinforced continually by fresh wandering bands, and threatened almost to overthrow the kingdom. But France was saved by the resistance of the great nobles, whose chiefs were dukes in Neustria. Eudes, Count of Paris,

son of Robert the Strong, held out in Paris against the full strength of the Northmen for a whole year, 885-6. If in the end the invaders only retreated on payment of a ransom by the craven Emperor Charles the Fat, a limit had been set to their ravage, and by a natural process Paris, the bulwark of France, became the chief French city and Eudes, her count, king of the French (888-98) and ancestor of the Capetian dynasty. It was, however, his Carolingian rival, Charles the Simple (893-923), who disposed of the Northman peril. In 912, following Alfred of England's example, he made a treaty with the Northmen's chief Rollo at St Clair-sur-Epte. Rollo and his men became Christians and subjects of Charles. The land they held became the French duchy of Normandy, and in a few generations they were French-speaking and the protagonists of French civilization. No race, in fact, was more imitative or adaptable than the Northmen, or more strenuous in carrying out what they learnt. Norman knights were soon famous all over Europe for great achievements with small means. And to their energy and adventurousness they added a power to rule and organize unparalleled since the Romans. These universal borrowers could invent one all-important thing, the framework of a government.

Merely destructive, on the other hand, was the influence of the Saracens. After hard fighting (827-78) with the Byzantines, the Emirs of Kairawan in Africa made themselves masters of Sicily. Meanwhile their fleets, seconded by hordes of lesser pirates often from Spain, destroyed Mediterranean commerce and ravaged the coasts and interior of Italy and France. In 843 the suburbs of Rome itself and the churches of St Peter and St Paul were sacked. The Emperor Lewis II (855-75) strove heroically against the Saracen pest, and all but

drove them from their strongholds in southern Italy; but he was ruined by the faithless selfishness of his ally the Duke of Benevento. On the death of Lewis north Italy and the Papal State fell into feudal disorder, and soon into civil wars between rivals for the Italian and imperial crowns. The south was in miserable anarchy under the Saracen scourge. At length Pope John X succeeded in forming a general league of the Italian powers against the Moslems, of which the most important member was the Byzantine Emperor. In 916 the Saracen settlement on the Garigliano was exterminated by the league, and henceforth their piracy declined. The Greeks, as chief victors, became the dominant power in south Italy.

But the Saracens could still torment the north. About 894 they seized Frainet on the coast of Provence. Thence they devastated for many years both sides of the Alps. Provence and west Lombardy were almost equal sufferers. The trade over the Alpine passes nearly ceased, while kings and magnates were too intent on their own quarrels to root out the colony. At last a combination of great nobles, about the year 972, took effective action and destroyed Frainet. A revival could then commence, although Saracen piracy in spite of its decrease continued the plague of the western Mediterranean.

Meanwhile neither eastern Italy nor Germany escaped the general misery. Their tormentors were the Hungarians or Magyars, a mixed people of Finns and Turks, whose way of life was mainly Turkish. They were wild, fierce nomads, archer-horsemen, like the Huns and Avars. In 893 Arnulf of Germany called them to his aid against the powerful Slav kingdom of Moravia. Two years after the whole people left their earlier halting-place on the Black Sea and occupied the present Hungary, left vacant by the exterminated Avars or held by Slavs. They destroyed

the Moravian kingdom; in 907 they overthrew the Bavarians, and thenceforward ravaged Germany as far as the Rhine and the North Sea; in 899 King Berengar I of Italy had been equally routed, and Lombardy suffered the same fate; in 924 they crossed the Alps and ravaged Provence. For years their bands raided the West leaving desolation in their track. Yet feuds and anarchy raged unceasingly in the stricken lands. Not till 933 did Henry I of Germany first check the Magyars near Merseburg. New fortified towns were built in Germany; most walled cities in Lombardy had held out. So gradually the area of Hungarian incursions grew less, till at last Otto the Great of Germany ruined their main army in the battle of the R. Lech in 955. The Hungarian peril then came to an end. The Magyars were themselves changing by intermixture with subject Slavs and captives, and in 1000 under their king Stephen I they accepted Christianity, adding a new and warlike nation to Western Europe.

A complete anarchy resulted from the breakdown of the royal power, the feuds, and barbaric invasions. Only the feudal lords could hold their own, entrenched in their castles and commanding their armed vassals. The theory of government remained the same, but the kings were little more than landowners more or less powerful. The counts and dukes were often strong as feudal lords. But great and small vassals, barons and knights, ruled their lands and fought out their quarrels at their will. The peasantry and townsfolk, pillaged by heathen and tyrannized over by the knightly class, lived in miserable dependence. Their ill-armed footmen were obsolete and helpless beside the mail-clad expert horsemen of the barons. None the less the knightly class saved the West. They fought the barbarians in detail, broke their impact, and be-reaved them of their booty. Finally they crushed them

in pitched battles. Thus the mailed horseman and his fenced castle did their work. Some towns, some monasteries remained untouched, to carry on the work of re-civilization.

How dire was the need for a renaissance may be seen by the condition of the Papacy which had once been a civilizing energy. A kind of compromise had been arrived at between Lothair and Lewis II and the Popes. The imperial supremacy in the government of the Papal State was admitted, while the spiritual claims of the Popes increased till they amounted to the full rule of Christendom, bishops and kings alike being absolutely subject to the Successor of St Peter. These claims were furthered by a stupendous forgery, the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, which were composed in Neustria about 850. The Decretals, which were foisted on early Popes, declared the complete inferiority of the lay state to the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and they made the hierarchy impregnable and uncontrolled in relation to its clerical inferiors. The Pope, in this conception, stood at the apex of the hierarchy, accountable to no man and wielding an ecclesiastical dictatorship. Such a view had been long in growth before it was so definitely set forth in its extremest form. St Augustine of Hippo had laid the foundation in the *City of God*, Gregory the Great had been an active builder, Charlemagne's theocracy had furnished a model and a preparation. Now in the ruin of the Carolingian Empire the medieval Papacy reached full consciousness of its ambitions. Nicholas I, one of the greatest of the Popes (858-67), eagerly adopted the whole theory of the forged Decretals, and acted on it with success. He crushed the resistance of the wretched Lothair II of Lotharingia and his metropolitans, when the king committed flagrant bigamy with their support. The Eastern Empire, indeed, was again severed from Rome. A new schism, the

Photian, began, in which the dispute over the words *filioque* in the creed was revived; but the East would never have accepted papal absolutism. Nicholas was the inspirer of later Popes, Gregory VII and Innocent III. He was thus a moulder of history; but at the time his success was transitory. Pope John VIII (872-82) did, it is true, contrive to dispose of the imperial crown and claimed that it was in the gift of the Apostolic See. But the shadow-Emperors, Charles the Bald and Charles the Fat, whom he created, could not protect him, the Roman landed nobility defied his peaceful bureaucracy, and he was murdered in a revolution. The Papacy became the prey of baronial factions and sank into utter demoralization. The Popes were the creatures of abandoned women, so that it was a turn for the better when a baronial leader, Alberic, gained despotic power in Rome, and made them his servile instruments.

SECTION 2. GERMANY AND THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE

In Germany, of all the kingdoms which arose from the wrecks of the Carolingian Empire, the power of the state had declined least and feudalism had made the slowest progress. The royal demesnes were still large. The number of allodial landowners, many of them by no means wealthy, was still considerable, especially in Saxony. The prepotency of the great landowners, in spite of their importance, was not so pronounced as elsewhere, and their immunities were not so wide-reaching or so destructive of the older system of local government, although Franconia, *i.e.* that part of Austrasian Francia which fell to Lewis the German, was markedly more feudalized than the rest of Germany. Lotharingia, which approached more nearly to French conditions, was in the ninth century not an integral part, but an occasional annex of the German kingdom.

But Germany had her own special causes of weakness. She was composed of four main races, the Franconians, the Alemanni or Swabians, the Bavarians, and the Saxons, who very imperfectly realized their common destiny. The centrifugal tendencies of the four sub-nations constantly imperilled the realm and were with difficulty restrained by the prestige of the Carolingians and the influence of the Church, which here, as in England, attained earliest to the conception of a German nation and found the national king a preferable master to the local magnates. It was, as elsewhere, the barbaric invasions which gave the centrifugal forces their opportunity. Local chiefs of fame took the lead in resistance, and founded or re-founded sub-national dukedoms; the Liudolfings became Dukes of Saxony, the Liutpoldings Dukes of Bavaria. Lewis the German may have hoped to check them in apportioning the sub-nations among his sons, but the extinction of the Carolingian house gave the victory to the Dukes. When Lewis the Child (899-911), Arnulf's son, died, each race had its Duke, even the Lotharingians who then transferred their allegiance to the Carolingian Charles the Simple of France. King Conrad I of Franconia (911-18) carried on the strife in vain. His successor, Henry I the Fowler (918-36), Duke of Saxony, frankly accepted the new state of things. Outside his native Saxony, he was only suzerain of the Dukes. Yet he began the revival of Germany, for he repelled the Hungarians, and recovered Lotharingia, and left a strong state, with great influence and traditional powers over its vassal sub-nations, to his son, Otto I the Great (936-73).

Otto the Great started his reign with the determination to restore the royal authority and to recover at least the dominant position of Arnulf, to whose rights and claims he considered himself the heir. The Dukes were to remain,

but as removable royal officials. They were to rule the counts in their duchies, but not the bishops. The Slavs on the eastern frontier were to be subdued and Christianized. The other kings within the limits of the Carolingian Empire were to be vassals or dependants of Germany. The first obstacle to this programme was the sub-national Dukes. Over them Otto's victory was complete by 941. His scheme then was to appoint either members of his family or personal friends to the duchies, but it worked indifferently. The tendency of the Dukes to identify themselves with the particularist feeling of their duchies, and to revolt on any personal grievance, was too strong, and Otto had to fight a severe civil war with his nominees from 953 to 955 before they submitted to the strict subordination he demanded.

One of the greatest achievements of Otto's reign was his defeat of the Hungarians on the R. Lech in 955, by which he freed Germany and Europe from those mortal foes of civilization. But his eastern policy did not stop there: he was intent on extending Germany towards the east. He created the march of Austria proper from his Hungarian conquests; he made the Slav state of Bohemia Christian and his vassal; and he portioned out the Slav tribes between Saxony and the Oder in further marches. The plan was to extend the German race. The new marches were placed under margraves who ruled with ducal powers; Austria and the middle Elbe region were thickly colonized with Germans; and new bishoprics were created to Christianize and Germanize the Slavs. Thus began that extension of Germany eastward which has continued to the present day. There were many setbacks, but Otto was the founder of the movement which created Prussia and Austria.

On the west Otto was more cautiously aggressive. He

succeeded in making himself the patron of the weak French Carolingian, Louis d'Outremer, in his hopeless struggle against his overpowerful vassals. He also secured the suzerainty of Jurane Burgundy and aided its young king Conrad to acquire the dissolving realm of Provence. By this means he barred either French or Italian intervention in the united kingdom of Burgundy and safeguarded his south-western frontier.

The value of Otto's western policy was shown when his ambition led him to Italian conquests. Italy was a tempting country to invade. Her lot in the anarchy had been as miserable as that of France. In the south, although the Byzantines had established a secure and extortionate rule over Apulia and Calabria, the duchy of Benevento had split into fragments and anarchic wars were in progress. In Rome itself Alberic ruled unchallenged, as head of the feudal aristocracy, and when he died in 954 could leave his dominion to his son Octavian. The former exarchate, however, had become part of the kingdom of Italy. That kingdom was now distracted by the selfish ambition of the greater nobles, the Marquesses as they were styled, a title somewhat analogous to the German Duke. Their desire was to have a powerless king, and they faithlessly invited rivals to contest the kingship. Some kind of order was restored by the faithless and cruel king Hugh from Provence (926-45), but in the end he was turned out by Berengar II (950-62) Marquess of Ivrea. Here was Otto's opportunity. Berengar had at first ruled under the name of Hugh's son Lothair II (931-50). On the young king's death, he tried to force his widow Adelaide to marry his own co-regent son Adalbert, and Otto came to the rescue. He easily conquered Lombardy and married the rescued Adelaide; and, when his hopes of attaining the imperial

crown were frustrated by Alberic's refusal to admit him in Rome, returned to Germany as the suzerain of Berengar. The Italian king, whose realm was maimed by the cession of east Lombardy to form the German march of Verona, soon revolted, and Otto, when his own hands were free, found a new pretext to intervene. Octavian of Rome, a most unpriestly youth, had united his despotism with the Papacy under the style of Pope John XII. In a quarrel with Berengar he called for the aid of Otto, who in 961 marched triumphantly to Rome and was crowned Emperor. Berengar was captured next year and Otto united the German and Italian kingdoms. Soon Pope and Emperor fell out, and John was deposed, to the scandal of the strong party which believed a Pope unamenable to the sentence of any synod. Otto, however, carried his purpose through, and died in undisputed supremacy after his son Otto II had been crowned co-regent Emperor in 967.

The Holy Roman Empire re-founded by Otto the Great was intended to be the revival of the Roman Empire of Charlemagne. There was much resemblance in the character and ideas of the two Empires. Otto was acknowledged as the secular chief of Western Christendom, and ruled a large part of it; his position in the Papal State was not dissimilar; still more important was the belief, universal in the West, that he was the successor of Charlemagne and Constantine and Augustus. Yet the Holy Roman Empire was but a shadow of Charlemagne's, and that not wholly owing to the superficial, if strong and capable, character of Otto himself, who was glad to drape his aggressions in Charlemagne's robe. There was a real element of universality in Charlemagne's theocratic monarchy which was lacking in Otto's realm. By Otto's time the sentiment of nationality due to language and

historic continuity had begun, though faintly and blindly, to make itself felt; Germans, Frenchmen and Italians formed peoples apart, for all the wide fissures which existed within each inchoate nation. And the fact that the ecumenic Empire had disappeared made more prominent the ecumenic character of the Western Church under the Pope. The boundaries of Empire and Church no longer approximately coincided. The kings of France and England admitted only a vague superiority in the Romano-Germanic Emperor, but the national churches of England, France and Germany acknowledged their ecclesiastical obedience to the Roman Pope. Thus Otto had to be content with a mere *de facto* power over the Papacy in its ecclesiastical functions. He never even conceived what Charlemagne's theocracy had been, although he secured a share in the appointment of the Popes. His outlook was narrower. Nor, though his power was great, had he anything like the control which Charlemagne had exercised on the daily government of his lands. The anarchy and rising feudalism had swept away the habit of submitting to a central authority. Government from the centre had become intermittent, however forcible and obeyed from time to time. The Empire, keeping the peace, and based on armed force, rested by necessity on feudal support, on the knightly class, which was also the enemy of its world-wide, orderly ideal. The Papacy, although in its deepest degradation, never forgot its claims, and, resting on general belief and an ecclesiastical hierarchy, ran much less danger of seeing its inner essence lastingly nullified and contradicted by its practical embodiment.

It is evident, therefore, that, although the Holy Roman Empire, by preserving and nourishing the idea of the secular state, rendered inestimable service to human progress, its ecumenic claims would mainly add strength

to the growth of the Papacy, which, unlike it, was really constituted on ecumenic lines. A conflict between the two world-claiming powers, which were so bound together by geography and history, was also inevitable. But the form that conflict took, and, in part, the ruin of the German kingdom were due to a peculiarity of Otto's policy. He was faced by the insubordination of hereditary feudal lords and landowners and by the particularist strivings of sub-national dukes. The royal demesnes and the royal authority were still extensive, but insufficient, and Otto based his power on the German Church he controlled. The Carolingians had appointed bishops and abbots, had granted them immunities and made free with their lands to endow the royal vassals. Otto went much farther. He made the bishops his chief secular agents and most trustworthy vassals. There was no fear, in their case, of creating new overweening hereditary officials, since their office was purely personal. Secular functions and immunities, whole counties, were heaped on them by the king and his successors. They were soon as powerful as any lay magnate. Chosen from among the royal chaplains, and employed either in the central government or in the local care of the king's interests, they became a kind of educated laymen. A bishop might be years absent from his diocese owing to his duties at court. The church lands provided a specially large proportion of the royal army. Thus Otto recovered control of much local government, by seeming to grant it away, and secured faithful, powerful adherents over Germany, and after 962 over Italy likewise. The arrangement, however, had its dangers. The granted lands and privileges were given to the Church. Otto assumed that they remained royal benefices, and the ecclesiastical office of bishop or abbot to which they were annexed was looked on as a royal

benefice too. Thus his nominees became his vassals by homage and fealty, and the abuse, already customary, by which the king invested his bishop with staff and ring and the words, "Receive the Church of N.¹," became the expression of his claims: the bishop exercised his ecclesiastical authority by the king's grant. It could be and was later justified by an appeal to the king's theocratic claims or merely as an investiture of the bishop's secular authority. But the contradiction could not last. Bishops appointed for secular purposes were as a rule bad spiritual officers: a reform movement, when it came, was certain to demand their liberation from the king. And the German Church was part of the Western Church under the Pope. Whenever the Papacy should be freed from its degradation, the bishops would serve two masters, to both of whom their obedience was essential, and in the realm of beliefs and ideas the Roman Pope was far stronger than the feudalized Emperor, who had no jurisdiction over the other world. The Emperor would be crippled by a general fear of damnation, as well as by the obvious fact that bishops and abbots were in the first place church officials.

Two other weak points were hid in the imposing structure of Otto's empire. The German kingdom since the extinction of the Carolingians had been purely elective, and in spite of the king's efforts the princes, as the great nobles were called, would never give up their valuable privilege. At critical moments the realm always suffered loss by it. Then the union with Italy rested in reality on force alone. However much the Italians might acknowledge their claims, the Emperors had always to fight their way south for their coronation, and spend energies, which were urgently needed at home, in obtaining and

¹ Accipe ecclesiam.

keeping their dominion beyond the Alps. And the conviction that the imperial crown was only to be won from the Pope's hands at Rome made the Emperors perpetually dependent in some sort on the Pope's favour and allowed the formation of the most far-reaching papal claims.

For the time, however, Otto the Great had built wisely. His empire lasted. Otto II (973-83), it is true, met with failure. He was unable to annex southern Italy to his empire, and the Slavs between Elbe and Oder broke loose from Christianity and Germanism together. The half-Greek Otto III (983-1002), if he fanned to life again the belief in a theocratic monarchy, yet found himself incapable of gaining the affection of Rome and Italy. A Lombard revolt commenced, and Rome recovered independence under the patrician John Crescentius. Meanwhile the spread of Christianity to the north and east no longer meant the spread of German rule. Poland and Hungary founded national churches on their conversion. It soon became clear that the Scandinavians, as they became Christian, would follow the same path. All these states acknowledged the supremacy of the Roman Pope: they looked on the Roman Emperor as a German foreigner.

The death of Otto III, the last male descendant of Otto the Great, raised two questions. Should the union of Germany and Italy, and the Holy Roman Empire continue? And what principle, national or hereditary, should govern the election of the new German king? Hereditary claims won in the choice of Henry II Duke of Bavaria, last male of the line of Henry the Fowler (1002-24). He was of Saxon descent, but a native of south Germany, and henceforth the Saxon predominance ceases. Henry II, strong, shrewd and religious, left no doubt as to the continuance of the Empire. He claimed to be its

ruler by virtue of his German kingship. It took years to make his claims good. But the Lombard bishops supported him against the native king of Italy, Ardoïn of Ivrea (1002-14), and he obtained at last full, if grudging, recognition. In Rome fortune favoured him. On the death of John Crescentius, the faction of the Counts of Tusculum set up the warrior Pope Benedict VIII, who allied himself with Henry and crowned him Emperor in 1014. Still more than his predecessors Henry II leant on the bishops, but he was their master. The theocratic idea was strong in him, and led him to an alliance with the nascent party of Church reform, which was to prove the Empire's deadliest enemy.

Hereditary claims triumphed again in the election of Conrad II the Salic of Franconia (1024-39). But they did so at the cost of the alienation of Saxony. Particularism there was dominant, and the Saxons at best held sullenly aloof from a south German king. As far as energy, ability and ruthless strength, combined with harsh, un-inspired self-will, could increase the imperial power, Conrad increased it. On the east progress was made between the Elbe and the Vistula, which renewed, though slowly, the German advance. He quickly put down an attempt of the Italian Marquesses to introduce a French king and was crowned at Rome by the worthless Tusculan John XIX in 1027. Thereafter the belief in the Romano-Germanic Empire lived unchallenged. Then the fear of French intervention in north Italy, always imminent from the great vassals though not from the king, was finally laid by the annexation of Burgundy on the death of the last native king Rudolf III in 1034. Little was added to the strength of the Empire by this acquisition, for save in Jurane Burgundy (modern west Switzerland) the royal authority was and remained all but nil, but the vigorous

outward thrust of the French race was diverted southwards, first to south Italy and then in the Crusades to Palestine. It was not till over two centuries later that the French again pressed forward against Burgundy and north Italy.

In his internal policy Conrad showed a wisdom which, by being too cynical, defeated often its own ends. He kept the Dukes in hand and conferred the south German duchies as they fell vacant on his own family. At the same time he attached the lesser vassals, who held of Duke or Count, to the Empire by securing to them heredity in their fiefs. It was a natural development towards complete feudalism, a development which diminished the power of the great vassals, like the Dukes, who held of the king direct. But it occurred before the local authority of the great vassals had been supplemented by a non-feudal royal administration. So the lesser vassals in the end merely increased in independence, and the realm crumbled into small fragments. Conrad, however, like his predecessors, rested largely on the Church, which he ruled with a firm hand. But he never realized the mission of his theocracy. Simony, the purchase of preferment by money, increased to a deplorable extent in his days, and his simoniacal nominees were often unfit for their clerical functions. Yet Conrad had his workaday ideals. He did stern justice and kept order, the first need of the anarchic century.

In Italy, the new growth since the establishment of domestic peace took a special national form. The cities situated on oriental trade-routes made rapid advance, and many of the lesser vassals, or valvassors, were partly town-dwellers. The valvassors had long been at odds with their lords, whether bishops or great lay nobles, but at the same time the townsmen, who included many valvassors, were hankering after some degree of self-government,

and inclined to side with their bishops to attain it. The quarrel between the valvassors and their lords broke out first in civil war, in which in 1035 the valvassors had the best. Conrad intervened with an army, and pacified the valvassors by declaring their hereditary right in their fiefs. This embroiled him with his chief supporters, the pro-German bishops, headed by the mighty Aribert Archbishop of Milan. Aribert rebelled, and was defended by the townsmen of Milan, while the now loyal marquesses, delighted to attack their old rivals, the bishops, joined Conrad with the country valvassors, whose grievances were now redressed. Conrad died in 1039, and the whole affair was patched up: bishops, great nobles and valvassors seemed loyal in common to their German king. But a new power had arisen, the townsmen, whose real objective was to acquire autonomy, and exclude their masters.

The strong Conrad was succeeded by his stronger son, Henry III, under whom the Holy Roman Empire attained its apogee (1039-56). He maintained firm control internally, trying to meet the particularist difficulty by nominating to vacant duchies dukes from the other sub-nations. To some extent he abated the continual feuds of the nobles. Bohemia, Hungary and Poland were his vassals. He was a conscientious prince, full of belief in his theocratic rule and its duties. It was in pursuance of this ideal that he undertook his journey to Italy in 1046. Conrad II had rather preferred to see the Papacy degraded by the Tusculan Popes. Henry, who had renounced simony to the damage of his revenue, felt it his duty to reform the Papacy. Benedict IX (1033-45) had been elected Pope in boyhood, and had early developed into a profligate tyrant. Driven out at last and replaced by an Anti-Pope, Sylvester III, he had returned only to sell the Papacy to the well-meaning

reformer, Gregory VI (1045-6). Then he attempted to resume the dignity, and the world saw three claimants, none of them with clean hands, contesting the Apostolic See. Henry intervened with overwhelming force. Sylvester and Benedict were deposed in synods at Sutri and Rome, Gregory abdicated by compulsion at that of Sutri. Then on the King's mandate a German bishop was elected as Clement II (1046-7). He promptly crowned his benefactor Emperor, and Henry to secure a legal leading voice in the papal election, as well as the right of confirmation he possessed as Emperor, obtained the dignity of Patrician from the Romans. In his hands the title meant the headship of the Romans as John Crescentius had held it, not the protection of the Pope, as Charlemagne had been patrician, an office absorbed in that of Emperor. Now, on a vacancy, an embassy was sent to the Patrician Emperor to obtain the nomination of a new Pope. Henry soon had occasion to use his new powers, for his German nominees died quickly. Damasus II (1048) was followed by Bruno Bishop of Toul, as Leo IX (1049-54), and Leo by Victor II (1055-7). All were zealous reformers, but Leo was a great man, who began the revolution which placed the Papacy at the head of Western Christendom. Under him, however, the aggressive, half-German, half-papal, expansion in the south was decisively checked. His German troops and their south Italian allies were defeated by the Normans at Civitate (1053). The Pope himself was captured, though soon released, and a new outlet for north French expansion was made sure.

Far better days had dawned for the West when Henry III died in 1056. The greatest material benefit resulting to Central Europe from the Romano-Germanic Empire had been some measure of internal peace and security. Since at the same time the efforts of the

Byzantines seconded by the Italian seaports, such as Venice, Amalfi and Genoa, had much lessened the extent of Saracenic piracy, intercourse, considerable for the time, had sprung up anew between East and West. Venice above all exchanged the wood, metals and slaves of the West for eastern silks, spices and objects of art and luxury. The inland Lombard towns traded with Venice and across the Alps, adding their own superfluous food-stuffs and woollen manufactures to the goods exchanged. A stream of commerce flowed along the Po and over the Alpine passes. Markets and fairs rapidly increased. Everywhere the towns became more prosperous, in Italy comparatively wealthy. And with the eastern trade came an increase of civilization. Besides the direct importation of ivories and other art-works, the most obvious evidence lies in the advance of architecture. Venice, with its St Mark's, might rest almost wholly on Byzantine models; but in Italy and Germany perhaps stimulating influence is as important as direct imitation. The later Romanesque architecture in its various local schools, of which the "Norman" style is the one found in England, took a brilliant development in the Rhineland, Lombardy and Tuscany. It was but the sign of a renewed spiritual and intellectual activity. Another side of the movement, specially favoured by the existence of the Empire, was the renewed study of Roman Law. Doctors of law arose in Lombardy, of whom Archbishop Lanfranc of Canterbury is a famous instance. The notion of a state and territorial law was thereby revived. It was the unlearned Emperor Conrad II who decreed that only Roman Law should be used in Rome, whatever the racial law of the litigants. The damage suffered since Charlemagne was beginning to be made good in the new feudalized society.

SECTION 3. THE FRENCH KINGS AND THEIR VASSALS

It was in France that feudal anarchy reached its worst, and that the power of the state was most completely shattered; it was also in France that the modern system of state-administration began. By the year 1000 the feudalizing of France had become complete, though its consequences in detail had still to be worked out. It had two aspects, feudal government and feudal vassalage. The main characteristic of feudal government was that the rule of the land passed from the king and the state officials as such to the landowners as such. By this time, though not all vassals were landowners, yet every landowner, in the north at least, was a vassal and held his land in fief of some superior, and such government as existed was carried on by this privileged class. The private estate took the place of the governmental district. The duties and rights of government became the property of individuals. The process was helped and concealed in two ways. The theoretic rights of king and state remained untouched, and the more important, now hereditary, public officials were among the greatest of the landowners. On the collapse of the Carolingians' authority a crowd of counts and immune nobles¹, whom we may now call barons, attempted to rule unchecked their counties and fiefs. But, just as the impoverished king was thrown back on his demesne lands for his real power, so were they. They had a hard fight for it, even partially to control their turbulent vassals, great and small. Both they and the king were somewhat strengthened by the second aspect of feudalism, *i.e.* feudal vassalage, which in the dissolution of the state provided the chief secular obligation still binding on men's consciences. The symbolic

¹ See above, pp. 112-14, 150-1.

ceremony of vassalage, as was natural in so primitive a time, was of the highest importance. The vassal both swore fealty (*fidelitas*) in feudal terms¹ with his hand on the Gospels, and did the still more binding homage, whereby he declared himself the man (*homme*) of his lord, by kneeling before him and placing his hands between his. Breaches of faith were indeed extremely common, yet not so common as to destroy the value of the act. Vassalage kept together feudal groups and lessened the prevailing anarchy. It added little to the strength of the Carolingians for a good reason. Though the titular king by its development had become the nominal owner of almost all the land in his realm, his demesne was very small, his vassals were few, and the vassals of his vassals were under no feudal obligation towards him. It was the great vassals of the crown, with their wide demesnes and numerous immediate vassals, who drew profit, however limited, from the feudal relationship.

To all appearance, then, the kingdom of France hopelessly dissolved in the tenth century. To begin with, two nations seemed likely to arise within its limits. To the north of the Loire was West Francia proper; to the south was Aquitaine. Each of these lands had its own characteristics, which they partly retain to the present day. The south was more Latin, the north more Teutonic. The dominant group of dialects in the north was forming into the tongue of Langue d'oil, that of the south into the tongue of Langue d'oc. Mainly within these capital divisions, though not altogether coinciding with their frontiers, lay the blocks of territory formed by the great vassals of the crown. The French bishops did not as a class obtain the wide lands of the German prelates.

¹ An abbreviated version of the oath of fealty is seen in the oath of the peers in the English coronation service.

Most of them were vassals of the great lay vassals. Yet some six of them in the north-east, headed by the Archbishop of Rheims, ruled real feudal states under the king, and were the king's surest supporters. The great lay vassals, who were rapidly acquiring complete independence, varied much in power and dominion. In the north and east were predominant, (1) the Count of Flanders ruling from Arras to the R. Scheldt, (2) the Count of Vermandois round Amiens, (3) the Duke of Normandy, (4) the Duke of Brittany, and (5) the Duke of Burgundy, *i.e.* the Burgundian land round Dijon which had fallen to Charles the Bald in 843. In the centre, round Paris and Orleans, lay the domains of (6) the Duke of the French, the ancestor of the Capetian kings of France. His duchy in 900 was almost co-extensive with ancient Neustria, and the powerful Counts of (7) Anjou, (8) Maine, and (9) Blois were in origin his vassals and endowed largely from his lands. To the south of the Loire there were four of special note, (10) the Duke of Aquitaine with a nominal dominion from Poitiers to Auvergne, (11) the Duke of Gascony, (12) the Count of Toulouse, claiming to rule between Gascony and the Rhone, and (13) the Count of Barcelona who possessed the remnant of the Spanish March.

We have seen that these greater potentates, although stronger than the Carolingian king, were by no means masters of their nominal dominions. The rights of a feudal suzerain were as wide-reaching as he could desire. His vassals owed him *aid*, which included military service for some forty days and money-payments on definite emergencies, and *counsel*, or advice in his affairs and service as judges in his feudal court. Their castles were his to occupy on demand. They paid *relief* on succession to their fiefs, and owed him hospitality as he moved about his dominions in the continual migrations of a medieval

magnate. He was the guardian of their children and disposed of them in marriage. During the minority of a vassal he entered on his fief. All these rights, though ill-defined as yet, the suzerain held, but they implied obligations to his vassals as well, which it was needful to observe, and in practice he had to gain the goodwill or fear of his vassals, who were well aware of their numbers and common interests. Then, too, king and duke alike were hampered by the "feudal hierarchy"; no fealty was due to them from the barons and knights who held of their immediate vassals. In fact, France was divided into several thousand petty seigneuries, involved in perpetual feuds and warfare. Below the seigneurs came the simple knights without feudal jurisdiction, whose fief just supported them. All together formed the chivalrous or noble class. The noble was trained to arms and horsemanship from his youth up. He spent his days in hunting and fighting. His castle gave him a secure stronghold against any ordinary attack. His heavy armour and skill made him easily the superior of the peasants of his demesne. The class to which he belonged was formidable also in point of numbers; it was exceedingly prolific in spite of war and hardship. However divided by feuds, it was united in caste-feeling, which expressed itself in the growing institution of chivalry. In the tenth century chivalry was neither so ornate nor so systematized as it became later. Still it provided a common training and a common ideal of honour for the noble class, and by the formal ceremony of knighthood emphasized its standards of efficiency and conduct. In the eleventh century the Church endeavoured to introduce a religious and loftier element into the yet rude conceptions of knighthood, with but a slow and partial success. A steady rising of the ideal, which had started from valour

and faithfulness to lord and kindred, was none the less manifest.

This was not the only service of the Church in the times of anarchy. Not to mention the way in which the unsacked monasteries kept alive learning and Christian ethics, the secular clergy, in spite of their deep contamination with feudalism, bore their part. It is with surprise that we find the often warrior bishops, who obtained their sees and dispensed their favours by some form of simony, and whose personal character was frequently none of the best, making efforts to mitigate the prevailing troubles. From the close of the tenth century a series of local councils were held, starting in Aquitaine and spreading to the kingdom of Burgundy and to northern France. They endeavoured to enforce by ecclesiastical penalties and by the sworn co-operation of the barons an elementary peace, the Peace of God. The general purport of these regulations was to exempt non-combatants, clergy, women and serfs, from murder, plunder and outrage, and even to establish a kind of close season for unarmed knights during Lent and Eastertide. More stringent regulations were adopted in the middle of the eleventh century by the Truce of God which was added to the Peace. An absolute cessation of hostilities was then enjoined from Friday to Sunday inclusive every week. Like all medieval regulations, both Peace and Truce were as much honoured in the breach as in the observance, but they did do something towards restoring a kind of order.

The general picture of the Church, however, at this period is gloomy enough. The parish churches were the family-property of the nobles, and exploited as such. The bishops, especially in the south and Brittany, were frequently indistinguishable from other barons. Many monasteries were wrecked or continued a maimed existence

as secular canonries, which meant in effect that they provided fresh endowments for the nobility. The marvel is that the minority of conscientious monks and clergy preserved and achieved so much as they did.

The clergy, good and bad, were all privileged. The helpless mass of the population, the serfs, had not even personal freedom. They were bound to the soil and subject to the cruel exactions of their lords. What with the heavy dues they paid in kind and money, the labour they contributed to work the lord's private farm, and the ever-increasing number of "abuses," *i.e.* fresh-invented exactions, their fate on their hereditary plots, with the continual war and plunder around them, was miserable even when some humanity stole in during the eleventh century. The sparse free peasants were in little better case. Only the serfs and freemen, employed as armed horsemen, serjeants¹, were more prosperously situated. They could rise to trust and power and even to knight-hood in their lord's service.

More secure and happier were the townsmen. They at least had some protection behind their walls, some power of common action in a rudimentary sort, some power of reaping the harvest of their industry and trade. Yet here, too, freedom and security were not great. The towns were the property of one or more feudal lords, and were subject to their extortions and involved in their incessant wars. Only the better-off bourgeois had some real privileges: the mass were all but serfs, who had more means of resistance and better treatment than peasants. Their trade beyond their town was precarious, even though the merchants travelled in armed caravans. Numberless tolls and dues, ancient or new usurpations, were demanded by the seigneurs everywhere, and the lesser nobles were often

¹ Servientes ad arma.

mere brigands, who levied blackmail when they did not plunder. The whole picture of tenth century France is dreary in the extreme, and it is only worse in degree than that of Germany and northern Italy. Yet a better time was slowly coming. The greater vassals were slowly restoring order. Great prelates were beginning to champion the oppressed. The stubborn townsmen were beginning to hold their own. Even the wretched serfs vainly revolted once in Normandy amid famine, pestilence and pillage. In the south one or two towns might be called wealthy by straining the word. The worst, at any rate, was over.

In the tenth century the central fact in French history is the fall of the Carolingians and their replacement by the Capetian dynasty. Eudes of Paris had been elected king in 888. He had wide domains, but the sentiment of loyalty to the Carolingians was still strong, and Charles the Simple (893-923), son of Louis the Stammerer, was also elected and won the day. Eudes' brother Robert, however, inherited his fiefs as Duke of the French, and eventually revolted. Charles, with the aid of Lotharingia which had declared for him, overthrew this rival only to fall before another, Raoul Duke of Burgundy (923-36). Raoul's death left the field clear for Charles' son, Louis IV d'Outremer (936-54), but Louis, possessing only a tiny demesne round Laon, was no match for Robert's son, Hugh the Great, Duke of the French. In spite of German assistance occasionally given to the Carolingians, Duke Hugh and his son Hugh Capet had established a suzerainty over almost all France by the death of Lothaire, Louis' son (954-86). The great vassals no longer held direct of the crown. The death of Lothaire's son, Louis V Fainéant, was the last disaster of his house. The heir Charles, who was German duke of Lower Lorraine, could make no

head against Hugh Capet, who was elected King of France (987-96). It was a victory of the feudal lords which eventually proved their undoing. Hugh had, at least, some material power with which to back his claims; and on that solid basis the monarchy was built anew.

At the time, however, the kingship seemed further to decline. While Hugh made his way to the throne, his greatest vassals had emancipated themselves and his demesne had shrunk. Anjou and Maine had slipped from his control; the Count of Blois increased his dominions till he formed the county of Champagne. By the time of Philip I (1060-1108) the royal domains only extended round Paris and Orleans, and even there his power was feeble, for he had still to subdue the unruly lesser barons within them. Outside them his formal intervention was nearly extinct. To all intents and purposes the great vassals were independent sovereigns. Their feudal duties were limited to sending a few men-at-arms to their suzerain in war, unless of course they were his allies and fought by his side for their own interest. Only the few royal bishops were real vassals of the crown. Some invaluable assets, however, remained. The king was no man's vassal; in breaking faith to him the great vassals affected the fealty of their own barons. Further, the prestige and associations of the anointed king still subsisted. He represented the state, legitimacy, peace and order, and had a hold over men's imaginations. Every step forward in peace and civilization was helpful to his influence. Then he possessed in Paris and Orleans two strong cities in central France, on the road from Spain to Germany, which were bound to be wealthy and to spread his influence over all France.

The chief interest of French history at this time is, however, transferred to the efforts of the great vassals to

found states. The main object of all was the same, to extend their dominions and exercise the ancient royal authority therein. The Counts of Flanders were early successful. They had few powerful vassals, and petty barons were easier to deal with. An adroit foreign policy kept them generally on good terms with the Capetian king. They succeeded in establishing a branch of their house in the German county of Hainault. Trade sprung up in the Flemish towns, and two fighting Counts, Baldwin VII the Hatchet (1111-19) and St Charles the Good (1119-27), took up vigorously the restoration of order and the protection of townsmen and peasants. Prosperity began to return in their days, and the brigand-like nobles were partially restrained.

Beside these princes the Counts of Blois cut a poor figure. Eudes II (995-1037) was feverously ambitious, and fell at last before a combination of his suzerain and the Romano-Germanic Emperor with whom he had disputed the kingdom of Burgundy. But he more than doubled the lands of his house by the formation of the county of Champagne round Troyes. Henceforward the house of Blois held the Capetian domain in a vice and were hereditary foes of the king. Had they possessed the organizing, anti-feudal instinct of their contemporaries, they might have been dangerous rivals to him. As it was they remained feudal barons of the first importance.

The Dukes of Brittany were chiefly occupied in maintaining a barbaric independence of their neighbours, those of Burgundy, poor and feeble, did little, but the Counts of Anjou were of another mould. The ferocious Fulk Nerra (987-1040) made his house strong by universal aggression; Geoffrey Martel (1040-60) conquered Touraine and Maine. Civil wars and the loss of Maine to Normandy

followed; but under Fulk the Young (1109-29) and Geoffrey Plantagenet (1129-51) a revival took place. Maine was recovered: the nobles were brought to order; at last Normandy itself (1144-50) became subject to the indefatigable Geoffrey.

Aquitaine seemed ready at first to eclipse its rivals. William V (990-1029) was a personage of European importance. William VIII (1058-86) acquired the turbulent duchy of Gascony. But the later Dukes were lacking in ability and unable to exercise real control over their many powerful vassals and allodial nobles. In the twelfth century they were declining, though in a splendid sort of way.

The Counts of Toulouse were in the midst of enemies. The Dukes of Aquitaine and the Counts of Barcelona coveted their lands; their great vassals were numerous and refractory; the ancient towns of the south were wealthy and disobedient. To these disadvantages the Counts themselves added the subdivision of their lands among their heirs and a perpetual crusading ardour.

It would be possible to omit the Counts of Barcelona, who were busily engaged in warfare with the Moors in Spain, were they not also rulers north of the Pyrenees and rivals of Toulouse. In 1108 they acquired for a branch of their house the county of Provence in the kingdom of Burgundy, with its seaport of Marseilles. This increased the seaward tendency of the Counts, whose subjects, both Catalans in the Spanish March and Provençals, began to take a considerable share in the western Mediterranean trade. The French connexions of the Counts, however, were lessened by their Spanish acquisitions. In 1137 Catalonia was united to the little neighbour kingdom of Aragon, and its separation from France was sealed by St Louis' renunciation of the Count's homage.

All these great vassals, however different in power and

talent, did something to repress the turbulent minor nobles and to restore a degree of state-government in their lands, utilizing their rights as suzerains to renew their authority as chiefs of states. But the Dukes of Normandy far surpassed the rest. They had started under disadvantages; they were hated pirates, and their western, more Scandinavian, districts were insubordinate. In compensation they possessed a valuable advantage; there was no real "feudal hierarchy" in Normandy, *i.e.* all barons held of the Duke and were his vassals, there were no barons of his barons: the two or three vassal counts were not rulers of states. The Dukes were thus far more real rulers of their duchy than most other great vassals were of their provinces. Their viscounts controlled a good deal of the remnants of local administration. They could exact their rights as suzerains and exercised those rights which had belonged to the Carolingian kings, uncontrolled from above if thwarted from below.

The Dukes weathered their external dangers mainly by reason of firm alliances. At first they supported the Carolingians; then in 945 Duke Richard I (942-96), bitterly injured by Louis d'Outremer and only saved by the still roving Danes, transferred his homage to Hugh Duke of the French. The new alliance lasted a century. The Normans helped Hugh Capet to the French throne and supported his descendants; the Capetians were a bulwark to the Dukes. Meanwhile the fissure between Scandinavian Normandy in the west and eastern Normandy, grown French in character, continued. The last trial of strength came when William (1035-87), illegitimate son of Duke Robert the Magnificent, came to the ducal throne as a minor. With the aid of his suzerain, King Henry, the young William overthrew his rebels in 1047 at Val-ès-Dunes. The battle gave the victory to the

Francized Normans and the ever more despotic government of the Duke. It also broke the Capetian alliance, now that Normandy was too strong a state for a vassal-neighbour. But William more than held his own in two wars against the French King and his allies, and, completely master of his duchy, was able to proceed in 1063 to the conquest of Maine. In 1066 came the conquest of England which gave a new turn to Norman history. William the Conqueror's son Robert, indeed, ruled over Normandy only. But Henry I reunited kingdom and duchy, and gave, too, a more organized form to the government of his continental land, which the civil war under his successor Stephen could not wholly eradicate. Finally Geoffrey Plantagenet united it to Anjou and Maine.

Among the very varied conditions of France at this epoch there were several factors which affected the whole country. One was the large emigration of the nobles for conquest or crusade, which weakened effectually the forces of anarchy and oppression. Another was the growth of local patriotism. The lands of the great vassals became more and more self-conscious entities, not indeed sub-nations like the German duchies, but still provinces and not fortuitous collections of fiefs. A general advance, too, was made in administration. The prince's *curia*, his feudalized court composed of his vassals and officials, acted as the central government, administrative and judicial. The barons had their own *curia* for their lands, and so on. It was all elementary, but in the prince's court at least began the formation of a bureaucracy, the feudal duty of attendance at the Curia being more fruitful than the vague Carolingian assemblies of magnates.

Meanwhile a change was taking place among the non-noble classes of the population. The increase of peace and trade through the incipient restoration of order by

the great vassals, and the removal of a host of turbulent nobles to the new fields of adventure were seconded by the gradual appreciation by the barons of the fact that well-used subjects were more profitable than wretched serfs, and by the civilizing, if selfish, efforts of the ecclesiastical lords, bishops and abbots. The dues of the serfs and peasants became fixed, and therefore less burdensome. The townsmen in parish or gild acted together, and in the south rich bourgeois and petty nobles sometimes joined forces. In the twelfth century privileges to the towns grow numerous. Dues and tolls were fixed, fairs established, and rights to property protected. The crusades brought a comparatively vast increase of trade. Lastly, town self-government, the commune, makes its appearance, where the mayor or town-ruler is elected by his fellows, and accounts to the town's lord for dues and justice. The movement succeeded in Flanders and the south, and mainly failed elsewhere. But a less degree of privilege became common. The third estate had arisen: fortunate was the ruler who saw in it his natural ally.

SECTION 4. THE FRANCO-NORMAN CONQUESTS

Even in the Dark Ages there was a constant movement of the population. Travel and adventure were common. The clergy attended synods and journeyed to Rome. The nobles attended their suzerain's court and took part in his expeditions. Minstrels and mummers wandered professionally. So did the growing class of traders. By ship along the rivers and across the sea, by foot or on mules along the land, the merchants took their wares. Venetians, Amalfitans and others brought goods from the Levant, Marseillians and Catalans from Spain and Tunis. Townsmen from the inland continued the traffic along the Rhone, the Seine and the Rhine. Each country brought

its quota of surplus production. The total amount would seem ridiculously small now, but it was then sufficient to make men rich and to lure them to far countries amid disorders and perils of the greatest. And one main result was a steady, though slow, growth of civilization.

Pilgrimage was another factor in this intercourse. The famous shrines of saints were never without their devotees. Penance for crime, profit and adventurousness drew there swarms of the undevout as well, and a journey to the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem, to the graves of the Apostles at Rome, or to St James of Compostella in Spain, to mention no others, was a favourite exploit, which appealed to all the West.

Most of all, this migratory instinct was strong among the French, who thus, while their country had abandoned international politics from disunion and weakness, made it famous all over Europe. Exile and prolificness were the two chief external causes of this. Many were disinherited in the continual wars. Many found the peace and surveillance of the new local states intolerable. Still more emigrated because they were younger sons without an inheritance. The French nobles were remarkably prolific, and their numerous sons could not be provided for at home. This was especially the case with the Normans, now a mixed race of Scandinavian and French descent, which united the adventurousness, courage and organizing power of one ancestry with the adroitness and keen intellect of the other. They were the most successful of the emigrants and founded the most remarkable states of medieval times.

The conquest of South Italy was the work of private adventurers. By the year 1000 that country was splintered into small states. The Byzantines held Apulia and Calabria; various Lombard princelings the centre; two

or three powerful commercial cities, such as Amalfi and Naples, were on the west coast; a Saracen dynasty displayed oriental civilization in Sicily. The rivalries of the Lombard princes and the disaffection of the Apulian Lombards to their Greek masters made the situation as unstable as possible. It was an Apulian revolt which introduced the Normans. In 1015 a band of pilgrims from the Holy Sepulchre took, as was frequent, the shrine of St Michael on Monte Gargano on their way. There an Apulian exile induced them to recruit mercenaries in their native Normandy. The newcomers soon became known as the best soldiers to be had, and in 1030 the Duke of Naples gave them a permanent lodgement by granting to their leader the county of Aversa. Fresh adventurers flocked from Normandy in consequence, among them some stalwart brothers, sons of Tancred de Hauteville. Their opportunity was given by a fresh revolt of Apulia from the Greeks. Two brilliant victories in 1042 won the mercenaries north Apulia, of which they elected William de Hauteville chief Count. By this time they were gaining universal hatred for their rapacity, cruelty and brigandage. But they were invincible, and acquired a chief of genius, Robert "Guiscard"—the wily—one of the de Hauteville brothers. A statesman, diplomat and general, the faithless and ruthless Guiscard compels a kind of admiration. He had to win his spurs in the piecemeal conquest of Greek territory which was in progress. Meanwhile the Norman outrages stirred up a new foe, Pope Leo IX, and led to his attacking them in 1053 at the head of a mixed army of Italians and Germans. The Normans' victory at Civitate saved them, and showed to the world the superiority of the French knights. It suggested, too, perhaps, in 1059 a change in the papal policy. Guiscard had become chief Count in 1057; in the same year he conquered all

Calabria; the Lombard prince of Salerno was restricted to his capital; the Count of Aversa conquered Capua. Evidently the Normans would be allies of the highest value, and the Popes, striving for independence, needed an ally against German Emperor and Roman nobles. In 1058 the bargain was struck by Cardinal Hildebrand for Pope Nicholas II. Guiscard was invested as Duke of Apulia and Richard of Aversa as Prince of Capua, as vassals of the Apostolic See, in virtue of the Popes' claims under the forged donation of Constantine. It was a decisive stroke. The settlement of the Normans and the separation of southern Italy from the north received a definite form which lasted till modern times. The suzerainty of Apulia time and time again warped the papal policy, and led to epoch-making developments. Henceforward, too, the dread of an overpowerful Apulian state is a factor in papal policy. When Hildebrand became Pope as Gregory VII in 1073 he found the Byzantine dominion vanished, the Abruzzi conquered from the Empire by stray Norman adventurers, and scarcely anything left of his vassal state of Benevento. His ban, however, had no effect. Salerno and Amalfi were conquered by Guiscard, and the Pope was glad to purchase Guiscard's protection against the Emperor by investing him in 1080 with his acquisitions, save the now papal town of Benevento. Guiscard rescued the Pope at his leisure, but his real attention was now bent to more magnificent schemes. He had finally reduced his erstwhile rival barons to obedient subjects in 1080. By persevering campaigns since 1061 his youngest brother Roger had all but achieved the conquest of Sicily from the Moslems. Being so strong, the conquest of the East opened out before the Duke. His dominions owed their prosperity to the Eastern trade; their natural outlet

and ambitions were toward the Levant; the weakness of the Byzantine Empire, internally decaying and reeling under the blows of the Seljuks, was manifest. A splendid victory seemed within sight, when the Pope's plight and a baronial revolt delayed him, and death in 1085 put an end to his projects. But Guiscard had left an indelible stamp on the Norman conquest. In Apulia there was a tradition of strong government and no "feudal hierarchy"; in Sicily the barons were weak and loyal. It took, indeed, some time to secure the monarchy. The Apulian barons hated their subjection, and their disloyalty, which remained the vulnerable spot in the state, made Guiscard's heirs dependent on their strong kinsmen, the Counts of Sicily. Not till Roger II of Sicily acquired the mainland in 1128 could Guiscard's position be regained. Then, to seal his despotic power, the new Duke took the style of King of Sicily (1130). Naples (1137) and Capua (1139) rounded off his realm. The kingdom, thus founded, was for a century the most civilized of the West. It was a bridge between Orient and Occident, a meeting-place of races, and, as a consequence and by reason of its wise and strong kings, was a pioneer state in the new development of monarchy.

More durable in its effects and as unique in its character was the Norman conquest of England. It was due to no congeries of adventurers, but to the ruler of the Norman duchy, William the Conqueror. He was as great a genius in politics and war as Guiscard, with less of the brigand and more of the scruples of a lawful sovran in his composition. Ruthless and savage on occasion, of iron will and relentless ambition, he had no doubt of his duties as ruler and meant to do right by submissive subjects. The conquest of England was pointed out to him by circumstances. He was master of Normandy and England was

masterless. The death of Canute the Great had left England under the domination of a few great families, strong in their local authority as Earls of great provinces. The kingship was paralysed for most purposes, although the fact was concealed by the dominion which the mighty Earl Godwin of Wessex held over the pious king, Edward the Confessor. Edward had, indeed, a will of his own in some matters. Bred in Normandy, he loved Norman ways and Normans and the higher culture to be found in Normandy, all contrasting with the clownish inertness into which much-harried, subjugated England had fallen. But his Norman favourites were driven out, and on his death, Harold, Godwin's son, secured the crown in 1066 like a second Hugh Capet.

This was William's opportunity. He had a vamped-up claim to the English throne. Harold was weak and threatened by a Norwegian invasion. The adventurous spirit of the Normans could be appealed to, and the reformed Papacy, which had every reason to be dissatisfied with the apathy and independence of the English Church, gave a blessing to the Conqueror's enterprise. William gathered an army from Normandy and the neighbouring provinces, prepared a fleet, and invaded England. Harold, just victorious over the Norwegians, fell before him at Hastings in 1066. The invertebrate kingdom offered little resistance as a whole. Local revolts there were later, met in some cases with savage repression, but by 1070 they were over, and the disloyalty of the imported Norman barons was sternly checked in 1075.

William's rule in England was despotic, by far the strongest monarchy of the day. He was the leader of the immigrants and protector of the natives, and so could dispose of both. In the course of the war and the revolts the greater part of the land changed owners, and, with the

introduction of the Norman baronage, the inchoate feudalism of England was metamorphosed pretty nearly to the Norman form; all land was held of the king, mostly by military service; feudal jurisdiction increased, the king's included; the king's court, his Curia, became an assembly of his vassals, not of magnates as such. Yet the worst consequences of feudalism were avoided. As in Normandy there was no "feudal hierarchy." Every baron held direct of the crown, save in one or two districts. As in Normandy, too, the baron's estates were almost always scattered. They did not dominate entire provinces, and the great provincial English earldoms were abolished. Further, as in Normandy, every landholder swore allegiance to the king, though he might be another man's vassal. These advantages were all to be found in Normandy, but William had no intention of surrendering the strong points in the English state. England had kept in exceptional vigour the local courts, shire-court and hundred-court, and in the shire the sheriff, a nominated official, like the Counts under Charlemagne, represented the king. William favoured both, although great baronies were exempted from the shire and small baronies superseded the hundred-court. The sheriff both administered the royal demesne and royal justice and dues, and represented the king in his shire. Thus king and state were never ousted from the local administration; in fact they were much strengthened by the Conquest. The dependence of both races on the king was the essential matter: William's use of Anglo-Saxon institutions, and his introduction of Norman ones were the means. Two importations were to be of enormous importance, the sending of king's *missi* from court to the shires, and the sworn inquest of local representatives to ascertain facts on any matter. Both usages were Carolingian prerogatives surviving in Normandy and brought to

England. Thus William's work was not unlike Guiscard's in Italy, but with better means and better material to work upon. In each case an absolute monarchy, with means, considerable for the Middle Ages, of watching over local government, was established. In England this was mortised on to strong and living local institutions, and produced a new and unique growth.

William's first successor, William Rufus, did no more than construe his feudal rights in tyrannous fashion, but the next king, Henry I (1100-35), besides establishing a stern order and annexing Normandy, was an organizer of note. Under him the feudal Curia was half divided into the full court of vassals and the small official group. The latter too held special sessions for financial business as the Exchequer. This Exchequer in fact began the formation of a bureaucracy; it was the first true government department, however slowly severed from the Curia; and the men who served in it and in the king's business were mainly royal employés outside the ranks of the barons. Owing to the sheriff's obligation to render his accounts in the Exchequer they were readily in touch with the local administration. Thus began the welding together of the central and the local government.

The Norman monarchy seemed to run a risk of collapse in the civil war between Henry's daughter Matilda and his nephew King Stephen (1135-54), when feudal anarchy appeared in its worst form. But one main result of the Conquest was never endangered. That was the re-linking of England to the civilization and intellectual development of the Continent. In spite of Edward the Confessor's efforts she had withdrawn to a Scandinavian seclusion, and had sunk far below the level of an earlier time. Now she was placed once more in the main current of European history, and the effect, marked in politics, was still more striking

in the ecclesiastical progress which belongs to another section of this history.

The Crusades, which demand a separate treatment, were of even more consequence for the progress of Europe. They carried off and weakened the hosts of turbulent nobles from France. They brought the West into active connexion with Constantinople and the Moslem Levant by the migrations they caused, and they stimulated intercourse and trade both within the West and between West and East. A general ferment, in fact, far different from the anarchy and barbaric invasions, was set up over Europe by these vast offthrows of activity by the French nobles, who thereby unconsciously made amends for the temporary misery they inflicted on their own country.

One outlet of their energies, akin to the Crusades and the Norman migrations, though weaker, has yet to be mentioned. When the Visigothic kingdom fell, small fragments of Spain preserved their independence to the north, where they persisted in obscurity while the Moslems dominated the greater part of the land. The Moslems, however, brought neither peace nor union. Spain, divided sharply by mountains, plateaus, and by climate into marked provinces, offered the best field for racial particularism. The Berbers were settled on the barren plateaus of the north and centre; the more favoured Arabs in fertile Andalusia and on the east coast. They were bitterly hostile one to another, and the tribes and factions of each were further at odds among themselves. Thus, though the Mozarabs, or Christian Spaniards, on the whole came under a better government than that of the Visigothic kings and nobles, they suffered under the anarchy which soon began to prevail. Peace was restored by the foundation of the kingdom of Cordova. On the victory

of the Abbasids and the transference of the Caliphate from Damascus to Bagdad, one of the dethroned Umayyads, Abd-ar-Rahman, made his way to Spain, and raised a revolt in 755. By hard fighting and adroit merciless policy, he quickly made himself master of the country; and soon his kingdom of Cordova became renowned for its culture and prosperity. Weaker successors compromised its strength; the old feuds revived, and allowed the extension of the independent Christian states which held all the extreme north, Leon to the west, Navarre in the centre, and the Spanish March in the east. They were thrown back, however, by the greatest Umayyad, Abd-ar-Rahman III (912-61), who raised the splendour of Cordova to the highest pitch. Yet the lost ground could not be entirely recovered, even by the warrior Vizier, Almanzor (978-1002), who spent his life in defeating the Christians. A wide tract between the Douro and the Guadarrama Mts was left desolate, and the Christian states at once took advantage of the renewed anarchy after his death to extend their devastating forays and permanent conquests. While the Umayyad dominion split up into twenty petty states, the Christians, in spite of a similar tendency to particularism, were growing more organized and disciplined. Navarre and Leon, which at first had the preponderance, dropped to the second rank before the kingdom of Castile (or western Leon) and the county of Barcelona. It was Alfonso VI (1073-1109) who united Castile and Leon, and made a decisive forward move. He crossed the Guadarrama and conquered Toledo in 1085. Henceforward the waste lands south of the Douro could be re-colonized by Spaniards and adventurous French, and the Christians' strength increased. In their extremity the Spanish Moors called their coreligionists of Africa to their aid. The Almoravids,

nomad Berbers who had founded a fanatic empire in Morocco, rapidly overthrew the Castilian, but they could not retake Toledo, and became enervated by the delights of Andalusia. Alfonso I the Warrior (1104-34) now took the lead on the Christian side. He was king of Aragon on the central slopes of the Pyrenees, as well as of Navarre. If most of his campaigns were furious forays, he extended Aragon securely to the Ebro and made Saragossa her capital. On his death another reshuffling of the Christian states took place. Aragon formed (1137) a permanent union with Barcelona and became the sea-state of Spain, Provençal in language and open to foreign influences. Navarre, cut off from further expansion by the annexations of her neighbours, falls into the background. A new kingdom of Portugal was formed round Oporto, and soon developed special characteristics due partly to its moist, fertile climate, which distinguished it from barren central Spain. Its independence dates from the victory of Ourique over the Moors in 1138. But Castile and Leon, still united, took the foremost place. Their king, Alfonso VIII, made himself dreaded by his raids, while Portugal reached the Tagus and Catalonia the Ebro. A temporary setback was occasioned by a new Moslem invasion. The Almohades, a new fanatic sect, this time composed of the settled Berbers of Mt Atlas, overthrew the Almoravids in Africa and then in 1146 invaded Spain. They quickly conquered Andalusia, and held the Christians in check for two generations. Then their fall came, when Alfonso IX of Castile at the head of a general confederacy crushed them at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212. They soon abandoned Spain, where after this decisive victory the supremacy of the Christian states was unchallenged. In the next forty years Portugal was extended south to Algarve, Aragon secured Valencia, while Castile and Leon, finally

united after 1230, took Seville and Cordova. Only the little kingdom of Granada in the far south remained to the Spanish Moors.

The reconquest of Spain by the Christians had begun in the forays of hardy and barbarous mountaineers against the enemies of their race and religion. The wars were ferocious from the start on both sides, and till the capture of Toledo in 1085 the advance of the Christians was marked by a frontier belt of desolation, which as it moved southwards was cautiously followed by a second belt of land in process of re-settlement from the north. It was a golden opportunity for valiant adventurers, a holy war with booty and lands for the asking. Errant knights flocked from France, especially from Burgundy, to join the fray: the dynasties of Castile and Portugal were French. They and the native nobles acquired a special character, in which the daring freebooter was oddly mixed with the knight full of religious fervour. The famous Cid (*ob.* 1002), who set up a short-lived state at Valencia, is the unforgettable type of these. Spain, however, in spite of the reconquest, remained partly orientalized. After the capture of Toledo swarms of Mozarabs returned to Christian sway, and they had been deeply influenced by the Moors. Such European intercourse as existed was mainly with France. Architecture, feudalism and knight-hood all bore a French imprint. It was needed, for the retreat of the Moors was too often the retreat of civilization.

France, in fact, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries radiated energy over Europe. The mixed Norman stock might take the lead in migration, but as a whole the movement was French. Germany was keeping out the barbarian and restoring order. Italy was working out self-government and organization and bringing foreign

civilization by her commerce. But France produced the epoch-making Western creations, feudalism with all it implied in energy and government, bureaucratic government, the typical national literature, the great medieval architecture, true Gothic, and finally that movement for the reform and regeneration of the Church which conditioned the whole progress of the West.

CHAPTER V

THE PAPAL MONARCHY

SECTION I. THE BEGINNING OF CHURCH REFORM

The decadence of the Western Church has been incidentally described among the results of the anarchy succeeding Charlemagne. The remaining monasteries had become poor and often corrupt. Heathen ravage had been seconded by the appointment of lay abbots which amounted to partial confiscation. The Rule of St Benedict was no longer observed, the common life was frequently abandoned, and only in a few abbeys were learning and religion kept alive. The bishops had become feudal lords, appointed by king or great vassal, the parish clergy, members or dependants of the lesser landowning class. In the worst districts, as in southern France, the episcopal sees were merely a portion of the magnates' inheritance. In the decadence of the monarchy, in aims as well as in efficient power, strictly ecclesiastical discipline was left to the metropolitans and bishops, and these prelates were absorbed in secular ambitions. When in the tenth century the royal control of the episcopacy tightened in Germany and northern France, secular matters still took the lead, for the bishops only became more useful royal agents. It was a lamentable degeneration from the beneficent work of the Church under the earlier Carolingians. Simony, which was all but universal, and the misuse of church endowments, by alienation for family and other reasons

and by appropriation to provide knights to king or great vassal, were crying evils, and they were emphasized by the character of the clergy, which had become indistinguishable for the most part from that of the knightly class.

The very intensity of the evils in Church and State had some share in preparing a regeneration. Men in despair of this world, like St Benedict, renounced all and entered the cloister to prepare for the life to come. The un-governed passions of the time sometimes found a vent in religious self-abnegation. And among the monks were ruling spirits, fit to lead a reformation. It was the borderland between Germany and France which became the seeding-ground of the new religious movement and eventually of the reform of the whole Western Church. We may suppose that the mixture of the Latin and Teutonic peoples there had some share in its origin. In Lotharingia, both Upper Lorraine round Metz and Lower Lorraine round Liège, monasticism revived in the first half of the tenth century, and the efforts of the reformers were directed to a rigid asceticism and a return to the strict Benedictine Rule. But their abbeys, old and new, remained isolated and under the control of bishops and great nobles. Soon, with growing wealth, a relapse towards the old abuses took place. On the other hand, the innovating reforms of Cluny had permanent success. The most famous of abbeys was founded in 908 near Mâcon by the Duke of Aquitaine with Berno for its first abbot. It was a triumph of the French power of logical organization. Apathy, seclusion and self-indulgence were the foes. They should be conquered by the new Rule. Mere asceticism was discouraged; strict obedience took its place; the monk was absorbed in the system; the community was all in all. That community was independent. It obtained from the Popes complete exemption

from the authority of any bishop, save the see of Rome, and from the lay princes an equal privilege. This did not mean isolation. Cluny's spirit was fervently propagandist. Daughter monasteries, both new founded and converted houses, sprung up throughout France. But they did not separate in the ancient fashion. Each dependent priory or titular abbey remained an integral part of the Cluniac body; over them the Abbot of Cluny was supreme, appointing the Priors and inspecting in continual peregrinations the subject houses. As he was kept in touch with them by his visitations, so they were kept in touch with one another by the General Congregation of priors which met periodically at Cluny to advise their chief. On his character success depended, and for two centuries the Abbots of Cluny were rulers of singular fitness. Odo, Maiolus, Odilo and Hugh in succession increased the fame and power of their Order, till hundreds of Cluniac priories were spread over Europe. Thus not only a venerated model of monasticism was formed, but a united body which controlled monastic and religious public opinion. It was of enormous advantage to the Papacy. Cluny led the way in effective centralization in the Western Church, and her monks, dependent for their own essential autonomy on papal prerogative, expert in reform by centralized systematic supervision, and learned in the reviving Canon Law which included the doctrines of papal monarchy set forth in the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, were the best propagandists and champions of papal supremacy in the Church. They had succeeded in their own ideals by a revolt from the decadent local authorities. They aimed at a similar remedy for the whole Church.

The influence of Cluny extended wide outside its own great congregation. Old abbeys were reformed and new

abbeys continually founded on semi-Cluniac principles throughout the West. The lack of a federated congregation was often the main point of difference, the non-Cluniac reformers preferring the older Benedictine isolation, though frequently obtaining exemption from the local episcopate. From the year 1000 there was an immense growth of this new revival. Lorraine became a chosen home of it, but all through Germany, North Italy and France new colonies of enthusiastic monks were scattered over the land, redeeming waste or forest districts and inculcating a better agriculture and a more orderly society. It was a golden age of saintly abbots and of princely founders, kings or great nobles. As a general result, by 1050 the monasteries of the West had become a power by their religion, their wealth and prestige, and their influence with high and low.

The revival of monasticism meant the revival of literature and thought. It was natural in an age of anarchy and decadence that men's thoughts turned to the orderly law of a happier time, to the sacred prescriptions of the past. Just as the study of Roman Law was being renewed, as monastic reform meant the return to the ideals of St Benedict, so the studies of ecclesiastical reformers, seeing the evils around them, turned to the Canon Law, and in the Canon Law they thought they saw the necessary remedies, through the neglect of which present evils were caused.

In three chief prescriptions concerning church-government the Canon Law was almost wholly disregarded in the year 1000. Simony and clerical marriage were everywhere prevalent, and so was uncanonical presentation to ecclesiastical office. Simony, the ancient heresy of Simon Magus, included the purchase both of office and of ordination. When bishopric, abbey and parsonage were considered as fiefs of king or landowner, it was a natural step

to demand a feudal relief on the change of tenant, and the unblushing sale of the benefice was extremely common. A lowering of the character of the clergy resulted, and the same happened in a more roundabout way from clerical marriage. Parsons either left their benefices to their sons, using them much like other landed property, or impoverished them by grants to their family. Taken in conjunction with simony the custom produced a clergy, little distinguishable from surrounding society, apathetic and ignorant, and barely knit into the ecclesiastical organization. To an age also, when the best and only true Christian life was believed to be monastic asceticism, there seemed something degrading in a married priesthood. The dispensers of the Sacraments should conform to the monastic ideal. Equally fatal to the structure of the Church was uncanonical appointment. By the Canon Law parish clergy should have been appointed by their bishops, and bishops elected by their clergy and people and confirmed by their metropolitan. Actually, the parsons were appointed uncontrolled by the lay-lord of the parish, of whom they held their cure as a benefice, and the bishops were nominated by king or great vassal, of whom they held the bishopric, or at least its lands, as a fief. There might be a form of election gone through, but it was often omitted, and in any case the bishop's right to his bishopric depended on the act of investiture when the king handed him his episcopal staff and ring. The metropolitan's part was to confer episcopal Orders at the king's command. The result was valuable to the State, for the bishops were indispensable royal officials, but harmful to the Church, since they were chosen for secular reasons, and controlled by the king, and not by metropolitan or pope.

The first steps to reform, however, came from the

secular monarch. Henry III of Germany avoided simony and encouraged the reforming zeal of Leo IX. That Pope, once Bishop of Toul in Lorraine, was a convinced reformer, and determined to assert the papal prerogative as laid down in the forged decretals. If he made no change in theory, he effected a revolution in the practice of the Church. The bishops should be brigaded under their ecclesiastical head, and reform and return to the strict Canon Law should be introduced and maintained by constant papal intervention. Leo was the real founder of the papal monarchy over the Church. He was a travelling Pope, crossing the Alps three times to France and Germany, and holding synod after synod. Thus the papal supremacy was practically enforced, in spite of the dissatisfaction of the episcopate. The monks were delighted and formed henceforward a papal garrison in their countries. At the same time Leo gave the Roman Curia an international complexion corresponding to its ecumenic claims by the elevation to the Cardinalate of non-Italians, chiefly his fellow-countrymen of Lorraine. Continuous control of the provinces was further inaugurated by the frequent sending of Cardinal-legates to inspect and reform, while pressure was exercised on the bishops to enforce their frequent visits to the Holy See. In all these methods reform was slowly pressed on. Simoniac bishops and clergy were deposed; canonical election was insisted on; an attempt was made to prevent the marriage of the clergy in higher orders.

None of these reforms, nor the new papal authority, could be expected to last while the Pope himself was the Emperor's nominee. An even worse danger was the return to free election by the Roman clergy and people, which had long made the Pope the creature of an aristocratic faction. From these two dangers the Papacy was

extricated by the bold skill of the leading Cardinals, who were in fact the titular clergy of the local Roman churches. Henry III's death left the patriciate in the hands of his infant son, Henry IV, under the regency of Agnes, the pious, weak Empress-mother, and, when Pope Victor II's death followed in 1057, the way was clear. The Cardinals gained over Duke Godfrey of Lower Lorraine, then ruler of Tuscany, and under his protection obtained the election of his brother Frederick as Stephen IX. The old imperial right of confirmation was only acknowledged by a belated embassy after the Pope had already been consecrated. Stephen's death in 1058, however, produced the opposite danger. The Tusculan faction carried through a tumultuary election of Benedict X. But the Cardinals remained obstinate and wily. With extreme address they won the support both of Duke Godfrey and of the Empress Agnes for the Bishop of Florence, and then elected him Pope Nicholas II (1058-61) at Siena. He entered Rome by Godfrey's aid, and soon after the Anti-Pope was captured for him by the Normans. The Norman alliance gave a material backing to papal independence for the next few years. A new Canon gave it a legal foundation. The right to elect the Pope was practically confined to the College of Cardinals, who could meet away from Rome for the purpose. The patriciate of the Emperor was treated as meaningless, and, although a vague personal right of confirmation was reserved to Henry IV, it was rendered nugatory by the decree that the elect had all the prerogatives of Pope from the moment of his election. Thus it was hoped to secure a free election by the Cardinals, themselves now an international body, untrammelled either by an imperial nomination or the violence of Roman factions. One more attempt was made by Roman nobles in conjunction with the Empress to defend

their rights and those of the patriciate when Nicholas II died in 1061, but their Anti-Pope, Cadalus, made little headway against the canonically elected Alexander II (1061-73), who could rely on Norman aid. The German bishops eventually declared for Alexander and the schism ended. The most important step for the freedom of the Papacy had been taken.

Meanwhile the progress of reform and the increase of papal control was steady. Legate after legate toured France, repressing and punishing simony and clerical marriage. Everywhere, even in Germany, the custom of appealing to the Pope from the lower ecclesiastical courts was growing, a practice the more important as the exemption of the clergy from secular courts was vigorously insisted on. One after another, the prelates were compelled to submit to papal decisions. A new bureaucracy extending over all the West was being established, firmly bound by intercourse and supervision to Rome. England was almost a new acquisition. The Norman conquest introduced the reform of monastic and secular clergy together. New abbeys were continually being founded, the clergy were exempted from the lay courts, and ecclesiastical causes remitted solely to their jurisdiction. Simony and the marriage of the clergy were much diminished. Christian Spain, too, under the influence of Cluny, recognized the papal supremacy and began the work of reform. From the days of Nicholas II the Papacy employed a more searching method of compulsion. By forbidding men to hear mass from a married priest, it called the ordinary laity to its aid under fear of losing the Sacraments, and especially in Italy the laity took the reformers' side. It was a factor of enormous importance in the coming struggle with the lay monarchies.

SECTION 2. GREGORY VII AND HENRY IV

The evils in the Church, simony and the bad effects of clerical marriage, were rampant in Lombardy, in the great province ruled by the Archbishops of Milan, the successors of St Ambrose, who were almost as independent of the see of Rome as the northern metropolitans. Simony prevailed to such an extent that there was a tariff for Orders. Ecclesiastical endowment had become a part of the inheritance of the nobles. Social circumstances made the situation specially unstable. The great nobles and the valvassors of Milan by now were reconciled and lived in some primitive form of a commune under the leadership of their archbishop, but the wealthy traders, followed by the populace, were restive under their domination. Their indignation at the nobles' abuse of ecclesiastical advantages after 1056 turned quickly into zeal for church-reform under the guidance of reforming demagogic clerics, and the party of Patarines¹ grew to formidable strength. They rioted for clerical celibacy and the abolition of simony; they denied the validity of the Sacraments consecrated by simoniacs.

It was a golden opportunity for the Papacy, anxious to extend its authority and to enforce reform. Guido Archbishop of Milan was weak and unpopular, and allowed the Popes to intervene. The Patarines ruled the city, and in 1059 submission was complete. Riots and broils, however, between nobles and clergy and the Patarines continued fiercely. Guido decided to resign and persuaded King Henry IV to appoint and invest a new archbishop. But the Patarines would not admit the king's nominee, and, with Pope Alexander's approval,

¹ "Rag-pickers," a nickname for the poorer classes, given at first in contempt to the Milanese reformers.

elected an archbishop, who, in a reverse of fortune, was driven out in his turn.

The question was of prime importance to Henry IV. In the lack of royal demesnes in Italy, his authority there, when he was not present with an army, depended chiefly on the bishops, and became null if he did not appoint his own men. With the utmost difficulty he had been endeavouring to restore the royal power in Germany after the anarchy into which the realm had fallen during his minority. Able and resolute as he was, his cause was injured by his own vices and barbaric passions. His attempt, tyrannously carried out, to assert the royal power in Saxony led that particularist duchy to revolt in conjunction with some disaffected great nobles of southern Germany, and from 1073 to 1075 he was wholly occupied in subduing the rebellion.

Meantime in 1073 a new pope had been elected, the famous Gregory VII. As Cardinal Hildebrand, he had long been a leading figure of the Curia. As a diplomatist and financier he was unrivalled, and from the death of Stephen IX had contrived the political manoeuvres of the Papacy. Under Alexander II he was more important than the Pope. A Tuscan peasant by birth, a monk by inclination¹, he was an ardent reformer. He had an iron will, a combative nature, a genius for command and administration, and a singular diplomatic dexterity. He came to the tiara determined to put in practice the papal claims as they had been understood in the Curia since the days of Nicholas I. The Pope was to be absolute monarch of the Church, and, invested with a theocracy like Charlemagne's, should guide and govern secular princes. There

¹ It seems he never definitely entered a monastery, owing to which he was called a Sarabaita, *i.e.* a vagabond monk, by his enemies.

should be only one earthly head of the City of God with power to set up and depose all inferior dignitaries. The Emperor should be merely his secular lieutenant. With this theocratic power he meant to reform the Church. The abolition of simony and clerical marriage seemed in fair prospect of coming about now that the populace had been stirred by the fear of invalid Sacraments. He added to the programme the restoration of canonical election and appointment. Only so would the Church be free from the secular powers, and a spiritual ministry disciplined under the Pope.

So far Gregory was planning the reassertion of old papal claims and of the ancient Canon Law. There was, however, an extreme section of reformers, who wished to go further than the demand for canonical election of bishops. In 1058 Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida had laid down their programme. Property, he said, given to the Church was given to God in full gift. After the donation, neither the former owner nor the secular king had any claims on it. The bishop's obligation was towards the Church and the Pope, he must not enter into any contract of vassalage to a lay lord, whatever practical aid he might give for conscience' sake. Similarly he must not receive the ensigns of his ecclesiastical office from lay hands which could not confer spiritual powers. Investiture of his temporal possessions was unnecessary and wrong, for they had been given once absolutely to the Church and could not be transferred to the Church anew. The argument, it will be seen, severed the ties of the ecclesiastical hierarchy to the king, and gave it absolute freedom in secular as well as in ecclesiastical matters. But it was fatal to the state-system and royal power. The main bond of government was the feudal tie, and the king, who rested largely on the support of the bishops for his

authority, could not do without their vassalage. Even that was insufficient unless he had the deciding voice in their nomination, of which their need of investiture at his hands was the safeguard. From the point of view of principle, laymen would not give up their claims over the churches their ancestors had founded, and the kings in addition were the Lord's Anointed and by no means allowed that they were secular intruders dealing with sacred things. There was a conflict between a royal theocracy derived from Charlemagne and the papal theocracy derived from Nicholas I. In practice the bishops held a dual position in the hierarchies of Church and State; neither master could do without them, and, now that service to the Pope and Church had become incompatible with service to the King and State, there was bound to be a struggle for dominion over them.

Gregory himself, however, at first made little account of the ceremony of lay-investiture, nor did he try to sever the feudal tie of the bishops to the king. But he was absolutely determined on the point of canonical free election, in which the king would only have a certain influence and by which bishops would be appointed in the first place for ecclesiastical qualifications. Milan was the test case, with its rival archbishops, the elected reformer and the king's nominee. Its control was essential both for church-reform and for the maintenance of the imperial authority in Italy. Although Henry was in disgrace for simony and tyranny and temporarily involved in the excommunication of simoniacal councillors, long negotiations led to a *rapprochement*, till Gregory ventured on a further move in a Roman Synod of Lent 1075. For the first time he forbade lay-investiture; thus a mere royal nomination without election was barred by the abolition of the legal ceremony in which it was carried

out. Henry refused to give way, and took advantage of the reduction of Saxony and a revolution in Milan which placed the anti-reformers in power to appoint a third archbishop, disregarding the two existing rivals. Gregory then took up the gauntlet boldly, and widened the controversy. The contest between the Papacy and the Empire, the *regnum* and the *sacerdotium*, had begun. The Pope fell back on his doctrine of his absolute theocratic power, and made that the object of his policy. The suppression of simony and clerical marriage continued with much success, canonical election and the abolition of lay-investiture were insisted on stubbornly, but his main endeavour was directed to the subjection of the secular sovereigns, especially the Holy Roman King, to the Apostolic See. He threatened Henry with deposition. The King in fury hastily summoned a Synod at Worms and declared Gregory no Pope. In the Lenten Synod of 1076 Gregory replied by excommunicating and suspending the King and annulling all oaths of allegiance or vassalage taken to him. It was the first exercise of his theocratic prerogative and a precedent of incalculable importance.

At the moment Henry was much the weaker. The Saxons once more revolted. The bishops were frightened, the dukes disloyal, the general effect of his excommunication enormous. Gregory, meanwhile, was safe. Although he had broken off the Norman alliance, he was on intimate terms with Matilda Countess of Tuscany, the strongest of the Italian feudatories, and thus was protected against any inroads of the Lombard bishops and nobles who sided with Henry. The King found himself helpless, and at a Diet at Tribur submitted to the demands of the Saxons and great nobles. He recognized Gregory as Pope, and the nobles declared that, unless the Pope absolved him by February 1077, a new king should be elected. They

then barred the Alpine passes and invited Gregory to visit Germany. But Henry broke through the toils. At Christmas he crossed the Mont Cenis and intercepted Gregory at Matilda's castle of Canossa. Three days he stood as a penitent barefoot in the snow outside the castle-gates till Gregory, pressed on all sides, granted him absolution and the Communion. He had forced the Pope's hand, and re-won at a stroke the allegiance of his many supporters in Germany who had been scared away by his excommunication. Never again could Gregory recover the ascendancy he possessed in 1076. But Henry bought his advantage at a heavy price. He had admitted the Pope's right to excommunicate him in spite of his royal dignity and sacring. He had admitted the Pope as arbitrator between him and his lay vassals. And further the successor of Charlemagne and Henry III had been publicly humiliated before the successor of Nicholas I. Henceforward the Empire never recovered its old estimation in Europe. At most it could claim an independent vicegerency of God in lay matters. The lay theocracy had gone. The ecclesiastical theocracy stood forth unquestionably first in dignity among Western potentates, ready at a favourable opportunity to pursue its claims of an absolute dominion over Church and State.

The absolution at Canossa had no effect on the German rebels. They proceeded to elect an Anti-Caesar, Duke Rudolf of Swabia, and the tedious civil war recommenced. Henry gradually gained the upper hand. Beyond the Saxons and a few of the greatest nobles, who were his deadly enemies, the general feeling was in his favour. At last in 1080 his hands were freed by the indecisive battle of the R. Elster, in which the Anti-Caesar was killed and the rebels disorganized for a time. He could then turn his attention to Italy.

Meantime the strife with Gregory had broken out afresh. Gregory had tried to stand neutral between the rival German kings and to extort the acknowledgement of his theocratic supremacy from each. Neither came in to his terms, but Henry was by far the more stubborn, resisting especially all compromise on his right of investing bishops. The King himself perhaps sent an ultimatum to the Pope. At any rate in the Lenten Synod of 1080 Gregory threw down the gauntlet once again. He excommunicated and deposed Henry, and declared Rudolf King of Germany as a vassal of the Holy See. It was the widest stretch of the Pope's theocratic claim. Deeply influenced as he was by the prevailing feudalism, he had latterly been attempting to obtain the homage of most of the West European kings. Thus his theocracy would have feudal expression and be strengthened by the feudal tie. But he did not carry public opinion with him. Even Rudolf never submitted to be his vassal, and Henry could proceed with much support to a rival Synod at Brixen, which deposed Gregory and elected an Anti-Pope.

Gregory's plans were far-reaching. He had once more secured the alliance and vassalage of the Normans by giving in to the terms of Robert Guiscard¹; and he aimed at separating Italy from Germany, by making the feudatories of the north papal vassals like the Normans of the south. Matilda of Tuscany, by a famous donation, granted her lands to the Apostolic See. The future Roman Emperor might be a kind of lay-advocate of the Roman Pope, but for all practical purposes the Holy Roman Empire as founded by Otto the Great was to be broken up.

In 1081 Henry came to Italy. So long as Guiscard was occupied with eastern ambitions, or internal revolts, he had a free field and slowly warred down the resistance

¹ See above, p. 189.

of the Romans, with whom the Pope was popular. But they grew weary of suffering for Gregory's theocracy, and surrendered in 1084, while the unbending Pope held out in the castle of S. Angelo. Henry could induct his Anti-Pope and at last be crowned Emperor. Then Guiscard came late to the rescue with overwhelming force. The Emperor could only retreat across the Alps where his presence was urgently needed. The Normans captured Rome from his partisans, ruining the city more than Goth or Vandal had done, and leaving a third of it in ashes. When they returned to the south they took the now hated Pope with them to die in 1085 at Salerno. He was convinced that his whole policy had been a religious duty—"I have loved justice¹ and hated iniquity; therefore I die in exile," were his last words; but his main design had failed against the stubborn resistance of kings and peoples who had refused to bow down to his theocracy. Nevertheless, he left the theocratic claim for his successors to carry through at a later date with brief triumph. Innocent III was his true heir.

On the other hand, Gregory had completed the erection of the ecclesiastical monarchy of the Papacy. In Spain, besides urging on the usual church reforms, he completed the reduction of the once independent Mozarabic Church under the papal monarchy, and introduced the Roman ritual in place of the indigenous Mozarabic. In France, he insisted successfully on the practice of electing bishops, without, however, removing the sovran's influence, and subdued the metropolitans. The papal authority was secured by the almost continual activity of papal legates, who carried on the campaign against simony, clerical marriage and lay-investiture. From both Spain and

¹ "Justice" in the sense of St Augustine, *i.e.* obedience to the Divine commands.

France appeals from the local ecclesiastical courts to the Roman Curia became more and more common, and the whole Church began to be gathered up in a unified administration under the Papacy. England and Normandy, however, still retained much of the earlier local autonomy. William and Lanfranc of Canterbury were zealous for the older church reforms. They attacked simony and clerical marriage, they furthered monasticism and learning, and established the exemption of the clergy from the lay courts. But they looked on the papal supremacy as involving only occasional intervention. The English Church should normally be governed by the King and the Primate of Canterbury. William refused to allow visits or appeals to Rome, the entrance of papal legates, or the excommunication of his vassals, without his special permission. Similarly he rejected the idea of a papal theocracy. When Gregory demanded homage from him he promptly refused. When Henry IV's capture of Rome seemed a judgment of God in the Emperor's favour, William and Lanfranc declined to recognize either Pope or Anti-Pope, and England remained awhile in complete ecclesiastical independence.

The death of Gregory VII allowed the claim he had made to a theocracy to be quietly dropped, but it neither closed the schism nor ended the dispute over the election and investiture of bishops. On both questions the Papacy gained ground. Henry might overcome the Saxon rebels, he never could induce all Germany to side with his Anti-Pope. When Cardinal Eudes, an adroit French monk of Cluny, acquired the tiara as Urban II in 1088, he renewed the attack on Henry's schismatic Lombard bishops. Henry vainly waged a seven years' war in Lombardy: Matilda of Tuscany could not be subdued. His own son was seduced into rebellion by the unscrupulous Pope, his

second wife blackened his character by her accusations, and, while he was engaged in petty campaigns, Urban seized the opportunity of taking the leadership of Europe by promoting the First Crusade. Whatever views might be held of papal theocracy, the Pope had stepped into the Emperor's place. In 1097 Henry left Italy, which now for fifty years developed in independence on her own lines, in spite of the occasional imperial campaigns.

Meanwhile Urban II made an advance in his claims. He forbade not only lay-investiture, but fealty to laymen on the part of the episcopate. The bishops should only be bound by oath to the Papacy. His successor, Paschal II (1099-1118), was rigid in the same demand. He stirred up the Emperor's son, Henry V, against him, and the unhappy father yielded to a universal defection. He abdicated in 1105 and died in the following year. Debauched and violent, he had by ability and perseverance prevented the dissolution of the Empire. Henry V (1105-25) was resolved to lose no more, and, while he abandoned the schism, held firmly to his right to lay-investiture and fealty. When he came with overwhelming force to Rome for his coronation in 1111 the Pope proposed a strange compromise. The German bishops should renounce the feudal lordships and lands they held of the crown, and be free henceforward from the crown's claims over them. It was rejected by the German nobles in a tumult at the attempted ceremony; and Henry amazed the West by capturing the Pope. He was crowned on his own conditions, but they could not be kept by Paschal, who was threatened with ecclesiastical revolt from the French bishops. So the struggle continued. The Emperor tried another schism with no success. At last an able statesman, Guy Archbishop of Vienne, became Pope as Calixtus II. He perceived what settlement was

really possible, and agreed to the Concordat of Worms in 1122. Henceforward free election was guaranteed, but the Emperor had a voice in it. He then received the elect's homage and fealty for the temporalities, and invested him with them by the lay symbol of the sceptre. Consecration and ecclesiastical investiture then followed at the hands of the metropolitan. It was not unlike the scheme of Gregory VII, made possible by the changes of the times. The Emperor had lost power and gave up little more, for the German nobles who filled the electoral chapters already had a large share in episcopal appointments. In Italy the independence of the cities had so grown that the bishops could no longer defend the imperial government. Calixtus on his side retreated from the papal claim to the undivided allegiance of the prelates. It had been unattainable, and their ecclesiastical dependence on Rome alone at least was ratified. The very shadow of the lay theocracy of Charlemagne and Henry III had vanished. At most the Emperors insisted that they were direct vicegerents of God in the sphere of secular affairs.

Much the same results had been achieved outside the Empire. In France, indeed, the Popes succeeded in abolishing both lay-investiture and homage, but the weakness and need of royal protection which characterized the elected French bishops bound them to support the crown more efficaciously than any ceremony. In England and Normandy a miniature investiture controversy broke out between Henry I and his saintly archbishop, Anselm. It ended in 1107 by the same solution as at Worms. The king admitted election, which in this case was mostly a mere shadow, and gave up investiture by ring and staff. In practice he lost little, in theory his claim to rule the English Church was renounced. His successor, Stephen,

was in urgent need of the Church's support, and gained it for a while by concessions. One of these, elections really free, was cancelled by the next king, Henry II, but the other, the regular practice of appeals to Rome from the ecclesiastical courts, became permanent.

One of the most powerful motives in the whole movement of church reform had been the conviction, that the renunciation of the false delights of the world and the practice of asceticism were a necessary part of the complete Christian life and necessary qualifications for the handling of holy things. It was, therefore, to be expected, as church reform advanced, that more and more efforts should be made to place the secular clergy under monastic conditions, and to sharpen the monastic Rule for actual monks. The mass of the parish priests, of course, scattered in their villages, could only be called to celibacy: monastic organization was not for them. But the canons of cathedrals and other collegiate churches were open to change, and among them, too, richly endowed as they were, abuses were rampant which invited change. The remedy, it was felt, for the abuses and the way towards the ideal was the submission of the chapters to a semi-monastic Rule; the Canons Secular were to become Canons Regular. This implied a life in common and asceticism. A Rule was invented for them which was attributed to St Augustine of Hippo, and, during the last quarter of the eleventh century, it was applied to the reform of the chapters with much success, although many chapters, especially in Germany, persisted in the old ways, living on their prebends or following a laxer Rule. Soon the same principles were extended to new foundations. Of these the most important was that of Prémontré founded by the German Norbert in Champagne in 1121. Norbert's scheme was to create not only an abbey, but a monastic

Order like the Cluniac, for parochial duties. His Praemonstratensian Canons were ascetic monks; numerous daughter-houses spread over Europe, and they served parish-churches in town and country.

The aim of the Canons Regular was to approximate the life of clergy, having the cure of souls, to the life of monks. Contemporaneously a new movement arose with the object of increasing the austerity of real monastic life. Partly, it was caused by the ever-increasing zeal for asceticism, partly by the invariable tendency of the monks, as wealth poured in upon them from the offerings of the faithful, to relax their Rule and indulge in worldly splendour. Two new Orders were more successful than their fellows in stemming the decline. The most important of these was the Cistercian Order, named from Cîteaux Abbey in Burgundy, which like the Praemonstratensian and Cluny was essentially French in character, though it had an Englishman for its founder. Flight from the world was the Cistercians' aim. Their many abbeys were built in forest lands and sequestered glens. They avoided the immunities and lordships of the older monks. Their churches were as plain as possible. They renounced even learning. Their monastic labour was pastoral, and their houses so many sheep-farms. In this way temptation came to them, for they grew to be the wealthiest wool-producers in Europe.

The asceticism of the Cistercians surpassed that of their other rivals, but the Carthusians made asceticism their chief aim. Founded by a German, Bruno, at Chartreuse amid the Alps in Dauphiny, each house of the Order formed an assemblage of hermits. The common life was reduced to the minimum which would allow supervision and common action. Religion and work, mental and manual, were lonely exercises for the Carthusian. Their Rule, however,

was effectual. They declined less than the other Orders, and the numerous Charterhouses retained a veneration throughout the Middle Age.

The solidarity among monks induced by the great centralized Orders, like Cluny and Cîteaux, had been of immense service in unifying the Western Church and establishing the papal ecclesiastical monarchy. It could also place the leadership of Christendom in the hands of a famous monk. Something like this had happened in the case of the Abbots of Cluny, but their greatness lay in the time when the local churches, the bishops, and secular influences were still strong. The full fruition was reserved to the virtual chief of the Cistercians, St Bernard Abbot of Clairvaux (1114-53). Great as a theologian, great as a monk, great as a preacher, he dominated the West. The Popes seem almost in his leading-strings, he fought and ended a schism. He kept the Church strung up to the level of the reform. In secular matters he had an effectual voice; he was the causer of the European effort of the Second Crusade. So long as he lived, it was certain that the mere business-like organization of the Church would not overmaster its spiritual and religious mission.

It remains to sum up the general effect of this reform in the Western Church on the progress of Europe. Revived monasticism brought with it revived learning and thought, the propaganda of Christian ideals besides mere asceticism, and a steady spread of the cultivation of the soil and of prosperity. The monks drained the marshes and cleared the forests; on the great highways they dispensed hospitality and facilitated intercourse; often round the abbeys grew up towns and markets. As to the secular clergy, the restriction of simony, an ill past entire cure, and their recall to ecclesiastical duties produced for a

time at least some of the same effects. But the main result both of that, and of the abolition of clerical marriage, and of the erection of the Popes' ecclesiastical monarchy, was to establish a great international machine for civilization. All roads led to Rome, which became the centre and link of the West European nations. The unified Church provided the only model of an organized administration at the time. Although the enforced celibacy of the clergy was attended by many evils, their separation from ordinary life ensured the cohesion of the Church and the maintenance of the Church's system. Their personal exemption from the lay courts of justice and the fact that birth, marriage, death, and other matters of personal life were dealt with by the ecclesiastical courts, were of first importance. For in the Courts Christian alone, in the twelfth century, were a scientific method of proof and a series of trained and generally impartial courts of appeal known. And the law practised in the Courts Christian was no less civilizing and valuable. On the one hand, the Canon Law was largely a derivative in contents and method from Roman Law, and was skilfully extended by Popes and Councils. On the other, it contained a higher morality of Christian origin which slowly raised the standards of life from the barbaric level of the Dark Ages. Lastly, the administrative authority of the Popes worked for good on the Churches subordinated to them. They corrected abuses, they promoted efficiency. In view of the corruption we shall soon have to note in the Roman Curia and the manifold calamities which both the ecclesiastical monarchy and the theocratic ambitions of the Popes were to bring upon the West, it is well to remember in their favour the splendid services they rendered to civilization in the century following Gregory VII.

SECTION 3. THE REVIVAL OF SECULAR CIVILIZATION

The movement for church reform, with all it implied, was only the most splendid instance of a general amelioration which was taking place over Western Europe as it recovered from anarchy. Some small measure of peace and order was the first essential. The most notable symptom and agent in social life was the development of commerce. Trade in the earlier Middle Age was an exchange of goods between the civilized East and the half-barbaric West. The West exported its natural wealth, wood, iron, copper and wool, and too frequently slaves, and received luxuries, silk and linen, pepper and spices and objects of art. Merchants ran immense dangers and obtained immense profits. The intermediaries of this trade, therefore, were the first to advance in economic prosperity, and the intermediaries, by reason of their geographical position, were the Italian cities. In the eleventh century, the efforts of the chief seaport towns, especially of Pisa, and the conquest of Sicily by the Normans had reduced Saracenic piracy to a mere nuisance, no longer a barrier to trade. The First Crusade completed the work. Henceforward the commerce of the Levant was open to Italian exploitation. Definite routes were established along which the annual or half-yearly trading fleets, or *caravans*, proceeded under the escort of armed galleys. The sea-towns competed one with another for this carrying-trade, but none the less they each predominated in special spheres. To Venice fell the lion's share of commerce with Constantinople and the Aegean Sea whence, besides Byzantine manufactures, goods came *via* the Black Sea even from Persia and China. Genoa, Pisa and Venice, all shared in the commerce of the Crusading states on the Syrian coast, but Pisa and the Sicilian kingdom had the closest

connexion with Egypt. By both channels the produce of the farther East, Mesopotamia, Persia, and India filtered through to Europe. Nor was the Levant the only objective of the Italian merchantmen. Genoa, Pisa and Sicily drove a thriving trade with the north coasts of Africa and with Moslem Spain.

Part of these imports were destined for Italy itself; another part, together with Italian manufactures, was re-exported northwards by the Italian merchants. With Germany, as yet, trade over the Brenner and Septimer Passes was relatively small, but to the West three main routes were thronged. The first, by sea, led to Marseilles and other coast towns, and enriched the south of France. From Marseilles a branch of it went north to Lyons, where it met the second route, and to Dijon, where it met the third, and proceeded to Champagne, which in its great fairs formed the centre of the north French, English and Rhineland trade. The second route led up the Po, receiving many tributaries, and crossed the Mont Cenis Pass to Lyons. The third branched off from the Po at Pavia and Milan, crossed the Great St Bernard Pass and joined the others at Dijon or in Champagne. Both these land routes were used by the inland towns of Lombardy and Tuscany, which thus shared in the prosperity of the seaports.

The material effect of this commerce in the increase of wealth was the least of its benefits. Wealth and trade caused the rise of the trading class and led to the restriction of feudal oppression. And especially the movement of men, merchants and ecclesiastics and pilgrims, along the great routes produced a stir and gave a mental stimulus which enabled medieval society to make an advance towards better conditions of life and polity. Wherever commerce extended, the townsmen rose in status and

obtained a varying share in the government of their towns. In Italy it led to the creation of practically independent city-states. Among them Venice was the eldest-born. No oligarchy as yet, the state under the rule of its Doges elected for life was already controlled by its merchant aristocracy. Its original dependence on the Byzantine Empire had vanished, and it had acquired dominions of its own on the Dalmatian coast as well as settlements in the Levant. In a way it was a fragment of the past, carrying on Roman imperial traditions, unhampered by Germanic blood-feuds and feudalized methods in its government. Autonomy, however, was the privilege of all the north Italian cities in the twelfth century. The collapse of the Holy Roman Empire under Henry IV was accompanied by the decadence of its episcopal and feudal officials. The citizens, protected by their walls, powerful by their wealth, and accustomed to co-operation, seized on self-government in the form of a *commune*, which in essentials was a commonwealth. Each town had its own pattern and its individual development, but none the less the general outline was the same. The ultimate civic authority was formed by the general assembly known as the *arengo*, *parlamento* or some such name. Real power, however, lay with the wealthy men, nobles and prosperous plebeians, from whom mainly the advisory council, the *credenza*, was taken and the executive, the yearly *consuls* were elected. This was the formal constitution. Four characteristics of the utmost importance further demand notice. First, the cities were bourgeois in temperament and commercial in occupation. Even the nobles for the most part engaged in trade. The most important community in the city was the merchants' guild, and the lesser traders, manufacturers and shopkeepers, were already of weight. Feudalism, with its

private jurisdictions and also its chivalrous tendencies, was of little account within the walls. Secondly, the old Germanic blood-feud was unhappily prevalent among the nobles. Closely organized families and family alliances dominated the city politics, and gave to the class-hostilities, which were almost inherent in the motley population, the heritage of bloody faction-warfare. The cities could never control their quarrelsome nobility; rather the people (*popolani*) were drawn into the same riotous, street-fighting methods. Thirdly, the authority of the commune at first ceased with its walls. It had to subdue in detail the feudal nobles of its countryside, including pretty generally the bishop or count who in the imperial system should have governed it. No mere greed of land inspired the communes in this warfare. It was necessary self-defence to destroy brigandage and extortion on the highways and to protect the citizens' fields. In result, the *contado* was made subject to the city, and a large proportion of the country nobles were made citizens with compulsory residence within the walls, where they stimulated all the elements of disorder by their feuds and insubordination, but where they also formed the best troops of the state. Lastly, the communes were bitter rivals, one of another; trade-rivalries, trade-disputes, questionable boundaries, where a road, river, pass or ford was of commercial value, all went to swell the sum of mutual hatred, bolstered up by long traditions of intense civic patriotism and pride, and reinforced by a constant interchange of injuries. Thus the cities were vexed perpetually with internal and external strife. Independent as they were, with conflicting interests stretching half over Europe, they soon formed political systems of states, and a local quarrel could spread to a straggling warfare throughout North Italy. Empire and

Papacy were ready to join in the broil and make it worse, as the kings of Persia had done in classic Greece to which medieval Italy bears a marked resemblance. Only the strong trade-gilds maintained a steady industrial life through the confusion. But the race of men, so occupied in narrow civic concerns and international politics and trade at the same time, was stimulated to an energy and activity without a medieval parallel.

The social advance of Europe was assisted by the fortunate survival of Roman Law, the knowledge of which centred in Italy owing to her connexion with the Byzantine Empire. In the eleventh century a system of local custom, based partly on the obsolescent Germanic and Roman racial laws and partly on local practical conditions, was growing up over the West. The Emperor Conrad II had already declared Roman Law to be the territorial law of Rome itself, and in the twelfth century the personal hereditary law of men disappears altogether. Local territorial law in immense variety takes its place. By necessity the new law was fragmentary and chaotic, and the eyes of lawyers were naturally directed to the two universal, organized systems, the Roman Civil Law and the Canon Law, both of which could meet the advancing civilization of society. In Italy and south France the growth of local law had been guided by the fact that Justinian's code was taken as the standard, and it was especially in Italy, in the ancient Exarchate, that the study of Justinian flourished most. Ravenna and Bologna produced schools of lawyers, who settled the correct text, explained its meaning and applied it to real or imaginary cases. Their influence spread in the twelfth century over France and England. Even where and when, as in Germany, they did not affect local law, they exalted the secular state and the lay sovran by their doctrines,

becoming a valuable auxiliary to the royal power which was greatly in need of an offset to the theocratic claims of the Papacy. For the Latin South they provided the more civilized system which was required by a commercial population.

Apart from practice Roman Law was an excellent educative training, and we find that the schools of jurists were the earliest medieval universities. Learning had hitherto been acquired and taught in the schools attached to monasteries and collegiate churches. Now at Bologna, Ravenna and other Italian towns secular schools came into being which gradually attracted a concourse of students from all the West. In the eleventh century the theological students of Paris were taking a similar course. Scholars flocked to hear famous teachers independent of any church organization, and in this way the foundations of the later famous University of Paris were laid.

French spiritual ascendancy was as marked in chivalry as in monasticism, and it was from France that European vernacular literature, designed to amuse the knightly class, took its origin and received its character. Some of this literature was religious and edifying, but the more famous part of it was devoted to the idealizing of baronial life. There were the semi-epic songs of the Carolingian cycle in which the deeds and feuds of the traditional heroes of the anarchy and of Charlemagne himself were celebrated. Among them the *Song of Roland*, narrating his glorious death at Roncevaux, stands pre-eminent, but it shares its somewhat crude, yet Homer-like, qualities with many kindred compositions. More feeling for wild nature and fairy-like glamour was shown in another group of lays, known only by its later development, which borrowed its theme from the Arthurian legends of Wales and Brittany. Its great poet was Chrestien de Troyes in the last half of

the twelfth century. Lastly, a lyric poetry of chivalrous love blossomed in the lands which spoke the south French *Langue d'oc*, which, if it missed the simplicity of the adventurous tales, was more civilized in its exquisiteness and subtlety. All these kinds of literature were spread by the wandering *jongleurs*, purveyors of amusement, among whose leaders the authors, *trouvères* or *troubadours*, were often found. Thus oral and written tales and poems were carried far and wide. Italy, Germany, England and Spain were content to learn them, if not to the exclusion of their native traditional material. In the thirteenth century translation and direct imitation stamped this French influence on Western Literature even in its most national forms.

But it was in architecture that French medieval civilization won its crowning triumph. It was in the Capetian domain especially that the art of building advanced, that new devices were adopted and that the type of a church was altered from the gloomy, solid stateliness of the eleventh century to the aspiring energy and enchanted imagination of later Gothic. Up to 1150, however, we have rather the gradual invention of the means which a century later were to be gloriously used. The barrel vault gives place to ogival with its thrust and counter-thrust, the ogive is strengthened by the ribs which then collect the pressure to be passed on to column and flying buttress, the windows in the unweighted spaces of the wall can open from narrow slits to receive a wide expanse of coloured glass sustained by slender tracery. The true splendour of the art was yet to come, but its elements were there, ready for the time when a cathedral should be within a mystical hall of tense beauty filled with rich-hued light and religious gloom, and without should strain at heaven with its spires, and blossom in

stone around its doors, "carved with figures strange and sweet." Man's imagination in its springtide freshness took a shuddering delight in the scantily known and suspected world, informing its obvious beauty with terror and holy awe.

SECTION 4. THE REVIVAL OF THE EMPIRE

The Papacy had scarcely completed the erection of its ecclesiastical monarchy, before its gains were imperilled by an accidental schism. On the face of it the double election of Innocent II and Anaclete II in 1130 seems merely the outcome of the rivalry of two factions among the Cardinals, backed by corresponding factions of the Roman nobles, and it is hard to say why, in view of the obvious defects in the claims of both rivals, St Bernard and the monks in general should have espoused so fervently the side of Innocent. One reason may have been, perhaps, that Anaclete, though a staunch reformer, was one of those business-like prelates who dominated the Curia. Roman centralization, a Curia preoccupied in legal appeals and more and more intervening in the diocesan rule of the bishops, and at the same time greedily making its powers a plentiful source of income, might well arouse the aversion of the Church and especially of St Bernard and the ascetic party. The mediocrity Innocent who was willing to be guided might well seem preferable to Anaclete. St Bernard declared unhesitatingly for him, and as usual the West followed his lead. But Anaclete had two strong points in his favour, the adhesion of Rome and the alliance of the Normans of Sicily, whose chief, Roger II, he made a king. To overcome him it was necessary to recur once more to German intervention as in the days of Henry III, and St Bernard knew that the dangers to papal independence therefrom were now comparatively small.

The death of the last Salian Henry V in 1125 had further altered the character of the German monarchy. The German princes exercised to the full their right of election and chose Lothair III, Duke of Saxony. With no hereditary claim to the throne, and grown old as a Saxon particularist and clerical champion, Lothair was not the man to restore the declining monarchy. He had the better, indeed, after a long sluggish war, of his rival Conrad, the heir of the Salians, and he increased the power of his own family; yet he allowed the royal share in the appointment and control of the bishops to slip from his hands under clerical pressure, while the independence of the great nobles increased. At St Bernard's instigation he agreed to restore Innocent to Rome. In 1133 he brought the Pope to the Lateran and received his reward in the imperial crown and the enfeoffment to him of Matilda's inheritance, but Anaclete soon drove out his rival again, and it needed another stronger expedition in 1137 to close the schism. For a moment it seemed as if Lothair would revive the imperial power in Italy, driving King Roger back to Sicily and controlling the cities, but his relations with the Pope became strained and he himself died during his retreat to Germany which was urgently demanded by his German troops. Innocent was really freed from the Anti-Pope by Anaclete's death in 1138, and bought the adhesion of Sicily, after being defeated and captured, by acknowledging Roger's kingship.

In Germany the main preoccupation of the princes was to keep Lothair's overpowerful heir, Henry the Proud, Duke of Bavaria and Saxony and head of the Swabian house of the Welfs, from the throne. With this end they elected the former Anti-Caesar, Conrad III of Hohenstaufen, and the manoeuvre was successful. Hampered by his feud with the Welfs, Conrad was weaker than

Lothair. First of the Kings since Otto the Great, he was never crowned Emperor, and Italy slipped from his grasp. The best of his energies were exhausted in the ruinous Second Crusade. But his very weakness provoked a change. The bishops were weary of the interference of the Roman Curia, and the princes of the impotence of Germany in Europe. Conrad's death, therefore, in 1152 gave the opportunity for a full reaction. The man was there to lead it, Frederick Barbarossa (Redbeard), Duke of Swabia. Frederick was not only Conrad's nephew and heir of the Salian Emperors, but through his mother he was akin to the Welfs, the most powerful house in Germany. So he was elected unanimously King of the Romans¹.

His firm resolve was to restore the royal authority and the greatness of the Empire. For this he needed the co-operation of the princes and a control over the German Church. The first aim was achieved by his alliance with the Welfs. Henry the Lion, son of Henry the Proud, was restored to the duchies of Saxony and Bavaria, lost by his father in revolt against Conrad, and henceforward King and Duke supported one another's interests. By similar connexions of friendship, and by the influence of Frederick's attractive personality, the other chief princes were brought into line, while by a vigorous administration of justice and the careful husbanding of royal rights and demesne, an effective sovereignty was secured by the King. Nor was it difficult to recover his rights over the Church according to the Worms Concordat. Bishops and abbots were again elected in the royal presence and by the royal choice. Fealty and homage and feudal dues were rigorously exacted from them. The kingship, in short, was revived in Germany, and Frederick could look forward to its reassertion in Italy and his imperial coronation.

¹ *Rex Romanorum*, the title used before coronation at Rome.

The course of events, meanwhile, had placed the Popes in need of aid. Perpetually harassed by the threatening power of Sicily, they had lost all control of Rome itself. Rising in insurrection against Innocent II in 1142, the citizens had coerced the great nobles and formed a commune. No efforts of the Popes could tame them. One pontiff, Lucius II, was mortally wounded in a street fight. In these contests the revolutionary spirit which lurked in the communal movement found an articulate voice. Arnold, a priest of the Lombard town of Brescia and a follower of the incipient rationalism of the famous Abelard, St Bernard's adversary, appeared in Rome, and declared against the temporal power and wealth of Pope and clergy. It was an aftermath of the Patarine movement, church reform and asceticism carried to their logical extreme. Apostolic poverty and abnegation were to be the rule of the Church. The same essential belief was later to give birth to the Orders of Friars, and to haunt the Middle Ages till new ideals arose with the Reformation; but, made into an article of faith, it was irreconcilable with the existing functions of the Church, and its actual development. As such it could expect nothing but suppression from the ambitious Papacy with its theocratic strivings, and from Barbarossa, the champion of a reaction to the days of Henry. III. Eugenius III (1145-53) begged Frederick to come to his rescue, and the need became more pressing when the only English Pope, Adrian IV, acquired the tiara in 1154. The imperious Adrian refused to acknowledge the commune, and, for the first time in history, laid Rome under an Interdict¹, which he only removed on the expulsion of Arnold. Meanwhile the Pope refused investiture to William I of Sicily, who was held in check by a revolt in

¹ An Interdict forbade all ecclesiastical ceremonies save baptism, marriage and the last Communion of the dying.

Apulia, for Frederick, when he came with a moderate force to be crowned Emperor in 1155, could and would do little in the Pope's favour beyond securing the capture of Arnold of Brescia. The latter-day prophet, whose advent in the twelfth century was so inevitable and so untimely, was promptly executed.

Frederick's expedition made clear the fundamental opposition of the Empire and the Papacy. Adrian IV upheld his ecclesiastical monarchy and the theocracy aimed at by Gregory VII. Frederick, on the one hand, maintained the independence of the imperial power derived from God alone—he was the secular Vicar of Christ; on the other hand, he claimed his full royal rights in Germany, which included the *de facto* mastery of the German Church. Adrian scored the initial successes. He forced Frederick to hold his stirrup, a humiliating ceremony which had been introduced by the clerical Lothair III¹. And, when the Emperor was gone, he arrived at a compromise with William I in 1156 at Benevento, by which the questions in dispute were settled, mainly to the advantage of the Sicilian king. At this time Sicilian ambitions were directed south and east, and Adrian knew it and could safely yield. But the breach with the Emperor was made.

The first open strife occurred over an insidious phrase. In 1156 Frederick had made an important addition to the power of his house by his marriage with the heiress of Franche Comté in Burgundy. From that time he possessed an increasing influence in the neglected third kingdom of the Empire. Therein at Besançon he held a Diet in 1157 to which came as papal legate, Cardinal Roland Bandinelli. The papal letter he bore spoke of the imperial crown as a *beneficium* received from the Pope. The word was

¹ In imitation of the gushing piety of some Carolingians.

ambiguous, and no doubt was so intended. Did it mean a benefice, *i.e.* a fief, or a benefit? Frederick and his vassals took it to mean a fief as did the legate himself. They were up in arms at once; the German bishops were at one in supporting the Emperor; and Adrian, baffled, was forced to explain that he had meant a benefit after all.

The inevitable battle-ground, however, of the Empire and the Papacy was Italy. Not to mention the subsidiary questions of Matilda's inheritance, over which and the papal lands the Emperor claimed sovran rights, the Popes could not submit to a strong imperial rule in North Italy, which threatened their own independence. On his side Frederick was determined to rule with all Charlemagne's authority, his belief in his imperial rights being seconded by the prospect of the ample revenue which he sorely needed and which the subjection of the Lombard cities promised him. That subjection he now set about, and the time seemed favourable, for two chief groups of cities, one headed by Milan and the other by Cremona, were bitterly at feud, and Milan was hated by the smaller towns which she forced to obey her. In 1158 Frederick marched to Italy with irresistible force. Cremona, Pavia and their allies declared for him, and Milan after a brief siege was compelled to make full submission. Frederick could then proceed to his constructive policy. At Roncaglia he held a Diet and promulgated the legislation which should make Lombardy the treasury of the Empire. By old charters the *regalia*, *i.e.* the local rights and dues of the Emperor, had mostly been vested in the bishops and great lay vassals, but in the days since Henry V the city communes had seized them in great part from these dignitaries. Frederick now reclaimed them for the crown. Nor was this all. Imperial justice should put an end to the cities' wars. Their consuls must

receive his approval. And an imperial official, the *podestà*, should be placed in each town to administer justice and exact the imperial rights.

Such an inroad on their autonomy roused Milan and her allies to revolt, and a dim feeling of national dislike to the German stranger added energy to this main cause of their resistance. The ferocious cruelty with which Frederick crushed the rebellion only gave them more resolution. In the midst of the struggle came a schism to set all Europe by the ears. In 1159 Adrian IV died, just after he had made alliance with Milan. Cardinal Roland was at once elected as Alexander III, while the imperialist minority of the Cardinals declared Cardinal Octavian Pope as Victor IV. Frederick made a show of neutrality and arbitration, but of course his synod declared for his candidate Victor. Europe, however, judged otherwise than the German prelates, and before the year 1160 was out Alexander was acknowledged everywhere outside the Empire. Rigid in his claims, moderate in action, and of invincible courage, the new Pope was well fitted to withstand the onslaught of so great an antagonist as Frederick. In Italy his position seemed desperate, and in 1162 he fled to France. At the same time, after three years' warfare, the Emperor levelled Milan to the ground and reduced it to four open villages. For a moment North Italy was subdued.

Italy, if subdued, was anything but conciliated. The restriction of their autonomy, the oppression of the German *podestàs*, the heavy taxation on the *regalia*, and ruth for the blotting out of Milan even among the rival cities which had shared in it, were rousing bitter resentment which only two or three specially favoured communes did not feel. Frederick was sensible of the Lombards' hatred during an unarmed visit to Italy in 1163. Next year the eastern-

most cities formed a league obviously directed against him, and, worse blow still, his Anti-Pope died. The new Anti-Pope, Paschal III, had not his predecessor's hold on Rome, and Frederick prepared to conquer the city by a mighty effort. The continuance of the schism made still clearer the grounds of it. Frederick made no claims to a lay theocracy, but he firmly controlled the German Church, and he was determined to control the Pope as well. Alexander fought for papal independence and for the papal ecclesiastical monarchy. The Western nations might often be restive under the latter, but they were bound to support the former in spite of Barbarossa's blandishments. They could not allow their spiritual chief to be under a German master.

Frederick, however, was lured on to continue the struggle by his success in Germany and by the profitable subjection of Italy. With a great army he besieged Alexander in Rome, whither the Pope had returned. In 1167 Rome surrendered, but the Pope escaped south, and Frederick was overtaken by sudden and complete disaster. His army was annihilated by plague. Retreating, he found the north in full revolt. With barely an exception the communes had founded the famous Lombard League, and Milan's bitterest enemies had joined in restoring her walls and commune. Frederick could hardly escape over the Mont Cenis to Germany.

The Lombard League could now extend its membership and emphasize its alliance with the Pope, in whose honour it founded the new city of Alessandria. But Frederick was by no means at the end of his resources. If he showed signs of treating his next Anti-Pope, Calixtus III, as an asset to bargain with, he increased his mastery of Germany and retained considerable power in central Italy, while his international position grew stronger in spite of the

schism by means of the friendly relations he established with the king of France. None the less the German princes nourished an aversion to further Italian expeditions, sure as they were to destroy by sword or pestilence a large part of the invading army. When Barbarossa entered Lombardy anew in 1174 to subdue the discordant Lombard League, his forces were insufficient for the task and largely composed of Brabantine mercenaries, who were a portent of the anti-feudal tendency then beginning. Alessandria heroically repelled a long siege and treachery at its close. An abortive peace of Montebello came to nothing when the Lombards found that they must either break their ancient alliance with Alexander or the new treaty. At the fresh outbreak of war Frederick moved in 1176 towards the northern passes for reinforcements, leaving his diminished army at Pavia. He was joined by considerable forces from Germany, but the mighty Henry the Lion remained obstinately intent on his own northern schemes and would not come. Shorn of his full power, the Emperor turned south to receive a crushing defeat from the League at Legnano. It was one of the first battles where footmen won the victory over even outnumbered mail-clad horse. Frederick escaped to Pavia, now resolved to yield in essentials. A partial agreement with the Pope was the prelude to the treaty of Venice in 1177.

Frederick's concessions were great. He renounced the schism. He practically gave up his claim to sovereignty over the papal lands round Rome. He agreed to a six years' truce with the Lombard cities which left them their autonomy. Yet he retained much of the acquisitions of his reign. If he gave up the attempt to dominate the Papacy, he remained master of the German Church, with his schismatic bishops left in possession of their sees.

Even in Italy his position was not contemptible. He exercised considerable control over the centre, and he could hope to profit by the ever-increasing dissensions of the Lombard communes. In short, his defeat lay in the fact that his prolonged efforts to subjugate the Papacy and to make Italy a homogeneous imperial demesne had failed. In spite of that, he had revived the Empire.

Alexander could celebrate his triumph in a General Lateran Council, which safeguarded the future by declaring a two-thirds' majority of the Cardinals necessary and sufficient for a valid papal election. Frederick proceeded, with unpleasing legal adroitness, to revenge and increase of power in Germany. The co-operation of Welfs and Hohenstaufen had broken down. Henry the Lion, through whose defection the Lombard campaign had come to grief, was by far the most powerful prince of Germany. Master of the two sub-national duchies of Saxony and Bavaria, and of wide landed domains within them, he had been given a free hand by the Emperor in the management of German interests to the north, and had skilfully used his opportunity for increasing the power of his house. The Danish king was his dependant; he had thoroughly Germanized what is now east Holstein and Mecklenburg, driving the barbaric Slavs eastward and compelling their conversion to Christianity; under his auspices the town of Lübeck became the centre of the Baltic trade. Under him and his rival, Albert the Bear of the Nordmark, the expansion of Germany eastward was resumed. But now, irritated perhaps by Frederick's acquisition of the Welfs' Swabian lands and Countess Matilda's inheritance¹, he had refused to support the Emperor in Italy, and Frederick was determined to

¹ These had been held by Welf VI, Henry's paternal and Frederick's maternal uncle, who sold the right of succession in them to Frederick.

curb his power. Henry's numerous quarrels with other princes of the Empire easily gave the occasion for legal proceedings. Henry refused to plead and was put to the ban. Vanquished in 1180 in a short war, he was exiled and only allowed to retain his allodial lands in Saxony. Frederick at once proceeded to radical changes. The duchy of Bavaria, indeed, though cut short, was conferred as a solid state on the house of Wittelsbach which still holds it. But dangerous Saxony was broken up. Only a fraction was given with the ducal title to Albert the Bear, while the ecclesiastical princes received large increases of territory and most of the lay magnates became direct vassals of the crown. The same fate had already overtaken Franconia and Upper and Lower Lorraine. Thus the Emperor was relieved of insubordinate sub-national dukes. Yet the results were disastrous. The now numerous princes ruled and warred unchecked. There were no local imperial officials, no organized central administration which could control them. All Frederick could do was to favour the imperial Free Towns, but this was an advance in communal autonomy, not in imperial authority. A new splintered Germany was taking the place of the five sub-nations.

Frederick had been defeated in Italy, but he by no means gave up his designs, and now sought to effect them in more roundabout ways. He made use of the incessant quarrels of the Lombard communes to bring about in 1183 the definite Peace of Constance, by which the cities acknowledged his sovran rights in some points if they kept their autonomy in the main. The Lombards had always felt that the Emperor had a just claim on their loyalty, and, fortified now by their friendship, Barbarossa could make further progress. He depressed the independence of his great vassals in southern Burgundy,

and re-established the imperial authority in western Lombardy (or Piedmont). More than this, he thoroughly worsted Pope Urban III (1185-7) in the friction which always recurred between Empire and Papacy, his task being made easier by the feud which existed between the Popes and the insubordinate Roman Commune. Meantime the Emperor brought about a marriage which altered the course of history. In 1186 his son and heir, King Henry, married Constance, the heiress of the Norman kingdom of Sicily. The Emperors were on the way to acquire a new and wealthy land they could really rule. The Popes, in spite of Alexander III's triumph, seemed about to be caught between the upper and nether millstones. Frederick could now assert the secular leadership of the West which in theory belonged to his office. He headed the Third Crusade to recover Jerusalem, just fallen once more into Saracen hands. But he was drowned in 1190 in Asia Minor, and the direction of the war in the Levant fell into the hands of the French and English kings.

Frederick Barbarossa had the most splendid career of all the Romano-Germanic Emperors. He was a knightly personality, possessed of most of a ruler's gifts, power to attract men, resolution, statesmanlike insight, diplomatic skill, courage and day-to-day shrewdness. His cruelty towards his Lombard enemies was calculated and extreme, but he was undeniably a good master to the submissive. Yet, with all his grandiose schemes, he lacked the power to shape and create which would make him equal to Charlemagne or Otto the Great. In spite of all his energy and zeal for justice, Germany was, though more orderly, more disorganized at his death than at his accession. At a time when new bureaucratic institutions were coming into being to strengthen monarchy elsewhere, his only contribution was the abortive *podestàs*. Absorbed

in his imperial dream, he missed his opportunity in Germany, and, when he failed in Lombardy, he linked the fortunes of his house and of the German kingdom still more irrevocably by the Sicilian marriage to Italian ambitions and the contest with the Papacy. It was a natural effect of the idea of the Holy Roman Empire, under which both Italy and Germany suffered, but under which they also completed their special work in the creation of modern Europe.

SECTION 5. THE STATESMEN KINGS

(ROGER II, HENRY II, PHILIP AUGUSTUS)

The dissolution of the chief constituent kingdoms of the Holy Roman Empire, Germany and Italy, has been ascribed, and justly so, to their unnatural union in the Empire, to the futile and wasted efforts of the Emperors for the subjugation of Italy, which prevented a national, resident kingship in Italy and diverted the Emperors' strength and interest from Germany. But two other causes were of the highest importance. One was the ineradicable tendency of the Italians to the formation of city-states, communes, which choked all national patriotism. The other was the political inefficiency of the Germans, which paralysed the growth of state institutions. Frederick Barbarossa doubtless saw the advantage for the royal power of nominated, removable officials, but he never seems to have thought of the necessity of an organized central administration which could steadily control local authorities, whether nominees or barons, and maintain a tradition of permanent supervision and interference. And this was the case in the face of the example of the Papacy and of the rival lay powers of the West. His reign is full of triumphs of war and diplomacy.

In government it is merely a record of the personal energy of himself and his assistants. The historian inevitably disregards the unprofitable, unguided tangle of German domestic events for foreign policy and European disputes.

Domestic progress, however, was marked in other kingdoms of the day. It showed itself in the growth of a non-feudal official class, the germ of a bureaucracy, in the organization of the royal court, *Curia Regis*, as a central administrative body, and in the linking to it of the local officials; all three causes, symptoms and results of the revival of monarchy. The emergence of an official class was indeed a sign that one main root of feudalism, the hereditary principle, was beginning to decay. Now the kings raised to office and gave their confidence to men outside the baronage, who depended on their favour, and did not hand on their dignity to their sons of right. They were chosen for ability, and, if they were not ecclesiastics, came chiefly from the lower strata of the knights or from the townsmen. In their hands the theory of royal government could be transmuted into persistent fact.

Henry I of England had made the first steps in this pregnant change. Its earliest full development, and the establishment of a monarchy which not only was absolute, but in its workings penetrated without intermission into every cranny of the realm, was seen in the Norman kingdom of Sicily. At root it was a French, and more especially a Norman-French, phenomenon. The logical, clear, and keen French intellect seemed to gain initiative from Norman force and energy. But the particular circumstances of Sicily were peculiarly favourable. The country was in close connexion with the Byzantine Empire and with the Moslem states of Africa. No small part of its population was Greek and Moorish. It was thus near

to higher civilizations and able to profit from their methods. Then in Sicily the royal power had a firm foundation. The four elements in the population, Norman, Latin-Italian, Greek and Moslem, were mutually hostile, and all dependent on and grateful to the strong and wise royal house which protected and in some degree sympathized with all. A singular ecclesiastical policy had been evolved by the first Count, Roger I, and perfected by the first King, Roger the Great (1105-54). The latter favoured the Greeks and Moslems. He preferred an oriental way of life in his palace at Palermo. His army was half-composed of Moors for whom excommunication had no terrors and feudalism no attraction. His chief ministers and the commanders of his all-important navy were Greeks. Yet he was the champion of the Latin, Western faith. As such, to Roger I was granted in 1098 and to the king was confirmed in 1118 the strange office of an hereditary legateship in Sicily. No special legate could enter Sicily without his permission, and he enlarged his rights on all sides to the exasperation of the Popes. He appointed bishops, summoned synods and created dioceses. Worse than all, he extended the exercise of the legateship to his mainland dominions. If the Anti-Pope Anaclete submitted, Innocent II resisted to the last, even after he acknowledged Roger's kingship and annexations in 1139. The legateship remained a cause of perpetual strife till 1156, when Adrian IV admitted it fully for Sicily, and partially for the mainland, while at the same time he at last acquiesced in the northern frontier as Roger had left it.

Thus the Sicilian monarchy was armed at all points, but only after a desperate struggle. Roger II had fought a host of foes on the mainland. The Pope and the Emperor Lothair III had endeavoured to depose him.

They had found allies and eggshells in Greek and Lombard communes, yearning for independence, in the rival and injured Prince of Capua, and, more than all, in the turbulent Norman baronage of Apulia, who never admitted the right of the house of Hauteville to rule over them. Only in 1140, after three furious rebellions, after defeats and cruel reprisals, Roger won the mastery by means of his fleet, his Moslem army, and the wealth he derived from the rich Sicilian trade.

The king was second-rate as a general, but in the first rank of statesmen, wise in his choice of men and means, clear in purpose, unbending in resolution, and personally enjoying routine finance and administration. He set himself to govern his polyglot realm in the spirit of a Byzantine Emperor. He was well aware of the advantages he derived from its motley character and took pains to maintain the separateness of its elements. Barons and towns were allowed only strictly subordinate functions. The king's nominated catapans and bailiffs for general administration, his justiciars for justice, and his chamberlains for revenues were the most important local authorities. Controlling these, at least in the reign of Roger's successor, William I, there stood at the head of each of the two provinces, into which the kingdom was divided, a master justiciar and a master chamberlain. Linked to the local administration was the carefully organized central government, the *Curia Regis*. Finance was the charge of the Grand Chamberlain, whose department was formed into two sections, one for feudal, the other for general revenue. Less defined administrative action fell under the Chancellor, the feudal levy under the Constable, while the Admiral¹ acted as Prime Minister besides

¹ *Ammiratus ammiratorum*, or "amir of amirs," borrowed from the Arabs, a Grand Vizier.

commanding the all-important fleet. These great officials with some others were the *domini Curiae*, forming an inner council, or cabinet.

Thus the government of Sicily was bureaucratic, and it was also international. Elements in it were furnished by the several races which inhabited the kingdom, Norman, Arab, Byzantine and Lombard, and the kings took into their service men of kindred race from outside. George of Antioch was the most eminent of Roger's Admirals, Robert Selby from England his Chancellor. Within the king promoted division; he furthered the isolation of the official and baronial classes. It was a realm such as the West had not seen since Justinian, and fitly enough had some of the characteristics of the ancient Empire.

The ambitions of the Sicilian monarch pointed to a consciousness of his non-Western position. Barred from further conquest in Italy by the hostility of Pope and Emperor, he was content to hold the frontier from the R. Tronto to Gaeta as it still existed in 1160. But he took up designs of expansion to the East and South which remained with his successors. Like Guiscard, he hoped to subjugate the Byzantine Empire which by reason of its own ambitions in South Italy was his foe. But when he attempted to utilize the Second Crusade for his purpose he failed miserably. In Africa he had more success; at the close of his reign he held the coastland from Tripoli to Bona. This, however, was lost to the Almohades by his son, not to be recovered. And the schemes of the Hautevilles came to an end, when William II's (1166-89) armament for the conquest of Constantinople was shattered in 1185.

Their kingdom rested on an insecure foundation. The medley of races might be tactfully controlled in spite of

their mutual hatred; the Romano-Germanic Emperors might be at last bought off by the prospect of inheriting the kingdom. But the compound of Christian Norman and Moslem Arab was too strange to form a permanent basis for the realm. The defects of both remained incurable flaws. The persistent disloyalty of the Apulian baronage to every ruler tempted foreign foes and lamed half the army. And the Moslem luxury adopted by Roger II was fatal to the ruling house. Princes, brave and wise by nature, were harem-bred, and showed the indolence, the vanity and megalomania of their training.

With much resemblance to Roger the Great in character and abilities, and even in aims, Henry II of England both showed greater caution and trod on firmer ground. He had less opportunity and less need for singular experiments. He had succeeded to Anjou and Normandy as heir to his father Geoffrey Plantagenet. England he acquired by a short war with Stephen, more by the evident overweight of his power and partisans than by the actual fighting, and on Stephen's death he easily took the crown. To these possessions he added the extensive but ill-consolidated duchy of Aquitaine by his marriage with its heiress Eleanor, the divorced wife of Louis VII of France. His dominions, therefore, though vast, were heterogeneous, and it was not so much their impracticable consolidation, as the effective assertion of his power in each, that he aimed at. In England and Normandy, especially, he restored the stern control of Henry I, and, true to his Norman-French instincts, laboured at the increased organization of his government.

Like Henry I, Henry II leant much on the new official class. The nominated Chief Justiciar, corresponding largely to the Sicilian Admiral, and Chancellor or chief secretary, far outvied the feudal Constable and Steward.

Yet he carried the baronage with him and made a practice of frequently assembling them in Great Councils, which were the widest form of the Curia Regis. The definite appearance of the Great Council as a special assembly was itself a proof of increased organization and institution-making, but Henry's personal influence was more seen in the development of the Curia in its smaller form, his confidential council of officials and favoured barons. Sitting as the Exchequer¹ it acquired steadily more consistency on the way to becoming a real ministerial department. Another offshoot was a real creation. Henry ordained that certain councillors should sit as a permanent court of justice at Westminster instead of following his peregrinations. Here was another incipient department of state, which could form a tradition of customary royal law by its consistent decisions; so that the English Common Law proved the only law in Europe which could create a civilized jurisprudence without recourse to a short cut to a system by the adoption of Justinian's code. It was rapidly extended throughout the kingdom by the perpetuation of Henry I's custom of sending out Justices in Eyre from the Curia to the shire-courts, and before it Norman and Anglo-Saxon custom-law melted away.

No more than his contemporaries was Henry II a conscious enemy of feudalism, but his insistence on his regal rights and his business-like aptitude made him strike deadly blows at purely feudal government. Certain offences were always reserved in England to the king's judges, and Henry allowed no baron to refuse the entry of royal officials for such cases into his barony. Similarly, he devised new and reasonable processes of law for the decision of disputes on the possession of land, which speedily drew all questions of the kind into the royal

¹ See above, p. 193.

courts, and brought in subsequent times much other legal business to them. Thus the authority of the Common Law and the withering of baronial justice were assured. The feudal levy of knights' service, too, was partially supplanted by commutations *ad hoc* which allowed him to war on the Continent by means of Brabantine mercenaries, and decreased the importance of feudal methods.

The same love of authority and also of justice and order led Henry II into his conflict with the Church. He only slightly endeavoured to restrict the jurisdiction of the Courts Christian, but in the case of ecclesiastics convicted of crime he found the canonical punishments insufficient, and decreed their second punishment in the royal court. Here St Thomas Becket Archbishop of Canterbury, his own nominee and once his chancellor, stood in his way. The struggle ended tragically in 1170 with the archbishop's murder by knights of the king, and, though the deed was not by Henry's orders, it was only Pope Alexander's need of his support against the Emperor and his own surrender of the main points in dispute which saved him from excommunication.

Henry II was not only King of England; he was lord of a number of fiefs held of the French crown and threatened the independence of his suzerain. But a feudal ruler was naturally reluctant to break the fealty, which also bound his own vassals to himself, and Henry's policy was in the main unaggressive. In fact, his design was to divide his dominions among his sons. England and Normandy were to go to the eldest Henry, Aquitaine to the second, Richard, who at once began to tame the insubordinate duchy. Henry's schemes, however, were wrecked by the mutinous greed of his sons, played upon by the astute French king, Philip Augustus. For long Henry II held the upper hand, till a final league of Richard

with Philip, after the death of the younger Henry had left him heir, broke his resistance just before his death in 1189. His main acquisition had been one he thought little of, the partial conquest of Ireland. The tribal anarchy of that country had tempted Anglo-Norman adventurers to invade and seize its eastern portions, and Henry was able to enforce his suzerainty over the whole island. In so doing he had the support of the Papacy and the not unwilling adherence of the Irish Church. In this way the last semi-independent church of the West came under control of the Papacy. The secular results were less effective. Henry established his youngest son, John, as lord of Ireland, and by John the lordship was later united to the English crown. For a time the Norman barons, in spite of tyranny, brought a higher organization and greater peace, hampered though they were by the natural efforts of the English kings to assert their authority. But at the close of the thirteenth century an invasion from Scotland broke the nascent order, and the land relapsed into miserable anarchy.

The energy and generalship of Richard I (1189-99) deferred for a while the break-up of the Angevin dominions, just as his extortion and recklessness made the task heavier for his successors. But the natural development of both England and France was making the task an anachronism. The feeling of French nationality, on one side, had been growing steadily stronger for a century, and went to the profit of the house of Capet, sapping the loyalty of the Normans and Angevins to their dukes, while the countering particularist current worked equally against the combination of territories under the Plantagenets and made their barons restive. As for England, the amalgamation of Norman and Saxon was by now nearly complete, and was producing among the baronage a dislike of their kings'

burdensome activity in France, which even the possession by themselves of estates in Normandy was insufficient to cure. The wicked John (1199-1215), therefore, who succeeded his brother Richard, only precipitated disaster. Particularism raised up a rival heir, Arthur of Brittany, and John, already odious by his tyranny and embroiled with some of his greatest vassals, threw away his remaining chances by murdering his boy competitor. Philip Augustus had been almost continuously at war with the Plantagenets, and he took advantage of the loathing which John inspired to renew his attack. By an adroit use of his suzerain rights he succeeded in declaring John's French fiefs forfeited under feudal law. In 1203-4 he conquered Normandy, Anjou and Poitou. Barons and towns made a half-hearted resistance, and there was only left to John southern Aquitaine, where the barons still did not feel themselves Frenchmen and had been least hampered by the Plantagenets' centralization.

John also caused the ruin of the royal despotism in England. His unbridled tyranny gave it one shock; his foolish quarrel with Pope Innocent III over the filling of the see of Canterbury, which exposed England to a lengthy interdict, another; and the defeat of his great combination against Philip Augustus in 1214 a third. Next year the English barons rose in revolt and extorted from the king the Great Charter. It was in essence an acknowledgement that the sovran was bound by feudal law and custom equally with his vassals, and as such forms the cornerstone of English liberty. Concerted control of the king by his subjects had begun. John, however, did not give up the struggle and died during the renewed civil war, combating a French invasion in aid of the barons.

The monarchy which overthrew the Plantagenets had made enormous progress since the days of Philip I.

Louis VI the Fat (1100-37) had begun the work. By indefatigable warfare he tamed the brigand-like barons of the Capetian domain, and thus made a solid basis for the reviving monarchy. Not an organizer of note, he at least made nominated officials the chief element of his Curia. The goodwill of the bourgeois and peasants was of course his for the peace and justice he secured. The clergy were devoted to a pious king for the same reason as well as owing to their inclination to the Lord's Anointed, and his services to the Papacy during the strife with Emperor Henry V and to the monks of the later reform gained him invaluable allies. As suzerain of France, his success was small, though national feeling began to tell in his favour. He failed against Henry I of England. The acquisition of Aquitaine in 1137 for his son by marriage with its heiress Eleanor turned out an illusory triumph.

The leading features of Louis VII's (1137-80) character were devotion and inertia. In his difficult reign, threatened on all sides as he was, he seems buoyed up, first by the influence of an able minister, Abbot Suger, and later by the support of the Papacy and the Church and by the prestige and attractive power of a national king. He had need of both. The divorce of his first queen Eleanor meant the loss of Aquitaine and a treble danger from the Plantagenets: over half France was held by the English king who seemed to make continual advance in power. Under these circumstances it must be owned that Louis VII's policy was wise in its main principles. Abroad, he succeeded in establishing an understanding with the Hohenstaufen which lasted three generations, and he checked Henry II by fomenting the disloyalty of his sons and insubordinate vassals. In his domain, he allied the monarchy definitely with the bourgeois for whom he built new towns, thus marking an epoch in their

importance and restraining his disorderly barons. The weight of the official element, ecclesiastic and bourgeois, grew in his Curia, which in practice widened its competence. He intervened adroitly in the states of his vassals, and, however ineffectual his action was, it nourished the ever-stronger national inclination towards the King of France. Once a wider domain was obtained, it was clear that the king would be able to put in force his full feudal rights and much of his sovran rights even in the territories of his greatest vassals.

The increase of the Capetian domains was the work of Philip II (1179-1223), therefrom named Augustus¹. Hard and unscrupulous, he was a statesman and diplomat from boyhood. If he was inferior as an institution-maker to Henry II and as a general to Richard, his all-round ability and his crafty policy worked in harmony with the natural development of France and led him to triumphs rarely equalled by a European ruler. He began his reign by gaining the benevolent neutrality of Henry II, who was misled perhaps by self-confidence mingled with feudal scruples. Thus secured, he humbled in a long war (1181-5) the three semi-independent northern vassals, the Counts of Flanders and Champagne and the Duke of Burgundy. The prize of victory was the rich lands of Vermandois and Artois, and Philip could commence his duel with the Plantagenets. He missed no advantage that mutinous barons and suicidal family feuds could give him, but at first, it seemed, in vain. The personal ability of Henry and Richard and their strongly organized bureaucracy baffled him. Still his foes were reduced to the defensive, and when John Lackland alienated his barons, mismanaged the war and lost his allies, Philip could conquer Normandy, Anjou and half Aquitaine with

¹ "Augmenter of the realm" by medieval etymology.

surprising ease (1204-6). The conquest was permanent, and Philip became at once only second to the Emperor in power. His domains were more than doubled and with them his income and his resources in men, fortresses, ports, and lands.

It required, however, a long and hazardous struggle by war and diplomacy to assure the conquest and the new authority of the French kingship. John's wicked folly was punctuated by outbursts of both skill and energy. In 1213 he had gained the favour of Pope Innocent III, hitherto his outraged foe, by becoming a vassal of the Holy See. At the same time he had formed a wide-reaching league, which included endangered French vassals, like the Count of Flanders, and the Romano-Germanic Emperor Otto IV, the head of the Welfs, who needed victories to support his declining cause in Germany. The eastern allies were to invade Capetian France from the north, while John struck up to Anjou from what was left to him of Aquitaine. Against them Philip could depend on the awaking patriotism of north France and on the not very efficient alliance of the Hohenstaufen, Otto's rivals in Germany. The danger was great, for Otto in 1214 mustered in Flanders 80,000 men, while John won over the barons of Aquitaine, to whose particularism, now that Normandy was lost, he could more easily appeal. But Philip had keener troops and a central position. First, John's forces broke up before the French heir Louis in Anjou. Then, on the 27th July Philip gained his crowning victory over the eastern allies at Bouvines in Flanders. The results were decisive. The Plantagenets were cooped up for good in southern Aquitaine, where particularist feelings made the English connexion welcome. The remaining great northern vassals were rendered definitely subordinates of the monarchy, and French

patriotism and national pride were now united with the service of the crown.

Contemporaneously, the Albigensian crusade¹, which was to crush the independent civilization of Languedoc and to bring the county of Toulouse and its dependencies under Capetian rule, was in progress. Philip Augustus took no personal part in the warfare waged by his vassals and his son against the heretics, but he skilfully safeguarded his suzerain rights, and waited till the exhaustion of both sides should make Languedoc an easy prize. Meantime he showed his medieval character by schemes of greedier aggrandisement. A first scheme to conquer England was nipped in the bud by Pope Innocent, when John became his vassal; a second (1216-17), undertaken by Louis of France at the invitation of the rebellious English barons, was brought to nothing by John's death and by the consequent coalition of Pope and barons in support of the child-king, Henry III.

On coming to the throne Louis VIII (1223-6), the first Capetian whom there was no need to crown in his father's lifetime, continued Philip's essential policy, the consolidation of France. He made further progress in Aquitaine, though Bordeaux escaped his grasp, and he took up the conquest of Languedoc in fierce earnest. The original crusaders, led by Simon de Montfort, a northern baron of secondary status, had not only conquered Toulouse, but had defeated the King of Aragon in 1213 at Muret and deprived him of his widely extended suzerainty in Languedoc. Cruelty and tyranny, however, provoked a general insurrection in which Simon was slain (1218). His heir Amaury only lost ground to the Counts of Toulouse, and was glad to cede his rights to Louis VIII. The king's crusade at least planted the monarchy firmly on the coast

¹ See below, pp. 263-4.

Hohenstaufen Domains



Kingdom of Sicily




Plantagenet Lands



Royal Domain of King of France



Lands of House of Aragon and Toulouse



EUROPE IN A.D. 1189

of the Mediterranean from the Rhone to the Pyrenees. His death gave the unhappy Raymond VII of Toulouse a further respite in the interior.

The kingdom of France had undergone a revolution since 1180. Then the Capetians were not even the most powerful princes in the lands which owed them allegiance: they were in pressing danger from the Plantagenets: the great vassals of the south took little notice of them. While French knighthood was stirring throughout Europe, it was only occasionally that the French king took the lead, although Louis VII's part in the Second Crusade showed the attraction and prestige of his name. In 1226 the Plantagenets were fallen; the King of France was incomparably the most powerful French prince; his domain stretched from the Channel to the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, the aloofness of Languedoc was a thing of the past, the remaining great vassals stood in dread of their suzerain. Further, the king was a great power in Europe, only overshadowed by the Emperor and more secure than he. Changes in government kept pace with this extension of power. Philip and Louis were the allies, but also the undoubted masters of their clergy and bourgeois. The royal Curia, in its restricted form, where officials and lawyers of bourgeois extraction formed the majority of the members, kept increasing its legal and administrative activity. New nominated local officials, bailiffs in the north, seneschals further south, were invented by Philip Augustus, who kept fast control over the royal domains and checked and supervised the secondary baronage. Feudal government, in short, here too was giving way to an organized bureaucracy.

SECTION 6. INNOCENT III

The death of Frederick Barbarossa only intensified the limitless ambition of the Hohenstaufen. His son, Henry VI, was as able and strong-willed as any king of the day and was possessed by a thirst for world-dominion which knew neither pity nor scruple. His aims were so chimerical that we are surprised to see how near he came to achieving them. To make the Empire hereditary in his house, to rule all Italy, to render all European kings his vassals, to conquer the Holy Land, were the objects of his seven-years' reign. In spite of opposition in Saxony and Lorraine he kept the German princes submissive and only just failed to obtain their assent to an hereditary imperial dynasty. The Lombard towns were his partisans, central Italy was governed by his officials, Pope Celestine III was obliged to crown him Emperor, and, for all his sullen opposition, found himself hemmed in on all sides. Sicily, fighting for independence, was conquered in 1194, and its revolts were subdued with a fiendish cruelty which caused a permanent decline even from the low humanity of preceding centuries. Poland and Denmark remained vassals and England was made one by means of the unknighly imprisonment and ransoming of Richard I on his return from the Third Crusade. The Holy Land seemed likely to be conquered by a German expedition, when Henry died in 1197. It was a deliverance for Europe, but perhaps the sudden collapse which followed shows that Henry was exhausting the energies and political capital stored up by Barbarossa, and thereby hastening to his fall.

The weakness of Germany's political structure was at once shown in the civil war which broke out on Henry VI's death. The Saxons and Lower Lorrainers declared for Otto IV, the heir of the Welfs and of particularism. The

south chose Henry's brother, Philip Duke of Swabia. Neither king had personal qualities or means to bring matters to a decisive issue, and their long desolating warfare inflicted irretrievable damage on the royal power. It also liberated the Papacy, and gave his opportunity to the new Pope, Innocent III (1198-1216). Innocent, a Roman born, came nearest of all the Popes towards realizing the theory of papal theocracy held by Nicholas I and Gregory VII. His monarchy of the Church was absolute; he disposed of sees, benefices and endowments; the Roman Curia was flooded with ecclesiastical appeals and suits at first instance; every cleric was a servant and subject of the Papacy. If Innocent attained his purpose often after long resistance, he attained it so surely that his claims became unchallengeable law. But the rule of the Church formed only a part of Innocent's conception of his office. He was Vicar of Christ, "more," he said, "than a man," the sacrosanct despot of the earthly City of God. Everywhere he intervened to guide and check the secular potentates. Here again he met with stubborn resistance and partial success. The lay powers could not be altogether coerced even by interdict and excommunication, and the national kings with their bureaucracies had quite other strength than the Romano-Germanic Emperors claiming an authority which had never been a fact since Charlemagne. Yet the Pope achieved much. By hook or crook he gained the victory, although the victory might be of dubious value. His justification lay in his ends and in his success. This admirable man of business, this unscrupulous diplomat, this lawyer autocrat aimed sincerely at a higher standard of life for Europe, at justice, at order, at a religious, high-minded clergy, and at an attempt towards realizing Christian ideals. And by means of the enormous power which his genius and

men's beliefs placed in his hands, he left Western Europe better than he found it, and this with all deductions made, admitting the growth under him of legalism, of temporal ambitions, of extortion and religious persecution. It was the fate of the Middle Ages to buy slow advance not only by present suffering, but by the development of new corruptions and new obstacles to progress.

Innocent's first successes came rapidly. Henry VI had roused in Italy a deep aversion to German rule, which had free scope now Germany was paralysed by civil war. The Pope quickly swept away the faint remnants of imperial rule in Rome and substituted a limited authority of his own, which in spite of broils he maintained intact. Everywhere in central Italy and Lombardy the imperial German officials were driven out. Innocent could adroitly introduce his own suzerainty in the long-lost lands of Pepin's donation, and even in the Spoletan duchy and Anconitan march which had never before been separated from the kingdom of Italy. At the same time he assumed the protection of Henry's infant heir Frederick, as king of Sicily, extorting as a price the recognition of his suzerainty and the abandonment of the ecclesiastical privileges of the Sicilian monarchy. Years passed before the German barons and soldiery could be driven out, but at last it was done. By 1208 Innocent saw autonomous communes in Lombardy and Tuscany, vassal communes in the States of the Church, and a vassal king of Sicily.

Meanwhile he had unexpectedly got his way in Germany. He had claimed the right of adjudicating on the rival claims to the Empire, but the candidate whom he naturally declared for, the Welf Otto IV, had eventually been ousted by the Hohenstaufen Philip. The Pope yielded to necessity at last, renounced his Italian acquisitions and acknowledged Philip. Then in 1208 in the

midst of his triumph Philip was murdered by a private foe. The princes, wearied of the civil war, turned to his rival. Of Innocent's theocratic claims they took little notice, but his ecclesiastical gains were immense and spelt ruin to the older German kingship. Otto admitted the free right of appeal to the Papacy from the local church tribunals; he gave up the royal intervention in episcopal elections, and allowed the intervention of the Pope; he renounced the regalian rights over vacant bishoprics, *i.e.* the government of episcopal lands during a vacancy. In short, the German bishops ceased to be royal officials; they became non-hereditary princes, either elected by their chapters or nominated by the Pope. As the royal demesnes and rights had been prodigally granted away by the rival kings, the monarchy founded by Otto the Great was weakened beyond repair. With equal recklessness Otto IV acknowledged the acquisitions of the Pope in Italy, in the hope of facilitating his imperial coronation.

He did not intend to keep his engagements, however. On being reconciled with the Hohenstaufen party he adopted their policy with a blundering energy of his own. At the head of a powerful army he made his Roman expedition in 1209. Innocent had no material force with which to resist, and felt, it seems, he might be satisfied if the new Emperor conformed to Philip's dealings. But Otto threw away his advantage by resolving to conquer Sicily as well and reacquire the full measure of Henry VI's dominions. The German princes were displeased, they had no wish for another Henry; the Hohenstaufen party were outraged by the causeless aggression on the last heir of Barbarossa; more than all, the Pope, who saw his very independence vanishing, determined to resist to the last extremity. Ingenious and hazardous was Innocent's counter-move. He excommunicated Otto and released

his subjects from their fealty, but this had been shown by Barbarossa to be an ineffectual threat, if a revolt under an Anti-Caesar did not break out in Germany. Only one rival was possible, Frederick of Sicily himself. Innocent knew the danger he ran in uniting Sicily with the Empire. He hoped to avert it, however, by stipulations with Frederick, and took the risk. He stirred up the princes, who, either as bishops or as Hohenstaufen partisans or as particularists vexed by Otto's monarchic efforts, were ready to rebel, while Philip Augustus of France, in dread of an Anglo-Welf combination, bribed and urged them in the same direction. Otto was forced to return to Germany, whither his young rival, after promising the Pope to surrender Sicily eventually to his infant son, followed him in 1212. Defection was general in favour of the Hohenstaufen, and, when Otto with his levies from Saxony and Lower Lorraine was overthrown by the French at Bouvines in 1214, his party finally dissolved. He died in 1218 restricted to his allodial lands of Brunswick, and the Welfs sank to a place among the secondary princes.

It is characteristic of Innocent's energy and courage that during the German contest he was successively at grips with France and England. Against Philip Augustus he proceeded in defence of Christian marriage. The king had put away his queen Ingeburga, and had adulterously remarried. The Pope laid the Capetian domain under an interdict in 1198, which forced Philip to submit to a papal inquiry into the circumstances. But he eluded a verdict, and only gave the unhappy Ingeburga her rights in 1213 in furtherance of his diplomacy. With England, on the other hand, Innocent was strikingly successful. In a disputed election to the archbishopric of Canterbury, he had carried in 1207 the appointment of a third party, his own nominee Stephen Langton. When John refused to

admit the new archbishop, England too was laid under interdict, and finally John was excommunicated. The strength of the English monarchy, however, enabled him to hold out for five years in spite of the hatred his subjects felt for him and the fear of the Church. It was not till Philip Augustus was preparing a formidable invasion in 1213 that he gave way, suddenly and completely. He became a vassal of the Pope for his kingdom, and shortly after gave up the royal control of episcopal elections. Here again the ecclesiastical victory was more lasting than the secular.

All over Europe Innocent's adroitness and unbending resolution were displayed. If King Sverri of Norway defied him and died unsubdued, it was a single failure. Aragon and Portugal acknowledged his suzerainty. He consolidated his authority by the ready and generous help he gave. It was he who collected the crusaders and provided the subsidies which helped the Christian states of Spain to their decisive victory of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212. From the beginning of his pontificate he took the initiative in a new Crusade to the Holy Land, thereby snatching the leadership lost to Barbarossa, and, although the crusaders disregarded his wishes, the chief profit of their piratical conquest of Constantinople in 1204 came to the Papacy. The Latin Empire of Constantinople they founded, tottering and subdivided though it was, admitted him as overlord and depressed the Eastern Church beneath his sway. The Slav Balkan states paid court to him. The Papacy was incomparably the strongest force in Europe, victorious over the Empire and feudalism.

In like manner Innocent crushed the heresies which had risen in opposition to the medieval religious system and to the aggrandized, wealthy, despotic Church. These heresies, which were popular and thus of a completely

different character from the intellectual heresies of the schools, consisted of two main sects, which in their turn admitted sub-varieties. The Waldensian tenets were but an expression of the typical medieval yearning for complete asceticism and self-abnegation which also found a home in the official Church, and a development and continuation of the extreme wing of church-reformers who, nicknamed Patarines in Milan¹, had so powerfully aided Gregory VII. Arnold of Brescia² forms the connecting link between earlier and later radicals, but Peter Valdes (1173-97), founder of the Waldensians, did not go so far as Arnold and was thrust from the Church more owing to the blundering of those in authority than for any other reason. He was a fervently religious merchant of Lyons, who desired to live in apostolic poverty and good works, and to wander preaching the uncompromising morality of the Gospels. He founded a lay Order, the Poor Men of Lyons, to do the like. But the ecclesiastical hierarchy was up in arms, and the Pope forbade their activity. They refused to give in, and, as their sect spread, were excommunicated by Pope Lucius III. Their numbers grew until they extended throughout the West; but their headquarters were southern France and Lombardy, where they fell into two groups. The French Waldensians did not renounce the Church, they were only disobedient to the erring hierarchy, and practisers of a rigid morality which looked on trade and mundane gaieties as sinful. The Lombards, however, followed the ancient Patarine doctrine, which declared the Sacraments of unworthy priests as null. All priests, who were endowed, were unworthy. So they were led to establish a separate church of their own. Soon the Lombard cities were full of them. Both sects were

¹ See above, p. 207.

² See above, pp. 232-3.

by this time irretrievably enemies of the Papacy, for they both denounced the theocracy and the hierarchic government and legalizing system of the Church.

In sharp distinction to the Waldensians, the Cathari¹ who drew their by-name of Albigenses from Alby in Languedoc, embraced a different religion to the Catholic, with but a small blend of historical Christianity. In the tenth and eleventh centuries there had already begun to filter into Italy and France the Balkan Slavonic creed of the Bogomils. In spite of occasional local persecution it gained ground, chiefly in Languedoc, in the twelfth century, and by 1200 was held by large numbers of the population. Whereas Waldensianism was a peasants' and artisans' faith, Catharism in the West appealed to nobles and bourgeois. It was hardier and more fantastic. It proclaimed the ancient Manichean dualism. The spirit world was created by the good god, matter and all belonging to it were created by the evil god. Thus all that involved matter was dangerous, and marriage, flesh-eating and the Sacraments were sinful. They were wholly hostile to the Church and its system. Their priests were the *Perfecti* who observed the full injunctions of their faith.

Different as these two groups of belief were, they had tenets in common, an impracticable asceticism, and aversion to the worldly, power-loving Church. The Church, on its side, saw in them wicked rebels, leading souls to perdition and ruining its cherished dominion. Innocent attacked them in their stronghold, Languedoc. His attempts at peaceful persecution and conversion failed, since the Count of Toulouse and other great nobles too obviously favoured the Albigenses. Then the Pope resolved on force. Fanaticism and greed brought thousands of north French knights to the Crusade he declared. For

¹ "The pure."

twenty years from 1209 onwards horrible scenes of bloodshed devastated Languedoc. At first directed against heresy, the crusade soon became a means of replacing the southern nobles by north French adventurers headed by Simon de Montfort, and with it a struggle of Languedoc to preserve its independence. Innocent's own humanity was shocked by the crusaders' excesses, but he could not stop what he had begun. Finally, in 1229 Raymond VII of Toulouse, an undoubted Catholic, succumbed. The Capetian kings became heirs to his lands, and the inquisition could slowly extirpate Catharism in Languedoc. It was not only a strange heresy, but a distinct nationality, that of Languedoc, with its brilliant, lawless, early-ripening civilization, which received its death-blow.

Innocent had learnt a lesson from the mistakes of his predecessors. He saw, perhaps, that the Church could not maintain her hold on the people by her hierarchical organization and exclusive monks alone. She required humble workers in society, who would practise evangelic poverty and asceticism in co-operation with the existing hierarchy. Imitators of Peter Valdes should be welcomed and utilized, or at least tolerated, not driven to revolt. The impulse to the new form of self-abnegation was so ingrained in the religious emotion of the time, that the opportunity to adopt the new method was offered him almost at once by the founders of the Friars, St Francis and St Dominic. They were as diverse-natured men as possible, and, as was fitting in a time of growing national self-consciousness, one a typical Italian, the other a typical Spaniard. St Francis, the most lovable of the saints, was a Perugian, and, like Valdes, a merchant's son. His Order of Friars Minor¹, though essentially his creation, was hardly designed by the man, whose passionate desire for the

¹ "The lesser brothers."

perfect Christian life, the imitation of Christ, led him to adopt absolute poverty and self-abnegation, and to wander converting others. He woke a like spirit easily. The masterful Innocent gave him leave merely. Honorius III and Gregory IX shaped his Order for him, introducing organization and fixed purpose. Soon Franciscan Friars were to be found in every town. Although bound by monastic vows, they lived in the world and mixed freely with rich and poor. To the disgust of monks and clergy, rich and poor thronged to their sermons and confessionals, for their ideal at last satisfied the spirit of the age. Even when they yielded to temptation and grew wealthy much of their prestige, due to their continuous activity and zeal, still remained. St Francis, too, had made provision for that perpetual connexion with the laity, for want of which the monastic Orders withered. He instituted the Tertiaries of the Order, pious laymen who remained in ordinary life. Thus the gulf between the professed religious and the ordinary man was bridged. The elder ideal of flight from the evil world faded, partly indeed because the government of strong rulers and the persistent efforts of the Church, popes, monks and bishops, were making the world, though slowly, less evil.

The first thought of the Castilian St Dominic, on the other hand, was a spiritual crusade, the war on heresy. He was a learned Austin Canon, who entered the same path as St Francis, as part of the strategy of piety, welcome to the devout follower of Christ. His Order sprang from his personal work in the reconversion of the Albigenses. Like St Francis his activity was suffered by Innocent and eagerly favoured by Honorius III. But his organization was more his own, although he adopted absolute poverty and the idea of affiliated laity from the ideals of St Francis. Coincidences also were numerous between the two Orders.

The Friars Preachers of St Dominic were also town-dwellers, living ascetic lives in the world. Still the main purpose of the Order was combative. From their learned convents, whence arose the greater number of the theologians and scholars of the later Middle Ages, the literary warfare with heresy was eagerly carried on. To the Dominican Friars, who took their origin in the suppression of heresy in Languedoc, was intrusted the new machinery of the papal Inquisition which was to root out heresy everywhere. They were sterner, more select, more intellectual than the Franciscans. One conviction, however, the two Orders shared in common, a devotion to the papal monarchy. They were organized under a single general each, who was in close connexion with the Papacy, and their provincial hierarchy had no national or autonomous leanings. By their exemptions and privileges they drew to themselves a large part of the cure of souls from the secular clergy. Till the close of the Middle Ages, in religion, in politics and in war, they were the surest henchmen of the Popes and the instruments of their control over the mass of the population.

Under Innocent III the papal monarchy and the centralization of the Western Church were completed. While the beneficial results of this new Roman Empire attained in his time their widest effect, the evils and abuses inherent in it were already pronounced, although their full development was reserved to a later generation. The independence of the Papacy had become inextricably entangled with the temporal dominion of Italy. If the weakness of the Empire, which the Popes necessarily strove for, was no bad thing, they also became involved in purely secular combinations which led them to the misuse of their spiritual authority as a political expedient, and degraded their actions and their motives. Much the

same may be said of their theocratic claim. If Innocent mainly used it for good aims, it inevitably led to the political abuse of spiritual things, and the consequent opposition of nations which had become conscious of their existence and looked on the ecumenic Pope as a foreigner.

Innocent, however, lived while the ideal of the Christian commonwealth was still dominant. He was master of a marvellous organization. At its head stood the Pope, the Vicar of Christ. His "plenitude of power" made him the despot and legislator of the Church; the bishops were merely his delegates. Even a General Council seemed subordinate. The Canon Law was all in his favour. In the middle of the twelfth century the canons of councils and the decretals of the Popes had been digested and codified by Gratian, a jurist of Bologna, and, in a system which grew steadily more elaborate, the permanent source of legislation, the Popes, naturally had the upper hand. His administrative competence, too, was absolute. He taxed the clergy at pleasure, for, by the Canon Law, all their endowments were his. By the same code he could appoint to all ecclesiastical dignities and benefices, if Innocent III exercised the right with caution. He gave privileges, defined boundaries and competence, confirmed or disallowed Rules. He was the supreme judge and referee. More than the number of appeals from lower courts were the cases at once sent for his decision or referred to him by the bishops.

In the exercise of his jurisdiction the Pope was assisted by the Roman Curia, which included the Cardinals as its chief members and a large staff of administrative and legal officials. Their dilatoriness and greed of money were notorious, but so were their ability and the general fairness of their decisions. The Curia was brought into the all-important personal contact with the local authorities

in two ways. On the one hand, the periodical visits of the episcopate to the Roman court were rigidly insisted on. On the other, to every kingdom was dispatched a succession of papal legates and agents, who carried out the Pope's instructions and often acted with full authority. Further, the bishops and lower dignitaries were made themselves the engines of their subjection. The greater number of legal cases were decided by them on the spot as papal commissioners.


For a generation after Innocent's day this system had mainly beneficial results. The Curia was wise and well-meaning, discipline was enforced, the standards of the local churches were raised. But corruption grew, the character and aims of the Curia became worse. Meanwhile the episcopate had lost initiative and suffered from incipient paralysis. The metropolitans found their dignity ornamental, the bishops their authority decayed. The interests of both Church and clergy were jeopardized by transactions with the kings. Endowments were used to provide for papal favourites and to pay the expenses of papal wars. Fifty years after Innocent's death, the Papacy was disliked, its decisions mistrusted and its exactions hated.


Like other victorious Popes, Innocent summed up the triumphs of his pontificate in 1215 by a General Council in the Lateran. Many of its canons summed up the ecclesiastical progress and ideals of the time. Some were levers for the advance of civilization, such as the prohibition of the barbarous judicial duels of feudalism or the no less barbarous trial by ordeal. Others were pregnant with future evil, like the sharpening of the procedure against heretics. But nearest to Innocent's heart were the regulations for a new Crusade, this time to deliver the Holy Land without fail. It was while hastening the preparations that he died in 1216.


— Boundaries of ecclesiastical provinces.


A=Province of Arles.
 G=Province of Grado.
 R=Province of Ragusa.
 T=Province of Tarentaise.
 Z=Province of Zara.


1 = Sardinian provinces.
 2 = Apulian provinces.
 3 = Sicilian provinces.
 4 = Crusading provinces.
 5 = Provinces in the Latin Empire of Constantinople.

Focus of Reform movement,
 centuries X to XII. 

Foci of Manichean and Waldensian
 movements, centuries XI to XIII. 

Foci of Wycliffite and Husite
 movements, XIV—XV centuries. 

Eastern Church 



THE WESTERN CHURCH, c. A.D. 1230

CHAPTER VI

THE EAST AND THE CRUSADES

SECTION I. THE ICONOCLASTS AND THE BYZANTINE REVIVAL

Leo III the Isaurian had saved Constantinople in 717, and with Constantinople the Eastern Empire. He used well the breathing-space he acquired. When the war with the Saracens broke out anew, he was able to repulse their inroads into Asia Minor. His son Constantine could advance and recover the upper Euphrates by 752. He could then deal with the other deadly enemy, the Bulgarians, in another stubborn war, which also ended victoriously in 774.

These successes were rendered possible by the internal revival of the Empire under the Isaurian dynasty. It was suffering under two evils, the transmutation of its best fighting material, the peasants of Asia Minor, into serfs, and the portentous influence of the swarms of monks. The latter malady was bound up with the image-worship, which had reached dangerous dimensions under the Heraclians. It was no longer ability, energy and valour which were to defend the Empire but the miraculous interposition of sacred images and pictures, which gave only too great authority to the ignorant and turbulent monks. Leo's motives, indeed, were largely theological, for he came from eastern Asia Minor where image-worship had made less progress, and he set about his reform with

harsh tyranny. In 726 he decreed the destruction of all images of Christ and the saints in the Empire. It cost him at once a schism with the West and the temporary revolt of Byzantine Italy; but in the East in spite of bitter opposition he carried through his iconoclasm¹. His son Constantine V (741-75), insultingly nicknamed Copronymus, a coarser replica of himself, obtained the approbation of an Eastern synod for the abolition of image-worship, though the Greek populace remained obstinately bent on its restoration.

A similar radical policy was followed by the Isaurians on the land-question. For long not only had the peasant proprietors been steadily bought out by the great landlords, whether lay or ecclesiastical, but the peasant tenants too had become serfs bound to the soil. Leo III abolished serfdom at a stroke, and the peasantry was further recruited by settlements, apparently of barbarians, which owned their land in common. These reforms were accompanied by a Christianizing of the law of more doubtful benefit. Leo's *Ecloga* placed the law of marriage and the family on a better footing, but it also, from a dislike of the death-penalty, made mutilation a frequent punishment, and thus permanently barbarized the Empire and its inhabitants.

The conquests of the Iconoclasts from the Arabs had been largely due to the decay of the Umayyad Caliphs, and the decisive victory of the Abbasids at once endangered the Byzantine Empire, which soon after fell under a woman ruler, Irene (780-802), as regent for her son Constantine VI. She was an image-worshipper and quickly at odds with the able iconoclastic ministers of the dynasty. An invasion forced her to become tributary to the Caliph in 783, but she retained the regency, and was able to force through

¹ "Image-breaking": hence his surname of "the Iconoclast."

a Council the restoration of image-worship in 787. When Constantine VI was freed from her tutelage, the misfortunes of his reign enabled her to conspire against him and to depose and blind him in 797. The horror, roused by her unnatural crime, gave a pretext in the West for the foundation of the rival empire of Charlemagne; the East waited till 802 before replacing her by Nicephorus I. The new Emperor improved the finances, but in war he was defeated by the Caliph Harun Ar-Rashid and by the Bulgarians, losing his life in the latter contest. Meanwhile the contest between the iconoclastic party and their adversaries proceeded. The Emperors were either indifferent or alternate partisans; but the image-worshippers had most hold on the population, and, although Theophilus (829-42) harshly persecuted them, his widow Theodora during her regency for their son, finally suppressed the Iconoclasts in 842.

None the less they had revived the Empire, and maintained its boundaries. Latterly, Leo V (813-20) had repulsed the Bulgarians and Theophilus, although he lost Sicily and Crete, held back the Saracens. When the Abbasid Caliphate began to dissolve on the death of Mu'tasim in 842, the Eastern Empire, under a strong monarch, was soon to be ready to enter on a period of expansion. Basil I (866-86) was of Armenian¹ descent and acquired the throne by servility and murder, but he was a vigorous sovrán. By his new code, the Basilics, he restored to a considerable degree the laws of Justinian, after their interruption by Leo III's *Ecloga*, and made peace with the great landed proprietors by binding their tenants once more to the soil. He preserved the Empire's limits, and if the Photian schism separated formally the

¹ He and his dynasty were called Macedonian from their official pedigree.

incompatible Greek and Latin Churches, yet the Greek missions, under St Cyril and St Methodius, to the Slavs and the final choice the Bulgarians made to be Greek Orthodox were events which in the end were to help to safeguard the Empire and to continue its influence till modern times.

For the time, however, the Bulgarians were a formidable foe. Become a Slavonic people by dint of intermixture with their Slav subjects and arbitrarily converted to Christianity by their Tsar¹ Boris (864), their ruinous attacks nearly conquered Constantinople (924) under Tsar Simeon (893-927). Fortunately the death of Simeon and the pressure of the Magyars on the Bulgarians led to a *modus vivendi* which lasted many years, but none the less the existence of a strong Bulgarian state, which occupied almost all the Balkans, was a continual danger to the Empire, which was reduced to the coastlands of Europe.

All the more pressing, meanwhile, had been the need of combating the Saracen pirates of the Mediterranean², who, since the establishment of a colony of Andalusian exiles in Crete in the reign of Theophilus, and the gradual conquest of Sicily, had all but suspended trade by sea and brought devastation to the coasts of the Empire. Under Leo VI the Philosopher (886-912) they even sacked (904) Thessalonica, the second city of the Empire in Europe. The Emperors saw that these Moslems, who drew their strength from the West, must be attacked in the West. Leo obtained a hollow settlement of the Photian schism, and, using the remaining Byzantine provinces in Italy as a base, warred on the Saracens in concert with the Pope.

¹ The title *Tsar* was borrowed from the "Caesars" of Constantinople.

² See above, pp. 91, 156-7.

It was the victory of the allied south Italian powers at the Garigliano in 915 which began the extirpation of the pest.

The decline of the Saracens of East and West and the peace with Bulgaria at length gave the sorely-tried Empire its opportunity. The popularity of the dynasty helped to ensure domestic peace, and, as Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus (912-59), a nonentity, took no part in politics, a series of able co-regents and generals had a free hand and secured victories by land and sea. The same curious system of legitimacy combined with natural selection continued after Constantine's death. As the general of Romanus II (959-63), Nicephorus II Phocas reconquered Crete (960), as co-regent of Romanus' sons (963-9) he attacked the Saracen states which had arisen on the ruins of the Abbasid Caliphate, and restored Cyprus and Antioch to the Empire. Even more brilliant was the reign of John Tzimisces (969-76), but his eastern campaigns had no result beyond confirming the possession of Nicephorus' acquisitions.

Tzimisces' important triumphs were in Europe. The kingdom of Bulgaria in 963 had broken into two rival states, and Nicephorus II, who had found it an insufficient barrier against the Magyars, refused the subsidies hitherto paid to Tsar Peter, and determined to get rid of a still dangerous neighbour. He adopted the unhappy expedient of calling in a still more powerful, but distant, barbaric ally. The Russians, in whom the Slav element was now preponderant, had prospered under the descendants of Rurik. Their kingdom stretched between the two capitals of Novgorod and Kiev; the Altaic Patzinaks and Khazars on the north of the Black Sea were almost their dependants. The fact that the trade-route from the Baltic to Constantinople ran through their territories had

brought them into relations with the Byzantine Emperors, and they supplemented this by formidable sea-raids. Three times (860, 907, 941) they had vainly assaulted Constantinople. Now Nicephorus called in their prince, Sviatoslav, to attack Bulgaria from the north. He came and overthrew the eastern Bulgarian kingdom on the Danube, but he then turned against his ally, and the Empire was again threatened in 969 by a heathen Slav conquest. Tzimisces took the field and warded off the danger. In 972 he defeated Sviatoslav and forced him to surrender at Silistria on the Danube. East Bulgaria was annexed to the Empire.

Sviatoslav's dream of a Russian empire of the East was baffled, but the attraction which Byzantine civilization exercised on the Russians did not cease. They also naturally sought an outlet on the Black Sea. The two motives worked to a curious result. In 989 the great-prince Vladimir (972-1015) captured the Greek seaport of Cherson in the Crimea. He restored it to the Emperor Basil II and accepted Christianity in return for his marriage to Basil's sister Anna. His people became Christian at his order with little resistance, and began the acquisition of Byzantine civilization. As if to sever further Russia's connexion with the West, Vladimir ceased to draw fresh Varangian colonists from Scandinavia. Instead, he passed them on to his Byzantine ally, for whom they thenceforth formed the *corps d'élite* of the army.

Basil II (963-1025) only became real sole ruler in 989 after furious civil wars among competing generals. His victories over the Saracenic kingdoms on the east resulted in more glory than lasting profit, but his wars in the Balkans, which gained him the name of Bulgaroctonus¹, renewed the Empire in Europe. He had a worthy

¹ "Slayer of Bulgarians."

antagonist, the West Bulgarian Tsar Samuel (976-1014) who from his capital of Ochrida renewed once more the attempt to unite the Balkans in a Slav kingdom. In 986 he reconquered East Bulgaria from the Empire, only to lose it in a second war in 1000. He died after a crushing defeat in 1014, and Basil was able to annex the remnants of Bulgaria four years later. The Eastern Empire had recovered its ancient limits in Europe under the leadership of the cruel and warlike Emperor.

Symptoms of decline were soon visible after the death of Basil II. The male line of his house became extinct in 1028, but, as loyalty to it was traditional, a semblance of legitimate succession was obtained by the successive marriages and adoptions effected by the two elderly princesses Zoe (1028-50) and Theodora (1042-56) who remained of the dynasty. A slow contraction of the frontiers began, though it was resisted with energy by the short-reigned Emperors. A revolt of the Bulgarians was subdued by Michael IV the Paphlagonian (1034-41); two dangerous invasions, one of the Patzinaks by land in 1048, the other of Yaroslav I of Russia by sea in 1043, were vanquished by Constantine IX Monomachus (1042-54). But the Serbian Slavs, so long subject to the Bulgarians or the Empire, established their independence in 1040, and the Normans from 1032 onwards were conquering piecemeal the Byzantine possessions in South Italy¹. At the same time the long-threatened separation of the Eastern and Western Churches took place. The papal and oriental doctrines, the civilization and temperament of Greeks and Latins, were indeed incompatible, but, since the quieting of the Photian schism, a semblance of surly amity had been preserved. The grounds of difference, however, in creed and practices remained, and it is not

¹ See above, pp. 188-9.

surprising that the demands of Pope Leo IX, the founder of the papal ecclesiastical monarchy, brought about a final schism in 1054. The East belonged to the conservative, decadent, civilized past, the West to the innovating, creative, barbaric future. It was none the less a blow to the Empire, for it was isolated between the Latins and Islam, and an existing antipathy was strengthened by religious hatred.

The preservation and revival of the Byzantine Empire were due partly to its favourable geographical position which rendered it defensible, and partly to its wealth, its civilized government, and its able bureaucracy. Constantinople was the emporium and link of East and West, where congregated Latins, Slavs and Saracens. Her own manufactures of silks and textiles were eagerly exported, and the excellence of her gold coinage which was never debased assured her commercial supremacy. Amid all the revolutions and civil wars and luxury the bureaucracy had preserved a high level of ability and efficiency. Admirable generals led the troops, which, whether barbarian mercenaries like the Varangians or peasants from the military districts, were a standing and disciplined force. The navy, if singularly inferior in daring seamanship to those of the Italian cities, was well provided and by means of the Greek fire more than a match for the Saracens. The main lines of the civil administration continued unchanged. The Empire was still divided into themes governed by military *strategoi*, and directed by officials forming the Emperor's Consistorium, or Privy Council. Only the titles of the chief ministers were somewhat altered. The Grand Logothete was treasurer and chief secretary, the Grand Papias, a eunuch, was chamberlain, the Grand Domestic commander-in-chief, the Grand Duke head of the fleet. The Patriarch of

Constantinople controlled the Church with little opportunity of real independence. An elaborate hierarchy of titles distinguished the members of the hereditary official class, whose merit is apt to be forgotten under the impression of the oriental servility which had invaded it.

Law was not the only study to revive in this general revival. Literature reawoke, mostly it is true in the form of an uncreative, uncritical encyclopedic learning of which the Patriarch Photius is the chief example. Art and architecture under Armenian influence showed more originality, and as before gave hints to the West. But in spite of all these evidences of prosperity the inner strength of the Empire was failing. A deficient system of credit, surprising in so civilized a state, handed over external commerce to the Italian cities, and intensified the chief political evil of the Empire by encouraging the extension of great estates as an outlet for surplus capital. Though most Emperors tried preventive legislation, the great proprietors, ecclesiastical and lay, persistently bought out their peasant neighbours, who thereupon became their serfs. Thus not only did the class of local magnates, who under the despotic military constitution were always inimical to political stability, steadily increase in power, but the peasant farmer, who gave both soldiers and stability to the state, was on the brink of disappearing.

SECTION 2. THE TURKISH CONQUESTS

The vast dominions ruled by the Turkish Khans in the days of Justinian broke up like the similar aggregation of Attila. The Turks, however, were left the predominant people of central Asia. While certain branches of them, like the Khazars and Patzinaks, wandered between the Danube and the Caucasus, the main body of clans kept

to the present Turkestan. In the eighth century the conquests of the Arabs along the R. Oxus brought them into close connexion with Islam, and conversion by compulsion or conviction went on apace. As soldiers and slaves the dauntless courage and domineering energy of the Turks, as well as their indifference to Arab feuds and Persian nationalism, made them sought after by the Abbasids and their nobles. It was the last great Abbasid Caliph, Mu'tasim (833-42), who took the dangerous step of forming a Turkish bodyguard, thousands strong. His successors for a century were the puppets of their Turkish guard; their empire shrank to lower Mesopotamia, while governors and adventurers seized the provinces. Over Irak itself the real government was in the hands of the Grand Viziers, till in 945 the Buwayhid kings of southern Persia conquered Bagdad and reduced the Caliphs to a spiritual supremacy. Even that was diminished, for the heretical Fatimite Caliphs of Africa conquered Egypt and Syria (969-1003) from the local dynasties who suffered so severely in the contests with Tzimisces and Basil II, and in their capital of Cairo far surpassed their Abbasid rivals in wealth and power.

It was not long before the Turkish slaves and soldiers themselves aspired to kingdoms. One of them, revolting from his masters, the Persian Samanids of Samarkand, set up a little kingdom at Ghazni in Afghanistan on the borders of India. Mahmud (998-1030), son of another Turkish slave, who succeeded to this principality, was the first of those Turkish conquerors who were to spread far and wide the faith of Islam. He annexed the Punjab, thereby opening India to Moslem invasion, and ruled from Ispahan to Lahore. Meanwhile the independent Turkish tribes to the north had overthrown the Samanids and began to press across the Oxus. After Mahmud's death,

under their leader Tughril Beg (1037-63) of the house of Seljuk, they conquered Khorassan from the Ghaznavids. Constantly reinforced by fresh Turkish clans, Tughril Beg united in a few years the whole of Persia under his yoke; in 1055 he captured Bagdad itself, and was invested by the Abbasid Caliph with the secular rule of Islam under the title of Sultan. His progress further west was slower, but he had already ravaged the Byzantine frontier before his death. His successor Alp Arslan (1063-72) carried his arms to the Mediterranean. The Fatimites were defeated by a Turkish army, and Syria and Jerusalem (1070) wrested from them. The Seljuks were, however, repulsed from Cairo, where the Fatimites maintained a decadent rule.

Another prey, more pleasing to the fierce Moslem fanaticism of the Seljuks, was offered them in the Byzantine Empire. The stability of the government was shaken. Isaac I Comnenus (1057-9) had been a successful insurgent. An untimely anti-military policy had been adopted by Constantine X Ducas (1059-67), to whom the throne had come by Isaac's selection, although the recent annexation of Armenia (1046) had increased the frontier to be defended. He was succeeded by children under the regency of their mother Eudocia, and Alp Arslan at once took the opportunity of invading the ill-prepared Empire. In Byzantine fashion a leading general, Romanus III Diogenes (1068-71), was married to Eudocia and made co-regent to resist the attack. At first Romanus drove the Turkish bands back by energetic fighting, but, when he attempted in full force to reconquer Armenia, he was met in 1071 at Manzikert near Lake Van by Sultan Alp Arslan himself. Weakened by discord and treachery and outmanoeuvred by the light, rapidly moving Turkish horse, the Byzantines were utterly routed and Romanus was captured. It was a crushing blow, but worse still was the civil war which

broke out and lasted ten years. There was a crowd of candidates including Romanus who had been set free on easy terms. During the miserable strife Malik Shah (1072-92), Alp Arslan's successor, dispatched his cousin Sulaiman to Asia Minor for further conquests. Aided by the rival pretenders, the Seljuk's task was easy. By 1081 only one or two isolated cities, such as Trebizond, on the coast remained to the Byzantines. The rest formed the vassal Seljuk Sultanate of Rûm¹. The Turks settled thickly over the country, reducing the Christian inhabitants to a subjection so miserable that the long descended Byzantine civilization died out within it.

Barbarous and bloodthirsty as the Turks themselves were, their dominion brought a renewal of vigour to the Moslem world. Good government prevailed under Malik Shah, and a revival both of learning and material prosperity took place, which continued even amid the splintered and quarrelling states arising on the dissolution of his empire at his death. But the polity of the Near East took a long stride towards barbarism. Not only were the Turks hard to civilize, but the institutions they introduced were of a feudal character destructive of internal order. The ruling class was composed of Turks, either mercenaries or slaves, and the conquered lands were distributed among them as military fiefs, which provided in feudal service the famous Turkish horse. Warlike natives were rewarded and employed in the same way. Unity of the empire had not been thought of from the first. Branches of the Seljuk house, like that of Rûm, and influential clansmen and slaves (the Atabegs) were established as governors of the provinces, and soon acquired complete independence. All ruled on the feudal model.

The Byzantine Empire, amid its calamities, was at

¹ *I.e.* Rome.

least fortunate in the issue of the civil war, in the accession of Alexius I Comnenus (1081-1118). He was an excellent general and administrator, and, what was now of supreme importance to the enfeebled state, cool-headed and adroit in his foreign policy. For the Empire, with the loss of the Asiatic provinces, had lost much of its independence. Its resources in men and wealth were enfeebled. Its soldiers were barbarian mercenaries from all quarters, amid whom the Varangians, now composed largely of English exiles, were conspicuous. Its trade was in the hands of the Italian cities, among which Venice obtained extraordinary privileges. And the fleet of the once vassal Venetians was of more importance to the Emperors than their own. In short Alexius was in need of the help of the West, to which his decadent Empire formed a bulwark against aggressive Islam, and all his arts and energy were needed to prevent his sinking into a client of Western powers. From that or from destruction he was really saved by the First Crusade.

The West was quick to see the Empire's weakness, and Robert Guiscard of Apulia, who had conquered the remnants of Byzantine Italy, initiated during the civil wars the design of a Latin Empire of Constantinople. In 1081 he was ready to invade and, crossing the Adriatic, besieged Durazzo. Alexius' attempt to raise the siege failed, but his diplomacy was more successful, for Guiscard was obliged to return to Apulia to quell a rebellion and guard against the advance of the Romano-Germanic Emperor Henry IV. Guiscard's son, Bohemund, was out-generalled in his absence, and, when he renewed his invasion, his death in 1085 brought his schemes to nothing.

No rest, however, was given to Alexius. He repulsed with difficulty the invasions of the trans-Danubian Turks,

the Patzinaks and Uzes. To the Seljuk Kilij Arslan of Rûm he lost even the islands of the Asiatic coast. It is no wonder that, with a shrewd perception of the motive forces in the West, he appealed for aid in 1093 to Pope Urban II, who had both power and will to bring about an intervention on a vaster scale than Alexius had desired.

SECTION 3. THE EARLY CRUSADES

The extraordinary movement of the Crusades, so illustrative in its nature and so important in its results for medieval history, had its roots far earlier than 1100. War with infidels, especially with the Moslems, had been at first forced on the West in self-defence against the Moorish invasion repulsed by Charles Martel in the eighth and in the suppression of Saracen ravages and piracy in the ninth and tenth centuries. Not unnaturally it was viewed as a laudable act of piety, and one outlet for the adventurous, fighting nobility of France became the Holy War against the Moors in Spain. Gregory VII, as in so much else, completed the evolution. On the one hand, he pronounced a plenary absolution of sins for those who warred on his schismatic adversaries in the struggle with Henry IV. On the other, he planned a Crusade to the East. The Eastern Empire was in imminent danger after Manzikert, and the Turkish conquest of Jerusalem had interrupted pilgrimages to the Holy Sepulchre. Pilgrimage to shrines and relics was, as we have seen, a chief and favourite act of devotion, almost a passion, of the time. The Holy Sepulchre was the holiest shrine of Christianity, and its recovery a fit endeavour of all Christendom under the Pope's command.

Gregory's scheme remained an aspiration only, but the idea of a Crusade to Palestine had been given shape. His design was taken up by his clear-sighted successor Urban II.

In part the Pope's motives may be called defensive. The danger to Christendom from the Seljuk advance was great. Sympathy and self-preservation called for aid to be given to the hard-pressed Alexius. To rescue the Holy Land from the infidel appealed to a fervid piety, while the condition of the Holy Places under the Turks as related by returning pilgrims, such as the famous Peter the Hermit to whom legend attributed the origin of the Crusade, was a severe and wounding grievance. The prospect of advantage was also dazzling. The Greek Church might be led to acknowledge the supremacy of the Papacy, which in any case might win new Latin provinces in the East, and at the same time the Pope assumed the secular leadership of the West.

Urban broached the scheme of rescuing the Eastern Empire in response to Alexius' appeal at a Council of Piacenza in Lent 1095, and found it well received by clergy and laity. But he mainly depended on his native land of France where in November he held the Council of Clermont in Auvergne. Here the Holy Land was put in the forefront, and the scheme of Gregory propounded in its entirety. Urban preached in French with tremendous effect to the miscellaneous throng which gathered round a council. Adventurousness, religious enthusiasm and the fact that the Crusade was declared a complete penance for all sins committed, all raised the listeners to a fevered pitch of emotion which broke out in the cry of "Deus vult¹," the Crusaders' war-cry. Crowds rushed forward to take the crusading vow and receive the badge of the cross, which gave the movement its name. Once taken, there was no going back from the vow. It was venial not to take it, but disgraceful to break it. Their enthusiasm was infectious. Itinerant preachers, like

¹ "God wills it."

Peter the Hermit, and the vowed Crusaders themselves gained recruits far and wide. France and Lorraine were swept by a wave of warlike fanaticism, knights, peasants and townsmen joining in swarms. Germany caught the infection in spite of her civil war. Other countries began to take their share.

Urban and his advisers were careful to organize their expedition, but they could not control their agents and the lower ranks of Crusaders. Early in 1096 three successive hordes from north-east France, Lorraine and Germany, rushed off recklessly towards Constantinople by the land-route of Hungary. Their indiscipline and marauding brought disaster. Such as survived the indignant reprisals of Hungarians and Bulgarians were mostly cut to pieces by the Seljuks when they crossed the Bosphorus. Alexius must have been disgusted. He had wished for disciplined mercenaries and allies, not this perilous disorderly deluge, nor could he desire Latin states in the East or an attempt at papal supremacy.

It was out of his control, however, for the initiative had passed to the Pope. A day in August 1096 had been fixed for the start of the multitude of Crusaders, and by four different routes they made their way towards the rendezvous at Constantinople. The Lorrainers, among whom the leading figures were Godfrey of Bouillon, Duke of Lower Lorraine, and his brothers, passed through Hungary and Bavaria; the Provençals, guided by Count Raymond of Toulouse, crossed Lombardy and Croatia to Epirus; the Normans of Apulia, under Bohemund, son of Guiscard, sailed direct to Epirus; there had preceded them by the same route one section of north French Crusaders under the Capetian Count Hugh the Great of Vermandois; and there followed them a second section from Languedoil, among whom Robert of Normandy and the Counts of

Champagne and Flanders were the chief. It will be seen that, fortunately for their lands, none of the Western kings took part; but the great French vassals were numerous represented. They were, however, but little capable of controlling their comrades, nor were they, with the exception of Godfrey, much inclined to control them from fighting and plunder.

Alexius was in a quandary. The mutual dislike of Greeks and Latins amounted to loathing. Skirmishing, plundering on both sides marked the Crusaders' progress through the warlike Balkan tribesmen. The Emperor dreaded their intentions, for they might seize on Constantinople, and he was determined, if possible, to use them for the reconquest of the lost provinces. After a winter of quarrelling and intrigue with the chiefs encamped round his capital, he got his way. They did fealty to him, and swore to hold their conquests of him. Gradually he transported them all to the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus. By their arms he recaptured Nicaea, the capital of Rûm, and after a decisive victory, which they won over the Seljuks at Dorylaeum in Phrygia, he joyfully saw them vanish on their march to Antioch. His gains in his own ensuing campaign were worth the peril. The whole coastland of Asia Minor and a considerable stretch of the inland, though devastated, were restored to the Empire.

Meanwhile the Crusaders, much diminished by their hardships and the unfamiliar climate, laid siege to Antioch. One of them, Baldwin of Bouillon, had already deserted to usurp the little Armenian principality of Edessa. But Bohemund enabled them to capture the city in 1098, and received it as a reward, while a decisive victory won over the governor of Mosul, Kurbugha, prevented further interference from the Seljuks. Still more reduced in numbers

by deaths, by desertions and by knights left behind with Baldwin and Bohemund, the Crusaders could march toward Jerusalem where a less formidable foe now awaited them, for in 1096 the Fatimite Caliph had recovered it. In spite of its natural strength the Holy City fell before their assault in 1099, and its possession was assured by the rout of the Egyptian relieving army.

It was a difficult task which Godfrey of Bouillon (1099–1100), elected by the Crusaders first King of Jerusalem, and his successors, Baldwin I, Baldwin II, and Fulk of Anjou, took up. The new Latin principalities were weak, divided, and ill-supplied with men and money from the start. The native Syrian Christians were ill-disposed towards them. Fresh bands of Crusaders lost the greater part of their number before arriving in Syria and speedily were gone again. Yet the new kingdom was extended at the expense of the petty Moslem states which arose on the ruins of the Seljuk empire. In gaining the seaport towns the aid of the Italian sea powers was of the greatest service, and Genoa, Pisa and Venice were richly rewarded with privileges and the trade of the Levant. For the maintenance of the Latin rule the main reliance of the kings came to rest on a new development which combined monasticism and chivalry, the two Orders of the Templars and Hospitallers. These knights were devoted to the defence of the Holy Land. Bound by monastic vows and recruited from the West, they escaped the enervation of actual settlers. Gifts from the faithful poured in, and they speedily became exceedingly wealthy, which, if it corrupted their manners, also supplied means for the unending Holy War.

Otherwise the organization of the Latin kingdom had little to recommend it. Founded by feudal barons of France, it was erected on a purely feudal basis. There

were four all but independent states, Edessa, Antioch, Tripoli, and Jerusalem itself. In each the domain of the suzerain was small, and the vassals had full feudal powers. The Latin settlers, too, under a half-tropic sun and affected by oriental influences, degenerated rapidly. The frontier, with the interior of Syria unconquered, was bad. Byzantine help, now and again proffered by the warlike Comnenian dynasty, was inefficient and always tainted by schemes of annexation to the Empire. It was evident that, once the petty Turkish states could be united under an able ruler, the Christians, who at best waged an indecisive war, would have the worse.

Such a Moslem leader was found in Zangi Atabeg of Mosul (1127-46), who annexed Moslem Aleppo and destroyed the Christian county of Edessa in 1144. The news of the loss of the bulwark of Syria rang through the West, and St Bernard himself was the agitator for a supreme effort. This time it was not only great vassals, but the Roman King, Conrad, and Louis VII of France who took the Cross. Their Crusade (the Second, 1147-9) was a miserable failure. Misled by the example of the First Crusade, they made Constantinople their rendezvous instead of journeying direct by sea. The Greeks were hostile and treacherous, and their own mismanagement brought on them enormous losses at the hands of the Seljuks of Rûm. When their remnants reached Syria, the perpetual bickering of the chiefs, and the mutual enmity of the Crusaders and the settled Latins, caused the defeat of a well-planned attempt to capture Damascus. The Crusade broke up, and the most potent combined effort made by medieval Europe came to grief.

Zangi's son, Nur-ad-din, confronted the Latins with a single Moslem state by means of the annexation of Damascus, but the ability of Baldwin III and Amaury

of Jerusalem, coupled with their alliance with the Byzantine Emperor Manuel, kept the crusading states undamaged. Amaury and Nur-ad-din were rivals for the control of Egypt, laid open to their ambition by the feuds of Viziers who governed in the name of the decadent Fatimite Caliph. Nur-ad-din won the prize in 1169, and, when, after his death in 1173, his Kurdish viceroy, Saladin, took the title of Sultan and conquered Syria, the kingdom of Jerusalem was perilously hemmed in. Saladin's personal character won the loyalty of his motley subjects; he ruled from the Nile to the Tigris; the Emperor Manuel, who might have created a diversion, died in 1180; and the Latin kingdom was paralysed by faction. The offensive party, led by the military Orders and pilgrims, were reckless; the peace-party of settled Latins were timid and self-seeking. It was no wonder that, when the decisive conflict came in 1187, Saladin won the crushing victory of Hittin. King Guy and his nobles were captured, Jerusalem surrendered, and the whole kingdom was conquered save Tyre which held out owing to the courage of Marquess Conrad of Montferrat, aided by the command of the sea possessed by the Italian towns.

Europe was once more stirred to its depths by the disaster and a new Crusade (the Third) was prepared. Like the Second, it was a crusade of kings, unlike the Second, the leadership rested with the Emperor and the lay monarchs, and, in spite of their efforts, the Popes never again reacquired all the ground they now lost. But for all the vast effort made the Crusade produced only petty results. Frederick Barbarossa, who took the route by Asia Minor, was drowned in Cilicia, and his army melted away. Philip Augustus of France and Richard Cœur-de-Lion of England came (1191-2) only to quarrel bitterly. In the end they merely wrested from Saladin

Acre and Joppa. Incidentally, however, Richard had conquered the Byzantine island of Cyprus from the rebel Emperor who ruled it, and this new Latin kingdom under the dynasty of Lusignan was united temporarily to the diminished kingdom of Jerusalem in 1197, thus increasing the strength of both.

Although Saladin died in 1193, little territorial change occurred for many years. The era of the great combined efforts of Europe in the Holy Land closes with the Third Crusade. The conquest and maintenance of the kingdom of Jerusalem had been incited and engineered by the Papacy which had thereby made one of its most singular achievements and displayed most brilliantly its power. The West in the time of its greatest subdivision had acted, however imperfectly, as a unity for a common aim. Though alloyed with the crassest superstition, that aim, with all the brutality, self-seeking and mere adventurousness which accompanied it, was religious and ideal, worthy to set beside the Empire of Charlemagne and the Church of Gregory VII. Strange enough were the practical results. The West, which set out in unison, in the Crusades first distinctly fell into the separate, hostile nations of modern times: the peoples of Europe realized by experience their divergent characters. Utterly feudal as was the society which produced them, no series of events injured feudalism more, if only by the exhaustion of the noble class, which came to the profit of the kings and the townsmen. For the loss of life was incalculable; not a tithe of the crusading swarms returned home. At the same time the Crusades brought trade and wealth to the towns. The trade-routes to the Levant were made secure and familiar. If Italy gained most, Marseilles and Barcelona and the northern towns had their share. Lastly, if we must not overrate the amount of civilization

which trickled in from the East, the stimulus of this new experience and wider knowledge on the parochial West was epoch-making. In its lesser kind and degree, it was like the discovery of the New World.

SECTION 4. THE FOURTH AND LATER CRUSADES

The decline of the Byzantine Empire was temporarily arrested by the personal brilliance of the Comnenian dynasty, both in war and diplomacy. John the Good (1118-43) and Manuel I (1143-80) warred ceaselessly and victoriously on all hands. Patzinaks, Hungarians, Normans of Sicily, and Seljuks of Rûm were all held in check. Manuel could even act as protector of the crusading states until he suffered a severe defeat from the Seljuks in 1176.

A literary renaissance accompanied this political revival, but it was a hollow prosperity. Taxation grew heavier while the means to meet it decreased. The countryside was populated by great nobles and serfs. The Greek unity of the Empire disappeared. Not to mention the Slavs who preponderated in the Balkans, the Latin-speaking mountaineers from whom Justinian had descended took shape as a separate people, the Vlachs¹, who ranged from the Adriatic to the mountains of Transylvania beyond the Danube, while the non-Romanized Illyrians appear speaking their ancient tongue as Albanians on the Adriatic coast. The Empire was dissolving into national elements.

Meanwhile it was undergoing a strong Western influence due to the crusading movement, and with it descending some grades towards a medieval civilization. Manuel in his ways had a strong resemblance to a Western knight,

¹ Or Wallachians, a name, akin to Welsh, applied to Latins by the Germans and Slavs. Their modern name is Rumanians. . . .

loving hand-to-hand fighting and the tournament. In place of the former Byzantine exclusiveness, the Comnenian house became closely allied in blood and marriage with Western princes. To these court influences was added that of the Italian towns. The Venetians possessed a special quarter ruled by their *balio* in Constantinople itself. Two long wars (1119-26 and 1170-5) failed to dislodge them from their privileged status, and the counterbalancing concessions granted to the Genoese and Pisans only increased Italian preponderance. One thing, however, expressed the antipathy of Byzantine and Latin, and served as the rallying-point of Greek nationality. That was the difference of creed, which called forth still more bitterness now the Latins were no longer remote barbarians. It became of the greatest moment whether the Popes would be able to secure for the Western Church the non-Greek nations springing up within the Empire, and for a while it seemed as if they would succeed.

On the death of Manuel the rotten structure of the Empire began to collapse. The hatred felt for the Latin Empress-mother enabled a junior Comnenus, Andronicus, to usurp the throne (1183-5) by a series of abominable crimes. He made a genuine attempt to reform the Empire by crushing the great nobles, but his tyranny turned against him the mob of Constantinople, to which and to the mercenaries the control of the Empire had now come. Their choice was the incapable Isaac II Angelus (1185-95) who hastened the disruption. His extortions raised Vlachs and Bulgarians to a joint revolt under two Vlach brothers, who thus founded the second Bulgarian kingdom. He was soon dethroned and blinded by his equally incompetent brother Alexius III (1195-1203).

Besides the great expeditions a constant stream of Crusaders passed eastward. A new military Order, too,

the Teutonic Knights, had been founded by the side of the old. But these auxiliaries were insufficient to make progress, and Innocent III in his world-wide activity schemed also a fresh Crusade, the Fourth. The very prudence of its planning, however, wrested its control from his hands. It was to go by sea, and the great French nobles, who led it, negotiated with Venice for the transport. An arrangement was come to, and the Crusaders gathered at Venice in 1201-2. But, though Venice kept her side of the agreement, they could not raise the money to pay, and to Innocent's indignation accepted the scandalous compromise of conquering the Christian town of Zara in Dalmatia for Venice as an equivalent. It was done in 1202, by which time a further temptation was ripe. Alexius, the son of Isaac II, had escaped and was imploring aid—he would cause the Greek Church to submit to the Pope, and would reward his allies and further the eventual campaign against Egypt. The Venetian Doge Dandolo urged on the scheme, the more conscientious Crusaders left the army, and the decision was taken to restore Alexius. It was easily carried out. Alexius III fled after a mere pretence of resistance, when the crusading fleet arrived and commenced the attack. Isaac II and Alexius IV (1203-4) were enthroned, and prepared to satisfy their allies. But they only roused hatred in the vain attempt. A new usurper, Alexius V Ducas, became Emperor to resist the Latins. He failed utterly, for they stormed Constantinople and after fearful havoc were masters of the city. Enormous wealth, and treasures of art and literature were destroyed in the sack. It was the first time since Constantine that the capital had been captured by assault, and the Empire broke to pieces at once. Greek rivals took some fragments, of which Nicaea with part of Asia Minor, under Theodore I Lascaris (1204-22),

possessed the exiled patriarchate and was the most considerable. The centre of the realm fell to the Latins.

The Latins had no conception of the value of the civilization they found. Their feudal and communal chiefs divided their gains as booty. Venice got most. Her "three-eighths" of the Empire consisted of a quarter of Constantinople, the most valuable islands, such as Euboea and Crete, and a number of ports on the Adriatic. Boniface of Montferrat obtained the kingdom of Thessalonica. Baldwin of Flanders was elected Emperor. Other nobles were allotted districts to conquer, and those who succeeded founded petty states like the principality of Achaia in the Peloponnese.

Such an empire was not likely to last against strong foes. All Greeks of patriotism and spirit emigrated to Nicaea, while the Latins seized on the property of the Greek Church for their own prelates. Numbers of the Crusaders either went on to Syria or returned home. Taking into account their essential weakness, it shows the energy of the Latins that their states subsisted at all. Johannitza, Tsar of the Bulgarians (1197-1207), almost succeeded in ruining them. He overthrew the Emperor Baldwin I in 1205 and Boniface of Thessalonica in 1207. In this crisis the Emperor Henry (1207-22), Baldwin's brother, saved the Empire. He vanquished the Bulgarians and made peace with the Greek Despot of Epirus and the Greek Emperor of Nicaea. He only of the Latins conciliated his Greek subjects and braved the wrath of Innocent III by the toleration he allowed.

On his death the decline began. Theodore Lascaris of Nicaea had gained a free hand by an alliance with the Seljuks of Rûm. His successor John Vatatzes (1222-55) conquered the Latin territories in Asia and effected a lodgement in Thrace. There he was met by a rival

emperor, the Despot of Epirus who had put an end to the kingdom of Thessalonica, and by a more powerful rival, Asan II the Bulgarian (1218-41) who ruled from sea to sea. Asan and Vatatzes united to besiege Constantinople in 1235, but here they were checked by the valour of John of Brienne. That ex-King of Jerusalem had been elected colleague of the boy Emperor Baldwin II, who had succeeded on the Latin throne two shadowy sovereigns of the house of Courtenay. John, however, soon died, and, as the Bulgarian kingdom decayed after Asan II's death, Vatatzes could proceed. He had annexed southern Bulgaria and Thessalonica when he died in 1255.

The recapture of Constantinople by the Greeks was now only a question of time. The Latin Baldwin II traversed Europe three times in the vain quest for assistance. It was here first seen how little power the Papacy, his protector, possessed in the face of national feeling. The Greeks would have nothing to do with the Latins, and the Venetians were at variance with the French and preoccupied by their rivalry with the Genoese in the Levant. At the same time the Seljuks had ceased to menace Nicaea owing to their ruinous defeat by the Mongol hordes in 1244. A capable Emperor, Michael VIII Palaeologus, obtained basely enough the Nicaean throne in 1259. He made no secret of his resolve to acquire Constantinople. First, the Despot of Epirus was thrust back to his highlands. Then, during a truce in 1261, Michael's general Strategopulus was offered the chance of assaulting the city by the absence of the Venetian squadron. His men broke through a gate, the Grecian population joined them, and Baldwin took to flight with the Latins.

Although fragmentary feudal states still remained in the islands and in the south of the Balkan peninsula, the Latin Empire vanished when Palaeologus captured

Constantinople. It had been founded by means little short of piracy, and its weakness was soon contemptible. The harm it had done was irretrievable, for the Empire of the Palaeologi was a mere travesty of that of the Comneni, and could furnish no longer the needful barrier for Europe against oriental invaders. Among the chief sufferers eventually were the Venetians, who had urged on the enterprise of 1204. They immediately lost their favoured position at Constantinople to Michael's allies, the Genoese, and later they were exhausted and despoiled in warfare with the Turks.

After the perversion of the Fourth Crusade, the crusading impulse still continued, though with decreasing enthusiasm, under papal guidance. John of Brienne, a French noble, became King of Jerusalem (1210-2) by marriage with the heiress, and took local charge. In his support Innocent III and his successor Honorius III designed the Fifth Crusade against Saphadin, Saladin's brother. After some desultory beginnings it was resolved, as had been the case originally with the Fourth Crusade, to attack the centre of Saphadin's power in Egypt. Damietta, the portal of the country, was captured in 1219, but the interference and mismanagement of the papal legate and the perpetual dissensions of the Crusaders ruined the enterprise. They bought their free retreat from Kamel, Saphadin's successor, by the surrender of Damietta.

It was clear that a single leader, with full control of his forces, was necessary for a reconquest, and the Pope arranged with Frederick II, Emperor and King of Sicily, for a new crusade. In 1225 he married John of Brienne's daughter and dethroned the unfortunate king, who later found a new dominion in Constantinople. But Frederick's preparations were slow. When he suddenly put off his expedition in 1227, he was excommunicated by the fiery

Pope Gregory IX for the breach of his word. Then with a small army he went at last in 1228, and in spite of the hostility of the military Orders and the clergy used the feuds which were paralysing the Moslems to such good effect that Kamel ceded to him the Holy City.

The feuds among the Christians, although to some extent neutralized by those raging among the Moslems of Syria and Egypt, prevented any durable state of things being established by Frederick's treaty. The Pope had renewed his excommunication on Frederick's crusading after all without absolution, and stirred up too much trouble in Italy for the Emperor to give any more aid to the Holy Land. Yet the crusading impulse continued. Jerusalem was lost and won once more in 1239-40. Events far away decided its fate at last. The Mongols, coming west, had overturned the powerful kingdom of the Khwarizmians in northern Persia, and these savage Turkish exiles were glad to accept the alliance of Sultan Salih of Egypt against his Latin and Syrian foes. They annihilated the Latin army at Gaza in 1244, and made Jerusalem finally a Moslem city.

There was now no longer the general crusading enthusiasm in the West, where Pope and Emperor were at death-grips. One monarch, however, St Louis of France, held fervently to the moribund ideal, and led himself the forces of his kingdom to the rescue of the Holy Land. Following the example of the Fifth Crusade, he decided to attack Salih at the centre of his power in Egypt. Damietta was easily taken in 1249. But time was wasted, which allowed Salih to gather his forces, and the advance on Cairo was utterly mismanaged. As a result Turan-shah, Salih's heir, was able to surround the Crusaders and force a surrender. St Louis' ransom was the surrender of Damietta in 1250, and after a long

stay in Palestine he returned to France, leaving some new fortifications behind him as the sole result. He still longed to renew the Crusade, in spite of the indifference of his subjects, but his second expedition in 1270 was diverted, by the influence of his brother, Charles of Sicily, and by his own incurable visionariness, to Tunis, where he died. It was the last Crusade, although the dream and the pretence of one lived on. To fight against the infidel in the Levant still remained part of a knight's ideal, but the old religious conviction, which had once caused Europe to pour hundreds of thousands of men into the East for the Holy War, was dead. The Popes had misused the crusading method against heretics and political foes. The merit had become too easy, the reward too cheap. And the nations of Europe had become engrossed in their domestic broils and in the erection of the national kingdoms and new structures in politics and civilization which occupy the concluding centuries of the Middle Ages.

A new empire like that of the Seljuks arose in the Near East in the thirteenth century. In 1220 the generals of the Mongol Chingiz Khan overthrew the Turkish monarchy of the Khwarizmians, which then dominated most of Persia. Their progress further west was slow, the Seljuks of Rûm, though defeated, fought stubbornly, but in 1258 Hulagu, Il-khan of Persia, and his Mongols destroyed the Abbasid Caliphate of Bagdad, and swarmed over Syria subverting the petty Moslem kingdoms. Egypt, however, proved hard to conquer. Sultan Salih had followed the example of the early Abbasids in increasing and favouring his bought Turkish slaves or Mamluks¹. On the murder of Turan-shah in 1250 they gave the Egyptian throne to Aybak, one of their number. Thenceforward Egypt was ruled by the Mamluk kings. Of slave origin, for they

¹ *I.e.* white, as opposed to negro, slaves.

kept up their guards by constant purchases of Turkish Mamluks, usually of brief reigns terminated by their murder and the exaltation of a fresh Mamluk, they were yet monarchs of ability and vigour and disposed of an army of matchless courage and discipline in the field. It was Sultan Kutuz who in 1260 met and defeated the invincible Mongols at Beysan in Palestine. All Syria submitted to him, but his murderer and successor Beybars (1260-77) has the credit of putting a final term to the Mongol onrush. He set up an exiled Abbasid as Caliph with merely religious authority in Cairo, and, having thus made Egypt the centre of Islam, could the more easily employ an adroit diplomacy. His main dependence was on the Mongol Khan of the Golden Horde who had turned Moslem and ruled from the Carpathians to the Oxus, and whose enmity to the Il-khans effectually prevented the latter from making any dangerous invasion of Egypt.

The only hopes of resistance to the Mamluks which the Latins of Syria possessed lay in their command of the sea and the valour of the knightly Orders. They were split up by feuds and degenerate, while their adversaries were united under an energetic Sultan. Beybars made steady progress in the conquest he determined on. All the inland castles, much of the coast, and the great city of Antioch were his before his death. His successor Kalaun (1277-90) disposed of the last Mongol invasion by his victory at Hims, and then resumed the conquest of the Latins. Tripoli fell into his hands and the siege of Acre was begun which ended in its capture by Sultan Khalil in 1291. The remaining towns surrendered and the kingdom of Jerusalem passed away.

The military Orders lost thereby the original reason of their existence. The Teutonic Order fared best. Its grandmaster, Herman von Salza (1211-39), seems to have

guessed the future of the Latin kingdom, and began a new activity against the heathen of the north. The Polish duke of Cujavia called the knights to his aid against the most primitive of Balt folks, the Prussians. In 1229 the Order took up its new crusade. Castles were built, German colonists introduced, and the land was subdued. In 1237 a union was effected with the Knights of the Sword who had created a similar state further east in Livonia (1201-37). A revolt of the unhappy heathen was crushed after a long war of extermination (1261-83). When Acre fell it was a simple matter to transfer the grandmastership to Prussia, and the Order became a Baltic power.

The Hospitallers also found a new outlet. In 1309 they seized on Rhodes, and thenceforward held it as a bulwark of Christendom against the Turks in an heroic warfare by land and sea, the fittest continuation of the Crusades. In this vanguard duty they stood side by side with the Latin Kings of Cyprus until that island fell to Venice in 1489, but the Templars were not given time for a similar mission. Their wealth made them envied and their pride hateful, and both raised against them a greedy and cruel foe, Philip the Fair of France. Charges of which the worst were untrue were brought against them. They were found guilty by deliberate injustice, and suppressed in a ruthless persecution (1307-14). Other countries followed France's lead with more or less atrocity, so that the Order disappeared¹.

The fact that the Crusaders gained no more success than they did may be put down to their barbaric indiscipline and their total inability to act together. Private feuds were seconded by national feuds. Later came disillusionment. The Popes obviously used the Crusades for their political ends. Lasting results were too clearly not

¹ Cf. below, pp. 362-3.

to be obtained. And the zeal and interests of men were drawn to more practical and more civilized aims, and to national objects nearer home.

SECTION 5. THE SLAVS AND THE MONGOLS

Up to the tenth century there had continued a steady extension of the Slav race to the west and south. Possessing a low grade of civilization, they were little able to advance rapidly when in contact with civilizations more developed; and, being in their original disposition peaceful and singularly incapable of political and even of combined action, they fell continually into the position of serfs or dependants of other tribes, Altaian or German, in whose train their spread from their first districts was accelerated. Their progress therefore was a progress of barbarians, which took long to change its character. Nevertheless under pressure of circumstances and with some admixture of blood their character underwent modifications. They became warlike. Under foreign chiefs they founded states. They began to adopt some civilization from their neighbours. They embraced Christianity.

As their tribes moved farther apart they fell into three marked groups, which, coming under diverse foreign influences, formed quite separate races and subdivided into many peoples. There were the South Slavs of the Balkans, the West Slavs on the German frontiers, and the East Slavs from Lake Ladoga to the Carpathians.

The history of the South Slavs has been mainly interwoven with that of the Byzantine Empire. We have seen the Bulgarians, organized first by the Altaian Bulgars and then by the Vlachs, form a kingdom on the Danube. Other tribes were subjects of Greeks or Latins further south. No doubt, too, the Vlachs, or Rumanians, who in the thirteenth century were forming principalities north

of the Danube, were much intermixed with Slavs. Farther west, from Belgrade to the Adriatic coast, came the Serbs who in the thirteenth century founded a kingdom of some importance. One common character distinguished all these nations. In an elementary way they were heirs of Byzantium; in spite of some vacillation they were Orthodox Greek in faith.

On the other hand their kinsmen at the head of the Adriatic, the Croats, turned to the West. They accepted the Roman faith and in 1102 fell under the dominion of the Hungarians. The latter had changed from their wild Altaian nomadic state, even in physique, owing to admixture of blood. Endowed with a remarkable capacity for organization, they had followed the lead of their kings, St Stephen (997-1038) and St Ladislaus (1077-95), in accepting Latin Christianity and in imitating feudal civilization, of which in the thirteenth century they formed an eastern bulwark. They ruled a medley of Slavs and Vlachs. Their strength lay in the lesser nobles who in 1222 extorted from king and barons the Golden Bull, and made a beginning of a government, almost to be called parliamentary.

The group of West Slavs was similarly drawn into the sphere of the Latin Church. Of them the closely-allied Moravians and Bohemians¹ early showed some power of combination. In the ninth century a strong Moravian kingdom arose which embraced Greek Christianity at the hands of the Apostles of the Slavs, St Cyril and St Methodius. But it was overthrown in 905 by the Hungarian invasion, and thus cut off completely from eastern influences, while its neighbourhood to Germany had already tempted it to accept the Latin rite. The Moravians became insignificant after their collapse under the

¹ Called by themselves Czechs.

Hungarians, and their place was taken by their ex-vassals, the Bohemians, who formed a state in the tenth century. Bohemian history is governed by the cross currents of the attraction of German civilization and of resistance to German dominion. The attraction proved the more potent. Although the Bohemian dukes and later kings remained rather tributaries than ordinary vassals of the Holy Roman Emperors, their court and life became Germanized and their country feudalized. German bishops linked them to the German state, and German colonists held a third of Bohemia. The policy of their most powerful kings in the thirteenth century was directed towards expansion over German lands, and Ottokar II (1253-78) for a while conquered the borderlands from the duchy of Austria to the Adriatic.

The Wendish tribes, on the other hand, stretching from the Erzgebirge to the Baltic, proved unable to unite and repugnant both to Germanism and to Christianity. For a moment in the seventh century the Frank Samo made a kingdom among them when they revolted from the Avars, but they quickly fell apart again, and their fate from the tenth century onwards was that of gradual expulsion and absorption by the invading Germans. Henry the Lion and his rival Albert the Bear and their successors did for Mecklenburg and the march of Brandenburg what the Saxon Emperors before had done for the march of Misnia further south. By the middle of the thirteenth century the whole land between the Elbe and Oder was well on the way to be completely Germanized.

Still farther to the east, roughly between the Oder and the Vistula, the Poles founded a kingdom more purely Slav than that of Bohemia. In the tenth century under German pressure they were converted to Western

Christianity, but their king Boleslaw I the Valiant (992-1025) made his kingdom independent of his neighbours in both secular and ecclesiastical causes. In spite of its disorderliness—for the Poles had no talent for organization—the kingdom held its own for a century. Before the Hohenstaufen Emperors, however, its star paled. If not yet feudalized in the true sense of the word, the warlike landowners were insubordinate, the constituent tribes were ready to fall apart, and the divisions of the ducal house led to incessant civil war. In the twelfth century Pomerania and Silesia were lost to the Romano-Germanic Empire. By the thirteenth century trade was in the hands of German immigrants, and Poland, without a sea-coast and isolated, was torn by the dissensions of its feudal barons and prince-bishops.

The West Slavs all sooner or later adopted Latin Christianity and by consequence formed outposts of Western civilization, but their next neighbours, the East Slavs or Russians, belonged to the Greek Orthodox Church, and remained definitely in the Byzantine sphere. Even with the help of their Varangian intermixture and imitation of Byzantium, however, the Russians had far too little organization to hold together the vast territories they possessed. Vladimir II Monomach (1113-25) was the last great prince of Kiev to rule all the tribes, and he was followed by an anarchy, in which the warring descendants of Rurik split up the realm among them. Two sub-national groups were formed, the Little Russians to the south and the Great Russians to the north. It was the latter who in spite of subdivision won fresh lands for their race. The Finnish tribes to the north and east were pushed back and absorbed, and the unpeopled forest was occupied.

What would have been the outcome of this development of the Russians if it had been uninterrupted is

impossible to say. It was cut short by the invasion of the Mongols. The Mongols, who founded the widest of the great empires, were still in the twelfth century, what they had been long, a typical race of Altaian nomads of minor importance, living in the north of the territory now called after them Mongolia, and not infrequently in relations with China. It was their fortune that in 1175 the largest of their tribes fell under the rule of a boy of genius, Temujin, later known as Chingiz Khan¹. He seems to have been the ablest of all the Altaian conquerors who swept devastating over the world. His advent, too, coincided with a fresh period when the increase of the Altaians made a new overflow likely. Thirty years of hard fighting gave him the absolute rule of all the Mongols, as well as of the Tatars² and of the far more numerous Turks of these northern steppes³, and at their head he could commence conqueror on a larger scale. The Empire of North China, or Cathay, was his first victim. In an appalling war from 1210 to 1216 he conquered the provinces north of the Hoang-ho, including the capital Pe-king, from the Manchu dynasty which governed there. Then Chingiz Khan turned west. The Gur-khans of Eastern Turkestan fell before him and their subjects went to swell the Mongol hordes. In 1220 came the turn of the Turkish Khwarizmians who had just conquered the whole of Persia. They, too, were overthrown, although a spasmodic resistance was maintained till 1231.

The conquests of Chingiz Khan were by no means merely due to the pressure of numbers, although he

¹ *I.e.* "the very mighty Khan or ruler."

² Hence the medievals called his people, by a wrong but natural etymology, Tartars or inhabitants of hell.

³ One Turkish kingdom conquered was that of the half-fabulous Christian "Prester John."

disposed of far greater forces than his opponents¹. But in his swarms of Mongol-Turkish horse he possessed the best military material then extant, and he had the luck to obtain and the art to use generals whose conceptions of strategy were far beyond anything known in the rude warfare of the time, both in science and skill. The same could not be said of his government. He ruled all the Altaian nomads from his capital of Karakorum, and his despotism linked East and West, China and Persia, as never before. But over the West, if not over China, the Mongol dominion was a desolating blight from which Persia and Irak at least have never recovered. The conquests were governed by a system of appanages, the sons of Chingiz Khan being allotted so many Mongol and Turkish clans in their old or new-conquered homes. When the great conqueror himself died in 1227, one son, Ogotay (1227-41), succeeded him as Great Khan at Karakorum, another son, Tuluy, took eastern Mongolia and north China, and a third, Chagatay, Transoxiana. After Ogotay's death the line of Tuluy obtained the supreme Khanate. Its greatest member was Kubla Khan (1257-94), who completed the conquest of China and founded the Yuen dynasty. He maintained some sort of supremacy over the other Khanates, but this superiority grew nominal with his successors until the Mongol empire entirely disappeared. Two of the Khanates, however, meanwhile exercised a strong influence on Western history.

One of these was the collection of sub-Khanates, known as the Golden Horde, which was ruled by the descendants of Chingiz Khan's son Juji. They already held all the steppes from the Dnieper to Kashgar, when their chief Batu was ordered by Ogotay to make further conquests

¹ *E.g.* the army with which he conquered the Khwarizmians reached the then enormous number of 150,000 men.


in the leading-strings of Subutay, the best of Chingiz Khan's generals. The Mongols had once before in 1223 routed the Russians on the R. Kalka by the Sea of Azov, and now they were equally invincible. Between 1237 and 1240, when Kiev was destroyed, they overran all the Russian principalities and made them prostrate tributaries. In 1241 Poland and Hungary were the objectives. While one army wrecked the Poles' resistance, defeated a German army at Liegnitz in Silesia, and marching through Moravia rejoined the main army, Batu with the latter entered Hungary, destroyed the Hungarian forces at Mohi by the R. Theiss, and occupied the whole country. Flying columns devastated Serbia and Bulgaria, when an unlooked-for deliverance was caused by the death of Ogotay, which called the army back for the election of a new Great Khan. Civil wars over the succession, the diversion of the Mongols to China, and the inert disposition of Batu prevented a renewed invasion, and Europe was saved from almost inevitable disaster. As it was, though Poland and Hungary could recover from the terrible scourge of Mongol devastation, Russia remained for two hundred years blotted out from European history under the heel of the Golden Horde.

A better record than the Golden Horde's is that of the Mongol Il-khans of Persia. Hulagu (1256-65), son of Tuluy, was sent to complete the conquest of Persia. We have seen how he destroyed the Abbasid Caliphate of Bagdad, and was checked by the Mamluks of Egypt. He completed the conquest of the Seljuks of Rûm, who became mere governors of the Il-khans till their extinction in 1300. Shortly after, the dominion of the Il-khans themselves broke up and was divided among their amirs. They, like their cousins of the Golden Horde, had become Moslems, and attempted to be civilized monarchs, but the damage they had done could not be repaired.

Chief Towns trading with the Levant underlined thus Barcelona.
 " " " " Constantinople " Venice.
 " " " " the Ponent " Gaeta.

— Frontier of Byzantine Empire in 1100 A.D.
 - - - " " Seljuks of Rûm " "
 - - - " " Crusading States.

Reconquests of Alexius Comnenus
 from the Seljuks



CHAPTER VII

THE FALL OF THE WESTERN EMPIRE AND OF THE PAPAL THEOCRACY

SECTION I. FREDERICK II

The young prince, who reunited the territories once held by his father Henry VI, was in his own day named the Wonder of the World, and without being either great or good he deserved his appellation. Frederick II inherited his marvellous qualities both from his Hohenstaufen and Hauteville ancestry, but without doubt the Norman strain favoured by his Sicilian upbringing was the stronger. He was a true heir of Roger II cursed with the succession to Hohenstaufen ambitions. His talents were not only great, they were universal. He was a legislator and administrator of high rank, a skilful diplomat, a respectable general; he had an intellectual turn, was a linguist and a minor poet, whose influence transplanted Provençal poetry into his native idiom and thus founded Italian literature. Physically and in his excessive cruelty the blond Frederick took after Henry VI, but his other qualities, a singular receptiveness and power to innovate and a luxuriousness which led him to adopt the harem-life of the Sicilian kings, recalled his Norman ancestors; and in most things he was a strange suspected portent to Western Europe. His friendliness to Moslems and his indiscreet caustic wit led him to be conjectured a heretic without his affecting any views which were not held by

many unquestioned sons of the Church. He was indeed a bitter persecutor, for he regarded heretics as rebels against Christendom of which he was the secular head.

Frederick's aims were prescribed for him by his descent and his acceptance of Innocent III's offer of the Holy Roman Empire. He was born and educated King of Sicily, and he schemed to resuscitate the shattered Empire from a Sicilian point of view. Germany he clearly regarded as hopeless, for the royal authority had been irremediably crippled in the civil war of Otto IV and Philip. In Sicily, on the other hand, he could hope to restore speedily and increase the strong Norman monarchy. From the south, with Sicilian gold and German troopers, he would endeavour to renew the imperial authority over North Italy. How far this course would lead him, he would hardly measure at the commencement of his reign, but two things were obviously needful, the placation of the Papacy, to the essential interests of which he was running counter, and the loyalty of the princes who now held the destinies of Germany in their hands.

For the time Frederick seemed in the way of obtaining both these advantages. The Pope and the spiritual princes were gratified by his solemn confirmation of Otto IV's concessions at Eger in 1213. Innocent III's death and the accession of the conciliatory, weaker Honorius (1216-27) enabled him to slip out of his pledge of resigning the Sicilian crown by further progress in the same path. Innocent had designed to keep Sicily separate from the Empire, but he had forgotten that Frederick's young son Henry might be elected to the Empire in his turn. This election Frederick secured in 1220 by means of a privilege to the ecclesiastical princes which practically shut out the imperial authority from their lands. It was

a heavy sacrifice but successful. Honorius, anxious for a new Crusade and for Frederick's help in the mutinous Papal State, allowed him to retain the Sicilian kingdom while crowning him Emperor. Meanwhile Frederick had left the Archbishop of Cologne as guardian of the boy King of the Romans in Germany, and for the next few years the princes had it their own way. Some of them succeeded in thrusting back the threatening power of Denmark from the south coast of the Baltic, but to the demesne-knights who desired the restoration of the ancient strength of the monarchy the independence of the princes, not Denmark, was the chief danger, and, when in 1228 King Henry took over control from his then guardian, the Duke of Bavaria, their influence was felt. The young king and his knights failed, however, utterly in their attempt to create a counterweight to the princes by means of favours to the towns. In 1231 the wrathful lay princes extorted the privilege of Worms, which shut out the imperial authority from their lands as fully as from the ecclesiastical principalities, and this concession was confirmed by the absent Emperor. Frederick was indignant with his son both for crossing his general policy and for the loss of power occasioned by his action. He forgave him once, but, when Henry renewed his old tentatives and openly revolted, while Germany was torn with feuds and vexed by the fierce persecution of her numerous heretics, he struck. In 1235 he entered Germany, imprisoned and deposed the resourceless Henry, and attempted, by regulations for the judicial settlement of disputes and for the erection of a central court of justice, to restore the monarchy at least in non-princely territory. The election of his second son, the child Conrad, as King of the Romans was to secure the succession, and the annexation of the duchy of Austria to the imperial demesne

was to give a much-needed increment of material strength. The latter scheme, however, missed fire, for the rebel Duke Frederick of Austria held his own. In fact, with the princes lay and spiritual all but independent, with the demesne diminished, and with the Emperor an absentee, Germany was sinking into an aristocratic federation.

Frederick's proceedings in Italy were in striking contrast to his German policy. Fortunately for him Pope Honorius, troubled by the Romans, had need of him and the vow of a speedy crusade was a further compensation for the personal union of Sicily with the Empire. Frederick, too, was careful to promise and take measures in general favourable to ecclesiastical claims. Then, disregarding his crusading vow, he threw himself into the reorganization of his Sicilian kingdom. In Courts held at Capua and Messina he re-erected the monarchy after the recent anarchy. All grants since 1189 were recalled, unauthorized baronial castles were destroyed, new royal castles built, the fleet was renewed, all royal rights were firmly insisted on, the administration was extended and strengthened. The Saracens had been in revolt for years among the Sicilian mountains: Frederick subdued them completely and transported the more warlike of them, some 20,000, to the city of Lucera on the mainland, where they formed a military colony on which he could always rely, whomever else the Popes might stir against him.

Meantime the crusade hung fire, to the natural annoyance of the Pope. At last in 1225 Honorius tried to clinch the matter by obtaining for Frederick, then a widower, the hand of Yolande, daughter of John of Brienne and heiress of Jerusalem. The Emperor, now King of Jerusalem, was to set forth on his crusade by 1227 under penalty of excommunication. In the interval Frederick came first into open conflict with one of his mortal foes.

Since the death of Henry VI the Lombard cities had enjoyed a complete independence. They had grown wealthier and stronger, and, in spite of the increasing menace of class-strife, their governments had become better knit under the rule of the new single officials, called *podestàs* after Barbarossa's model, who, since c. 1200, had been generally instituted to replace the consuls as heads of the commune. Frederick, who was sacrificing the imperial authority in Germany, wished to restore it in Italy, and summoned an imperial Diet in Cremona for 1226. The Lombards took alarm. Even the conditions of the Peace of Constance were now unwelcome to them, and Frederick's successful restoration of bureaucratic absolutism in Sicily made probable an attempt on his part to establish a similar government in the north. With the exception of a few imperialist cities, they hastily renewed the Lombard League, and, when the German princes tried to proceed to Cremona, they barred the Alpine passes and nullified the Diet. Frederick in wrath put them to the ban, and declared the Treaty of Constance void; but Honorius hastened to mediate and negotiated a *modus vivendi* which left the real grounds of dispute untouched. The Papacy was in fact the inevitable ally of the Lombard League. Like the cities, it feared a real monarchy of the Emperor in North Italy, which, especially now that Frederick was despot of the south, would hopelessly compromise its own independence. The Papacy's secular government, too, was more compatible with the communes than the Emperor's. In the papal lands communes flourished either in submission to an easy suzerainty or in disorderly defiance to impotent commands.

The gentle Honorius died in 1227, and was succeeded by quite another man, the son of thunder Gregory IX (1227-41). The new Pope's fierce passions were untamed

either by his advanced age or by his long studies in the Canon Law or even by the genuine piety which made him the especial patron of St Francis. They did not, however, blind his political insight, though they deprived him of adroitness and led him into blunders. He immediately demanded the execution of Frederick's vowed crusade, and, when the Emperor turned back suddenly through illness, promptly excommunicated him. It was the Pope's treaty-right, but in reality Gregory was taking the first opportunity to make a declaration of war on the power that threatened to hem him in. When Frederick did sail to Palestine in 1228 Gregory promptly excommunicated him anew for presumption, and utilized his absence to carry on war against him in Italy. He made an alliance with the Lombard League, he endeavoured vainly to stir up revolt in Germany, and he declared Frederick deposed from Sicily. He intended to uproot from Italy the dangerous Hohenstaufen dynasty. But, though his troops occupied over half Apulia, Gregory had disgusted Christendom by his unscrupulous violence, and he was not strong enough to resist Frederick when the Emperor returned. A peace was patched up at Ceprano in 1230, and Frederick could devote himself to fortifying his position.

The basis of Frederick's power in Sicily consisted in his Saracen warrior caste and his German mercenaries. Backed by an irresistible armed force he could insist on an absolutism greater than Roger II's and justified it by the Roman Civil Law now fully revived by the jurists. His Curia remained the central organ of government, modified only in details, such as the leading position now held by the Grand Justiciar while the Admiral merely commanded the fleet. A justiciar and a chamberlain now ruled the single provinces in judicial, financial

and administrative matters. The modernization of the state and the growth of bureaucracy were marked in the code of laws he issued at Melfi in 1231. The officials were rigorously controlled and their salaries paid from the royal treasury, but the whole kingdom was brought under their hand. The barons were deprived of criminal jurisdiction and the right to bear arms or make private war, the towns were deprived of the remnants of autonomy, the Church was forbidden to acquire fresh lands. Withal the poor benefited: justice was sternly done and personal freedom was given to the royal serfs. Taxation was heavy and de-feudalized. A general land-tax, the *collecta*, was levied from time to time, while a poll-tax on Saracens and Jews, heavy custom duties and profitable monopolies made Frederick the wealthiest prince in Europe. If much of these resources was drained from the realm by the Emperor's ambitions and wars, much went in the upkeep of a fleet which secured commerce, and much in building and government. Nor were the subjects unconsulted if they had no deciding voice. Local assemblies were created to bring forward complaints, and now and again deputies of the towns were summoned to arrange taxation.

Frederick was a conscious civilizer. He founded the University of Naples for the study of Roman Law. He collected and encouraged Greco-Arabic learning in his polyglot court. To him and to his rhyming courtiers Italy owed her first vernacular literature which replaced the fashionable Provençal. Following the lead of the Lateran Council of 1216 he abolished trial by combat and ordeal as unreasonable. And these gains were not for the kingdom of Sicily alone. Their influence spread far and wide, and with the greatest effect among Frederick's mortal enemies in North Italy.

There the Emperor was determined to reassert the imperial authority and to found a genuine monarchy. The support the Lombard communes had given to his rebellious son had clinched his resolution, and he was prepared to risk the Pope's intervention. The situation was not unfavourable for him. Certain towns, such as Pavia and Cremona, were on his side. A noble, Ezzelin da Romano, had made himself absolute master of Verona, the key of the Brenner Pass to Germany, and was his ally. And furthermore the Lombard League as a whole and in its constituent cities showed the greatest instability. While the desire for autonomy made the communes unite they were still more moved by rivalry between one another, and the fact that some were enemies of the Emperor made others inclined to be his friends. Within the cities, faction and class-hatred had reached a singular intensity. The nobles were divided, and one faction would be for, the other against, the Emperor. Arrayed against the nobles, who dominated the commune, stood the *popolani*, composed of traders great and small, who usually took the opposite side to the stronger party among the nobles, and endeavoured with more or less success to erect their own organization, the *popolo*¹, by the side of the older commune with equal or greater power. Tumult and often anarchy were the result of this internecine strife, and an opening was given for the establishment of city-tyrants, in the person of the leaders of the *popolo*, who could restore peace and subject or exile their opponents with a strong hand. It was not long before Lombardy was full of exiles driven from their cities by their victorious rivals.

Meantime Gregory IX hesitated. He hated and feared Frederick. Lombardy was honeycombed with

¹ "The people."

heretics. In the papal lands he was weak, with Rome more often in revolt than not. His refuge was to attempt to negotiate a peace on the basis of the Peace of Constance. But the Emperor refused this shadowy sovereignty, and began the war. He gained over town after town, and won in 1237 a crushing victory against the Milanese and the League. He might have made an advantageous treaty, had not his over-confidence led him to demand unconditional surrender. Only a few towns held out. With the aid of German troopers supplied him by the Emperor, the hideous tyrant Ezzelin had added Padua and Vicenza to his dominions and exercised a reign of terror. Elsewhere imperial vicars of Italian race supervised the submissive communes, which were grouped in provinces. The *caroccio*, or civic standard, of Milan was sent under the Pope's eyes as a trophy to Rome. It was a fatal error, for the Pope could not allow a new absolute kingdom in the north under the Sicilian king to overshadow him. When Frederick failed to take Brescia in 1238, Gregory, encouraged, found pretexts to declare war. He excommunicated Frederick in 1239, and thus began the fight to the death between Empire and Papacy.

Frederick passed his meridian with the failure at Brescia. Henceforward the Lombards strengthened in their resistance, his hold on Germany and even on Sicily began to fail owing to the propaganda of the Friars, now as ever the best instruments of the Papacy, and the general opinion of Western Christendom, though slowly, turned against him to the eventual destruction of his house. At first, however, the balance seemed inclining in his favour. He conquered Ancona and Spoleto from the Papal State and threatened Rome. A projected General Council summoned by the Pope was thwarted by the capture of a hundred prelates in a sea-victory

of his allies, the Pisans, over the papalist Genoese. Then in 1241 the indomitable Gregory IX died. He had nearly reached his hundredth year, and amid all the turmoil of his pontificate had strenuously administered the Church and had codified the Canon Law, in which he was a tireless legislator.

On Gregory's death the Emperor, hopeful of a placable Pope, ceased open hostilities for the time, but a new Pope with whom to negotiate was not easily forthcoming. The aged Celestine IV proved only a momentary stop-gap, and it was not till 1243 that the Cardinals, divided between the papalist and imperial parties, could unite on a candidate. Frederick's rude pressure perhaps did him harm, for they elected their strongest man who, if he had been a friend of the Emperor, was also a canon lawyer and an uncompromising exponent of the extreme papal claims. Sinibald Fieschi, who thus became Innocent IV (1243-54), was a Genoese noble and the embodiment of the political and legal spirit which more and more mastered the Roman Curia. Endowed with courage, with invincible resolution, with astuteness, he was utterly unprincipled and pursued his ends with a cunning faithlessness and disregard of his spiritual duty which lowered the standards of the Church. He used his spiritual powers unstintingly to raise money, buy friends, injure foes; he used the endowments of the Church, by taxation and by provision¹, as a papal revenue for his wars and a means of political rewards. By so doing he roused a disrespectful hostility everywhere, and began the decline of the medieval Papacy. Though men, and ecclesiastics especially, accepted the doctrine of the fulness of power resident in the Pope over the Church,

¹ The papal nomination of a cleric to succeed to a benefice made during the lifetime of the incumbent, and disregarding the rights of patron or electors.

they revolted in practice, now that power was abused obviously for purely secular ends. Thus Innocent points directly to the fall of the papal theocracy founded by Gregory VII. Of the results of his course of action he was unconscious. He saw the Papacy threatened with subjection by the erection of an absolute monarchy over Italy by the Hohenstaufen. He was convinced that the real remedy was to uproot the dangerous dynasty, and, if possible, even to break up the Sicilian kingdom. His blindness to moral forces prevented his seeing that he was divorcing them from the Papacy and sapping the theocracy he sought to preserve.

Negotiations between Pope and Emperor were at once begun with a view to peace, but reconciliation on essentials was impossible. The Pope aimed at the practical independence of the Italian communes, and probably at an eventual separation of Sicily from the Empire; the Emperor was determined to reassert some authority at least in Lombardy. Innocent seems to have merely played with the proposals, and, when a compromise was in sight, he suddenly fled from Rome, and took refuge in Lyons, which, while nominally within the Empire, was far out of reach of the Emperor's power. There he could carry out his cherished scheme of convoking a Council and deposing the Emperor by sentence of the Church. The General Council met in 1245, and in obedience to the Pope, if most inequitably, declared Frederick deposed from all his realms. He was then anew excommunicated, and a crusade was preached against him.

Frederick might protest and demand in his turn the reform of the hierarchy and the restoration of the Church to Apostolic unworldliness, but his words bore fruit only in the future. Innocent worked for the present. Frederick's hold on Germany should at once be broken, and the Pope

obtained in 1246 from the ecclesiastical and some lay princes the election of an Anti-Caesar, Henry Raspe Landgrave of Thuringia. On his death in 1247, a new anti-king was raised up in William Count of Holland (1247-56). These two carried on an indecisive contest with Frederick's heir Conrad IV, which depleted the Hohenstaufen resources.

Frederick meanwhile resolved to attack his enemy in Lyons. The Alpine passes were assured to him by the Count of Savoy and he had already reached Turin in 1247, when the revolt of Parma, the necessary link of all his north Italian communications, forced him to return to besiege it. His defeat before the town through his own over-confidence was a severe blow to his fortunes and a severer blow to his prestige. A plot against him among the Sicilian magnates was discovered only just in time. His favourite minister Peter delle Vigne was blinded for corruption and perhaps for treason, and then committed suicide. His ablest son, the bastard Enzo, was taken by the Bolognese to die long after in captivity. Yet he was recovering ground when he died suddenly in Apulia in 1250.

With Frederick II the Holy Roman Empire in any real sense disappeared, though not till the destruction of his house were the last links between Germany and Italy snapped. In Germany the kingship, already moribund, was never effectively restored; in Italy the establishment of a single monarchy had become impossible. Thus Frederick is the last of a series in both countries. Nor for all his innovations and prophetic secularism was he more than a precursor of the future. His example and influence lasted, his actual work disappeared.

SECTION 2. THE RECONSTRUCTION IN ITALY

The loss of Frederick II's commanding personality not only dispirited the Italian imperialists, it disunited them; and the common action to be found among them hereafter is due rather to the compromise of separate ambitions than to any true harmony of purpose. His heir Conrad IV was weak in Germany and unknown in Italy. His bastard Manfred, left regent of Sicily, aspired himself to the crown, and was faced by divergent interests; for the bureaucracy and the German troops were loyal to Conrad and suspected him, the barons and towns were hankering after independence, and the whole country was weary of heavy taxation and the irksome union with the Empire. Naples and Capua with the neighbouring barons soon revolted to the Pope.

Innocent looked forward to a speedy triumph. He hoped to annex the vassal kingdom of Sicily to the Papal States, and to see all Italy parcelled out among towns and barons under the guidance of the Holy See. But he was quickly disillusioned. When he left Lyons and held a Lombard congress at Genoa in 1251, he found that Lombard politics were decided, not by the claims of Pope and Emperor, but by the rivalries of the cities and the strife of factions and classes within them. His journey through Lombardy to Rome was marked only by vexations and losses. His means were exhausted, and Conrad IV with fresh troops was coming to Sicily.

Conrad looked at affairs from a German point of view, but the treasures of Sicily were no less essential to him than to his father. Unpopular as he was in the kingdom, he was supported by the bureaucracy and the soldiers, and by 1253 had stamped out the revolt. He was ready to return to Germany, when he died in 1254, leaving

behind him in Bavaria an infant son, Conrad II or Conradin. His death paralysed the Sicilian government. He had disgraced his Italian brother Manfred, whose ambitions were too clear; but the German regent, Berthold of Hohenburg, whom he nominated had no hold on the population. Innocent once more was master of the game. He had never lost heart, even though the imperialist faction was gaining ground over Italy, and was only moved thereby to seek a foreign champion to aid him against Conrad IV. He at last found one in Henry III of England, whose second son Edmund was to be enfeoffed with Sicily. Henry III was a broken reed, but his money and credit were invaluable, and, now that Conrad was dead, the Pope at once employed them to raise an army to invade the kingdom. Disunion was rife in Sicily. When Berthold resigned the regency, Manfred, who succeeded him, was just as helpless and on the approach of the papal forces he submitted to a treaty. Conradin's rights were to be adjudicated on when he came of age; Edmund's claims were coolly disregarded by the faithless Pope, who assumed the government with Manfred and the Calabrian Peter Ruffo as his principal vicegerents. Manfred, too, Innocent intended to cheat, when the knowledge of his purpose, followed by the accidental slaughter of a papalist Apulian noble, drove the Prince in despair to revolt. He fled to Lucera, was welcomed by the Saracens, and seized the imperial treasure. The papal army proved its wretched quality by taking to flight in a panic, and Innocent died in December 1254 with his schemes tumbling about his ears. The tenacious Pope had indeed broken up the Hohenstaufen dominion and had seen the separation of the Empire from Sicily, but the final defeat of the great dynasty and the annihilation of its Italian ambitions were as far from fulfilment as ever.

The new Pope, the mild and pious Alexander IV (1254-61), under the guidance of Cardinal Octavian degli Ubaldini reverted to the project of an English champion. Again a papal host was hired on Henry III's credit, and, commanded by Octavian as legate, invaded Apulia. Now, however, Manfred, being the only hope of Conradin, could depend on both Saracens and German troops, as well as on the goodwill of the population. Aided perhaps by the treachery of Berthold, who was acting as the legate's military adviser, he compelled Octavian to ignominious surrender in 1255. Although the Pope refused to bend, his further progress was not to be stayed. He acquired the whole kingdom, and was able to throw off the mask and usurp the throne in 1258.

Manfred was not content with the kingdom he had won. He aspired, partly in self-defence against the irreconcilable Papacy, to regain his father's dominion in North Italy and perhaps to acquire the imperial dignity. The posture of affairs in Lombardy was in his favour. Innocent IV's passage through the country had left the tyrant Ezzelin's power unshaken, nor was that of Ezzelin's ally, Marquess Oberto Pelavicini who ruled as imperial vicar in central Lombardy, at all enfeebled. The two made progress even, for the papalist cities were exhausted by war, and the prevalence of heresy, which brought about the unpunished murder of the papal inquisitor, Peter Martyr, estranged them from the Pope. But Ezzelin's insane cruelty and inordinate greed wrought a change. His oppressed subjects grew disaffected, his neighbours unremitting in their enmity. A crusade preached against him by the kindly Alexander IV was assisted by Venice to capture Padua from him in 1256, and, when he cheated his ally Pelavicini over their common conquest of Brescia, the Marquess turned against him.

A league which included both factions overthrew the monster in 1259.

By this time most of Lombardy was ruled by tyrants. Martin della Torre governed Milan, Mastino della Scala Verona, Marquess Azzo d'Este Ferrara, Buoso da Doara with Pelavicini Cremona. Chief among them was Pelavicini who in 1258 became Manfred's royal vicar in Lombardy. Besides his hold on the imperialist tyrants and free cities, his alliance with the papalist Della Torre of Milan fortified his supremacy.

Lombardy was thus secured for the Sicilian king. He had acquired most of the Anconitan March, and Rome and Tuscany were added to his adherents. For years Rome had leaned towards the imperialist side under the beneficent despotism of her Bolognese Senator Brancaleone. Deposed in 1255, he was restored in 1257 as Manfred's ally. The case of Tuscany was different. Tyranny was unknown there. The cities of Pisa and Siena had been steadily imperialist, or, to use the Tuscan name which soon became universal, Ghibelline¹. But Florence on Frederick's death adopted the papal side, called in Tuscany by the equally famous name of Guelf from the house of Welf which had so long opposed the Hohenstaufen. The city had long been growing in wealth as the centre of the cloth-manufacture, and in 1250 had set up the government of the *Primo Popolo* in which the bankers and merchants, in alliance with the Guelfic nobles, had the preponderance. They were naturally inclined to the Guelfs themselves, for they collected the papal revenues outside Italy, transferred them to Italy in the shape of wool-imports, and further made large loans to the Popes. Their government was strikingly successful. They secured

¹ Derived from Waiblingen, a Hohenstaufen castle in Swabia, the name of which was used as a war-cry.

their commercial pre-eminence by the coinage of their invariably pure florin, the only gold coin of northern Europe, and in concert with their Guelf allies they worsted the rival Ghibelline towns. Manfred, however, overthrew them in 1260 in the bloody battle of Montaperto, and restored for a time the rule of the exiled Ghibelline nobles. Though he lost Rome on the death of Brancaleone, the King of Sicily seemed now in a fair way to rule all Italy, when a change of Popes brought about his ruin.

Alexander IV died in 1261, and the Cardinals reacting from his amiable weakness elected an able master in Urban IV (1261-4). A native of Champagne, Urban was the first non-Italian to sit in St Peter's chair, now that national feeling was strongly developed, and he at once gave the papal policy a pro-French direction. Strong-willed and keen-sighted, he mastered the Curia, and by vigorous measures increased the papal authority in the papal lands and alleviated the papal debts. By steady pressure he forced all the Tuscan bankers to become Guelfs. To uproot Manfred, however, he required a champion, and, dismissing the useless Edmund of England, he found one in the Frenchman, Charles of Anjou. Charles was a younger brother of St Louis of France, who had received the appanage of Anjou and had acquired by marriage the county of Provence in the Arelate. In spite of revolts he had succeeded in turning his dominion there into a complete despotism, and had begun fresh conquests in Piedmont. Passionately ambitious, he was quite ready to be the defender of Holy Church and convinced himself that his own exaltation was the chief need of Christendom. He had already been fruitlessly in treaty with Innocent IV for the conquest of Sicily, and now haggled shrewdly with Urban. He put pressure on the Pope by accepting the senatorship of Rome from

the papalist faction of the city, and, when Urban died and was succeeded by another French Pope, Clement IV (1264-8), the bargain was finally struck. Charles was enfeoffed with Sicily; he renounced all other dominion in Italy after the conquest should be effected; heavy money-payments were to be made eventually to the Pope. In the meantime the confederates were in sore straits for money. They borrowed and taxed; as the expedition was a crusade, the clergy were laid under contribution. Charles equipped a fleet in Provence and crusading adventurers flocked to him from all France.

Manfred, indolent and vainglorious, a true child of the harem, did little to counter these formidable preparations. Pelavicini, his bulwark in Lombardy, was shorn of his power in 1264 by the death of Martin della Torre and the reversion of Milan to the papal side. So Charles could sail to Rome, and be joined there by his army which had taken the land-route. Manfred had awakened to his danger and collected all his troops for defence, but treason was busily at work amid the ever insubordinate Apulian baronage. The effect was seen when Charles invaded the kingdom in February 1266 and met his rival at Benevento with nearly equal forces. The French troopers were too strong for Manfred's fighting men, Germans, Lombards and Saracens, and the Apulians fled without a blow. Manfred himself charged into the fray to fall by an unknown hand. With him the glory of the Sicilian kingdom departed. Like Frederick II he had fostered its rich culture, the most advanced in Europe: he was himself an author. Very soon he was bitterly regretted by his subjects under the greedy and completely foreign yoke of Charles. It was, however, time that European civilization should find its centre further north away from the semi-oriental

influences of Sicily; time also that the now unfruitful connexion of Italy and Germany should give place to independent development; and these necessities were effected by the victory of the French knights over German and Saracen at Benevento.

A kaleidoscopic change took place over Italy. Sicily accepted its new master. Throughout Tuscany the Guelfs came back and took the lead. In Lombardy Pelavicini and his compeers lost their dominions. Of all the cities only tyrant-ruled Verona and republican Pavia remained firmly imperialist. Reaction, however, followed quickly. Charles' extortionate government made him hated. Rome under her new Senator, Don Henry of Castile, began to veer to the Ghibellines, who also were strong in Tuscany. It became known that Conradin, the last heir of the Hohenstaufen, was preparing to claim his inheritance by arms. To meet the invasion Charles was commissioned by the Pope to subdue the Tuscan Ghibellines, but he made slow progress, and was recalled by the revolt of the Saracens at Lucera. The island of Sicily was already in full rebellion. Meantime Conradin with his German army reached Pisa, and marched victoriously through Rome into the kingdom. Two-thirds of the land rose in favour of the rightful heir, but Charles met him dauntlessly at Albe¹ in August 1268, and won a complete victory. Conradin fell into his rival's hands and was ruthlessly beheaded to extinguish his dynasty. The rebellion was gradually quenched in blood.

Pope Clement IV did not live to see the final triumph of his domineering champion, for he died in November 1268. He had appointed Charles Senator of Rome again for ten years, and, by usurpation, imperial vicar in Tuscany. There the King subdued Pisa and the Ghibellines

¹ The battle is usually named from Tagliacozzo.

and ruled Florence as its lord, the Guelf nobles and merchants being placed in power after the abolition of the just revived *popolo*. Most of Piedmont was subject to him and Lombardy was under his influence. In the vacancy in the Papacy, which partly through his intrigues continued for years, he hoped to revive the Hohenstaufen schemes for the dominion of Italy, and to proceed, following the footsteps of the Norman kings, to the conquest of Constantinople from Palaeologus.

Thus the reconstruction of Italy was carried through. The dominion of the Hohenstaufen and the Germans had passed away. The Sicilian kingdom was still the strongest power, but it was under French sway. The army, baronage and chief officials were wholly French. Only oppressive tax-farmers were native. The Parliaments which the Hohenstaufen had occasionally summoned were discontinued. The *collectae* were levied yearly and gradually doubled in amount to pay for the king's costly schemes. Individual oppression was rife and the destruction of the land's prosperity began. North Italy was divided among petty states; anarchic communes in papal territory, prosperous republics in Tuscany, tyrants and feudal lords in Lombardy, European sea-powers in Venice and Genoa, all jostled one another. The third and last period of the Italian Middle Ages, that of independent national development, had begun in the agonized death-pangs of the ancient order.

SECTION 3. THE INTERREGNUM AND LATER EMPIRE IN GERMANY

The twenty years following Frederick II's death form the Great Interregnum of German history. It is true that during all this period there were nominal Kings of

the Romans, but they scarcely obtained general recognition and never general obedience. It was a kingless time in which Germany entered on a new phase of her development. She lost the leadership of Europe to France, and dissolved into a congeries of petty states which scarcely formed even a lax confederation.

The news of the Emperor's death gave the signal for a general desertion of his son Conrad IV, whom Innocent excommunicated and disallowed as king. On Conrad's death in 1254 the claims of his rival, William of Holland (1247-56), were no longer opposed and it seemed as if some revival could be achieved. But William died in a petty war, and the last band of union snapped. Germany was now ruled by the local powers of various sorts and sizes. Petty meaningless warfare, petty selfish ambitions harassed the land. Chief among the small states were the seven Electors of the Empire, now rapidly becoming a close body with definite privileges, although it was not till 1271 that it was admitted that the right to elect the King of the Romans lay wholly in them. They consisted of the seven great court officers, three spiritual, the Rhenish Archbishops of Mainz, Cologne and Treves, and four lay, the Count Palatine of the Rhine, the Duke of Saxony, the Margrave of Brandenburg, and the King of Bohemia. Next to them in power, and with somewhat divergent class-interests, came the remaining Princes of the Empire, ecclesiastical and lay; then a number of Counts of non-princely status; then the Knights of the Empire, mainly derived from the royal demesne-knights of earlier times, to whom the wreck of the monarchy gave practical independence; and lastly the Free Towns, now self-governing republics. Whatever their divergent privileges, all were now acting in complete freedom, and all engaged in a complicated struggle for individual, party

and class aggrandisement. Their separate histories largely take the place of a history of Germany.

The influence of foreign powers made itself felt as a natural corollary. The Popes sternly forbade the election of any descendant of Frederick II to the Empire, and we find English and French candidates for the throne. A double election took place in 1257. Richard Earl of Cornwall (1257-72), pushed by his brother Henry III of England, had the support of the Lower Rhenish princes and was crowned at Aix-la-Chapelle. Alfonso X of Castile was favoured on the Upper Rhine and in Swabia. Alfonso never came to Germany and lost ground. Richard made flying visits and gained adherents by lavish grants and bribes, but his reign never became a reality. Pope after Pope claimed the deciding voice and gave no decision. Anarchy, tempered by confederations and particularist government, persisted unchanged.

The break-down of the imperial system did not mean the cessation of the energy of the race. German colonization in the East was in its most vigorous stage; the trade and enterprise of the towns increased by leaps and bounds; and efforts at concentration began to be visible in the local powers which had divided the Empire. Ottokar II (1253-78), King of Bohemia, was the first to aim purposefully at expansion. Slav though he was, his government was pro-German. He peopled the wastes of Bohemia with German immigrants, he endeavoured to annex German provinces, and found at first his most dangerous enemies in the Hungarians and Poles. In spite of their coalitions against him, he united Austria and Styria and Carinthia under his sceptre in the wars which followed the extinction of the Babenberg Austrian dynasty. He even hoped for election as King of the Romans, but here the aversion of the German princes to a strong sovran who

might bring them once more into subjection proved an invincible obstacle.

A new election came in sight with the accession of the moderate Pope Gregory X (1271-6), who had no motive for prolonging the Interregnum in Germany now that the strength of the Empire had gone. After the death of King Richard the Pope, anxious for a fresh crusade, even urged on the dilatory Electors who could create a king to lead the Germans in it. French and other intrigues were rife to obtain the coveted dignity, but the decisive factor was the general determination of the princes to elect a man with little power who could not renew the ancient kingship. Their choice fell on Rudolf I Count of Habsburg (1273-91). Under the circumstances it could not have been bettered. Rudolf, although not a prince of the Empire, was a Swabian noble of considerable possessions. He was an old partisan of the Hohenstaufen, of ripe age and with no illusions. His mind had a practical turn. He was both daring, conciliatory and firm, and deserved to found a long-lived dynasty. His accession marks an epoch. He begged and obtained the Pope's recognition. If he at first showed some hankering after a real dominion in Italy and always wished for a Roman coronation, he was soon content to sell his Italian rights for what they would fetch. In Germany he was content to be president of a confederation of princes. This did not mean that he was unambitious. But, since real power lay with the princes, he bent his thoughts to so endowing the house of Habsburg that they might be the most powerful of the princes. That end accomplished, they might become hereditary Emperors and gradually conquer their rivals. As it turned out, however, the princes were alive to their danger. Their remedy was continually to raise fresh houses to the Empire. They

thus prevented any lasting reclamation of imperial rights and lands, and the policy of the Emperors became what Rudolf's was in practice, the use of their temporary dignity to increase the lands and power of their several dynasties.

Rudolf's opportunity was given by the dread of the princes for the overbearing Ottokar, and by the Bohemian king's refusal to recognize his lucky competitor. A first war in 1276 forced Ottokar to cede his German conquests; and, when strife was renewed, Rudolf with Hungarian aid overthrew his enemy in 1278 at Kruterfeld where Ottokar himself fell. In 1282 Rudolf was able to enfeoff the duchies of Austria and Styria to his sons, and so transferred the house of Habsburg eastward while making it the strongest in the Empire. He was not, meantime, neglectful of his imperial duties. He did his best to restore peace and order, and to control the unruly princes, but on the whole his efforts failed; and he died in 1291 without securing the election of his son to succeed him. His last faint efforts in Italy had come to grief years before.

The jealousy and fear with which the Electors regarded the new-founded might of the house of Habsburg led them to choose another princeling, Count Adolf of Nassau (1292-8), as Rudolf's successor. But the new King turned also to family aggrandisement. Less wise than Rudolf, he broke with France and alarmed the princes. They quickly revolted, and Adolf was defeated and slain by his rival, Duke Albert of Austria, Rudolf's son. On his election King Albert I (1298-1308) at once pursued the same line of conduct as Adolf, but with greater strength and more skill. His Francophil leanings at first alienated Pope Boniface VIII, till he bought the Pope off by the sacrifice of the French alliance and by taking the humiliating oath of fealty to the Papal See. With the

help of the towns and the non-princely magnates he had the best of the Electors. His chief rival was Bohemia. Wenceslaus II (1278-1305) was scheming to erect a Slavonic great power to the East. He obtained the crown of Poland, and fought with Charles Robert of Naples-Anjou for that of Hungary, left unpossessed by the death of the last native king in 1301. Albert and Charles Robert, however, were too strong for him, and the death of his son Wenceslaus III (1305-6) not only severed Poland from Bohemia but extinguished the Bohemian royal house. It was some make-weight for the decline of Germany, that by the disappearance of their national kings the formidable eastern states became more open to her influence for dynastic reasons. Albert at once obtained the election of his son Rudolf (1306-7) as King of Bohemia, but this extension of the Austrian realm was premature. The hostile princes repulsed him in Thuringia; on his son's death the Bohemians called in Henry of Carinthia; and, while he was preparing for a fresh campaign, he was murdered by his own nephew.

The scheme of an hereditary German kingship died with Albert I. It was clear that the project implied the unremitting hostility of the German princes, who would not so bitterly oppose the mere acquisition of territory by a king whose heir would merely be one of themselves. Albert's deliberate abstention from any Italian ambitions was shown to be wise by the next reign. Henry VII Count of Luxemburg (1308-13) was elected because he had little power, and because he was half-French and well-seen by the mighty Philip the Fair of France. The last German king to take his Italian dominion seriously, he wasted most of his reign in his romantic Italian expedition¹. None the less he showed the opportunities still

¹ See below, Chap. ix, Sect. 4.

inherent in the German kingship for dynastic advancement. Unlike his predecessors he submitted wholly to the influence of the Electors, and with their support he contrived to expel the incompetent Henry of Carinthia from Bohemia and to endow his own son John (1310-46) with the kingdom. Thus a new house, that of Luxembourg, was established in Germany to take an eager part in the race for fiefs and substantial power. Even the last Emperor who strove for the medieval ideal was subject to the spirit of the times which made Germany a land of particularism and princely rivalries.

SECTION 4. ST LOUIS AND HENRY III

The death of Louis VIII and the accession of a boy of twelve to the French throne under the regency of an unpopular foreign woman, the Queen-mother Blanche of Castile, seemed to place the work of Philip Augustus in jeopardy. The great vassals, at whose head was Henry III of England, were longing to regain their lost fiefs and lost independence. The lesser vassals had by no means put off their disorderliness or their particularism. Revolt and insubordination were inevitable. But the danger was intrinsically less than it appeared. Blanche (1226-34) was sagacious and strong. She had the invaluable support of the Papacy, the natural ally of the enemies of Albigenian heresy. Abroad the Emperor Frederick II inherited the league of the Hohenstaufen with the Capetians. At home the monarchy as such was unassailable, and the simple governmental machine of Philip Augustus was rooted and efficient. Further, the great vassals had changed in character. Henry III was the foreign absentee lord of the anarchic duchy of Gascony. Raymond VII of Toulouse was fighting desperately for the fragments of his shattered county. Burgundy and Brittany had always

been the weakest of these lesser states. Flanders and Champagne were both debilitated and both as a rule on the side of the regent. Most of the chief malcontents belonged to houses which once counted as secondary only, such as the Lusignans, Counts of La Marche. These were poor successors to the free rulers of the twelfth century.

Their efforts, if temporarily dangerous, were futile. Henry of England mismanaged two campaigns, which ended in renewed truce. Raymond VII submitted to the peace of Meaux (1229), and thereby the remnant of his lands which he was allowed to keep was entailed on the son of Blanche and Louis VIII who should become his son-in-law. The regent of Brittany and the rest, even the unquiet Poitevin nobles, were subdued.

Not the least achievement of Queen Blanche was to train a royal saint. Louis IX (1226-70) exhibited no weakling's or cloistered virtue, he had a strong character well-fitted to dwell in and cope with the world. Goodness, piety and uprightness, unforced and unfeigned, were attributes of his nature. His justice, since he was just to himself as well as to others, made his rule beloved without injuring the monarchy. A wise and, on occasion, bold moderation was his, which even characterized his obsession for a crusade and the rescue of the Holy Land. No one could be more medieval in his ideals than the strictly feudal, semi-ascetic, crusading king, and it is the best of the Middle Age that we see in him.

St Louis' foreign policy was directed towards the preservation of peace. Its means were just and amicable dealings with his neighbours. Its ulterior object was the furtherance of a united effort in the Holy Land, and its defeat lay in the waste of French resources in his two disastrous crusades. In domestic French affairs the same

ideals of old-fashioned justice reigned. Louis was careful to respect the rights of his feudatories and indeed all existing rights. He also firmly insisted on his own rights as sovran and suzerain, and these were ample enough, when effectively exercised, to maintain and increase the powers of the crown.

He was undoubtedly fortunate in his rivals. Frederick II was thoroughly entangled in his Italian schemes and in his contest with the Papacy, and Louis resolutely refused to be badgered, either into attacking him at the beck of the Pope, or into surrendering Innocent IV to the Emperor's enmity. Frederick was acknowledged as Emperor till his death; Innocent remained safe at Lyons. Henry III of England (1216-72) was a political adversary made to be conquered and won over. He had come to the throne as a child when Louis VIII seemed likely to conquer England and acquire the whole Plantagenet inheritance. From that disaster he was saved by the staunch protection of the Papacy, and the loyalty of the royal officials. The wise and upright Legate, Cardinal Gualo, joined hands with William the Marshal, Earl of Pembroke, to defend a child who did not share the odium induced by John's crimes. A timely reissue of the Great Charter conciliated the baronage and a slow and skilful warfare drove Louis VIII to renounce his claims. Order was restored and the hateful foreign mercenaries were expelled in the later years of his minority when Hubert de Burgh, Earl of Kent, was in the ascendant. But when Henry took over the government in 1227 troubles began. The king was restless, greedy of power and weak, and his art-loving amiable character only added financial embarrassment to the continual unwisdom of his actions. Nor could Hubert de Burgh's guidance as justiciar (1227-32) be termed successful. Henry's share in the war of the

great French vassals against Blanche brought discredit, and when the king's half-brothers, the Lusignans, settled in England after Blanche's triumph, serious misrule began. The Lusignans were greedy, the king extravagant and incompetent; taxation was heavy and the money squandered; while the Great Charter was persistently violated. The English barons grew more and more indignant at the alien invasion and its consequences. The king's marriage to Eleanor of Provence made matters worse by introducing new foreigners, his bride's relatives of the house of Savoy. The visits of papal legates, if they promoted the ever-necessary reform of the clergy, also led to heavy taxation by the Papacy for its Italian warfare and to a large endowment of papal nominees with English benefices, both in pursuance of now admitted rights of the Papacy.

It was amid growing discontent that Henry III was lured by his Lusignan relatives to try conclusions with St Louis over the possession of Poitou. He was defeated at Saintes in 1242, and the truce which followed left him little beyond the coast of Gascony.

Meanwhile the consolidation of the French monarchy proceeded apace, a consolidation in which even a counter-tendency initiated by Louis VIII had its share. Louis VIII, partly to conciliate the particularism of the new annexations, had planned the endowment of his younger sons from them on a scale far exceeding the appanages granted by the earlier Capetians. A new race of great vassals should be created from the royal house and in strict subordination to it. Robert received Artois, Charles Anjou, and Alphonse Poitou and Auvergne. The two latter gained further territory by marriage, Alphonse succeeding his father-in-law Raymond VII in Toulouse, and Charles obtaining the imperial county of Provence

as the dowry of his wife Beatrice. Both proved pioneers of north French influence in their Languedocian fiefs, but, whereas Alphonse's appanage fell to the crown at his death, Charles founded a family, whose separate policy was to deflect the monarchy from its wiser course.

Louis' firm belief in his royal rights and duties and his passion for justice and peace worked together for the progress of the monarchy. He insisted on the right of appeal to the crown even from the greatest feudatories, and by abolishing trial by battle increased the number of judicial appeals. Following the English precedent he reserved certain criminal cases solely for the royal tribunals, as well as those concerning the coinage. As the royal money was declared by him current throughout France, while that of the feudatories was to be only current in their fiefs, the ultimate victory of a single royal coinage was assured. Thus the authority of the great vassals was steadily circumscribed. To meet the increase of business and of government, a continuous evolution was in progress in the royal Curia. The domestic officers were separated from the public. Still following English precedent, a permanent delegation of the Curia, later called the *Parlement*, was set up at Paris for the transaction of judicial business, and speedily became a most efficient engine for the development of law and justice. Financial business, too, was in course of creating a department of the Curia, later called the *Chambre des Comptes*, which was also localized in Paris. Meanwhile the Curia still continued as a unity, and its chief members accompanied the king in his peregrinations to counsel him on state-affairs.

The local bailiffs and seneschals, who had always tended to become oppressive, had a larger sphere of oppression opened to them by the increase of their functions. The good king sought to restrain them by

various regulations; but his most effective measure was adopted almost haphazard in pious preparation for his first crusade. He sent commissioners, *enquêteurs*, mainly friars, to every district to redress abuses. The result was so satisfactory that the practice was continued as part of the ordinary administration.

St Louis' piety was not without its disadvantages. If, while scrupulously observing their rights, he knew how to repulse any usurpation of Pope or hierarchy, he was a bitter persecutor of Jews and heretics, and, in authorizing the proceedings of the Inquisition against Albigenses, consummated the destruction of the Provençal culture. His first crusade in 1248 was merely a waste of French life and treasure. None the less in other directions his anxious rightfulness bore fruit. In 1259 he put an end to the intermittent feud with the Plantagenets. Henry III was induced to surrender his claims to Normandy, Anjou and Poitou in return for generous cessions in Gascony, for which he thereupon did homage. A year earlier another difficult question had been solved by a treaty with the King of Aragon, by which St Louis surrendered his suzerainty over Catalonia while the King of Aragon ceded his vassals in Languedoc to the French crown. Thus a dangerous great vassal was removed from south France at small cost.

Louis IX's uprightness and fairness caused him to be frequently selected as an arbitrator by his contemporaries. His now reconciled foe, Henry III, was one of those who applied for his good offices in this respect. Henry had gone from failure to failure since his defeat at Saintes; misgovernment was chronic; taxation heavy and wasted. His finances were finally ruined, and the baronial opposition was brought to a head by his ill-advised acceptance of Pope Innocent IV's offer of the crown of Sicily for his

second son Edmund. Henry's own efforts in the cause were almost nil, but he freely lavished treasure and credit all to no purpose, till at last the candidature of Edmund was abandoned. Henry was left to face the English barons with his debts. They had a constitutional means of making their influence felt. The Great Council¹, by now called the Parliament, met during his reign nearly every year, and its consent was understood to be necessary for any taxation outside the feudal aids and the customs which were due to the crown. The barons, summoned for this purpose, demanded insistently reforms and the redress of grievances in return for subsidies. They had gained a brilliant leader. Simon de Montfort, Earl of Leicester, younger son of the Albigensian crusader, was half an ambitious adventurer; but he was also a statesman of genius who identified himself with his adopted country. The Parliament of Oxford in 1258 forced Henry to agree to a commission of reform, which issued the Provisions of Oxford. Under the Provisions the king's functions were transferred to a committee of fifteen barons, which was assisted by other committees. Henry's alien friends fled from the realm, and for the time being the barons were supreme. But they quarrelled among themselves, and did little to improve the government, while the king's eldest son Edward wisely declared for practical reforms. Henry, absolved from the Provisions of Oxford by the Pope, was able to resume power in 1261. Agreement, however, was not attained, and at last both Henry and the barons submitted the Provisions to St Louis' arbitration. The French king naturally decided in favour of his brother monarch and the older law. Thereupon Simon de Montfort and the barons rejected the award and rose in arms. They seemed at first to gain a complete

¹ See above, p. 247.

success. In the victory of Lewes Simon captured Henry and all his important foes. The Provisions of Oxford were in part restored, and a committee of nine ruled the kingdom. Simon, the chief of a faction, innovated yet further. To win support, he summoned not only knights elected by the shire-courts, but also burgesses from the towns to his Parliament in 1265. But his power was waning. His own greed and others' jealousy were strengthening the moderate party which looked to the heir-apparent Edward for guidance. Earl Simon only felt secure while, in spite of a pacification, he still held Edward in durance, and Edward took the first opportunity of escaping and joining Simon's enemies among the western barons. Civil war at once began. Simon was defeated and slain at Evesham. His adherents were blockaded in their fastnesses, till all had surrendered on moderate terms. Edward, now the real ruler, had the wisdom to avoid his father's faults and to confirm the remedies of grievances which had been adopted, while the baronial committees disappeared. So peaceful was the realm that he was able to go on crusade. Before he returned King Henry had died in 1272.

The crusade, in which Edward had intended to take part, was the second led by St Louis. It was intended once more to erect the kingdom of Jerusalem, but this purpose was most unwelcome to the king's brother, Charles of Anjou and Sicily, for whose oriental plans¹ and commercial policy the friendship of the Egyptian Sultan was necessary. Charles, therefore, succeeded in luring his brother into landing at Tunis, where war might be profitable to himself. It was there that St Louis died in 1270, leaving the crafty Charles to be the director of French policy, and to exploit it for the benefit of his own insatiable ambition.

¹ See above, p. 326, and below, pp. 340-1, 344.

SECTION 5. THE FALL OF THE PAPAL THEOCRACY

During the vacancy of the Papacy the ambitions of King Charles of Sicily seemed to be reaching their fulfilment. All Piedmont was in his grasp; central Lombardy, the best of which was now under the rule of the Della Torre of Milan, was his somewhat restive ally. He had a footing in the Balkan peninsula and was making ready for a great campaign against Constantinople. Even the unwelcome crusade of his brother Louis IX was diverted against Tunis, and substantial gains were secured to Charles in 1270 by the treaty with the vanquished Emir of Tunis. But on the return voyage the crusading armament was wrecked by a sudden storm together with Charles' own, and a further delay was forced on the king, during which the election of a new Pope could no longer be deferred. In 1271 the choice of the Cardinals fell, not on a French client of Charles, but on a moderate Guelf, the diplomatic idealist, Gregory X.

Charles' disillusionment came speedily, for the Pope saw his policy with perfect clearness. There was to be a real Emperor, now that he could only be useful and not dangerous: and Reunion with the schismatic Greek Church should be carried through as the indispensable preliminary for a crusade to win back the Holy Land. While Reunion was aimed at, Charles' war of conquest in Greece must remain in abeyance; he was the Pope's creature, and could not resist an obviously justified papal command. But he should not be uncompensated. Within due limits he should be supported in his Italian hegemony, after all his first interest.

For the Union with the Eastern Church and the settlement of the new order of things in the West, a General Council was necessary, which should seal the treaty of

peace to close the war begun between Papacy and Empire in the Council of Lyons of 1245. Gregory's Council was summoned to meet at Lyons also in 1274. He hoped to leave Guelfs and Ghibellines reconciled in Italy, but his wishes were thwarted by the King of Sicily, whose ambitions were then being hemmed in by his suzerain. On Richard of Cornwall's death in 1272 the election of a new King of the Romans became feasible, since Alfonso X of Castile, though favoured by the Italian Ghibellines, was impossible from a German or Papal standpoint. Charles urged the candidature of his nephew, the colourless Philip III of France. Thus France, now the leading European state, would obtain the Empire, and Charles might reckon on an undisputed tenure of power in North Italy. But Gregory refused to exalt yet higher the French monarchy. Under his influence Rudolf of Habsburg was elected, and was gladly recognized at the Council, on accepting the moderate Guelf programme by renouncing all rights over papal territory and admitting the permanent separation of Sicily from the Empire. Charles was equally thwarted in his Eastern schemes, for the Pope adroitly used them to exercise pressure on the Greek Emperor, Michael Palaeologus, and obtained thereby a forced submission of the Greek Church.

Gregory could now hope for a true crusade of all Christendom. The affairs of Italy, however, remained to be dealt with. A revolution had placed the Ghibellines in power in Genoa, and Charles, to whom the Genoese naval power was a necessary asset, had recklessly forced on a war with the city in 1273, only to receive signal defeats. As a counter-move, the Genoese admitted Spanish troops of the claimant Alfonso X of Castile into Lombardy. The Ghibelline towns promptly acknowledged the Anti-Caesar, and their number grew, till in

1275 the whole of Piedmont was lost to Charles. Here Gregory intervened. In personal interviews he obtained Alfonso's renunciation, and armed aid from Rudolf for the Lombard Guelfs, who distrusted Charles. Then in the full tide of success he died in 1276.

Three ephemeral Popes did little save maintain the *status quo*, but the Roman Nicholas III (1277-80) was a brilliant statesman of the secular type. His most patent fault was nepotism, which led him easily on to simony. Although Gregory X had set him an example, Nicholas' endeavours to exalt his Orsini relatives went far beyond older limits and introduced a new disease into the Western Church. Apart from this, however, he modified Gregory's policy in a secular direction. The Crusade slipped into the background; the consolidation of the Papal State and the restriction of Charles of Anjou to his Sicilian kingdom took the foremost place. By vigorous pressure he extorted from King Rudolf and the German princes a complete renunciation of all dominion over Romagna, which, although granted to the Apostolic See by Pepin the Short, had been ruled by the Emperors, as far as a central government existed, until the death of Frederick II. After this success the Pope could proceed to oust Charles from Rome and Tuscany. Any strong-willed Pope was sure to have the upper hand of Charles, and Nicholas enjoyed special advantages. He had mastered the cardinals by a large creation; he could rely on his fellow-Romans: imperialism in the old sense was extinct in Italy as a political force and no bulwark was needed against it; and Charles' power in Lombardy was gone.

The renunciation of King Alfonso had proved advantageous to the Lombard Ghibellines, who were thus dissociated from any foreign ruler: and Charles' lukewarm allies, the Della Torre of Milan, who headed the

Guelfs, had made themselves hateful by misgovernment. For a time they were bolstered up by King Rudolf's German troopers, but these were soon withdrawn again. The lead against the Della Torre was taken by the exiled Archbishop of Milan, Otto Visconti, who rallied the Ghibelline majority of the Milanese nobles at Como in 1277. Next year he overthrew his foes at Desio, capturing the tyrant Napoleon della Torre, and was at once received by Milan as her despot. A new grouping of towns followed, in which Milan headed the Ghibellines, and the founding of a Visconti state composed of several cities began.

Since Charles was also weaker in Florence, it was an easy matter for the Pope to command him to resign the vicariate of Tuscany and to terminate his tenure of the Roman senatorship. The establishment of peace and of papal suzerainty in central Italy were the next objects of Nicholas. Rome was placed under his own brother as Senator, but to annex Romagna and to reconcile the Tuscan factions proved a long and arduous task. Romagna and its chief city Bologna were unwilling to submit to papal government, and they were torn by faction-warfare which Nicholas' emissaries were unable to terminate. In Florence, however, an improvement set in when the Pope engineered a new constitution and the readmission of most Ghibellines in 1280. The Ghibellines were soon edged out of political power, but the new organization of the *popolo* lasted. In 1280 the Priors of the Arts, or Gilds, were made a council for general supervision, and became the true rulers of the city. Thus Florence passed under the control of the wealthy middle-class of traders.

The last days of Nicholas were spent in contriving an alliance between Charles of Anjou and Rudolf of Habsburg, partly to ensure peace and partly to compensate Charles for his losses by the kingdom of Arles, the new name for

Burgundy. So far as the alliance went the Pope was successful, but Charles was far from satisfied. On Nicholas' death he was determined to secure a pro-French Pope, and terrorized the moderate cardinals into electing his partisan Martin IV (1281-5). The Frenchman Martin typified the strong national feeling of the day. He hated Germans and loved his countrymen. His pontificate was a foretaste of the captivity at Avignon. He immediately made his patron Senator of Rome during his pontificate and officered the whole Papal State with Charles' functionaries, by whose means he conquered Romagna.

But Charles' chief wish was for freedom of action in the East. The unreality of the Union of the Churches was very clear, and Martin in 1281 excommunicated the Greeks anew. No doubt he destroyed a sham; yet his motive was to open the way for Charles' resurrection of the Franco-Latin Empire. The Papacy in his hands had lost its ecumenical spirit. Charles' victory seemed sure, now he could bend all his powers to its attainment. He had, however, roused his foes. In Sicily he and the French were hated for tyranny and extortion; Michael VIII was desperate; and a storm was brewing from Aragon. Its king, Peter III (1276-85), was the husband of Manfred's daughter Constance, and had long nourished plans for reconquering her inheritance. He had for advisers two Sicilian exiles, John of Procida and the seaman Roger Loria. It was John of Procida who plotted with the Sicilian malcontents and concluded a treaty with Michael in 1281. Provided with treasure by his ally, King Peter proclaimed a crusade against Africa and pushed on his armaments. Then on 30 March 1282 he was forestalled by a popular explosion, the Sicilian Vespers. Provoked by the insolence of the French soldiery, the Sicilians rose and massacred all the French in the island.

Charles' schemes were shattered, and he was forced to use his Eastern preparations to subdue the rebellion. The Sicilians, who at first had dreamed of a federation of communes, crowned Peter as their king when they saw the vast armaments of the enemy and the fierce hostility of Pope Martin. It was the Aragonese fleet under Roger Loria which saved them. Charles was obliged to abandon the siege of Messina and evacuate the island. His navy was put to the worse by the Aragonese and Sicilians, and suffered a disastrous defeat in 1284 in the Bay of Naples, where his heir Charles the Lame was taken prisoner. The Sicilians began to conquer Calabria. Rome had already revolted and elected native Senators. Charles' predominance had broken down when he died in January 1285, to be followed to the grave by Martin IV a few months later. The hard and narrow-minded man had seen his ambitions fail. The Sicilians had risen against his tyranny; Gregory X and Nicholas III had pulled down his north Italian dominion. In fact the union of Italy under the French was as out-of-date as its union under the Germans, and a Latin Empire as a crusade. Yet Charles achieved much. He drove the Germans from Italy; and began the process which placed the unwilling Papacy in French leading-strings. He also destroyed the once glorious Norman kingdom of Sicily. Its culture was irretrievably injured by his reign, and its material power by the extortion he practised and by its separation henceforward into two states, that of island Sicily under the Aragonese, and that of Naples under the French dynasty.

Before they died Pope and king had lured on Philip III of France to a crusade against Aragon in 1285, which was triumphantly repelled by sea and land. King Peter died in the same year, leaving Aragon to his eldest son Alfonso III (1285-90) and Sicily to his younger son James (1285-

95). They carried on the war prosperously, but, when in 1288 they released Charles II of Naples (1285-1309), he did not bring about the peace he promised. When James II (1290-1327) succeeded to Aragon, the risk he ran there from French ambitions and papal enmity, and perhaps the little profit he drew from the stubborn autonomy of Sicily, led him to obtain peace and a papal title to Sardinia by surrendering his father's conquest. The Sicilians, however, refused to submit and elected Peter's youngest son Frederick II (1296-1337) as their king in place of James. So the war recommenced. Though the Sicilians were defeated at sea by the Aragonese under Loria, who were now on the papal side, the King of Naples was overcome on land, and in 1302 consented to the treaty of Caltabellotta by which Frederick kept the island for life. The Sicilians, however, had severely limited their king by a Parliament not unlike that of Aragon, and they refused to allow the reunion with Naples. So Sicily vegetated in disorderly isolation, till it became anew an Aragonese dependency. When the island was re-linked with Italy during the Renaissance, the Greek Church and Islam had vanished, and only the strongly marked character of the people recalled its strangely blent history.

Meanwhile northern Italy was reaching great material prosperity. Trade, manufacture and civilization were all increasing. The land was, however, torn by faction-fights and city-rivalries, and the greatest variation was to be found in the political development of the several districts. Lombardy was fast becoming a land of despots with only here and there a surviving free commune. The D'Este had acquired an hereditary tyranny at Ferrara, the Della Scala at Verona, the Visconti at Milan. Further, a strong tendency to form more extended states was visible. William VII of Montferrat had united most of

Piedmont, and on his fall a junior branch of the Counts of Savoy took up the same ambition. Here the ancient feudal dynasts were in the ascendant, but in central Lombardy the Visconti were adding fresh cities to their civic tyranny when they were driven out by their rivals, the Della Torre, in 1302. In all cases the weariness, which the trading and industrial classes felt for the all but meaningless strife of the noble factions of Guelf and Ghibelline, made them willing to submit to the orderly government of a despot, whose cruelty and crimes were but rarely directed against themselves.

Tyranny was also making way in the lands under the lax papal suzerainty, but in Tuscany republican feeling was stronger and the communes more capable of keeping order and managing their affairs. Florence in particular outshone her rivals, enriched by papal banking and her cloth-trade and guided by her brilliantly gifted merchant-class. Her foe Pisa was depressed through encountering enemies at sea as well as on land. The disorderly nobles were tamed immediately after. Their serfs were freed in 1289. Then in 1293 under the leadership of the patriotic Giano della Bella the celebrated Ordinances of Justice were passed. By them the chief noble families, styled the *grandi*¹, were excluded from the government and the guilds. They were placed under a system of summary justice, and to maintain order the city militia was reorganized under an official called the Gonfalonier² of Justice, who speedily became the president of the Priors. Giano would have proceeded further towards democracy by favouring the Lesser Arts or Guilds, had not the wealthy citizens opposed him with the support of the nobles, who were still powerful in the faction-organization of the *Parte Guelfa*,

¹ "Great folk, grandees."

² "Standard-bearer."

and forced him to withdraw into exile. But their trading republic had been safeguarded by his reforms.

The great seaport-towns of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa, all had the common characteristic that they drew their wealth from their shipping and that their political interests were more European than Italian. Otherwise, however, they were diverse; and they were bitter foes to one another. Pisa was fatally hampered by being an integral part of Tuscany and consequently finding Florence her enemy as well as Genoa. The Genoese nobles, though merchants, were yet Lombards, and convulsed their city with the feuds of Guelf and Ghibelline, which as usual were blended with the strife of the *popolo* and the old-fashioned commune. Venice was likewise under the rule of a merchant aristocracy, but it was Latin in tradition and its internal disagreements had a political and almost orderly character remote from Lombard methods. The three cities were inexorable rivals for trade and dominion, and in the struggle Pisa fell. During a disastrous war with Genoa, Florence and Lucca she received in 1284 the crushing defeat of Meloria from the Genoese fleet, and never recovered from the blow. More equal was the struggle between Genoa and Venice. A first war from 1258 to 1270 had left Venice superior to her foe on the Syrian coast, but Genoa had the best of the Black Sea trade through her alliance with the revived Greek Empire. A second war from 1293 to 1299 ended in a draw in spite of Genoese victories. The decisive contest lay still in the future.

In this century of world-wide activity and fierce interstate competition the Venetian constitution was finally developed in the direction of oligarchy, by the closing of the Great Council and the institution of the Council of Ten. The Doge's power, as distinct from his influence,

had been rigidly limited. He and his ministers ruled with the advice and under the control of the Senate, or Pregadi, and the Great Council, which latter body was more and more oligarchical and hereditary in its character. To make it completely so was the object of the great merchant houses, whose leader was Doge Morosini (1289-1311). In 1297 the Great Council was closed, *i.e.* was restricted to its then members and men whose ancestors had sat on it. The class of patricians was thus founded, and disposed of all the powers of the state. The resentment of the excluded was great and led to a brief civil war in 1309. Though the oligarchs won, they found that neither the Great Council, now sextupled by the inclusion of all the eligible patricians, nor the Senate could act with speed and surety in emergencies. To remedy this defect, the Council of Ten was created in 1310. It really numbered seventeen, for the Doge and his councillors sat with ten members elected for a year, and, while far from tyrannous during the Middle Ages, the awe which its secrecy and promptness created, the need for it which existed, and its representative character made it the real master of the state.

While kings and nations beyond the Alps and cities in Italy were collecting their energies and widening their outlook, the theocratic Papacy was growing narrower in its real ambitions and more confined in its influence. The perpetual transaction of routine ecclesiastical business, indeed, kept alive its consciousness of an ecumenic authority, and it was to make a despairing effort to renew its direction of European politics, but it had lost Europe's confidence, and the power, which had been victorious over the vague bombast of the Empire, was to beat ineffectually against the solid, purposeful national kingdoms with their practical ends and concentrated patriotism.

Innocent IV had degraded both the standards and the methods of the Church; he had snapped the invisible threads which bound the conscience of Christendom to Rome. Urban IV had placed the Papacy in the tightening grasp of the French. Nicholas III had directed it to mere family aggrandisement. Martin IV had identified it with purely French aspirations. His next successors, Honorius IV (1285-7) and Nicholas IV (1288-92), freed from the overbearing domination of King Charles, were bound to support the Neapolitan kingdom as a papal creation, but they, too, contributed personally to the decline in process by their efforts to exalt their favourite Roman families, the Savelli and the Colonna. Party strife among the Cardinals then caused a prolonged vacancy, till the impossibility of agreement, and, it is likely, a desperate wish to free the Apostolic See from the perplexities of its petty, worldly policy, caused them to elect the hermit Peter Morrone as Celestine V (1294). The man thus strangely become Pope was an ignorant ascetic unfitted for any office whatever. Charles II of Naples gained possession of him, but found him useless as a tool, and, when Cardinal Benedict Gaetani induced the gentle modest Pope to abdicate, consented to the counsellor's elevation as Boniface VIII (1294-1303). Boniface, hard, worldly, frantically domineering and ambitious, was the antithesis to his predecessor. He was rigidly resolved to lead back the Papacy to the splendid past of Innocent III. But he hoped to do so while imitating the nepotism of Nicholas and the territorial greed of Innocent IV. Deluded by former papal victories, he hoped to cow the national kings into submission by unbending sternness, and forgot the descent the Papacy had made and the blunting of its spiritual weapons by unscrupulous misuse.

His policy in Italy was marked by a series of cunning

mistakes. He was in difficulty from the first owing to the circumstances of his accession, for it was widely held that a Pope could not abdicate and that his own election was consequently invalid. Boniface held the unhappy Celestine imprisoned till his death in 1296, but did not thereby do away with men's doubts. Meantime he had actively pursued the endowment of his own family, the Gaetani, to the disgust of the greater Roman barons. With the Colonna he was soon engaged in a furious quarrel. The two Cardinals of that house, who denied that Boniface was true Pope, were deprived, and a crusade was preached against them and theirs. It was the last step in the decline of papal policy and in the abuse of spiritual weapons, when the whole ecclesiastical armoury was employed against a race of Roman barons. However Boniface won the day and exiled his foes in 1298. Two years later, in order to exalt his prestige and to rake in the money always needed by the Papacy, he celebrated the jubilee¹ at Rome, whither came hundreds of thousands of pilgrims for the special indulgences offered. So successful was it as a financial expedient that later Popes shortened the interval established by Boniface between two celebrations: but as a means to restore papal authority it failed. Boniface designed to annex Tuscany to the Papal State, and as a means to this end allied himself with the extreme Guelf faction of Florence, the Neri or Blacks, who were at bitter odds with the moderate Guelfs, the Bianchi or Whites. In 1301 he called in Count Charles of Valois, brother of the King of France, for the purpose of concluding the Sicilian War and bringing Tuscany to heel by the way. Charles treacherously restored the

¹ The Christian jubilee was invented by Boniface. It was a year when pilgrimage to Rome was rewarded by special indulgences, like a crusade which it really replaced.

Blacks, who had been exiled, to Florence, and abetted the exile of the Whites¹; but no great profit, save some money, came to the Pope from the manoeuvre. Rather, it increased the general opposition he was arousing, and, when Valois was beaten in Sicily and the peace of Caltabellotta was signed, the real aims of the Pope were defeated all along the line.

Meantime the conflict with the national kings had come about. Boniface was not only trying to live up to the theocracy he claimed at a most ill-chosen time; he was given to expressing it in provocative language which at any time would rouse the secular powers to resistance. His first effort was to publish the Bull "Clericis laicos" in 1296. His object was partly to force peace on France and England, partly to reserve clerical wealth for his own schemes. The matter was old: that kings could not tax their clerical subjects beyond the feudal aids without the Pope's consent. But the kings had long been accustomed so to do under pretext at first of crusades and with papal consent or connivance. Feudal aids had decreased in importance with the growth of the more developed national state, and the clergy could not be excused their share in the subsidies raised for wars. So the kings resisted. Edward I of England outlawed the clergy till they submitted to his demands. Philip IV the Fair of France forbade the payment of papal revenues from his kingdom, and put a stop to Italian trade within it. Both were upheld by their subjects, and Philip had the whip-hand of the Pope, for Boniface was in desperate need of money for his wars against Sicily and the Colonna, and he was forced, too, to consider the interests of his Italian bankers. In 1297 he gave way, and allowed clerical taxation by the kings of France. A new breach was

¹ The poet Dante was one of these White exiles.

not long in coming. As before, Boniface managed to alienate France and England at the same time. Edward I was engaged in the conquest of Scotland, and the Pope endeavoured to restore peace in his usual arbitrary fashion by claiming Scotland as a fief of the Roman See and summoning Edward to justify himself. The king at once threw himself on the support of Parliament, and, with his baronage, vigorously refused in 1301 to allow papal jurisdiction over the temporal affairs of the kingdom. Here, too, Philip was the more deadly foe. He had irritated the Pope by his alliance with the German king Albert of Austria, whom Boniface refused to recognize, and by his patronage of the Colonna. He was angered on his side by the Pope's reprimands as to his government, and turned in 1301 on an ex-legate, the Bishop of Pamiers, who voiced the disaffection still existing in Languedoc towards the French crown. Boniface, meanwhile, was uplifted almost beyond sanity by the success of the Jubilee. He demanded the dispatch of the Bishop to Rome, and in the Bull "Ausculata, fili" declared uncompromisingly that kings were subject to the Pope. At the same time he summoned a Council at the Lateran. A pamphleteering controversy began on the independence of the secular state, while Philip forbade the French prelates to attend the Council. Like Edward I, the French king sought and gained the backing of a national assembly, the ancestor of the States General, and stirred its patriotic feeling by garbled versions of "Ausculata, fili" and his own reply. But his defeat in Flanders made him waver, and he was ready for a composition when the Lateran Council met in 1302. Boniface, intractable as ever, then issued the famous Bull "Unam sanctam," in which the papal theocracy found its most rigid expression. He declared that it was necessary for a man's salvation

that he should be subject to the Roman Pope; and further, on the relation of the ecclesiastical and secular powers, that the "two swords" of spiritual and temporal dominion¹ both belonged to the Church, the spiritual sword to be wielded by the Pope in person, the second by kings at his beck and call. The Pope, being God's Vicar, was judge of all men, but could himself only be judged by God.

Vain negotiations followed the Lateran Council. Philip was willing to admit some papal claims and to redress some ecclesiastical grievances, but, when Boniface insisted on absolute submission, he drew the temporal sword with a cunning and brutal, yet none the less effective, violence. In March 1303 his minister Nogaret left for Italy with instructions to use the aid of the Colonna and other enemies of the Pope to capture Boniface and bring him prisoner to France. Boniface was preparing for the struggle by recognizing Albert of Germany and consenting to the year-old peace of Caltabellotta with Sicily. But no one moved in his favour. Philip prepared the way by promulgating a series of charges against the Pope. They were mostly vile slanders, but they gained the fervent assent of the French nation, now aroused to champion their king and their national independence. The Pope was to be dragged before a General Council. In September the blow fell. Nogaret and the Colonna surprised and captured Boniface in Anagni, his native town. From their threats and insults he was rescued by a rising of the citizens, and was brought off safe to Rome. There he found himself a prisoner in the hands of the Orsini amid the rioting city. The old man—he was eighty-six—overcome by fear, suspicion and rage, fell into senile madness. Within a month he was dead.

¹ See above, p. 144.

The death of the "magnanimous sinner" closed the papal theocracy. The disaster was not wholly his fault. That a criminal outrage, which after all missed its aim, should have such permanent results, was due to the course of history. Nations and kings were conscious of their individuality and their power. The Church no longer stood on an eminence of unapproachable wisdom and righteousness. Her marvellous organization met other organizations compacted with stronger ties. The large recognition of the papal ecclesiastical monarchy, too, as distinct from theocracy, had produced a vexatious interference in local concerns, as well as a barely tolerable abuse of endowments and appointments, by the Popes. The theocracy, in short, died partly from its own success. It was not so much Boniface's fall, as the thinly disguised approbation of Europe which sealed its fate.

The next Pope, Benedict XI (1303-4), did his best to tide over the calamity in a decorous way. He annulled Boniface's censures on France and the confiscations of Colonna property, while endeavouring to punish Nogaret and other minor agents in the crime of Anagni. At his death a long contest between the Francophil and Italian Cardinals ended in the election of Bertrand de Got, Archbishop of Bordeaux, as Clement V (1305-14). Clement, a Gascon subject of Edward of England, had been a follower of Boniface and made concessions to the College of Cardinals; but he also secretly came to terms with Philip IV. To the indignation of the Italian Cardinals he refused to come to Rome, and eventually fixed his residence at Avignon in Provence. He was an unworthy man, in whose court nepotism and simony reigned supreme. More excusable was his Francophil leaning. He was the tool of Philip the Fair; French Cardinals of his creation filled the College. Under the pressure of Philip, who

could always drag the Papacy in the mud by a slanderous process against the dead Boniface, Clement annulled the late Pope's acts, exempted France wholly from "Clericis laicos," and approved by Bull all the French king's acts against his own predecessor. The "Babylonish captivity" of the Church at Avignon had begun. French Popes, subservient to their king, lost all moral weight in Europe.

CHAPTER VIII

FRANCE AND ENGLAND

SECTION I. PHILIP THE FAIR

At the close of the thirteenth century a dismal change sets in over medieval history. "The good old times are gone"; the conscious upward-striving, the zeal for great causes and ideals appear to vanish. The sum of villainy does not increase, but villainy grows meaner. The medieval philosophy of life becomes threadbare; the typical institutions and motives of the Middle Age grow rigid and decay. Chivalry and religion seem ever more a tawdry show. The age waits for the quickening of the Renaissance.

This gloomy appearance is far from being wholly justified. The life of men in general, nobles, townsmen and peasants, was infinitely more tolerable than it had been. Order, security, prosperity and civilization had all made great strides forward since the eleventh century. But they had still greater and many more strides to make, and the way was becoming uncertain. The means of advance devised were proving insufficient, and were bringing their own evils in their train. Chief among them were the ecclesiastical machinery of the Church, and the political machinery of the centralizing monarchies. The Church had fought the world with its own weapons till its efforts had ended in secularization. The monarchs had sought order and power with low cunning and greed,

till these vices had become part and parcel of their government. The Church was no longer capable of giving a better inspiration, for all its life was centred in the Papacy, which had fallen from its high estate. And in the decline the influence of the Popes was conspicuous. Innocent III had fostered cruelty and injustice in the Albigensian crusade and inquisition, Innocent IV had given an example of faithless diplomacy and ruthless policy. Right and wrong were deformed in the hard and ingenious legal system of the Curia. Scoundrels now availed themselves of legal chicanery and elaborate fraud in lieu of open violence. These evils increased, so as to palliate the unthinking brutality of an earlier time and to obscure the prosaic advance in ordinary life.

In France the change was all the more painful by contrast with the ideal reign of St Louis just over. His son, the honest and weak Philip the Bold (1270-85), endeavoured at first to follow in his footsteps. The death of Alphonse of Toulouse and Poitiers united his great appanage to the royal domain, and Philip, in pursuance of St Louis' treaty of Paris, thereupon surrendered some fractions of Gascony to Edward I of England. But he fell under the influence of his uncle Charles of Anjou and Naples, caught at the bait of the crown of Aragon, and died from illness contracted in his ill-starred crusade for plunder. His son typifies the new era. Philip IV the Fair (1285-1314) was so silent and reserved that he can only be judged by the councillors he chose and the actions he authorized. From them we may presume that faithlessness, hypocrisy, and ruthlessness were deep-rooted vices of his character. Shrewdness, resolution and political wisdom were his intellectual virtues. His policy was to unite France under the royal absolutism, to extend her borders by well-considered aggressions, and

to maintain her pre-eminence in Europe, and in pursuit of these ends he was led on to actions which cast a stigma on his reign. Crafty lawyers, mainly from Languedoc which had been debased by the ferocious hypocrisy of an inquisition used for political ends, were the instruments he preferred, among whom the villainous William de Nogaret has a sinister fame. Their ability and influence gained signal triumphs and tainted the political life of the French monarchy.

Philip early withdrew from unprofitable adventures abroad. His foreign policy was mainly directed to the absorption of, or at least the effective suzerainty over, those great fiefs which still remained from an earlier time. Champagne was annexed to the crown by his marriage with its heiress. Brittany was isolated. But Gascony was dangerous in the hands of a powerful foreign king, and Flanders, the wealthy centre of the wool-trade, was tempting to his ambition and greed. Successful in the long run, however, Philip the Fair was not. Taking advantage of Edward I's difficulties in the British Isles, and seizing on a convenient pretext of seamen's feuds, he occupied nearly all Gascony in 1294-6, only to surrender it again in 1303 when he himself was endangered by his contest with Pope Boniface VIII. The war of Flanders was more disastrous and obstinate. Its count, Guy, who held of the Empire as well as of France, was unfortunate in being at enmity with his neighbour the Count of Hainault and with the rich bourgeois who ruled the Flemish towns, and who were in close relations with the French monarchy. Guy found himself being reduced to a puppet by Philip's interference. He revolted only to be deserted by his ally Edward I and to be conquered in 1300. But the French rule, although pleasing to the merchants, was hated by the lesser folk. In 1302 the

Matins of Bruges formed a pendant to the Sicilian Vespers. There followed the epoch-making battle of Courtrai, where the Flemish footmen armed with pikes routed the disorderly charges of the feudal cavalry of France. Infantry, and with it the non-feudal classes of which it was composed, had come to its own again in war, although the French nobles to the misery of their country long refused to recognize the fact. Philip, however, as soon as he had overthrown Pope Boniface, resumed the struggle. Immense efforts on his part extorted a not unfavourable treaty in 1305, but its terms were never carried out and the close of his reign was still occupied in futile expeditions against Flanders. The hoped-for stream of wealth never flowed into his coffers.

Further south he had better success. The German kings were powerless to prevent aggression and were often his allies. So the frontier of the Empire receded. Lyons, for instance, fell under Philip's direct rule. Even Franche Comté¹ was temporarily gained in fief of the Empire. Philip had thus begun the expansion of France over the French-speaking lands to the east, the connexion of which with the decadent Empire had become a thing of form.

Financial embarrassment was a common feature of the new national monarchies towards the year 1300, earlier in some, later in others, according to the capacity or the needs of the sovran. The general cause of this was the necessary increase of state expenditure. A complex administration, with swarms of paid officials, and mercenary soldiers serving for long periods, required a revenue much superior to that flowing from the royal demesnes, which had once been ample. In the case of France the deficit was aggravated by the enormous and unprofitable expenses of the long war with Flanders, and Philip the

¹ The *Free County* of Burgundy, once a Hohenstaufen possession.

Fair gained an evil name by the remorseless expedients he used to raise money. Extra customs on merchandise, the *maltôtes*, feudal aids, commutation of military service, forced loans from the bourgeoisie were all insufficient. A progressive iniquity is noticeable in the extraordinary measures devised. The clergy were mulcted of specially heavy subsidies, and the unreason of their claim to be exempt from national taxation cannot palliate the opprobrium of the means used to vanquish Boniface VIII in the struggle with the Papacy to which their grievances led¹. The Jews and Lombard merchants were in such ill-odour through their usurious dealings, that their spoliation and ill-treatment needed no excuse at the time. For the Lombards, strong in their merchandise and their unassailable wealth at home, persecution was but an incident, but the Jews, who were aliens everywhere, were depressed for centuries. In the earlier Middle Ages they had been the moneyed men, scattered over Europe and the Levant, yet united by religion and race. This favourable situation, in spite of transitory persecutions, had enabled them to amass vast treasures, and to increase them by lending at oppressive interest to building ecclesiastics and crusading knights, whose lands provided them with little ready money. The Church's condemnation of lending money at interest had given them a monopoly by disallowing Christian usurers, but in the thirteenth century they found formidable rivals in the Italian merchants. In a mercantile community, the prejudice against the receiving of interest was dying down with the increase of the opportunities for the obviously fair investment of surplus capital, and by a natural consequence ingenious ways were invented for evading the strict Canon Law, which were also employed

¹ See above, pp. 352-4.

in making often oppressive loans to small landowners or townsmen. Thus the Jews met formidable competitors at a time when the hatred of usury and of their race was still extreme in northern countries. Philip used it, with his customary hypocrisy, to expel the Jews and exact payment to his exchequer of the debts owing to them. The Jews returned later, indeed, but ruined, and the Lombards ruled supreme in the economic world. Equally favourable for Italy, and more disastrous for France was the debasement of the coinage which earned for Philip the name of "the false coiner." It was more blundering than anything else, but it reduced French commerce and economic life to confusion by the despotic changes involved, giving a mere temporary profit to the crown and a lasting one to the Italians with their unimpeachable currency.

The king's need of money was also the cause of the suppression of the crusading Order of the Temple¹. It was after he had subjected the Papacy in the person of Clement V, that he turned his eyes on the wealth of an Order unpopular for its pride. By a shameful process of slander, fraud, torture and chicanery, the French knights were convicted of vice and absurd heresy, and hundreds of them were burnt at the stake. Here, as in the affair of Pope Boniface, Nogaret appears as chief actor, fully supported by the king. The gruesome parody of judicial proceedings lasted for several years (1307-14), since even Clement submitted reluctantly and public opinion, although carefully tutored, veered against the king. At last the Pope abolished the Order and conferred its endowments upon the Hospitallers. Philip gained his ends, for the Hospitallers were rather impoverished than enriched owing to the heavy payments they made him.

¹ Cf. above, p. 299.

Thus the ideals of the Middle Age perished one by one. The devout hope of the Crusades, in which so many heroes had perished, was dead when a bulwark of Christendom in the Levant was infamously destroyed by the Pope and the grandson of St Louis. Dead, too, was the belief in the king as the guardian of justice, and the Pope as teacher of righteousness. In France the results of the crime were long felt in a cruel and unjust criminal procedure, while all over Europe an example had been set of the manufacture of evidence by torture and of the invention of abominable slanders to serve political enmity.

Philip's own family and entourage were infected with these dark methods; but the ordinary administration of France owed much to him of another kind. His reign was fruitful in the development of institutions. Some of these, like the Parlement of Paris, were in active operation before his time. The States General, however, to give them a name they soon acquired, were almost his creation. It is true that the Capetians before his reign had summoned occasionally plenary assemblies of their vassals to their Curia. Philip, who saw the advisability of brigading national opinion in favour of his hazardous measures, made these assemblies a regular institution of government and extended their scope and membership. The first indubitable States General occurred in 1302 when he assembled prelates, barons and representatives of the towns, the Tiers État, at Paris to support him in the thick of his struggle with Boniface; he had recourse to the same means against the Templars; a third, to commend unpopular taxation, at the close of the reign, set a precedent of vast importance, the right to grant subsidies to the crown. Nothing was yet in final shape. The States came to hear the king's will; more restricted assemblies and assemblies of sections of the

country were still alternatives. But a national representation had come into being.

Two radical defects clung to the States General. They were the creatures of the royal absolutism, which still remained the essential political fact of France; and the orders which composed them were hostile to one another and pursued solely their class interests. This was seen in the provincial Leagues of nobles which sprung up in Philip's last years, and were temporized with by his son Louis X (1314-16). They demanded chiefly the restoration of feudal evils which had been abolished by the monarchy. Louis died and his posthumous son died, too, shortly after birth. The Leagues had now the opportunities provided by a disputed succession, for was Louis' daughter, the Queen of Navarre, his heiress in France or was his brother Philip the Tall king? The disunion of the Leagues and the union of the generality of the kingdom turned the scales in favour of Philip V (1316-22), for whom an assembly declared that no woman could succeed to the French crown. France needed a strong king and Philip was one. His reign was crowded* with legislation in which he brought the development of Capetian institutions to its completion. The States General gained definite form and met time after time. With all this, neither his reforms nor his exactions were popular. He left to his brother Charles IV the Fair (1322-8) the legacy of that war with Flanders, which with intervals of broken treaties had continued since the days of Philip IV. To his Flemish enemies Charles added England by the seizure of much of Gascony, most of which after all he restored by arrangement. Then he died, the last of the Capetians in the direct line. The nearest heir through males was his cousin Philip of Valois, and the right of succession became the pretext of the Hundred Years' War.

The government established by the Capetians was in essence a bureaucratic despotism, strongly influenced by the reviving Roman Law. It evoked and concentrated national patriotism; it had saved, and was the perpetual guardian of society from anarchy, baronial oppression and feudal subdivision. It maintained its independence and efficiency by means of an official class of bourgeois origin which manned the bureaucracy. Just as elsewhere, the king's Curia had formed a central administrative machinery by putting forth permanent offshoots with definite functions. The nearest representative of the older Curia was the Greater Council of the king which met at his call to discuss affairs of state, but the real direction of policy lay with the more select Secret Council with which he habitually conferred. The legal offshoot of the Curia was the Parlement of Paris, now organized and possessing a tradition of jurisprudence. The financial offshoot was the Chambre des Comptes, which was similarly manned by an organized staff of trained officials. The central administration, thus grouped, kept a tight control over local matters. Besides special intermediate commissions in Normandy and Champagne, the *enquêteurs* established by St Louis supervised the doings of the bailiffs and seneschals and their innumerable underlings, while an incessant stream of minor commissioners flowed from Paris to the provinces for the most various business. Oppressive as they and the bailiffs often were, their rule was better than the petty tyrannies of former times. It was Louis X who freed from personal slavery every Frenchman; and this was a fruit of the new bureaucracy. Perhaps the greatest harm that they did was, that the nation, divided by class hatred and local antipathies, looked to the crown for rescue in any emergency, and that the dealings of the crown were contaminated with a hard and pedantic legalism.

SECTION 2. EDWARD I AND EDWARD II

From the date of the Sicilian Vespers the evolution of Germany and Italy is still more strongly differentiated than heretofore from that of the westerly kingdoms. They are dominated by particularist forces; Britain, France and the Iberian states by national patriotism. And, as particularism proved its worth by becoming the environment of a new intellectual movement, the Renaissance, so did national patriotism produce political advance, from which modern political structure could in its turn appear. National consolidation and national expansion were the two aims of this strong national consciousness, sometimes allied and sometimes hostile to one another. They were never brought to completion. The means which governments and statesmen disposed of in the Middle Age were at best too scanty, and medievals were too fond of vast and visionary schemes to do all that was really feasible within their narrow reach. Nor were men sufficiently united in interests and ambitions to establish a tolerable concord. What they constructed was the residuum of violently conflicting designs. For national consolidation it was necessary to effect a threefold welding, the welding of district with district, of class with class, and of political authority with political authority. And it by no means followed that the most successful solution of any of these three problems was the best in the long run. They were most thoroughly attacked in England, and the results there were the most durable, if not the most brilliant in immediate efficiency.

The hero of national consolidation in England is Edward I (1272-1307). He belongs to the acquisitive, legal-minded, centralizing generation of Philip the Fair; but his character, which is frankly revealed, is far nobler

than that of his intriguing contemporary. Greedy of power and gain, and too adroit in his adherence to the letter of the law, he is yet straightforward in his methods and policy, and faithful to his obligations save on the few occasions when he had that all-sufficient excuse for a medieval prince, a papal dispensation. More than any king before him since the conquest he identified himself with his kingdom. Supported by his lawyer ministers, who, unlike Philip the Fair's, were still mainly ecclesiastics, he weakened and sterilized feudalism as a system of government. By famous statutes he prevented further subinfeudation, and thus eventually the increase of any vassals but the king's. At the same time he put on record existing feudal rights, and set his face against their extension. The gift of land to the Church was placed under royal control by the Statute of Mortmain, and the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts was rigorously defined. Thus the non-national jurisdictions of Church and baronage were strictly curbed. In like manner the recovery of debts by action in the royal courts was substituted for the primitive method of retaliation by which the fellow-townsmen of the creditor seized on any property they could get hold of belonging to fellow-townsmen of the debtor in the case when the two parties belonged to different towns; and one standard of weights and measures was decreed, if not fully enforced. He expelled the alien Jews, though not so tyrannously as Philip the Fair. All townsmen were to be members of the same national community.

These limitations of sectional jurisdiction required an extension of the royal administration. The central law-courts received their final organization, and local justice in the shires was made frequent and regular by the itinerant justices of assize. Yet, unlike the case of

France, there was no development of a great bureaucracy. The under-officers of the sheriff were elected by their neighbours among the squires, while the towns were governed by elected mayors and councils. Against the feudal franchises of the barons, was set the minor aristocracy of knights and burgesses.

Heterogeneous as the elements of the nation were they were consolidated in the chief constitutional creation of Edward's reign, the national Parliament. It had that in it which gave it a longer life than any similar assembly. All over the West in the thirteenth century the full Curia of the king, in which all his feudal tenants-in-chief, great and small, were supposed to give counsel, had expanded into a national assembly. But these assemblies, varying in authority from the powerful Cortes of Aragon to the late-born States General of France, were one and all gatherings of the Estates of the realm; they represented, that is, not local units, but the different orders of men, of which the realm was held to consist. The clergy had long vindicated their claim to be a class apart; the tenants by feudal service were obviously another, and of them the tenants-in-chief belonged of right to the full royal Curia; the townsmen, both as in a special sense subject to the king, and through their distinctive way of life as traders, were the third. These were the three estates, for the peasantry, free or serf, being partitioned among lords had no separate standing. The assemblies thus formed were all in a way representative, for the prelates represented the lower clergy, the tenants-in-chief the mesne tenants, and elected burgesses the townsmen; but they acted in the main as class-assemblies, and increased rather than allayed class-hostility. The English Parliament on the other hand resulted in such a grouping of the Estates as to rearrange classes of men and lead to a national repre-

sensation. Among the older causes of this development two stand pre-eminent. One was that the monarchy since the Conquest had refused to lose touch with the mesne tenants; the other that the ancient institution of the shire-court had been maintained in full vigour. In the shire-courts mesne tenants and lesser tenants-in-chief met together and found they had the same interests; there, too, they learnt to act with the burgesses. The members of the shire-courts thus formed a body which both king and barons were obliged to take into partnership. Knights elected by the shires and burgesses elected by the towns appear in some of the important Parliaments of the end of Henry III's reign. That the burgesses should come to form a third estate was part of the general evolution of Western Europe. Not so the knights of the shire; they were the exceptional product of the strong local community of mixed classes, the shire.

Edward I, with his consolidating schemes and national policy, made frequent use of Parliament. He was a legislator and general consent was thus most quickly given. He needed money, and it was easier got by a general grant. He needed national backing, and Parliament was the best means of obtaining it. Gradually the institution crystallized. In 1295 the Model Parliament was held where clergy, barons, knights and burgesses all sat. Even then the lower clergy were represented by their proctors to complete the clerical estate; but they preferred to make their grants in their ordinary ecclesiastical assemblies, the convocation, and so fell out of Parliament. Meanwhile the prelates continued to attend, and in the next reign were as naturally attracted to the barons, since they too sat in their own right and held baronies, as were the representative knights of the shire to the burgesses to form the Commons of the realm as a third estate. When

the historic division into the two Houses of Lords and Commons took final shape is uncertain; but in 1322 the Commons were strong enough and united enough for it to be declared that their consent was necessary for a valid statute of the realm.

Before it was settled how a full Parliament should be composed, Parliament had already succeeded in limiting, much to Edward's disgust, the royal prerogative. The partners he called in were not satisfied with merely obeying him. He had roused the barons by his arbitrary measures, and his financial embarrassment and his difficulties with Scotland and Philip the Fair gave them their opportunity for resistance. In 1297 Edward was compelled to admit anew that he could not raise aid or subsidy without Parliament's grant, and to renounce the power of increasing the traditional customs on merchandise without the same sanction. He was also obliged then and later to consent to reforms in ordinary government and in the carrying out of the Great Charter. The concessions were all the more valuable for being won from a strong and popular king.

National expansion was the aim of Edward's foreign policy. He endeavoured to make one state of the British Isles, while retaining Gascony and playing a distinguished part in Europe. But the retention of Gascony, although in the end achieved, much hampered him in the more important scheme, and his European diplomacy was ineffectual. In his British policy he gained one permanent success in the annexation of the principality of Wales, which had become a formidable power under its last prince Llewelyn in the troublous days of Henry III. If this acquisition removed a growing danger, and gave him valuable soldiers in the Welsh archers, it was unhappy that he turned from the organization of Ireland, which

perhaps he could have effected, to the disastrous attempt to conquer Scotland.

Scotland was a tempting prize, for her congeries of Anglo-Norman nobles, English and Welsh burgesses and peasants, and Gaelic clans in the Highlands, hardly formed a nation at the time; and in 1290 the throne became vacant by the death of the child-queen Margaret. Edward had hoped to unite the two kingdoms by Margaret's marriage to his own heir. Now he resolved to utilize the dispute for the crown which arose between numerous claimants for the enforcement of his own suzerainty. The relations of Scotland and England had long been dubious and complicated. The Scottish kings had done homage for fiefs in England. There were vague English claims to overlordship over Lothian, coupled with still vaguer claims over the rest of the kingdom. The Scots had long refused to recognize them, but Edward held fast to them, and he was able to extort an acknowledgement of his suzerainty when he was admitted to arbitrate on the succession. In 1292 he decided very fairly for John de Balliol, who thereupon did homage for the kingdom. Edward then attempted, unjustifiably enough, to treat Scotland as an ordinary fief, till in 1295 the Scots revolted. King John was soon deposed and the kingdom annexed by its suzerain. The conquest, however, and the blundering misgovernment that followed only helped to weld together the Scottish people and to stir them to an unweariable resistance. Sir William Wallace led a new revolt in 1297 and, favoured by Edward's other troubles, drove out the English. Edward could win a brilliant victory at Falkirk in 1298, but did not recover his conquest till 1304. Wallace was captured and ungenerously put to death. The conquest was not lasting, for by this time the Scots were bent on national independence. In 1306

Robert de Bruce, heir of one of the claimants, seized the crown and raised the country once more. Edward died in 1307 on the march against him.

The new king of England, Edward II (1307-27), was worthless and incompetent. The war with Scotland was neglected, and internal misgovernment, coupled with the hatred felt for his Gascon favourite, Piers de Gaveston, so lost his hold on his subjects that the discontented barons could wrest the government from him in 1310. The factiousness of the baronial committee of Ordainers, however, and the murder of Gaveston allowed the king to recover power, and make a last attempt to conquer Scotland, whence King Robert, chiefly owing to the divisions of his country, had not yet expelled all the English garrisons. A great English invasion ended in the ruinous defeat of Bannockburn in 1314, a battle which marks an epoch. In military history it demonstrated the impregnability of infantry pikemen to the disorderly charge of feudal horse. The day of knightly supremacy in war had gone by. Curiously enough, Edward I had already taken a further step in advance in military tactics which pointed the same social moral. He had levied among the Welsh bodies of archers, whose missiles combined with cavalry charges had broken the Scottish array of pikes at Falkirk. The learning of the two lessons was to give invincibility to the English armies for a hundred years. In politics, Bannockburn not only marked the defeat of the English attempt to annex Scotland, but it also sealed the consolidation of the Scottish people. Heterogeneous as its elements might still be—and they were soon reduced to two, the feudal Lowlands and the clannish Highlands—they yet formed as definite a nation as any in the West. In international relations, Scotland, being poor and thinly-populated, mainly

counted as a useful ally of France against England; but the war with Edward II was not closed till King Robert had struck a deadly blow at the English government of Ireland. His brother Edward de Bruce set up a Keltic revolt there in 1315, and, although he was overthrown in 1318, he had in its course brought to ruin the authority of the English king. The English Lord Lieutenant for the rest of the Middle Ages ruled little besides Dublin. Irish chiefs and Anglo-Norman barons held the rest of the land in anarchy.

Meanwhile the state of England was growing worse. Disasters in the Scottish war vexed the land from without. Within the strife of rival factions prevented government. The king's cousin, the Earl of Lancaster, once chief of the Ordainers, controlled the state for a while, showed his incompetence and fell. The king then ruled again with the help of his favourite barons, the two Despensers. They, too, were greedy and unwise. Gascony was lost to Charles the Fair of France. Barons, prelates and commons were all discontented. At last Edward's French queen, Isabella, who had become the paramour of Roger Mortimer, the leading baron of the west, contrived an invasion from France, and captured her unhappy husband. The Parliament in 1327 insisted on the king's abdication, and raised his boy son Edward III to the throne. But Mortimer's rule was as bad as that of his predecessors. Edward II was murdered, and a humiliating peace concluded with Scotland. It was with general approval that Edward III seized power into his own hands in 1330 and executed Mortimer.

The reign of Edward II had been occupied by the attempts of mean men with selfish ends to exploit the state and government built up by Edward I. An incapable king gave the opening. Factions of greedy

barons fought out their disputes with him and one another. Yet the machine endured the strain, and the advent of a strong ruler showed to an age, the designs of which went beyond private grudges, what it was worth.

SECTION 3. THE HUNDRED YEARS' WAR, FIRST PERIOD

When Charles IV expired in 1328, France had attained a prosperity unimaginable in the earlier Middle Ages. It was not that she was the first state in Europe and that the Pope was in her leading-strings, though these were facts. It was the well-being of the population. Whatever faults the royal government had, it gave a peace and order, which were a great advance then, if they would be judged defective at the present day. The towns traded securely. The peasants, in despite of their heavy customary dues and obligations, had by thrift and industry increased the productiveness of the land and the area of cultivation: the disappearance of the medieval forest was well begun. Even the nobles who regretted their former anarchic liberty were finding their profit as privileged landowners under the new monarchy.

Not very different was the general state of England, which, in civilization more backward, was politically more advanced. The disorders under Edward II had delayed but a little, and had compromised not at all, the increase in national welfare. In national consolidation England had progressed farther than France. Baron, knight, yeoman and burgess were far more aware of their common interests and more willing to act in concert than their like in France. The kingdom, too, was more united. Parliament was a single body and had no rival, whereas

in France, besides the alienation of the Three Estates one from another, the States General of Languedoil and Languedoc commonly met apart and acted independently, and, further, the provinces which made up Languedoil were coming to possess States Provincial of their own, which by no means followed the lead of the States General.

While feudalism was in decay as a method of government, the aristocratic instincts of the noble classes, which had been formed under feudalism, were as strong as ever and were finding a social form. The fourteenth century is the age of organized chivalry. By 1250 the ideal of knighthood had taken complete shape, just as its feudal mould was being broken, and by 1300 it was grown more defiant and more ostentatious in the presence of the increased power of the non-feudal classes. Knights and men who could normally aspire to knighthood formed a kind of international fellowship in the West with a special code of honour among themselves, with a special profession of arms and a special ideal of life. Attractive and inspiring as that ideal was, it brought serious dangers in its train. It nourished an inconsequent, festive way of life, made up of fighting for fighting's sake, of spend-thrift feasting and jousting; it led to an ignorant contempt of the homespun non-chivalrous classes. A false glitter surrounds and misleads the chief actors of the time, and betrays them and the nations they ruled into pernicious errors and disastrous calamities.

The chivalrous spirit was potent in the characters of the rival kings who began the Hundred Years' War between France and England. On the death of Charles IV the law of succession to the French throne was not yet settled. It had been laid down that no woman could succeed, but not whether a woman could transmit the right to succeed or not. The nearest heir through males

was Philip Count of Valois, cousin of the late king, but Edward III of England was nearest male relative to Charles, through his mother Isabella daughter of Philip the Fair. He at once claimed the throne, but the French barons reasonably enough declared for the French prince and inheritance through males alone, and Valois was crowned Philip VI (1328-50). After some hesitation Edward did homage for Gascony. The new king had little capacity for government, and the administration grew corrupt and more oppressive while he indulged his chivalrous tastes and dreamed of a crusade. Meantime he was drifting into war with England. Edward III, too, was chivalrous, but he knew how to rule, and his ambition, which was extreme, had a practical turn. He had schemes of commercial and territorial policy. Further, he was not only a good knight, but the best general of the day.

The causes of the war were numerous. Perhaps the most decisive was Edward's possession of Gascony. Philip was bound to assert the royal authority there in pursuance of the steady policy of the French crown towards its vassals. Edward as naturally maintained the ancient autonomy of the duchy, and declined to be reduced to the status of a powerful landholder. War was the almost certain result of this alone; but the kings were also enemies in Flanders. Philip was suzerain of the Count, whom he restored to power over his revolted subjects by the victory of Cassel (1328). The Flemings, however, disliked the aristocratic king, and felt no national unity with France. They were bourgeois: cloth was their manufacture, and England supplied them with wool to weave. They were thus drawn towards England, and Edward would not willingly see the principal vent of English exports under the control of his adversary.

Scotland provided a third cause of dissension. Edward was on the look-out for an opportunity to reverse the result of Bannockburn, which was given him by the invasion of Scotland by Edward Balliol, son of King John. Edward III came to his aid and established him as King of Scots in 1333. But the exorbitant cession of territory the English king extorted destroyed Balliol's chances. The war dragged on indecisively, and here Philip checkmated Edward. Scotland was a useful bridle for the English king, and the boy David Bruce (1329-71), the national king of Scotland, was Philip's guest in France. Hampered by the French war, which the Scottish imbroglio partly caused, Edward could not support his *protégé*, and by 1341 Scotland was free of invaders.

Philip would have been content to check Edward III in Scotland and to do away with his autonomy in Gascony by slow pressure. Edward, stirred perhaps by a French refugee, Robert of Artois, decided to bring matters to open war, which broke out in 1337. Edward was aware how inferior his kingdom was to France in wealth and resources, and his first plan was to form a coalition with the Rhenish German princes under the patronage of the Emperor Lewis of Bavaria. But the scheme did not work, and in 1339 he gained a real ally. The Flemish bourgeois had found a leader in a merchant of Ghent, Jacob van Artevelde, who pursued a commercial and anti-feudal, and therefore anti-French, policy. The English alliance was desirable on both grounds, and was accepted on condition that Edward salved the legal scruples of the Flemings by assuming the title of King of France to which he had renewed his claim. Philip was thus checked by Flanders as Edward was by Scotland. Yet this plan turned out a failure too. Edward effected nothing by his attempted invasions of France from the Netherlands, and in 1345

Artevelde was murdered in an insurrection and the alliance came to an end.

It was when the war was transferred westwards that Edward could make progress. A complete naval victory at Sluys in 1340 gave him the command of the Channel and the sea. In 1342 he took up the cause of one claimant to the duchy of Brittany, who was upheld by the Keltic Bretons, against the other who was recognized by King Philip. Thus fortified his conduct of the war became energetic. He had awakened to the fact that he disposed of much the more efficient troops. Philip could assemble an enormous host of feudal cavalry, quite indisciplined and devoid of any conception of tactics beyond the *mêlée* of a tournament. Edward possessed his knights too, but they had been long experienced in the Scottish wars, and beside them were the all-important archers on foot. This infantry, who were largely Welsh, were armed with the long-bow of yew, which discharged at least three arrows for one of the machine cross-bows of the Genoese in French hire and gave a complete superiority in missiles to the English armies. Edward had long relied on ravaging invasions in his wars, but now with the sea secure and after the experience gained they were directed at the heart of France. From Gascony terrible raids were made on southern France. In 1346 the king himself devastated Normandy as far as Paris. Philip was provoked at last to engage battle with his retreating enemy at Crécy on ground of the enemy's choosing. His feudal cavalry made vain and furious charges. They were repulsed with fearful loss by the English archers, while Edward's cavalry routed those who could come to close quarters. The French army was wrecked, but Edward had too small resources to make much of his victory. After a long siege he captured Calais, which became

thenceforward a gateway into France and a convenient centre for English trade. Meanwhile he had been freed from the Scottish danger by the defeat and capture of King David at Neville's Cross. When David was at length released he withdrew from the French alliance. Brittany too was gained by a brilliant victory at La Roche. There Edward's success stopped. His means were exhausted and in 1347 he made a truce, which, although little observed in detail, obviated any purposeful action till 1355.

French prosperity was already in decline through war and devastation when the Black Death swept over Europe. This disease, the bubonic plague of later times, spread from the Levant in 1347. France, Italy and Germany suffered equally. England was attacked in 1348, Scotland in 1350. No country was exempt. About half the population of Europe is said to have been destroyed in this visitation, though the panic at its first appearance may have exaggerated the numbers carried off. In any case renewed increase was for long impossible, for the plague returned every ten years on the average throughout the Middle Age if not with its pristine virulence. The state of the free labourer may have been somewhat improved, for wages naturally grew higher with the scarcity of men in spite of unintelligent attempts to keep them at their former level; but this was counterbalanced by the rise in prices which accompanied a decreased production and cultivation. Lords, who depended on the customary labour of their villein holders, while they lost much through the disappearance of their tenants, were better off than those who had accepted money-commutation when money was of greater value, as was largely the case in England. But the enforced rendering of customary labour under the new conditions excited bitter resent-

ment among the villeins, and prepared the way for peasant wars.

Just before he died, Philip VI made an acquisition of great moment for the future. This was the Dauphiny in the kingdom of Arles, which its last native ruler ceded to the French king to be held by his eldest son thenceforward. Lyons and other territories in the Arelate had already been annexed by the Capetians, and Provence was under the French dynasty of Naples, but the Dauphiny brought the French frontier to the Alps. It was a long stride towards the union of the whole south-French people under the French crown. Meantime France was enduring the raids of English troops and of cosmopolitan Free Companies of ex-mercenaries, and John II (1350-64) was not the man to mend matters. As a knight of unblemished honour he won the title of "the Good," but as a ruler he was frivolous and incompetent. He soon incurred the enmity of his villainous cousin, Charles the Bad of Navarre, who himself had claims on the throne as heir of Louis X through his mother, and whose Norman lands gave him endless opportunities for intrigue and treachery.

It was through an intrigue of Charles the Bad that Edward III resumed open war in 1355. He was detained at home by a passing war with Scotland, while his son the Prince of Wales, the Black Prince, began operations from Gascony. In 1356 one raid was made in Normandy with the help of Navarre's vassals, and another was led northwards by the Black Prince. John the Good with all the forces of his kingdom attacked the enemy near Poitiers. The Prince's generalship and the English archers again won an extraordinary victory over the mismanaged courage of the French, and the valiant John was brought captive to England.

Negotiations for peace followed, in which Edward III

tried to make the most of his victory. France was a prey to anarchy. Not to mention the English raids on a large scale, the whole country was reduced to atrocious misery by the hordes of Free Companies which held the land at their mercy. The Dauphin Charles, who represented the captive king, was moneyless and in trouble with the States General, which were manipulated by Charles the Bad. The vices of the royal administration had long tried the patience of the bourgeoisie, and they were redoubled by the mismanagement and the disasters of the war. In 1355 the Tiers État of Languedoil had successfully insisted that the subsidy they voted should be wholly applied by their own officials. Paris was the soul of the movement, and Paris found a leader in Étienne Marcel, the Provost of the Merchants. After Poitiers Marcel, in conjunction with the ever intriguing and betraying King of Navarre, endeavoured to use the States General, now continually resummoned to provide money for defence and for King John's ransom, in order to wrest the government from the Dauphin's hands and to secure reform. But the Dauphin was as unscrupulous and more skilful in his resistance. While he agreed to a number of reforms, he played off the provincial States against the States General, which had little real support in the country. Nobles and clergy and most of the provincial bourgeois believed in the monarchy. Even in Paris the Dauphin had a strong following, though it was outweighed by Marcel's. At this moment in 1358 a new insurrection broke out in north-east France, the *Jacquerie*¹ of the peasants. They had been made wretched by the plundering Free Companies, and were enraged at the nobles who could not defend them, and whose ransoms and dues only added to their misery. Gathering in bands they plundered

¹ Jacques Bonhomme was the nickname for a peasant.

the nobles' castles; at Meaux they almost captured the Dauphiness. But the nobles, joined even by Charles the Bad, were too strong for the peasant hordes. In a few weeks the Jacquerie was stifled in atrocities worse than those it inflicted. Marcel and Charles the Bad, meantime, were more and more discredited by the anarchy. To defend themselves against the Dauphin's army they took the fatal step of an English alliance. Paris was alienated from their cause. In July 1358 Marcel was murdered, and the Dauphin regained control of the city. The movement to limit the French monarchy was foredoomed from the first. Languedoil and Languedoc acted in complete separation. Nobles and clergy were at heart for the monarchy. Even in the Tiers État of Languedoil Marcel really represented the wealthy merchants and the people of Paris, for the mass of the bourgeoisie aimed at no more than practical reforms and security against the misuse of subsidies. In short, the monarchy had made France and was still more necessary amid class and local jealousies in these years of disaster.

Edward III had no means and no design of conquering a kingdom which against him was united. He could capture no town. But his raids forced the Dauphin to a humiliating peace at Brétigny in 1360. A heavy ransom was to be paid for King John, and most of the ancient duchy of Aquitaine, along with Calais, was to be ceded to Edward in full sovereignty. In return he surrendered his claim to the French crown. King John was set free, only to come back to die in England when one of his sons left as hostage for his ransom escaped by a breach of his parole. The Dauphin, who succeeded as Charles V the Wise (1364-80), though he lacked his father's chivalrous honour, combined remarkable statesmanship with many kingly virtues. His first task after Brétigny was to extirpate

as far as possible the marauders who were lacerating France. A general had fortunately been discovered in a Breton knight, the constable Bertrand du Guesclin, who broke the power of Charles the Bad in 1364. The Free Companies had already been somewhat checked. In 1365 Du Guesclin led them to Castile in support of the pretender, Don Henry of Trastamara. Two years later, the Black Prince hired them to restore the expelled Castilian king, Peter the Cruel, and won with their aid the battle of Navarrete. In 1369 Du Guesclin marched with them again, and finally established Don Henry. The benefit of these operations, which were seconded by energetic measures in France, was the gradual destruction of the mercenaries effected thereby. Fighting and disease wore them down.

With the revival of prosperity Charles the Wise was tempted to renew the English war under new, more favourable circumstances. England had felt the strain of an enterprise too great for her strength early in the war; Edward III ruined his Florentine bankers by repudiating his debts in 1345. He was obliged to make concessions to Parliament, which as a rule he disregarded later; but at any rate no taxation was allowed save by Parliamentary grant. The war was popular, however, and the victorious king was steadily backed by the barons and squires to whom it was profitable. Dangers loomed ahead from other causes. In place of moribund feudalism the barons were reviving its spirit by their crowds of armed retainers and dependants, whom they levied at first for service in France. Faction gained thereby a new and deadly weapon. At the same time faction found fresh scope in the anti-clerical movement of the time. The Francophil Papacy, the decadence of monasticism, and the need of money for the war roused a definite

hostility to the clergy, which found vent in the employment of lay ministers by the king and the repudiation of vassalage to the Pope. Under Edward these troubles did not amount to much, but, as he degenerated in his old age, they helped to derange an administration which had never been good.

Charles V's opportunity lay in the fact that, when the Treaty of Brétigny was completed at Calais in 1361, the renunciations of French suzerainty in Aquitaine and of Edward's claim to France had not been carried out. His hands were free. The Aquitanians had loathed quitting French rule; the Black Prince who governed them came back from Spain with ruined health and an empty treasury which he proceeded to refill by heavy taxation. Some Gascon lords appealed to Charles, who summoned the Black Prince before the Parlement of Paris in 1369. War then began. England had no allies and the great raiding expeditions which she undertook were failures. Du Guesclin refused to fight in the open field, and the invaders wasted away. A Franco-Spanish naval victory laid England open to invasion; the Aquitanians gladly received the French. When a truce was made in 1375, only Bordeaux, Bayonne and Calais remained untaken. Two years afterwards Edward died, leaving his grandson, the child Richard II (1377-99), at the mercy of baronial factions.

Charles the Wise did not long survive his adversary, but he lived long enough to overdo his crafty policy. Though he contrived to ruin his treacherous namesake of Navarre, in Brittany he roused the country against himself by a greedy attempt to annex it to the crown and thus unwillingly benefited the Anglophil Duke who re-obtained his duchy. In like manner Charles fostered the revolt of the Cardinals who elected Clement VII as

Anti-Pope¹. The king wished to continue the Babylonish captivity of Avignon. As it was he only effected the Great Schism, for half the West held by the canonical Pope Urban VI, and was freed from the ecclesiastical influence of France.

The reign had marked a further advance in the creation of a modern despotism. There is a curious parallelism in the history of France and England in the fourteenth century. Similar problems and similar expedients crop up. But in England national union and national safety were still independent of the monarchy, and in France they were strictly dependent on it. So with all the similarities the results were markedly divergent. Charles, like Edward, used hired troops composed of men of feudal training, but their leaders did not in France form a Parliamentary faction. He was able at last to make the States General a rare expedient and to impose his will on them, if he conciliated opinion by admitting to a marked degree the co-operation of notables in his councils. He had systematic ideas of government as Edward had of commerce. The debasement of the coinage was stopped. Indirect taxation and the new direct hearth-tax were put on a permanent footing. Royal magnificence became an affair of state-policy. By means of his dexterous diplomacy which kept the Emperor and Spain his allies, France was still the centre of Europe. The storm of English invasion seemed to have been weathered. But France was exhausted and was overtaxed by the splendour-loving king; and he neither foresaw, nor could he have prevented the revival of particularism and feudal anarchy under the princes of the blood with whom the kings had replaced their autonomous vassals.

¹ See below, Chap. IX, Sect. 3.

SECTION 4. THE HUNDRED YEARS' WAR, SECOND PERIOD

The practical disappearance of the Empire and the Schism in the Papacy had both fostered national particularism in Europe. International diplomacy, indeed, was busier than ever, but its achievements were for the most part unreal; kingdoms mainly acted in isolation, and, save for a soon vanishing intervention of Spain which had given Charles V mastery at sea, England and France were left to fight a national duel. Both kingdoms under their boy kings, Richard II and Charles VI (1380-1422), were attacked at this time by a similar disease. In each the great feudal houses of ancient date were extinct, but they found as dangerous successors, who carried out a bastard feudal policy, this time within the national unity and mingled with the framework of the royal government. These successors were the appanaged princes of the blood. In France they were chiefly endowed as the great fiefs were conquered or escheated to the crown. In England marriage with the heiresses of old lines was the principal method of acquisition. In both the motives of the kings were much the same. Younger sons had to be provided for. It seemed advantageous to concentrate the resources of a dangerous baronage in the hands of the royal family. A wide state without great barons was unthinkable in the Middle Ages, with their insecure slow communications and strong local feeling, and princes, much resident at court, were the best connecting links to be found. But it turned out that they were made enemies of the king and one another by their local possessions, their dynastic claims and their personal ambitions. The decadence of genuine chivalry, the dissolution of feudal morality and the weakness of a yet immature patriotism, left them

ever more unscrupulous, crafty and violent. They rent their countries with civil wars. Primitive savagery in motives and actions combines hideously with an advancing law and civilization, which were no longer informed with a wish for right and justice. All Europe felt the disastrous effects of the degeneration of the Church and the decrepitude of ideals, no longer served, yet unreplaced.

In each kingdom one appanaged house outshone its fellows. In France it was the Dukes of Burgundy. The duchy of Burgundy had been granted by King John II after the extinction of its Capetian line of Dukes to his youngest son Philip the Bold (1363-1404). Charles V, anxious to prevent the threatened renewal of the alliance between England and Flanders, had contrived with the Pope's aid to secure for his brother the hand of the heiress of Flanders and Franche Comté. In the next reign Philip gained her inheritance after a struggle. The Flemish towns, and more especially Ghent, had developed a nationality of their own, which was shown in their ecclesiastical leanings. While France was for the French Pope Clement in the Schism, Flanders was for Urban. There were internal difficulties also. The lesser bourgeois were up in arms against the monarchic, aristocratic tendencies of their count, Louis de Maële. In 1382 they drove him out under the leadership of Philip van Artevelde, son of Jacob, their one-time ruler. France at the instance of Philip the Bold came to the Count's aid, and crushed the Flemings at Roosebeke. Then England intervened under the hypocritical pretext of a crusade against the Anti-Pope. The French arms were again successful, and Philip the Bold, who inherited the county in 1384, could negotiate with his subjects. With a prudent moderation he recognized the franchises of the towns and allowed them to be Urbanist. Even Ghent

submitted in 1385. In this way a peculiar state was formed. Philip was a French prince taking an active part in French politics. But as lord of Flanders and Franche Comté and the anciently autonomous Burgundian duchy, he held a scarcely French position. He ruled a state like Savoy and Provence between France and Germany, and the natural ambition of his house would be to extend its dominion over the kinsmen of the Flemings in the Netherlands¹, and to use his influence in France for that purpose to the detriment of French interests. There Philip had as rivals his brothers, Dukes of Anjou and Berry, and eventually his nephew, Charles V's younger son, the Duke of Orleans. The Duke of Anjou was soon drawn away to Italy in quest of the kingdom of Naples, in the war for which he died; his son, however, kept the county of Provence, which was thus transferred from the Italianate Capetians of Naples to a genuine French house.

In England the overpowerful princely house was that of Lancaster. It was founded by Edmund, brother of Edward I, who was so largely endowed as to become the wealthiest English earl. In opposition to Edward II his son Earl Thomas took a line which made him chief of the Ordainers. Henceforward the house of Lancaster showed parliamentary leanings, which chiefly consisted in the tenet that the king should govern by the advice of the barons in Parliament. Edward III seemed to muzzle this tendency by marrying the heiress of Lancaster to his son John of Gaunt. But, if Duke John of Lancaster left the family policy in abeyance, he was a singularly formidable subject owing to his immense possessions. Overshadowed by him,

¹ *I.e.* the ancient duchy of Lower Lorraine, the population of which, whether speaking French or Low German, were becoming a distinct nationality.

yet too powerful, were his brothers, soon to be Dukes of York and Gloucester, while another royal kinsman, husband of the heiress of Duke John's elder brother Lionel Duke of Clarence, was Edmund Mortimer Earl of March. All these and many other barons were powerful landowners, powerful in the new semi-feudal way. The practice of levying bands for the French war by their means had made them captains of swarms of retainers. Thus arose the practice of "livery and maintenance." The great lords, besides disposing of the men in their pay and their tenants, made private agreements with the lesser landowners in their neighbourhood for mutual support in peace and war, and a peer at the head of one of these associations, though his feudal prerogatives were now trifling, was a power in the law-courts, in Parliament and in the realm. Their private quarrels and interests turned politics into an affair of faction, and perverted justice and government. Add to this, that they had been habituated to constant warfare in the French war, and it will be seen how violence and anarchy were hard to withstand.

Factions of the nobility were not the only troubles in England and France during the two minorities. There was deep-seated discontent in the lower classes of society. Heavy taxation and some misgovernment in the interminable, indecisive war were part causes. In England, however, the grievances of the villeins in the eastern counties took the leading place. Their forced labour for their lords had never been commuted, and they saw their favoured brethren to the west paying the ancient commutations in cash and being paid in return the new high wages as free labourers. Along with this went the European grievances of the lesser bourgeois against the wealthier. Every town at this period had become an oligarchy of the richer traders, which was arousing fierce hatred among the

poorer townsmen. In small cities it was merely a matter of rich and poor, but in important centres it had become a struggle between capital and labour, employers and employed. The older medieval economy, in which every journeyman might hope to set up as a small master on his own account, was disappearing in favour of the modern system, in which the capitalist employer hired journeymen who would always be journeymen. This fact had been at the bottom of the anti-aristocratic and anti-French revolutions in the Flemish cities; it had appeared in Italy, and now was present in France and England.

Under these circumstances occurred the peasant rising of 1381 in England. The villeins rose in the eastern counties plundering and burning. In some towns similar insurrections occurred. The rulers were paralysed by the novel danger, and large bodies of the rebels seized London. The courage of the boy-king, coupled with the slaughter of the rebel leader, Wat Tyler, and hypocritical concessions abolishing villeinage, weathered the storm for a moment; and then the forces of order rallied and crushed out the rebellion. A reaction against the villeins followed; but soon the gradual commutation of their services was renewed under the stress of economic facts. By the close of the Middle Age there was little villeinage left in England.

In France, where the Jacquerie had already failed, it was only the lesser bourgeoisie who rose, and only the Flemings who had any success. Elsewhere, in true France, the insurrectionary riots of the artisans against taxation and against their employers, which were most violent in 1381, were put down severally by the government. Capitalism and the modern state with its taxation, being necessary, were bound to win.

Meantime inefficient war and troubled truce were

alternating in the relations of the two kingdoms. There was no important peace-party in either, but France on the whole was the aggressor owing to the influence of Philip of Burgundy, who was anxious to secure Flanders. The two kings were now growing up. Neither had much capacity. Charles VI was flighty, feeble, and fond of a perpetual revelling. Richard II was bold and imperious, but a victim of his moods and emotions. He had the harder task, for England was losing in war with France and Scotland, and internally was troubled both with faction and religious discord. The Schism in the Papacy had given fresh impulse to anti-clerical tendencies in the kingdom, and had also favoured the growth of the new Lollard heresy. The Lollards might be a small minority, and anti-clericalism might find its chief vent in measures to check the abuses of papal prerogative; none the less a bitter hostility arose between the churchmen and their Lollard foes which added to the divisions of the realm.

In Richard's early years John of Gaunt had on the whole the most permanent influence on the government. Unpopular as he was owing to his connexion with the misgovernment of Edward III's last years, and with the mismanagement of the French and Scottish wars, he was the strongest baron in the country. But in 1386 he departed on a vain expedition to win the crown of Castile, which he claimed in right of his wife, from the house of Trastamara. Richard had already revolted from his influence, and now hoped to rule uncontrolled by means of his own nominees. The deep distrust of the unfortunate government, however, which had long existed and which was increased by a threatened, though eventually futile French invasion, gave the king's youngest uncle, the Duke of Gloucester, a turbulent and grasping man, the opportunity to put himself at the head of the

opposition in Parliament. Richard's ministers were unjustly punished, and the young king forced to assent to the appointment of a council, in which Gloucester took the lead, to govern the kingdom. When he and his friends tried to overthrow this regency by arms, they were put down. Gloucester and his faction, the Lords Appellant as they were named, then proceeded to lose support by the abuse of victory, till Richard was able suddenly to seize again on the government in 1389. In alliance with John of Gaunt, returned from Spain, the king ruled prudently and well for some years. His secret purpose seems to have been to revenge himself on the Lords Appellant, and convert the government into a despotism when time should serve. It was a cunning miscalculation. Barons and Commons, although factious, meant to keep their share in the control of the state, and were too powerful to be resisted. Richard's own folly also betrayed him. After breaking up the faction of the Lords Appellant, he murdered Gloucester, and commenced a series of tyrannous measures which unveiled his schemes. He contrived to banish John of Gaunt's own heir Henry, who had been a Lord Appellant, and on Duke John's death in 1399 he confiscated the Lancaster estates. This was his ruin. While Richard was away on a fruitless attempt to restore order in Ireland, Henry returned to England and gained general favour. Richard fell into his cousin's hands. He was deposed by Parliament, and Lancaster was declared king as Henry IV (1399-1413).

Richard II had fallen chiefly because he attempted to set up an undisguised absolutism in a manner that was vexatious and unwise. Henry IV, though a faction chief, was generally popular, and he reigned by a Parliamentary title. Richard, who was soon murdered, was childless, but by descent the boy Earl of March, great-grandson of

Lionel of Clarence, was nearer to the crown than the new king, who was also heir of the Lancastrian traditions. Henry therefore initiated the so-called Lancastrian experiment. Hitherto the king had governed, and Parliament had complained. Now king and Parliament were to govern in partnership. It was a hard task in days of disorganization and faction, but the crafty, cool-headed Henry was well adapted to it. He kept the crown to his death, overthrowing first Richard's friends when they revolted in 1400, and then his own allies, the Percies of Northumberland, who struck for a larger share of the spoil, in 1403-5. Otherwise the reign was unfortunate. Wales rose in rebellion under Owen Glendower, and was only subdued after years of fighting. Scotland, after indecisive warfare provoked by Henry, was only restrained by the unchivalrous capture of the young king James I (1406-37). France, though crippled by her factions, was permanently hostile and dangerous. It had been the wiser policy of Richard II to establish peace with his neighbours, but the change of dynasty made peace difficult, nor was Henry peaceably inclined. He was indeed bound to humour the warlike barons. In like manner he bought the support of the Church by an alliance with it against the anti-clericals, who were already thinking of confiscating its vast wealth for secular purposes, and by the fierce persecution of the genuine Lollards for their heretical doctrines. Besides its Parliamentary character, the Lancastrian experiment also implied aggressive war and religious persecution.

France might have taken more advantage of the difficulties of Richard II and Henry IV, had not her own troubles been worse. Charles VI had for a time emancipated himself from the tutelage of the Duke of Burgundy, which had been exploited by Philip in the interests of his Flemish dominion, but from 1392 he

became subject to ever more frequent attacks of insanity. Power fell into the hands of the greedy princes of the blood, each of them with a separate policy and all of them insatiable in their demands for money. The administration went from bad to worse and was soon a mass of abuses. At first the princes showed some agreement. In 1396 they made a truce with the pacific Richard II which was so long as to be a peace. They acted in concert in ecclesiastical matters. Since the Schism the Papacy of Avignon had lost most of its value for France. It was no check on the kingdoms which sided with the Roman Pope, and its heavy exactions were a grievous burden. Persuasion being unavailing, it was decided in 1398 to withdraw obedience from the Avignon Pope in order to force him to a compromise with his rival. In this way Gallicanism, the tenet of the semi-autonomy of the Church of France, took shape. But the withdrawal of obedience did not last long. The Duke of Orleans was a bitter rival of his uncle the Duke of Burgundy, and obtained the restitution of obedience in 1403. In the same spirit of opposition he renewed, at first by his private aggressions, the war with England, which thereafter continued feebly. Meantime Philip the Bold died, and was succeeded by his son John the Fearless (1404-19), who was more unscrupulous and also, by reason of his greater authority in the Netherlands, more powerful than his father. After fierce disputes he had Orleans murdered in 1407. From that moment civil war was inevitable, although it took some time for the rival factions to form completely, and for the attempts at reconciliation to fail. The new Duke of Orleans seemed to have the greater following. It included most of the princes of the blood and the greater nobility. From his father-in-law, the Count of Armagnac, who had the chief direction, it received the name of

Armagnacs. On the other hand, John the Fearless possessed two wealthy states in Burgundy and Flanders, his relatives ruled the other Netherland provinces, and he had made common cause with the bourgeois, especially in Paris, who desired reform in the administration. The renewed withdrawal of obedience from the Pope at Avignon, which occurred in 1407, was likewise in accordance with his policy and gained him favour in the University of Paris and among the clergy who desired to heal the Schism. Controlling Paris he controlled the king as well. Both factions competed disgracefully for an English alliance. John first obtained English aid; then the Armagnacs outbid him, so much to the disgust of Frenchmen that after all they had to submit to a disadvantageous peace with John.

John lost the upper hand again, however, through his own Parisian allies. Since the days of Marcel Paris had held a peculiar position in French politics which has lasted to the present time. It was the heart of France. Its bourgeoisie were organized, well-informed and spirited. It possessed the University, the centre of ecclesiastical thought, and the Court, the Parlement and the bureaucracy, which formed the mainspring of the government. But in Paris the mob of small tradesmen and artisans always tended to get out of hand. When in 1413 the States General of Languedoil were summoned to fill the empty treasury, the mob¹ rioted formidably in favour of reforms. They put to death unpopular officials and held king and Dauphin at their mercy. John the Fearless thereupon deserted them, as did the richer bourgeois. The Armagnacs in consequence were enabled to return to power as allies of the government; a bloody vengeance

¹ They were called Cabochiens from one of their leaders, the flayer Caboché.

was taken on the rioters; and the reforms, including a curious scheme for the election of officials, which they had extorted, were annulled. Soon after the two factions were again at war.

This time their strife gave opportunity for the ruin of France. Henry IV of England was now replaced by his son Henry V (1413-22), who as a practical general and statesman was perhaps the most gifted of medieval rulers. He was shrewd, adroit, an organizer and a strategist. There his merits stop, for he had neither long views nor broad views, only the utmost skill in gaining his ends. These were simple. His dynasty reposed on its alliance with the warlike baronage and the wealthy, decadent Church which was threatened by the Lollards, and also on the support of the Commons desirous of good and constitutional government. To satisfy the Church he embarked on a bitter persecution of the Lollards, which was congenial to his somewhat conventional piety. It did not extinguish the sect, but did away with its political importance. To attach the baronage an even more congenial means was ready, the conquest of France. By some casuistry Henry asserted that he was heir to Edward III's claim to the French crown, although if Edward's argument that he was the nearest male heir of Charles IV was valid, then his rights had passed, not to Henry V, who only represented Edward's third son John of Gaunt, but to the Earl of March, heir through females of Edward's second son Lionel of Clarence. More important was the opening given by the French civil war, which made one or other of the factions a secret ally of the invader. His first campaign took place in 1415 after negotiations of some hypocrisy. Its object was to capture a port of entry on the Norman coast, which would serve as a second and more formidable Calais, and the small and disciplined army

was equipped with an elaborate siege-train. Such foresight and organization were a sign of the approaching close of the Middle Age.

The object of the expedition was gained by the capture of Harfleur, and Henry with calculated rashness proceeded to challenge the French by marching across Normandy to re-embark at Calais. At Agincourt he met the army of the Armagnacs, which, even though John of Burgundy held aloof, was five times the English in number. But Henry reckoned justly on the ineptitude of French generalship, still in the traditions of two centuries before, and on his own tactical skill. He won a marvellous victory, in which the flower of the French nobles perished, and forced his way through to Calais.

While Henry V prepared for a fresh campaign, the civil war in France continued, and John the Fearless, who could not expel the Count of Armagnac, entered into alliance with the national enemy. Henry undertook the methodical conquest of Normandy by a series of sieges, and John attacked the Armagnacs at Paris. The tyranny they exercised turned Paris against them. A revolt burst out signalized by horrible massacres in which Armagnac was slaughtered by the mob, and John entered the city to control the government in 1418. He did not rule all France however, for the remnant of the Armagnacs held the centre in the name of the Dauphin Charles, who had succeeded his elder brothers as heir to the crown. Meanwhile Henry conquered Normandy, and John vacillated between alliance with him and reconciliation with the Dauphin. He seemed to choose the Dauphin's side, but in 1419 he was murdered by the prince's attendants when they met in conference at Montereau.

The murder may have been unpremeditated, but it

threw the new Duke of Burgundy, Philip the Good (1419-67), into the arms of the English. Since he directed the government, he easily effected a treaty in 1420, by which Henry married Catherine, daughter of the mad Charles VI, and was declared heir and regent of France. The conquest could then continue. It was slow, for all French patriots rallied to the Dauphin, and Henry had only reached the Loire when he died worn out in 1422. His mad father-in-law died in the same year.

Henry, so modern in his methods, was archaic in his aim, the impossible scheme of subjugating France to the English crown. That it took years to undo his work was due mainly to the feeble decadent character of Charles VII (1422-61) and to the feud of Burgundian and Armagnac. Other circumstances were unfavourable. Henry VI, "king of France and England" (1422-61), son of Henry V and Catherine, was a baby, and, although the child's uncle the Duke of Bedford, "regent of France," was an able man, England speedily showed signs of developing the same ferocious factions, which had ruined France. The Duke of Gloucester, youngest brother of Henry V, competed for power with Cardinal Beaufort, his illegitimate uncle; and, though worsted, hampered the alliance with Burgundy by his attempts to gain a state in the Netherlands.

Meanwhile Bedford, conscious that England was really too weak to subject France permanently, was endeavouring to gain over the occupied provinces. He did his best to keep order, he governed through Frenchmen, he maintained French institutions. His military superiority enabled him to conquer fresh fragments of territory. But, save the extreme Burgundian partisans, Frenchmen felt a profound aversion to his rule. Had Charles VII been capable, or the kingdom been less exhausted, the invaders

could not have resisted long. As it was, with the treasury empty, the land desolated by Free Companies and the Burgundian-Armagnac feud still raging, directly the French obtained a leader Bedford's precarious advance was stayed.

The new leader was a heroine who, like St Louis, fulfilled the ideal of the Middle Ages. Joan of Arc, "the Maid," was a peasant-girl of Domrémy, a village on the Meuse at the very edge of the kingdom. Her character was an admirable blend of goodness and good sense, and in the true fashion of a medieval saint visions, called forth by the misery of her country, urged her to undertake the deliverance of France. In spite of incredulity and the fibreless king she instilled a new faith and energy in the soldiery. In 1429 Orleans, the key to central France, was besieged by the English and near to falling. Armed like a man, she led a relieving force and rescued the city. The English who thought her a witch were as paralysed by her success as the French who knew her a saint were fired. She nerved Charles to reconquer Champagne and be crowned at Rheims like his ancestors. The spell of English invincibility was broken, but not the spell of inertia which bound Charles VII and his court. Even after her triumphs she received little backing and was captured by the Burgundians in an over-audacious attempt to save Compiègne from surrender. She was sold to the English and brought to trial as a witch and heretic. Such never received fair play in the Middle Age. Bedford was determined on her death, and he had French partisans base enough to carry out his will. By one subterfuge and another she was brought to the stake in 1431.

The crime that did to death Joan of Arc was ineffectual. The French, in spite of Bedford's generalship, made steady progress, and, what was worse, Philip of Burgundy wearied

of the English alliance. After a time he made an arrangement with Charles VII, by which he was to receive Picardy and change sides. He was first to endeavour to conclude a peace with England, but in 1435 at Arras the English obstinately refused to surrender Paris or acknowledge Charles VII. So with the tables turned and France united the war went on.

The English lost their general by Bedford's death in 1435. Soon after Paris fell to Charles VII, and if the end of the struggle was not yet in sight it was because France was all but prostrate from her long misery. Mercenaries of both sides, but principally French, the *Écorcheurs* (flayers), made the land a desert. The princes of the blood were disloyal, and, led by the Dauphin Louis, broke in 1440 into the brief revolt of the Praguerie. But Charles, according to his sobriquet, was well served, and the mass of his subjects were at his devotion. He put down the rebels, slowly diminished the *Écorcheurs*, and made progress against the English. By 1444 the invaders were bent to a truce which left them only Normandy and the coast of Gascony.

The interval of comparative peace was employed by Charles in forming a disciplined standing army and improving his finances. When in 1449 the English, already drifting into bitter faction at home, foolishly broke the truce, he was ready. Normandy, which hated its foreign masters, was conquered in a year. The Gascon coastland, which had reason to favour its ancient and well-governing Dukes, was harder to acquire. A first occupation in 1451 by treaty with the Gascons was followed by an English expedition and a revolt. But in 1453 the English under the Earl of Shrewsbury were overthrown in the decisive battle of Castillon. Bordeaux surrendered once more the same

year, and only Calais remained of the English dominions in France.

The Hundred Years' War was over. England, with a mad king and civil war imminent, was in no case to renew the struggle. France could rest in slow recuperation. The evils she had endured are beyond description. England, which suffered less, was none the less exhausted and disorganized. To set against the retarding of civilization and the misery caused by the folly and ambition of either side, there is little profit to record. Perhaps it was the alternative to the mere rotting of national unity and national institutions. Perhaps it was the safety-valve of the furious passions which had been chained all too weakly by the new medieval monarchies. In any case the nobler aims of the Middle Ages vanish in the long virulent struggle. Fortunately the victory of France was decisive enough to prevent its renewal.

SECTION 5. LATER MEDIEVAL CIVILIZATION

A change of the highest importance was taking place in European trade at the close of the twelfth century. Formerly native manufactures had been for the most part rude and their export of small range and quantity. Articles of luxury and elegance were brought from the East in exchange for raw products. But now the work of European handicraftsmen was vying with that of the Orientals, and a large industrial population was growing up in favoured centres. Venice made glass and silk, Genoa armour, Florence cloth, and their manufactures gave them a hold over all the West. It was the importation of undressed cloth or raw wool to Florence, which made the Florentines the bankers of the Papacy, for the papal revenues were transported to Italy in the form of merchandise. In the same way the Flemish towns rose to

opulence by means of their cloth manufacture which rivalled that of Florence and had a greater output. France, also, and England and even Germany traded more and more in manufactures as well as natural products such as wine and wool. Spain exported leather and steel; the Baltic fish, furs, and cord. Wealth and industry increased yearly; the great trade-routes, which had their centres, in the north in Flanders, Champagne and Cologne, and in the south in Italy, were thronged; and with the increase of security the conditions of a rapidly advancing civilization were present everywhere. Even the miseries of the recurrent Black Death and of the Hundred Years' War could only partially stem the progress so begun. Trade might recede from France and enrich Augsburg and other German towns on its way to Flanders; but its volume was little diminished. It was in the fifteenth century that Antwerp became the commercial capital of Europe. The town was central and convenient for the Western lands: it was close to the busy industries of Flanders: and it possessed a magnificent harbour to which came trading fleets both from Venice and the Baltic. A wise commercial freedom made business easy. Europe was effectually linked together by the exchange of commodities, and by the incessant journeys for business, devotion or adventure, which were undertaken by knight and cleric, merchant and even artisan.

While the merchant-class increased in wealth and importance, the early merchant-gilds, in which traders were at first banded together, gradually faded away, unless we consider a city-state such as Venice to be in economics a merchant-gild. From the thirteenth century, the true merchants concerned in export and import belonged according to their line of business to one or other of the new trade-gilds which included all of a trade

in any given town, whether their business was purely local or otherwise. The tradition of such guilds had probably come down from classical times and was revived by contact with the still existing guilds of Constantinople, but their exuberant growth was due to the medieval need of association if a tolerable life was to be obtained. They existed for mutual protection and regulation by which the guildsmen could drive an honest and steady trade. In the normal guild the full members or masters, who governed it, had each his shop. Each might have one or two journeymen, who could hope to become masters, and the guild was recruited by apprentices bound for a term of years. The system was excellently fitted for a defined and stable industry in which prices, quality and method could be fixed by guild regulations and suffered little change. The guild had its social side, and still more was this the case with the religious fraternity to which most of its members would belong. The journeymen and apprentices, though none too well off, were not divided by any social cleavage from their masters. At its best, town-life seemed an oasis amid prevailing disorder and frequent oppression.

The solidarity of the guilds, however, was not for long, at least in the more important centres of industry. There capitalism sprung up, and, although it was of incalculable benefit in the development of enterprise and the furtherance of civilization, its advent introduced the social division between employers and employed and between the petty trader and the industrial magnate. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries we find two kinds of class-separation, in Flanders and Italy of class-warfare also. One is the divergence between the guilds of petty tradesmen on the old system and the great half-merchant guilds of capitalists, the other the hostility of the permanent

journeymen, the artisans, to the members of the capitalist guilds who employed them. In Flanders the capitalist oligarchs were for long subdued politically by the turbulent artisans and petty tradesmen till Philip the Bold redressed the balance, and similar contests more or less acute were to be seen over the West. Yet it was to this capitalism that the advance of Europe, in commerce and manufacture, partly too in government and civilization, was due. The brilliant individual got his chance, and rapid progress was the result.

The influence of the bourgeoisie was great both in the elaboration of commerce and government and in the progress of the arts and of social life; but the chivalrous classes had also a most important share in the general advance. The erection of the national monarchies, and the establishment of orderly government were in themselves beyond price. They involved also as a bye-product the transformation of the royal entourage into a court, which, whatever evils it brought, was also a centre of civilization. Sumptuousness and leisure became characteristics of the royal establishments and of the imitative households of the greater nobles; and, at least by being appreciative purchasers and patrons, the chivalrous classes advanced the arts and amenities of life. They also—and this was more original in them—helped to raise the standard of customary conduct, in this way working on a parallel line to that of the Church. In the thirteenth century we find the code of honour of the Christian knight fully developed, and, although it was narrow in its application and too often degraded in contemporary practice, it marked a happy change from the lawless passions of an earlier time. A decline, indeed, soon began. Chivalry in the fourteenth century was already growing a thing of show and ceremony, and in the fifteenth its spirit was

half dead and replaced by a reviving barbarism more crafty than of old, and veneered with knightly phrases. But for all that the new standard was acknowledged, and its effects were not everywhere and altogether lost. The modern ideal of a gentleman was already conceived in the "verray parfit gentil knight" of Chaucer, who "loved chivalrye, Trouthe and honour, fredom and curteisye."

A similar culmination and decay was experienced by the Church during the later Middle Age. Perhaps we may take the year 1230 as approximately the apogee. Then a strong legislating Pope watched over the discipline and mission of the Church. Bishops and secular clergy, if far behind the ideal, were perhaps more efficient for good, more active in the leavening of a society but little removed from barbarism, even than in the days of St Bernard. The different Orders of monks had lost their primitive fervour, but were still in vigorous activity, while the newly instituted Friars were influencing the masses of the population as no Order had done before them. This prospect was very soon overcast. The evils, always present in the Church, worldliness and indolence, gained ground. The Papacy became perverted and held in leading-strings at Avignon, the bishops for the most part younger sons of great families. The monks grew fossilized. After the Black Death their numbers seriously diminished, and their learning and piety steadily decreased. The friars grew most corrupt of all. New heresies, caused, partly by the patent faults of the hierarchy, partly by the growth of knowledge and an embryo critical spirit, were rife. Yet even here the advance once made was not annulled. Christianity had permeated daily life in a way unthought of in the Dark Ages.

In literature, too, we trace the same set-back, which yet did not cancel the general progress made. It is

curious that, as the French monarchy rose to its height under Philip the Fair, the predominance of French culture began to decline. One reason, no doubt, was the growth of nationality, by which the vernacular literatures more especially were affected. Another reason was the decadence of French literature itself. The troubadours of the south never recovered from the devastation of the Albigensian crusades. In the north the romances in verse lost their savour and were replaced by prose romances ever longer and duller. New kinds of compositions, satiric and didactic, suited for the bourgeois audience which was increasing in importance, took the lead, and their energy and interest waned persistently. Although in the fifteenth century two great lyric poets, Villon and Duke Charles of Orleans, arose, they were swamped by the tedious mass of instructive poems and morality plays. The typically medieval motives and themes for literature were in fact worked out.

It was in other countries than France that medieval literature showed vitality and hopeful development. In Italy the Florentine Dante Alighieri (1265-1321) first brought a half-Provençal style of lyric poetry to its perfection, and later summed up the ideals, the life, and the thought of the Middle Ages in the greatest single poem of the world, the *Divine Comedy*. Not only that; the power of portraiture and sense of reality, the heightened style and sense of form, in the *Comedy*, heralded and made possible the new growth out of and away from the Middle Ages, which was the Italian Renaissance. How much of this, however, depended not on his individual genius, but on the progress his nation had made, is seen in Chaucer, who began the series of English poets late in the fourteenth century. With singular powers both in poetry and characterization, imitating as he did the


Italians of the early Renaissance who followed Dante, Chaucer none the less remains wholly in the Middle Ages and keeps still before us the blithe, boyish freshness of their prime.

Even in theology, although the University of Paris was the theological capital of Europe, France ceased to hold a marked pre-eminence. In the eleventh century it was Frenchmen and half-Frenchmen who formed Church-doctrine. St Anselm of Burgundian Aosta was the last of the Fathers; Berenger of Tours the heresiarch. In the twelfth century Abelard introduced the dialectic method of reasoning, and was followed by the long succession of the Schoolmen, who whatever was their origin almost all studied and taught at Paris. But, as the thirteenth century drew to its close, we find the most eminent schoolmen to be of non-French extraction. Thomas Aquinas, their greatest name, whose philosophy was accepted as the standard of the Church, was a Neapolitan, Duns Scotus an Irishman; Roger Bacon, whose intuitions foreshadowed modern science, was an Englishman. Afterwards something of decline, in spite of the genius of individuals, overtook theology also. It was impossible to continue a purely deductive reasoning, in the same methods, on the same subject-matter, with the same premises, without a decline of force and originality. Here, too, the Middle Age was waiting for some decisive step forward.

It was not to be expected that such a dearth of true inspiration should befall architecture, the art which embodied the most imaginative aspirations and the most feasible conceptions of the Middle Ages. Yet even here a certain falling-off is manifest. The main ideal, the vast aspiring abode of worship, the unity formed of infinite cells, filled with mysterious light and

shade, whence peered carven foliage and faces grotesque or saintly, was, so to say, reached. Further development implied the over-emphasis of some element of the fabric. And so it was. The fourteenth century was marked by a marvellous richness of decoration, which in fifteenth-century France became excessive and functionless as the flamboyant style. In England at the same time, a harder, more narrow style, suitable for Henry V, the perpendicular, became dominant. Here the desire for a wide expanse of stained glass by the readiest means was dominant. But even in these slight aberrations Gothic architecture remained a thing of glory. It retained imagination and thoughts on which to exercise its creative faculties. It had so much to say, that what it said could all have a definite meaning, as its ornamentation had a use. The very over-elaboration of the flamboyant churches was partly due to the advance of the art of sculpture. In spite of the radical lack of inquisitiveness which characterized medievals in regard to the physical world, they were not inobservant or without skill in reproducing what they easily observed; and in the fifteenth century they achieved portraits, which were lifelike, if oddly limited in their expression. Painting with its joy in colour progressed further both in range and technique. In power over their medium the best Flemish artists had little to learn from the coming Renaissance. It was the sense for form, for grace and imaginative simplicity, once so marked in the Gothic architects, that they failed in.

Italy was departing from the medieval standpoint in the fifteenth century, and demands therefore separate treatment; but much, or rather most of her life differed little from that of the north. In one notable characteristic an identical tendency ruled. This was the universal



SOME IMPORTANT TRADE ROUTES IN THE XIV CENTURY

desire for pomp and show. As the Middle Ages wore on this native desire for gorgeousness could be more satisfied and became more engrossing. Any event or action, that could be made an occasion for pageant or festival, was so used. The medievals had created such splendid trappings for life and thought, that the trappings seemed as important as what they clothed. In the fifteenth century we feel that what they clothed is often obsolescent or moribund.

CHAPTER IX

THE COUNCILS AND THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE

SECTION I. GERMANY TILL 1437

The first effect of the decadence of the German kingship was the continual subdivision of the principalities which made up the greater part of the kingdom. The old law of inheritance, by which private property was shared equally among the male heirs, was applied to those offices and fiefs which had once been indivisible units, and the manifest evils resulting from the custom, which caused the fragments of the broken realm in their turn to disintegrate, could not easily lead to its reform in view of the personal claims of the heirs and the support they had in tradition and opinion. The evils were seen however; the princely families saw their pre-eminence vanishing; and where custom did not intervene attempts were made in the direction of primogeniture. Thus to the senior Duke of Austria was reserved the sole rule of the Habsburg lands. And as a result the two new houses, which had made their profit of the imperial dignity, the Habsburgs and the Luxemburgs, were the most powerful in the Empire, for their rivals formed mere family groups, which by no means always acted in harmony.

Meanwhile the dread of an overpowerful king, which had once been the Electors' ruling motive, had passed away. The kingship was obviously a titular distinction. It was an object of ambition because it was the highest

of secular dignities, and because it gave opportunities for family aggrandisement; no longer because it conferred actual power. Indeed it was such a burden that only an already powerful prince could now venture to undertake it. When Henry VII died in 1313, the obvious candidate was Frederick the Fair of Austria. An attempt of Philip the Fair of France to get a French prince elected found no welcome, but, though the Luxemburg party could not put forward their chief, King John of Bohemia, on account of his youth, they could and did declare for one of the Dukes of Bavaria, Lewis IV (1314-47). A divided election, which was made more confusing by the votes of rival claimants to several electorates, was the result. The customary civil war then began. During it Frederick received a severe blow by the defeat of his able brother Leopold at the hands of the newly formed Swiss Confederation¹, and it was decided by his own defeat and capture at Mühlberg in 1322.

At this moment a new foe rose in Lewis' path in what seems a gratuitous fashion. The truth was that the Empire, although a shadow, could not free itself from its own past, so long as the Papacy had not surrendered its theocracy. The anxiety which possessed the Popes to prevent imperial interference in Italy and to keep their once dangerous rival in leading-strings had been increased, if anything, by their "captivity" at Avignon and consequent subservience to France. Their own power in Italy tottered, and yet must be maintained, and Henry VII's expedition seemed to show how effectual an Emperor's intervention could be. So on Henry's death Clement V took the opportunity to declare himself in set terms suzerain of the Empire, and in virtue of his powers to appoint his own partisan, the Angevin King Robert of Naples, Imperial

¹ At Morgarten in 1315. See below, p. 419.

Vicar of Italy. The claim implied that no King of the Romans could reign without receiving the Pope's assent to his election, and Clement's successor John XXII (1316-34), a man obstinate, grasping and shrewd, held firmly to his presumed right. He pretended neutrality in the civil war, and when Lewis was victorious merely offered to adjudge the conflicting claims in answer to his request for an imperial coronation. An open breach followed quickly: The unsteady, impressionable king was at least not minded to surrender the independence of his crown or to abandon the chance of gains in Italy. In reply to his alliance with the Italian Ghibellines the Pope summoned him to abide his decision and to answer for a league with heretics. Lewis countered by declaring that his election and coronation gave him full right to rule the Empire, and by retorting the accusation of heresy on the Pope himself, whose adversaries, the "spiritual" Franciscans¹, found refuge at the imperial court. The ancient controversy between Pope and Emperor was revived in a manner which prevented it being an anachronism. While John XXII, like another Innocent IV, excommunicated and deposed the king in 1324, Lewis' partisans gave a new and epoch-making turn to the extreme theory of the Holy Roman Empire. An Italian, Marsilio of Padua, with the help of a Frenchman, John de Jāndun, sketched in his *Defensor Pacis* theories which were to work potently for several centuries. They were in the nature of a return to Antiquity, and thus a beginning of the Renaissance, for, although most parts of them had already been broached under Philip the Fair, as a whole they struck a different note. Marsilio taught the supremacy of the lay state, and he considered the ultimate sovereignty of the state to reside in the citizens. From them Emperor or King had

¹ See below, pp. 432-3.

a delegated authority, which rested on God's ordinance. As the state was composed of Christian men, it was concerned with their eternal, as well as their temporal, welfare, and therefore had authority over the ecclesiastical hierarchy. That hierarchy was reduced to a purely erastian position. The priesthood was merely for the Sacraments and similar functions. The episcopate was not apostolic. St Peter was neither Prince of the Apostles nor Bishop of Rome. The Papacy possessed neither a theocracy, nor an ecclesiastical monarchy. While the government of the Church in their dominions rested with the kings, matters of faith belonged to a General Council of the Church, and, since every Christian was a member of the Church, a real General Council must be composed of laymen as well as priests. As a consequence Marsilio treated the Canon Law, being derived from the hierarchy and from papal authority, as invalid.

Actual events were a ludicrous parody of these magnificently premature speculations. Supported by the Italian Ghibellines and evading the Guelfs, Lewis in 1328 entered Rome. There the flattered Romans, acting as the sovran people, elected and crowned him Emperor; acting as a synod, they deposed Pope John on account of his heresy in the Franciscan controversy and set up an Anti-Pope. These proceedings gained no real acceptance in the West; and, when Lewis, driven from Rome by Robert of Naples and at odds with the Ghibellines, retreated to Bavaria, his quarrel with the Pope assumed its original lines. He demanded recognition and favoured the "spiritual" Franciscans; John demanded his renunciation and the acknowledgement of papal suzerainty. John XXII's death made little difference. The next Pope, Benedict XII (1334-42), saw that Germany in general was on Lewis' side, and might

have agreed to a compromise, had not the pressure of the kings of France and Naples kept him unbending and insistent on Lewis' abdication. Lewis was strengthened by this combination of inadmissible pretensions with political subservience to France. He himself concluded in 1338 a futile and short-lived alliance with England¹; his vassals were more effective in their measures. The Interdict under which John XXII had laid them had always been ill observed, and now was mainly disregarded. As for the papal suzerainty, the Electors were determined to repel it altogether. In a famous meeting at Rense in 1338 they declared that the Empire was held from God alone, that the elect of the majority of the Electors was at once King of the Romans with no need of papal confirmation, and that the King of the Romans was in possession of all imperial rights, his coronation as Emperor by the Pope being honorific only. It was the ancient doctrine of the Holy Roman Empire modified to suit the new electoral method, but none the less, coming when it did, it marks a definite stage in the decline of the papal theocracy, and in the transformation of the Empire into a national federation of Germany.

The conclusion of the Electors was promptly made an imperial law by the German Diet, and, as Lewis soon adopted a French alliance, some compromise might have been made with the Pope, had not Lewis weakened his own position in Germany. King John of Bohemia, intriguing, greedy, restless and inconstant, had generally been a thorn in the Emperor's side, for Lewis, in the true spirit of the time, was always scheming to increase the family power of his own house of Wittelsbach, and on this matter the Luxemburg interests collided with his. However in 1339 John and Lewis were again reconciled.

¹ See above, p. 377.

Lewis foolishly upset the reconciliation. To aggrandise his house, he had already obtained the vacant march of Brandenburg for his eldest son. In 1341 of his own authority he divorced the heiress of the Tyrol from her husband, a son of King John, and had her remarried to his own son the Margrave. After this the feud with the Luxemburgs was never closed, and the Electors were alienated. Lewis in vain tried to appease the new Pope Clement VI (1342-52). No concession was enough. In 1346 the Electors chose King John's heir as Charles IV (1346-78). Lewis still retained the allegiance of the greater part of Germany; the Free Cities had always stood by him; but he was old and in 1347 he died. The house of Wittelsbach remained important, but too subdivided among coheirs to take a leading place.

The death of his adversary enabled Charles to obtain a gradual acquiescence in his kingship, for the Wittelsbach party could not produce a formidable anti-king. Charles, too, though he personally admitted the papal right to confirmation and fealty, did not risk unpopularity by any move towards repealing the law of 1338. He was a monarch of the new type, cool and cautious, thoroughly practical and proof against illusions. His first pre-occupation was with the exaltation of the Luxemburg house, and with the solidification and welfare of their dominions. The chief acquisition he made, by means of adroit diplomacy, was the march of Brandenburg, with which, after ousting the Wittelsbachs, he endowed his son Sigismund. But Bohemia and its dependencies were his chief care. He increased and established the royal power, he enforced peace; by the erection of an archbishopric at Prague he gave the kingdom ecclesiastical independence; by the foundation of the University of Prague he made the city an intellectual capital.

Charles IV was not such a stepfather to the Empire as his contemporaries judged him. True that the glamour which surrounded the holy realm was altogether lost on him, the least romantic of men, but he did his best to patch the unseaworthy ship and to preserve its existing fabric. We may guess that his general policy was to gain a firm legal definition of what remained to the Empire by recognizing the changes which had come about, and, by admitting in practice the contraction of the frontiers, to retain formal claims over the lost lands which might be of use later. In this sense he acted throughout. While leaving untouched the law of 1338, he was debarred by no feeling of shame from personally recognizing the papal suzerainty and his own exclusion from Italy. By this attitude he bought the Pope's assent to a hasty visit to Rome for his coronation, and behaved so discreetly, merely selling titles and formal privileges, that he was even called to Italy again to help Urban V (1362-70) then in difficulties with the Visconti. Yet, besides the monetary profit, Charles drew from his two expeditions some advantage for his crown. The Popes, at last satisfied with the imperial impotence in Italy, made no further objection to the indissoluble union of the imperial dignity with the German kingship and were no longer concerned to introduce additional anarchy into, or insist on their theoretic suzerainty over, Germany itself. Much the same tactics were employed by Charles in the dismembered kingdom of Burgundy or Arles. He had himself solemnly crowned its king to revive the memory of his rights. France was won to receive investiture of Dauphiny and Franche Comté by the grant of an imperial vicariate which gave the full sovran powers which she possessed in fact. The border county of Savoy was strengthened by a like concession, all the

more valuable as it was an impediment to further French advance. Charles really abandoned what he had not got in order to prevent further change.

In Germany itself Charles was more constructive, although still on the line of least resistance. He presided over a loose collection of states of all sizes prone to civil war and foreign intrigues. The disintegration of Germany was now irrevocable, but civil war and foreign intervention could be minimized. The motives which led the Popes to increase them were now removed. The internal causes were uncertain elections to the Empire, the rivalry of great houses, and the numberless petty quarrels of numberless petty states. On all three the famous Golden Bull¹, which became imperial law in 1356, exercised ~~a healing~~ influence. By it the seven electoral votes were attached each to an indivisible territory inherited in the lay electorates by primogeniture. A majority of votes in the Electoral College carried an election to the Empire, and the prince elected was thereupon King of the Romans in full right. During a vacancy two Electors took over the regency, the Pope's claims being thus excluded. So successful were these provisions that there were no more disputed elections or papal interventions. The indivisible electorate did something to favour the custom of primogeniture, and still more effective were those enactments which regularized existing custom. The Electors were admitted to possess all the powers of sovereignty without the name. They formed a special College in the Diet as the leaders of that aristocracy of ruling princes which controlled the greater part of Germany.

As a federation Germany seemed to have some promise

¹ So called from being sealed in gold in common with other solemn imperial acts.

of development. Although the monarchy was a mere show deprived of lands and revenues, the Emperor was often a powerful prince, and the Electors maintained some common action. Town-leagues for mutual protection, and mixed leagues for local peace were springing up. None the less disintegration went on apace. Italy and Arles were practically lost. Now it was shown that Germany itself was too diverse to form a single nation, when two outlying provinces began to split off from the body of the realm.

The territory now called Switzerland had originally been divided between the kingdom of Burgundy and the duchy of Swabia, but in the twelfth century it was mainly under the rule of the Dukes of Zähringen. When the Dukes died out in 1218 their lands were broken up. Much went to their heirs, principally to the Counts of Habsburg; much was ruled by nobles of less standing. Some towns, such as Bern, and especially the forest community of Uri came directly under the rule of the Emperor. Within the disintegrated duchy two houses at once began to try to re-erect the Zähringen dominion. Count Peter II of Savoy conquered the Romance-speaking land of Vaud. Count Rudolf of Habsburg, later King of the Romans, and his kin made progress in the German-speaking lands. Dread of his encroachments on their communal autonomy was quickly aroused among the mountaineers, and in 1291 Uri made a permanent alliance with the two neighbouring forest communities of Schwyz¹ and Unterwalden with the view of resisting his son Duke Albert of Austria, afterwards King Albert I. They were thus the friends of the anti-Austrian party in the Empire, and Henry VII not only made Schwyz and Unterwalden imperial demesne like Uri, but also recognized these three original cantons

¹ From Schwyz the name of Switzerland is derived.

as forming a political unity. This was the origin of a new state and nation, the Swiss confederation. Austria did not submit tamely to be ousted from her ancient rights over Schwyz and Unterwalden, but Leopold, the brother of the Anti-Caesar Frederick, received a crushing defeat in 1315 at Morgarten¹, when the mountaineers on favourable ground proved more than a match for the Austrian knights. Troubles soon began again, for the free Swiss exercised a natural attraction over their neighbours, and their advance damaged the Austrian rights. They gained the adhesion of the powerful free towns of Bern and Zurich, and in 1355 a peace recognized their alliance with Lucerne, still a nominal Habsburg possession. In 1364 Zug acquired a like position to Lucerne. Still further aggressions of the Swiss, who like the south German Free Cities were alarmed at the ambitions of Duke Leopold III of Austria, led to a renewal of war, which resulted in the decisive defeat and death of Leopold at Sempach in 1386. Glarus revolted from its Austrian master and formed a new canton, and in 1415, when the Swiss of the "Eight Ancient Cantons" obtained full internal autonomy from the Emperor Sigismund, they had already conquered most of the Habsburg lands south of the Rhine. In the next fifty years they rounded off their territory. Then followed the victorious war with the French Duke of Burgundy and the conquest of Romance Switzerland from the Duke of Savoy, and finally in 1499 their membership of the Empire was reduced to a mere name after a war with the Emperor Maximilian. Some time before the valour of the Swiss infantry had made them recognized to be the best foot-soldiers in Europe, but, by their custom of hiring themselves out to their neighbours, they had acquired an equivocal fame as greedy mercenaries from a mercenary state.

¹ Cf. above, p. 411.

The second nation, which grew up within the limits of the Empire, differed from Switzerland in that it included a part of France, which supplied it with its directing bias. The kernel of the Netherlands was formed by the ancient land of the Salian Franks, and thus had a natural unity in spite of the fact that two languages were spoken within it, the Low-German dialect of Flemish and the Romance dialect of Walloon. At the break-up of Charlemagne's Empire, however, it had been divided into two, not of course for any linguistic or racial reason, but because of the varying facilities of communication and intercourse. The county of Flanders, which stood in constant connexion with the lands of the North Sea and the Channel, became a French fief. The division east of the Scheldt went to Germany under the name of Lower Lorraine. It was thus linked with the far more German Frisia to the north of the Rhine and subjected for long to strong German influences. But Flanders, meanwhile, was presenting a characteristically Frankish hybrid of Teutonic and Romance parentage; and, as first the duchy of Lower Lorraine, and then the Empire itself dissolved, it attracted the easterly lands, Brabant, Liège and Luxemburg into its orbit. By the fourteenth century a common social and political *régime* existed in these districts. They were essentially industrial, the cloth weaving and export of Flanders providing their chief trade. As such the cities went through the full career of a medieval commune. First, the count and nobles were obliged to yield before the oligarchy of wealthy mercantile families. Then, in the fourteenth century these in their turn were subjected by the artisan guilds among whom a riotous demagoguery flourished. The disorders which were the result helped to work a cure. Nobles, and merchants and small masters were all put

on the same side, and fortunately a reigning house appeared which had the skill to raise a moderate monarchy. This was the younger house of Burgundy, founded by Philip the Bold¹. While Philip's eldest son John the Fearless (1404-19) succeeded to Burgundy and Flanders, his younger son obtained the duchy of Brabant and this territory was united to Flanders by John's son Philip the Good (1419-67) in 1430. Other acquisitions rounded off Philip's dominions. In 1433 he gained not only Hainault, but Holland to the north of the Rhine, and in 1451 Luxemburg was acquired likewise. Only the prince-bishopric of Liège remained unabsorbed, and that was really in Burgundian leading-strings.

This collection of small territories soon began to put on the characters of a state and nation. The Dukes of Burgundy contrived to advance their monarchical authority, while admitting a considerable freedom to the Estates of their subjects. They even erected central organs for justice and finance. Steadily the Netherlands drifted away both from France and the Empire. Their civilization acquired a strong local colour. French in origin and elements, it was modified in a direction both German and bourgeois. The *hôtels de ville*, not the churches, show its best architecture. The Flemish painters, such as the Van Eycks and Memling, in spite of their technical skill and deep insight, show a singular indifference to grace and form. Yet, while Swiss nationality produced little beside soldiership, the Netherlands enriched Europe with their art and were the pioneer in most advances of material civilization.

Meantime the general body of the Empire continued its slow dissolution. Splintered into hundreds of petty states and distracted by countless feuds, which often

¹ See above, pp. 387-8.

developed into considerable wars between rival princes, or princes and town-leagues, its condition was aggravated by the Schism in the Papacy, which deprived it even of a steadfast, half-domestic enemy. The kingship could do little, and, being now without domains or income, tended inevitably to fall to some neighbouring monarch whose non-German lands enabled him to bear its burden. That foreign monarch became more clearly to be found in the south-east. A national sentiment among the Electors prevented them choosing from France or Burgundy. But in the south-east the kingdom of Bohemia was attached to the Empire, and the house of Luxemburg had German interests and represented German influences in its non-German realms. In the long run the outcome was that the Habsburgs, as heirs to the Luxemburgs, became in practice hereditary Emperors.

The Luxemburgs were hampered by the national needs of their kingdoms, which in their time were barely reconcilable with the claims of the Empire. Thus, when King Wenceslaus of Bohemia (1378-1400) succeeded his father Charles IV, he won general dislike not only by his own brutality and drunkenness, but also by his continual residence in Bohemia outside the German kingdom. He suffered, too, for what he could not help. There were no means of exercising real authority in Germany, or of putting a stop to the petty wars, which were exacerbated by the Schism. In Bohemia Czech and German mutual hatred, the insubordination of the nobles, and rising heresy produced something like anarchy. Lastly, the Luxemburgs could never hold together; Wenceslaus' kinsmen, Jobst of Moravia and Sigismund of Brandenburg, were his most dangerous competitors. None the less, the dominions of the house increased, for Sigismund married the heiress of the Angevin Lewis the Great of Hungary and Poland,

and after long wars with her Angevin kinsmen of Naples made good his claim to be King of Hungary (1387-1437).

Irritated by Wenceslaus' absence, vices and inefficiency, the Electors at last deposed him, and this time elected a pure German, Rupert (1400-10), the Elector Palatine of the Rhine. They soon regretted their choice, for Rupert, whose territory was small, and who wished to be a real king, alarmed them by his reclamations and aggressions, while his expedition to Italy in support of the Roman Pope whom he favoured was repelled in humiliating fashion by the Visconti. They returned on his death to the Luxemburgers in the double election of Jobst and Sigismund (1410-37). As Jobst soon died, Sigismund was left without a competitor. He was scarcely more effectual as a ruler than Wenceslaus, but with him the Holy Roman Emperor once more appeared as the head of Christendom, for which Sigismund's energy and diplomatic breadth of view well fitted him. By his exertions the Council of Constance was a success and the Great Schism was closed. That a real reform of the Church was not achieved was hardly due to Sigismund whose means were scanty and whose own dominions were insubordinate.

The impotence of the Empire was shown in the wars with Bohemia to which Sigismund (1419-37) succeeded on the death of his brother Wenceslaus. There a strongly anti-German national feeling combined with the heresies propagated by Hus to produce a revolution. When Hus was martyred by the Council of Constance, nobles, peasants and burghers joined to plunder the clergy and expel the hated German element of the population. For long Sigismund strove in vain to recover the revolted kingdom and stamp out its heresy. He formed wide leagues of German princes for these "crusades"; but they were all incoherent, and, when it came to fighting,

the German armies were disgracefully beaten by the Czechs under their leaders Zizka and Procop, while in the later years of the war the German border-lands were severely ravaged by their enemies. It was the internal divisions of Bohemia which gave Sigismund back his kingdom. The party of the nobles held a less radical heresy, and saw the land was exhausted. They defeated the extremists, and in 1436 came to an agreement with Sigismund which guaranteed their chief demands. For the time Bohemia had cut itself loose from the German connexion.

Hitherto in the Electoral College south and west Germany had held the decisive voice. The electorate of Saxony was too tiny, and that of Brandenburg had been a disorderly appendage to Bavaria or Bohemia. But the north could not permanently be without its due weight in the Empire, and it fell to Sigismund's lot to be the instrument by which it regained influence and two of the greatest of modern German houses won the front rank. When the house of Saxe-Wittenberg became extinct, he conferred in 1423 its electorate and duchy on his ally in the Husite wars, Frederick Margrave of Misnia. Thus the electorate, linked to the wide possessions of its new lord, became the powerful state of Saxony which subsists to-day. The larger electorate of Brandenburg only needed a resident and capable ruler to advance in power, and Sigismund provided one, when in despair of governing the land, he made Frederick of Hohenzollern, Burgrave of Nuremberg, his lieutenant in the March, and later in 1415 created him Elector in reward for his services. Lack of means and need of friends were Sigismund's motives, but incidentally he withdrew on behalf of the Luxemburgs and their heirs from north Germany. As for Frederick he soon reduced the electorate to order,

and became a chief of the Empire. The kernel of modern Germany was formed in the welter of its medieval ruins.

The house of Luxemburg became extinct with Sigismund and its hereditary claims passed to the Habsburgs, who thenceforward had the ambition of uniting Hungary and Bohemia with their Austrian dominions. Almost a century elapsed before they could do so permanently, but, once they had effected it, they could retain the imperial dignity in their house. In spite of all his efforts Sigismund left the Empire as he found it. The Husite wars had exhausted his material resources; the failure of the reforming Council of Basel had shattered his international position, and for the time being the Empire had become a mere name.

SECTION 2. SCANDINAVIA AND THE BALTIC

On the death of Canute the Great in 1035 his dominions almost immediately broke up. Norway at once became independent. England followed suit on the death of his son Harthacnut, and soon became detached from Scandinavia by the Norman conquest. The period of Viking emigration now was over. The Church, however, still linked the northern lands to the West. At first her influence was felt through Germany. The Archbishop of Bremen was metropolitan of the North. But the strife of the Empire and the Papacy gave Scandinavia ecclesiastical nationality. In 1105 the Danish archbishopric of Lund was founded; in 1152 Norway became the province of Drontheim; and in 1164 Sweden the province of Upsala. Eagerly favoured by the national kings, the Church rapidly grew in power and wealth. Heathendom disappeared, and, with the institution of monasteries, the Northern Churches followed, but little delayed, all the general ecclesiastical and religious vicissitudes of the West.

In Norway this evolution led to a special variant of the universal contest between Church and State, for in 1164 the prelates obtained, in return for their aid in the ever-recurring war for the possession of the throne, an acknowledgement of rights which amounted in practice to electing each new king. This was too much for the Norsemen to submit to. The leader of the lay party, Sverri (1182-1202), seized the crown and initiated a long struggle with the bishops and the Papacy. He successfully defied even Innocent III till his death, and, although in the final compromise under Hakon V (1217-63), the Church obtained the same degree of freedom as in Germany, the independence of the lay-state was confirmed.

While in Norway the ordinary freeman maintained his ancient position, and supported the kings in their contest with the Church, in Sweden the peasant steadily deteriorated in status. The more even land with its easier communications allowed the growth of feudalism. There the opposition between the Swedes proper to the north and the Goths to the south, which lasted through the twelfth century, gave way to the rivalry of great families for the throne, during which the nobles, and in a less degree the prelates obtained such power as threatened to destroy the central government. None the less the nation showed considerable energy. Finland was conquered, and partly colonized, if Russia repulsed them.

Like the Swede, the Danish peasants lost greatly in status by the increase of feudalism, and the nobles and prelates attained a dangerous degree of power, partly through the minute particularism which characterized Scandinavia and partly through the vitality which the custom of electing to the crown displayed. For a while, however, the ability of the reigning house overmastered its difficulties and led to a second Danish expansion, this

time to the east in the Baltic. The primitive, heathen tribes, which dwelt on the eastern coasts and through whose lands stretched trade-routes east and south, offered a tempting prize to their crusading and adventurous neighbours. Sweden conquered the Finns, the Danes turned further southwards. Under Waldemar I (1157-82), Canute VI (1182-1202) and Waldemar II (1202-41) they conquered the Slavs on the south and the Esthonians on the east. After the death of Emperor Henry VI German suzerainty was thrown off and Holstein was seized on. Norway became her neighbour's vassal. But the threatened north German princes banded together, and in the years from 1222 to 1227 the forces of Waldemar II were broken. Esthonia and Rügen alone remained of the Danish conquests.

The power of the kingship and with it the prosperity of Denmark then steadily waned. At each accession the bishops and nobles extorted fresh renunciations of authority from their elective kings. Feuds between the members of the royal house, all richly endowed with domains and ambitious either of the crown or of independence, added to the anarchy which prevailed. So weak became the kingdom that in the early fourteenth century it was all but conquered by the German Count of Holstein, Gerard the Great.

Long before German arms were invading Denmark, German commerce was supreme in the Baltic, where its predominance affected the internal evolution of the Scandinavian kingdoms. Being thoroughly overmatched, the native trading-class never had an opportunity of increasing in influence, and left the kings to struggle vainly with the nobles and the Church. The German sea-traders of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries came from all the towns of north Germany. While the Rhenish

towns, headed by Cologne, turned mainly westward and had their chief emporiums at Bruges and London, the north-eastern voyaged east under the leadership of Hamburg and Lübeck. At Russian Novgorod and Norwegian Bergen, and above all at Wisby in the Swedish island of Gothland were the centres of their trade. Wisby became a German town. They bought raw materials from the Baltic lands and even far-travelled oriental products. They sold manufactured articles, especially cloth, in return. In the decline of the Empire the towns formed leagues for mutual protection, and by 1300 the general League of the Hanse was firmly established.

In spite of quarrels between town and town the Hanse League proved too strong for the disorderly Scandinavian realms. It put down the remnants of Viking piracy. It was vainly challenged by Waldemar IV (1340-75), who had contrived to restore the kingdom of Denmark. Although he captured Wisby, he was helpless against the full might of the League and its allies. In 1370 not only were the privileges of the Hanse restored and increased, but they even received a voice in the election of the Danish kings. Hakon VI of Norway who had joined with Waldemar underwent a similar humiliation.

Parallel to the greatness of the Hanse was that of the Teutonic Order¹. Their territories were linked to Germany by the acquisition of Pomerelia in 1310, and its chief town Dantzic succeeded later to the commercial position of Wisby. By the purchase of Esthonia from Denmark in 1346 they reached the Gulf of Finland. Fed by a stream of warlike knights from Germany, and ruled by capable Grand Masters, the Order formed a well-knit and formidable state. It was half-feudal and half-monastic in character, and by the encouragement it gave to trade

¹ See above, pp. 298-9.

and colonization created a thoroughly German polity, especially in Prussia where the native Balts suffered most. There a German population was introduced. Further north there was only a German aristocracy. Under their attacks Christian Poland and heathen Lithuania were shut off from the sea.

But there were dangerous flaws in the structure. Lithuania became Christian and was united to Poland in 1386, thus creating a great power. In its own lands the Order was unable to abandon its greedy exclusiveness. Before long, it was hated by all its subjects including the settled German nobles, townsmen and peasants. Here was a lever for the intervention of the Poles, who under their king Wladislaw II won in 1410 the decisive victory of Tannenberg. The Order never recovered from the blow. Concessions to the Prussians came too late. When Polish intervention was renewed in the civil war, the knights were compelled to submit to their enemies' terms. By the peace of Thorn in 1466 they ceded Pomerelia or West Prussia to Casimir IV of Poland and became his vassals for East Prussia. Poland possessed Dantzic and had won her way to the Baltic Sea.

Meanwhile the monopoly of the Hanse was threatened in Scandinavia by a national reaction, which, owing to the undisciplined particularism of the three kingdoms, was curiously blind and tentative. In each country the royal authority was in a shattered condition, and Denmark suffered as well from partial foreign invasion, for the duchy of Slesvig, on the death of its last Danish appanaged prince, was taken possession of by the Counts of Holstein. Some remedy to this state of affairs was provided by the union of all three kingdoms in the Union of Kalmar, and by the efforts of a series of kings who after all were Germans. The Union came about through the extinction

of the native dynasties. At the death of Waldemar IV of Denmark in 1375 his younger daughter Margaret was queen of Hakon VI of Norway, who was himself the rightful heir of Sweden, but had been prevented from succeeding to the Swedish throne by the deposition of his father Magnus and the election of his German cousin Albert of Mecklenburg (1363-89). Margaret was skilful enough to obtain the election of her boy-son Olaf as King of Denmark, and the death of Hakon VI in 1380 left her regent of both Denmark and Norway. When Olaf died in turn in 1387, she succeeded him as queen. Meanwhile in Sweden the turbulent nobles were at odds with their German king and called in Margaret. She was victress in the war, and at once attempted to make the personal union of the three kingdoms a real one. She brought about in 1397 the Union of Kalmar, by which all three agreed to have the same king in perpetuity and elected Margaret's heir, Eric of Pomerania, as her co-regent.

The mutual antipathies and the dissimilarities of the Scandinavian kingdoms, as well as their internal divisions and the weakness of the crown in each, gave little hope of permanency to the Union of Kalmar. None the less it was maintained in a nominal fashion for over a century. Margaret herself almost immediately angered the Swedes by her statesmanlike endeavour to recover Slesvig for Denmark. It failed and the long war waged with the same object by Eric of Pomerania (1412-39) against the Count of Holstein and the Hanse failed too. During these outer rebuffs Eric's fondness for his German compatriots, his attempts to increase his authority, and his taxation aroused general anger. In 1435 the Swedes regained full autonomy and elected a native regent. In 1439 Eric was deposed in Denmark and his nephew Christopher of Bavaria (1439-48) was elected to succeed

him. After Christopher the Danes elected Christian I (1448-81), Count of Oldenburg and heir of Slesvig-Holstein. Christian made his position good in Norway, and duly inherited in 1460 Slesvig-Holstein as a new partner in the Union. But Sweden was recalcitrant. First, a native noble, Charles VIII, took the crown. Then, when Christian I drove out his competitor, he was soon compelled by a victorious revolt to admit a Swedish regent to power. His son, John (1481-1512), in spite of a transitory success, was reduced to a like nominal sovereignty by the Swedes.

Thus the Union of Kalmar was limited in effect to the union of Denmark, Slesvig-Holstein and Norway. It had none the less its triumphs. Kings Christopher and Christian I, by favouring the English and Netherlandish merchants, had freed Scandinavia from the economic monopoly of the German Hanse, and the kingship was increasing its resources. But this work was achieved by German princes. If Sweden, save its church, held aloof, and Norway remained insignificantly conservative, Denmark was deeply penetrated with German influences. Serfdom was harsher, feudalism more aggressive. The Church was decadent.

In short, Scandinavia made the transit through medieval times without gaining a political discipline. Yet her nations at least maintained their national independence and state-life, and in spite of their anarchy an increase of civilization was in slow progress.

SECTION 3. THE DISORDERS IN THE CHURCH AND THE COUNCILS

The absorption of the Papacy in political schemes and the deterioration in its methods and ideals which began with Innocent IV were accompanied by a general decline and demoralization of the Western Church. The Popes

aggravated this regression by their own acts and by the misdirection of their chief energies, but none the less it was the general exhaustion of the fiery religious zeal of earlier times, and the ever-increasing scope of secular improvement and civil life which were the main causes. Men were too preoccupied with the formation of states and the cares of advancing prosperity, to put their hearts into the obsolete enthusiasms and world-renouncing ideals of their fathers. And they were justified, for the world had emerged from the Dark Ages.

It was natural that the religious Orders, which needed for their healthy existence a fervid zeal and the renunciation of the world, should especially suffer degeneracy. The wealth which flowed in on them from all sides had always been a temptation. Reform had followed reform. Order after Order had been founded to revive or increase the stringency of the Rule. But in the fourteenth century the impulse towards effectual reform was small among the old-fashioned monks. The houses were often in debt, the brethren were decreasing in number. There was a general relaxation of discipline; some monasteries were corrupt, almost all were apathetic and indolent. In spite of the veneration they inherited from their founders and of the number of saintly or worthy monks to be found in them, they were rapidly losing influence and respect.

A like fate was overtaking the mendicant Friars. They, too, had been loaded with wealth by the admiring laity, and had been led astray from the ideals of their founders. The Dominicans, perhaps, were in greater reputation for strictness and learning, but their indiscipline and luxury were notorious and incorrigible. The more popular Franciscans were passing through an internal crisis. Early in their history they had become divided into two parties. The Spirituals or Fraticelli clung to

the exact model of St Francis, the life of complete poverty and mendicancy. A large number, however, perhaps the majority if not the most influential, were ready for the legal evasions and compromises by which the Order was rapidly endowed like any other; and it was among them naturally that the greedy dissolute friars who won an unenviable reputation were found. Nicholas III in 1279 had attempted to find a *modus vivendi* by vesting the Franciscan endowments in the Apostolic See, while granting the Order the use of them. But the Spirituals were thoroughly dissatisfied, and the controversy dragged on till the days of John XXII. That arbitrary pontiff first declared against the Spirituals on minor points, enforcing his sentence by fierce persecution, and then in 1322, provoked by the pronouncement of the Franciscan general Chapter that Christ and the Apostles had lived in absolute poverty, he repealed Nicholas III's bull. Next year he proclaimed the Chapter's pronouncement to be heretical. The Spirituals resisted. The deposed Franciscan General took refuge with the Pope's adversary, Lewis of Bavaria¹. But in the long run the Pope won. The mass of the Friars submitted to hold corporate property, and the number of the Spirituals dwindled. A disaffected spirit long remained in the Order, but the Inquisition crushed the Fraticelli in course of time, and with their fall the decay in morals and fervour became ever clearer. It had been a momentous decision of the Papacy to condemn the ideal of renunciation, and as a result the ideal became revolutionary and was soon linked with the forces which stood in opposition to the papal monarchy over the Church.

It had always been a difficult matter to enforce a semi-monastic life and a strict standard of learning and manners

¹ See above, pp. 412-13.

on the secular clergy. The prelates tended inevitably to be either nobles or royal officials; parish-priests to be ignorant peasants or absentees. These evils in the fourteenth century grew rapidly worse. Papal taxation so impoverished benefices, that for many it was hard to obtain clergy. Papal provisions increased the number of absentees and pluralists. Episcopal supervision was in a fair way to break down in the dioceses. It is to the credit of human nature that conscientious parish-priests and bishops still remained many in number.

Meantime the central organ of the Church, the Roman Curia, had become a byword for its secular policy and inordinate greed of power and gold. It was composed of a swarm of officials, who were largely pluralists and non-residents. But its instinct for government remained and its strong feeling for legality. It formed a capable, if mercenary and unscrupulous, bureaucracy.

The French Popes during the "Babylonish captivity" at Avignon were by no means insensible to the evils in the Church whether in the provinces or in their own Curia. But they were overborne in their efforts for betterment by the policy they inherited from former Popes and by their subservience to French interests. They inherited a Papal State in Italy and the leadership of the Guelf faction there. They had to maintain that state, and they viewed with constant fear all tentatives of the Emperors to influence Italian politics. Thus the weakness of the Emperors was to them highly desirable, all the more so since they firmly held to the Canon Law which taught that the Empire was in feudal subordination to the Papacy. Clement V declared his suzerainty in set terms; John XXII (1316-34) entered on his long struggle with Lewis the Bavarian to enforce it; and, although the attempt failed, some advantage on the practical side was gained by the

tacit abandonment by Charles IV and his successors of any rule in Italy.

It was clear, however, that the Popes were not merely pursuing papal objects. They were also promoting, although with reserves dictated by their own interests, the ambitions of the kings of France who wished to see the Empire weak and open to their influence, and excluded from Italy. The same prepossession was more glaringly shown in the attitude of the Popes towards France and England. They did indeed try to mediate, but with a leaning to the French side, and, when the Hundred Years' War broke out, they gave France active assistance by grants of ecclesiastical taxation and by heavy loans from their own treasury. Not different was their policy elsewhere; and the general result was a further impairment of a prestige already waned.

It was also to the prejudice of the Popes of Avignon in their schemes for reform that they followed the centralizing tendency of the Papacy and brought centralization to its highest pitch. Appeals to their court were still more frequent and expensive than in the past. The number of benefices to which they appointed by reserve or provision increased enormously to the general disgust. From John XXII onwards elections to bishoprics and abbeys almost ceased. It is true that the Popes "provided" for sees by collusive agreement with the lay monarchs, but this redounded to the credit of neither party, and did not produce the best of prelates. The Curia was mainly supported by the endowments of benefices thus granted by the Popes, and no denunciation of pluralism and non-residence when due to others could hide the fact.

The Popes were all the more eager to engross the patronage of the Church because of the pecuniary profit they drew from their nominees in the shape of heavy

fees and first-fruits, *i.e.* a year's income. The increasing luxury of a pompous court, and, above all, their perpetual wars in Italy made them needy, and the benefices of the Western Church were squeezed to pay off the deficit. Tenths, subsidies, the property of dead prelates, the income of vacant benefices, were all exacted by the Popes. Even the pastoral visitations of bishops were dispensed with, while, by a flagrant job, the tax they raised from their clergy to cover the cost of their journeying was still levied and divided between them and the Holy See. And this extortion took place in lands exhausted by war and plague and famine. No wonder that churches were often without priest and in ruins, and that the hated papal tax-gatherers met sometimes with violence.

The Popes who thus oppressed Christendom were for the most part well-meaning, respectable men. If Clement V and John XXII were pronounced nepotists and Clement VI (1342-52) was extravagant and luxurious, Urban V (1362-70) was a saint, and Benedict XII (1334-42) a notable reformer of the decadent monks, while Innocent VI (1352-62) drove non-resident office-seekers from Avignon. But the Curia gained an evil name for its simony, luxury and dissipation. There was a definite decline in the character of the Cardinals. Signs of the natural consequence, a diminished reverence and national hostility became frequent. Saints, poets and chroniclers assailed the court of Avignon with fierce invective; England legislated against papal provisions and the German chapters at times refused to recognize them; Naples shielded the persecuted Fraticelli.

Since the Popes had become French they created for the most part French cardinals. Their residence was fixed at Avignon, the sovranity of which Clement VI

purchased from Joanna of Naples and Provence. But the Roman Pope could not neglect Rome and his State in Italy, and many of the troubles of the pontiffs of Avignon were due to the attempt to be an absentee foreign monarch. Exhausting wars with Venice and the Visconti of Milan had little durable result. Various degrees of anarchy prevailed further south, diversified in Rome itself by the meteoric rule of Cola di Rienzo. Innocent VI determined once more to reduce the papal lands to a solid state, and found an apt instrument in the Spanish Cardinal Albornoz. By means of generalship and diplomacy the Cardinal restored an effective papal government throughout the States of the Church. Obedient communes retained a generous autonomy; forgiven tyrants ruled as papal vicars. In spite of the vacillation of his masters, Innocent VI and Urban V, he contrived to check the dangerous progress of the Visconti towards a north-Italian kingdom.

A new situation was created by the victories of Albornoz. It was no longer possible for the Popes with any decency to remain in French dependence at Avignon, when a peaceful state surrounded their see of Rome, whence they drew their prestige and authority, and in which alone they could permanently figure as the impartial chiefs of Christendom. The saintly Urban V to the horror of his French cardinals felt himself impelled in 1367 to transfer his court. But Albornoz died and his work began to crumble; the Pope was homesick and anxious to be near the scene of the impending hostilities between England and France. In 1370 he hurried back to Avignon to die. It soon became clear, however, that it was impossible to rule the Papal State as a foreign dependency. Gregory XI (1370-78) found himself involved in renewed war with the Visconti, which speedily

developed into a general revolt of Italy against the French Pope. Florence took the lead, and, save Rome, all the papal lands, exasperated by the misgovernment of French officials, joined her. Gregory could win the war by the aid of his ferocious mercenaries and his ecclesiastical weapons, but he dared not risk a further absence. He returned to Rome in 1376, and died there, longing for Avignon, in 1378.

A schism had long been brewing owing to the national hostilities which had been heightened by the pronounced Francophil policy of the French Popes. It came nearer when the French cardinals were compelled to elect an Italian, Urban VI (1378-89), by the violence of the Roman mob. And it broke out when Urban showed an unexpectedly tyrannous disposition, and a determination to bully and overbear the Cardinals, while he threatened a reform of the luxury and simony of the Curia which was most unwelcome to them. Three months' experience decided the French cardinals to revolt. They elected one of their number as Anti-Pope under the name of Clement VII (1378-94). The Great Schism had begun. Although, under the pressure of Urban's tyranny, even the non-French cardinals joined his rival and left him to create an entirely new College, the Schism was not long in taking a national character. In spite of the justifiable doubts of the University of Paris, Charles V of France compelled the recognition of Clement in his dominions, and the friendly powers of Spain and Scotland followed suit. After a fruitless struggle in Italy, Clement returned to Avignon as a French dependant. England and the greater part of Germany and Italy no less naturally sided with Urban, however much his character might excite repugnance. They now had a Pope who was not Francophil.

The authority of both Popes was crippled from the start. They were practically suppliants for the alliance of the secular monarchs, and could not resist their wishes or exercise discipline over the provincial churches. The financial demands of both were more extortionate than ever, for each kept up full papal state with a reduced area of obedience to maintain it. And their moral prestige vanished before the glaring scandals of their pontificates. Clement's court was a hotbed of simony. Urban's cruelty and tyranny, which included the execution of several cardinals, astounded Christendom. Their anathemas and crusades against one another ended by alienating their own adherents. The chief bone of contention was Naples. Urban, himself a Neapolitan, after quarrelling with the queen Joanna, sided with the native claimant of the crown, Charles III. Clement engineered a French invasion under his partisan Louis of Anjou. When Charles was victorious, Urban's greedy nepotism provoked a conflict with his own nominee. Thus the treasures and reputation of the Church were squandered. Urban's successor Boniface IX (1389-1404) did not mend matters. Moderate and wise, he pursued a conciliatory policy in Italy. While really ruling Rome, he submitted to the partition of most of the Papal States among local tyrants. But his need and avarice made him the worst simoniac who had yet sat in the papal chair, and his nepotism was unconcealed.

At such a time the voices of radical reformers were sure to be readily heard and to gain adherents among the devout and zealous. It was in England that theories of radical reform took shape, and ended in radical heresy. John Wycliffe was an Oxford theologian who championed the national discontent at the abuses of papal administration, the provisions and taxation. With the outbreak

of the Schism his speculations took a wider scope, going beyond those of his forerunner, Marsilio of Padua. He denounced altogether the medieval conception of the visible Church under the papal monarchy, and its manifestations in practical life. The Bible was the sole evidence for doctrines. Tradition, decretals and canons were not of binding authority. The true Church was formed of those predestined to be saved, and who it was who were so predestined was unrevealed. The jurisdiction of the hierarchy, the Pope and the prelates, should not be coercive. The whole system of the monastic Orders was a mistake, the celibacy of the priesthood pernicious. The endowments of the Church were contrary to the example of Christ. The clergy should live in holy poverty and their possessions should be seized by the lay state, which for Wycliffe, as for Marsilio, was the true ruling organization for mankind. Lastly, he denied the dogma of Transubstantiation at the consecration of the Elements by the priest, and substituted a Real Presence received by the faith of the communicant, thus removing the basis of the powers of the medieval priesthood. It was a mere corollary to his views, that he brought about a translation of the Bible into English, and so made possible the direct knowledge of Scripture by the mass of the population.

The effect of Wycliffe's numberless writings in Latin and English, and of the preaching of the missionary "poor priests" whom he employed for his propaganda, was a wide if temporary adherence to his tenets. Yet the unity of Christendom, which had once worked like enchantment in men's minds, was still potent in its decay, and the attack on Transubstantiation proved ruinous to Wycliffe's cause. He himself died in peace in 1384, in spite of tentative efforts to suppress him, but his followers, the Lollards, soon lost ground. King Henry IV came to

the throne with the help of the hierarchy, and a persecution of twenty years, if it did not destroy Lollardy, reduced it to impotence.

It was in another country that Wycliffe's influence was effective and produced a temporary revolution. The Church in Bohemia was as corrupt as any, and it was associated with a foreign element, the German settlers, who were hateful to the native Slavonic Czechs. At the end of the fourteenth century Wycliffe's writings reached Bohemia through wandering scholars and quickly gained converts. The greatest of them was John Hus. Hus was a secular priest, who owed his remarkable influence to his lovable nature and singular eloquence. Though he did not ultimately accept Wycliffe's doctrine of the Eucharist, he adopted his theory of the Church and denounced in fiery harangues the corruptions of the existing organization. His opinions were eagerly adopted by his countrymen. Some went further and denied Transubstantiation. All were tending to religious revolution.

Throughout the West the same indignation was felt at the corruption of the Church and the ruinous Schism. But the general desire was to cleanse the existing hierarchy of its abuses, not to remould it; and the belief in a united Christendom was still strong and absorbing enough to make the healing of the Schism the chief object to strive for. The University of Paris took the lead in projects for its cure. The two most feasible methods seemed to be either the holding of a General Council, with or without the two Popes' consent, in order to decide what should be done, or the simultaneous abdication of both Popes and the election of a new Pope by both Colleges of Cardinals combined. The General Council independent of the Papacy seemed revolutionary, but its advocates main-

tained that when all established methods failed, it was necessary to use extraordinary means. They also claimed, in contradiction to the Canon Law as it had by then developed, that the authority of a General Council was superior to that of the Pope, and that the papal monarchy over the Church was not unlimited. These views were gaining ground, but the gentler means of a joint abdication naturally appealed more to the rival Curias. Neither, however, was inclined to compromise its own position. When on Clement's death the French court wished for no new election, that the Schism might be more easily healed, the Cardinals of Avignon hastily elected the Aragonese Benedict XIII (1394-1417), at the same time receiving his oath to abdicate when called upon. He evaded his undertaking with the result that France and Castile withdrew for several years (1398-1403) from his obedience, while he himself was held a captive. But a reaction took place in his favour, and he recovered recognition from the unstable French court.

The reluctance of the Pope of Avignon to abdicate was fully paralleled by the similar unwillingness of his Roman rival. Both were anxious not to admit the shadow of a doubt on their claims, and both shunned the loss of the power and profit of their office. Their cardinals were less stiff-necked. When Innocent VII (1404-6) of Rome died after a pontificate troubled by the aggressions of his domineering vassal, King Ladislaus of Naples, the Roman College elected an aged Venetian Gregory XII (1406-15) under pledge to abdicate when Benedict did the same. Gregory had been the most fervent advocate of reunion, but office and the influence of his relatives quickly changed his attitude. Insincere negotiations were undertaken for a conference of the two Popes at Savona, towards which they both journeyed, but they resolutely evaded meeting

and their delays disillusioned Christendom. The Cardinals' patience was exhausted. Gregory's Cardinals fled from him to Pisa where they were joined by Benedict's, and the united Colleges summoned of their own authority a General Council. The greater part of the Western Church followed their lead, and refused any longer to recognize the contending Popes.

The conciliar movement had thus won the day. It remained to be seen if it could effectively restore unity and reform the corrupted Church. Little was gained by the Council of Pisa in 1409. The Council declared that it had power to depose the Popes and proceeded to do so. The united Colleges elected a fresh pontiff, the Cretan Alexander V (1409-10). But nothing was done for reform, nor could be done while three Popes now claimed the tiara and had adherents in every country. The political situation of Italy was also unfavourable, for Ladislaus of Naples sided with Gregory XII and threatened Rome. To meet the danger the Cardinals committed their greatest mistake in electing the worst of their number, the dissolute adventurer Cossa, to succeed Alexander as John XXIII (1410-15). John, though once a *condottiere*, was unable to make head against the Neapolitan king. His French candidate for Naples, Louis II of Anjou, was driven back, and Ladislaus occupied Rome. It was only the king's death in 1414 which hindered further conquests.

In a temporary peace Ladislaus had recognized the conciliar Pope, and the adhesion of Sigismund of Hungary, the newly-elected King of the Romans, was a further nominal gain. The failure of the Council of Pisa, however, was fully manifest. Under John XXIII abuses were more flagrant than ever. On all sides there was a demand for a new undoubted Council, an effective healing of the Schism and energetic reform. Sigismund had the

imagination to put himself at the head of the movement and vindicate once more for the Holy Roman Empire the leadership of Europe. He forced the helpless John to consent to the summoning of a General Council at Constance in Swabia in 1414.

Three main questions formed the work of the Council, the ending of the Schism, the reform of the Church and the extirpation of heresy. The experience of the Council of Pisa showed that it was impossible to obtain reunion merely by overriding the claims of the two Anti-Popes, and, both for this reason and because of the scandals of his pontificate, it was necessary to dethrone John XXIII. John, who attended the Council, was most unwilling to retire, but he was out-manoeuvred and hopelessly outweighed. To avoid his Italian and curial partisans outvoting them, the reformers succeeded in organizing the Council by nations, the French, the English, the German and the Italian, by the side of which the College of Cardinals was admitted as a separate body; and each nation had a single vote. They declared that a General Council was superior to the Pope. John, finding the demand for his abdication too strong for him, fled from the Council to the protection of one of the Austrian Dukes. He was recaptured in a petty war by Sigismund and his allies and compelled to assent to his own deposition in 1415. Gregory XII, knowing himself isolated, abdicated shortly after. Benedict XIII remained stiff-necked to the end, but a personal journey of Sigismund to Aragon where he held his court, if it did not persuade him, converted the Spanish kingdoms. In 1417 a Spanish nation was formed in the Council, and Benedict was anew deposed, this time retaining no adherents.

The Church was reunited and the Papacy was vacant, and a new division at once broke out in the Council.

Should reform be undertaken first, or a Pope be at once elected? In spite of the resistance of the Germans, the latter course was followed. It was more logical, perhaps, for it was natural that the Church should be reformed when complete in head and members; but for effective reform it was a disastrous choice. An undoubted Pope, backed by the strongly-knit Curia, by the prerogatives assigned to him by the Canon Law and by the immense influence which the long exercise of those prerogatives had conferred on him throughout the West, was hard to resist by the changing and bickering members of the Council. It was the abuse of papal prerogatives which most needed reform, and no Pope would surrender his powers, and few would shun the abuse of them. That being so, the election of the statesmanlike Roman Martin V (1417-31) sounded the knell of the reforming projects.

The Pope had now only to wait till the divergent interests of the nations and the sections of the Church, the weariness of the long Council, and still more the difficulty of making reforms without limiting papal prerogative, worked their natural consequences. In the end minor privileges were gained separately by the nations and two or three crying scandals¹ were done away. The only real advance was the decree that a General Council should be held every seven years to consult on the government of the Church. Thus the schemes of wide-reaching conciliar reform and the abolition of abuses failed, owing on the one hand to the jealousies of the nations and their inexperience in a kind of parliamentary government of the Church, and on the other to the strength of the existing system which was

¹ Such as the payment to the Pope of the revenues of vacant benefices.

bound up with the organization of Western Christendom. Martin, who had taken an opportunity of declaring in contradiction to the conciliar theory that no appeal was possible from a papal decision, could peacefully dissolve the Council in 1418.

The Council in fact was mainly conservative, and showed it in its treatment of heresy. Although Hus claimed to the last that he was a loyal son of the Church, his adoption of Wycliffe's doctrines¹ that the true Church consisted of the unrevealed elect, that the teaching of the Gospel was sufficient for the Church without ecclesiastical tradition, and that it was a duty to resist ecclesiastical authority wrongfully employed, struck at the root of the medieval hierarchy, and the Council held no quarter with him. He came to the Council under Sigismund's safe conduct, and was at once put on his trial. The king broke his word to the heretic as a public duty, and Hus was burnt by the Council's decree in 1415. To change the basis of the Church was remote from its programme, which was that of restoration and reformation, to reinforce the medieval structure.

Bohemia was in a ferment at the news of Hus' death, and, when King Wenceslaus died in 1419 and Sigismund succeeded him, open revolt broke out. There were two parties among the Husites, the moderates or Utraquists and the extremists or Taborites. Both demanded the confiscation of the goods of the clergy, but, while the Utraquists insisted further that the laity should receive the Communion in both kinds, contrary to medieval usage, the Taborites were thoroughgoing converts to Wycliffe's tenets on the Eucharist, upheld the Bible as the sole rule of faith and denounced the greater part of the medieval church-system. The nobles were Utraquists, the peasants

¹ See above, pp. 440-1.

Taborites. Both parties joined in the religious and national war that followed¹. The Bohemian monasteries were destroyed, the lands of the Church were seized. But in their victories the Czechs were exhausted and disunited, and, when the Council of Basel, finding them unconquerable, offered to treat, the Utraquists, in alarm at the communistic leanings of the Taborites, accepted its concessions. Communion in both kinds was allowed in Bohemia, the other difficulties were slurred over. The Taborites resisted only to be crushed by the nobles, and the Church in Bohemia, if weak and impoverished, remained unchanged and unreformed. The Bohemian nation had been too small and divided, and its reformers too inclined to social revolt, to carry through a religious revolution. Nor was Europe ready for radical change.

Freed from the Council of Constance, Martin V was able to go his own way, and that way was a successful one. Aided by his family connexions and his own shrewd strength, he restored order in Rome. The Papacy quietly resumed its old ways with less of glaring scandal than before. The Cardinals were reduced to subjection. A Council was baulked and dissolved. Only at the end of his pontificate did Martin feel obliged to summon a new Council at Basel. None the less the demand for reform and for the abatement of the papal power was strong, and the election of an inexperienced friar, Eugenius IV (1431-47), gave opportunity for reaction. The Council of Basel had met in 1431 and was deep in the Husite question, when the jealous Pope rashly attempted to dissolve it. He only irritated it into reaffirming its superiority over him and commencing an open revolt from his authority. For a time Eugenius resisted, but the ruin of his temporal rule in Rome owing to his mismanagement left him no

¹ See above, pp. 423-4.

alternative save to recall his decree of dissolution in 1434. The consequences of the struggle, however, worked disastrously on the Council. In order to avoid national cleavages, it had abandoned the division by nations, which after all corresponded with existing facts, and had adopted a democratic method of voting which gave full play to the extremists who wished to substitute a clerical parliament for the papal monarchy. They passed decrees severely restricting the Pope's prerogative, and all but abolishing his income, as it had been obtained by the expedients of the Popes of Avignon. But Eugenius regained the rule of Rome, his position in Italy became more assured, while the Emperor Sigismund who at first had done much to support the Council refused to adhere to its later proceedings. A new turn of events gave the Pope the upper hand. The Greeks, now in the utmost danger from their Turkish foes, were willing to buy the aid of the West by reunion, and Pope and Council competed for the glory of the event. In its fear of being transferred to an Italian city under Eugenius' influence, the Council acted with captious hostility to him, and the Pope was emboldened to decree its dissolution and summon another at Ferrara in 1438. At Ferrara and at Florence the Union of the Greek and Latin Churches was decreed on the forced submission of the Greeks to the clause "filioque" in the creed and the papal supremacy. It was a hollow triumph, but sufficient to give the Pope prestige. Meanwhile the Council of Basel had dwindled to a group of extremists by reason of the desertion of the moderate elements. None the less it showed a bold front, deposing the Pope, elaborating a conciliar system, and electing an Anti-Pope, Felix V (1439-49), the ex-Duke Amadeus of Savoy. Although it had little real political backing, the new Schism was a serious danger for the Papacy. It

gave the temporal powers an excuse for standing neutral between Council and Pope, and using their neutrality to bargain with. King Charles VII of France issued the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges in 1438, the charter of the Gallican Church by which the power of the Papacy was much curtailed in his dominions. The German Electors adopted much the same programme. Against them Eugenius took up arms, but it was not till on the eve of his death that he won them to recognize him as the price of concessions. His successor Nicholas V (1447-55) entered into the fruit of his labours. The Concordat of Vienna gave an appearance of satisfying the German demands and in 1449, through the mediation of the King of France, Felix V was induced to abdicate upon terms, while the remnant of the Council of Basel was dissolved by its own decree.

The Schism and the conciliar movement ended together. The ambitious scheme to reform the Church and to bridle the Papacy had failed. The Councils had been based on the organic unity of Christendom, and that unity in its medieval embodiment at least was rapidly growing at variance with actual facts. It is symptomatic that the Council of Constance grouped by nations was more effective than the Council of Basel grouped by ecclesiastical departments. Again, the Western Church had been organized round a monarchic Papacy. To substitute a *soi-disant* parliamentary government for that Papacy, was on the one hand premature and on the other hardly compatible with the existing structure. Revolution the Councils would hear nothing of, yet their infraction of the Canon Law made them revolutionary, and alienated the conservative opinion to which they appealed. Success, in the presence of such contradictions, would have been far more marvellous than defeat.

Meanwhile, modern conditions were coming into being, which the Councils did not meet; the nation and the State with their demands for full autonomy and separate national life; the individual, like Wycliffe and Hus, with their adventurous intellect, their disregard of the corporate religion of the medieval Church and their claim for private judgement. Would the Papacy, now restored, be able to free itself from its own abuses, which awoke ever wider discontent, be able to assimilate or tame these new portentous powers?

SECTION 4. ITALIAN DESPOTS AND REPUBLICS

When the seat of the Papacy was removed to Avignon by Pope Clement V Italy had begun to feel her anarchy intolerable. Within each city-state the strife of persons and factions raged with unabated fury, and, if the rise of city-tyrannies gave some quietude for spaces of time, it was an unwelcome expedient, which could never fit with the public conscience and never gather round it that conviction of lawfulness and rightfulness whereby abiding order and acquiescence could be attained. Proscription and revolt had become political habits, and Italy swarmed with restless, plotting exiles. Externally, the same anarchy prevailed, the ancient rivalry between city and city, the unquenchable thirst for autonomy and expansion. The German Emperor and the Roman Pope had never been national foes of Italy. They had roots in her own aspirations and convictions. And consequently they never called up a united nation to oppose them. When the pressure of the contest relaxed, the cities fell apart once more. No league was national or permanent. In the Papal States especially the absence of the Pope destroyed what little bond of union existed.

Before long the land was given over to petty tyrants and faction-warfare.

In this welter the attempts which were made to form larger consolidated states, all wore the aspect of unscrupulous ambition and oppression. The King of Naples never resigned himself to the loss of Sicily or to his restriction to the south of Italy. In the north the more powerful cities sought to subjugate their neighbours, whether they were under tyrants like Milan, Verona or Ferrara, or republics like Florence, Pisa and Bologna. But, while the process of forming larger states went on, it did not speedily produce stability, for the once-independent cities never submitted willingly to their subject condition and were always ready for revolt and separation. This was the more the case when they were subjugated by another republic, for then they were entirely without a voice in state affairs, while under a tyrant the cities of his dominion experienced equal treatment and their individual citizens had an equal chance in his service.

The Italian tyranny had by now acquired a fully-developed character. Born of faction and revolution, with the stigma of usurpation upon it, the tyranny was suspicious, treacherous and cruel. But the normal tyrant was bound to be capable of ruling—he had no other guarantee of security—he would make the best of his dominion and strive to keep the people in general in his favour. Beyond the circle of his competitors and the warring factions his evil deeds would not usually extend. The chief harm he did to the main body of his citizens was to render them unwarlike and incapable of self-government by the very conditions of his rule, his mercenariness and his despotism. Deterioration in himself and his competitors was more marked. All scruples had long been set aside in the race for power. The bonds of the

family, as well as of the state, were broken and a tyrant's worst enemies might come from his own house. Luxury and profligacy sapped his vigour. A strange picture is presented, where material prosperity increased amid war and ravage, where the intellect grew modern and mature and character degenerated, where a rapidly advancing refinement and civilization coexisted with a society that began to decay. From another point of view, the individual was released from his medieval swaddling-bands of gild and clan and commune and had not yet learnt the bounds or the laws of his new liberty. The ancient shell of custom had been broken, the new had yet to form.

The factions of Italy were still Guelf and Ghibelline. Much meaning had been taken from them by the fall of the Hohenstaufen, much by the rise of the tyranny. They were on the way to be personal and ancestral feuds, devoid of political or social foundation. None the less, the theory of their existence remained clear and had some influence. It was now that the poet Dante worked out the old-fashioned Ghibelline theory of the Empire in his *De monarchia*, and he was scarcely dead before Marsilio of Padua produced his revolutionary transformation of it¹. In practical life the Ghibellines remained inclined to German intervention and monarchical authority, while the Guelfs leant on the Papacy and Naples and were more attached to the free commune. The effect of their tenets was seen when Henry VII made his attempt to revive the Empire in Italy. He had wished to be above faction, and found that he was a Ghibelline. But at first, when in 1310 he descended into Italy by the Savoyard passes, all seemed favourable. Guelfs and Ghibellines, partly from delusive hope, partly in search of an ally, rallied round the king who came under papal patronage,

¹ See above, pp. 412-13.

and the just, idealistic character of Henry seemed to fit him for a general arbitrator. But Clement V, though he was willing to add to Henry's prestige in opposition to his burdensome protector Philip the Fair, by no means intended to endanger the Papal State or to see the Empire made real in Italy. He at once called in the traditional papal ally in the person of Robert the Wise (1309-43), King of Naples, as a makeweight, appointing him Rector of the frontier province of Romagna, while he sent cardinals to crown Henry Emperor and allowed the election of a friend of Henry as Senator of Rome. Henry meantime was insisting on the repatriation of all exiles and attempting to set up an imperial administration by nominating Vicars for the Lombard cities. Almost immediately the Della Torre, Guelf tyrants of Milan, revolted and were driven out by the king and their Ghibelline rivals, the Visconti. Other Guelf towns followed the Della Torres' example, and it was not long before Henry was obliged to act frankly with the Ghibellines, and restore the wily Matteo Visconti to the tyranny of Milan. War with the Guelfs broke out, and, while Robert sent troops to occupy the Leonine city at Rome and entered into a league with Florence and other towns, Henry subdued the Lombard Guelfs and wasted his resources in the long siege of Brescia. He did not reach Rome till 1312, when he was not able to force the Leonine city and was crowned in the Lateran by the cardinals under pressure from the Roman mob and against the instructions of the suspicious Pope. He meditated revenge on Florence and King Robert, but the siege of Florence failed, and he died in 1313 when on the march against Robert and on the eve of a complete breach with the Papacy.

Henry VII was the last Emperor to attempt to revive

the Empire as it existed before the Interregnum, and to be received by the Italians as their natural sovran. Henceforward the Ghibelline ideal passes from the realm of politics to that of speculation. Even Lewis the Bavarian appears as really a foreign ally. For all that the association of Italian Ghibelline chiefs continued on the ground of common interests, though it gradually weakened in the changes of current politics. For a time it held the upper hand. The learned Robert of Naples was continually diverted from north Italian affairs by his vain efforts to reconquer Sicily, and, though he was Senator of Rome and lord of Florence, the Tuscan Guelfs were completely routed in 1315 by Ugucione della Faggiuola, tyrant of Pisa. Pisa, however, was waning rapidly; in 1323-6 she lost her last dependency, Sardinia, to the King of Aragon; and the leadership of the Tuscan Ghibellines fell to Castruccio Castracane, tyrant of Lucca. By defeating the Florentines, by utilizing the expedition of Lewis the Bavarian¹ to conquer Pisa, Castruccio seemed about to form a Tuscan monarchy, but he died in 1328 and his dominion fell to pieces.

Meantime Florence weathered the storm with difficulty. She obtained Neapolitan help by submitting first to the lordship of King Robert and then to that of his son Charles. When both Castruccio and Charles died in 1328, a change in the constitution was brought about. Two contradictory impulses were native to the city, the desire of a group or faction to control the government, and the desire of every citizen, natural in a non-representative system, to have his share of office and influence. The latter now had its way. It was arranged that every two years a number of Guelf gildsmen should be chosen in a roundabout way to fill the Priorate and Gonfalonier-

¹ See above, p. 413.

ship. From among them the Gonfalonier and Priors were drawn by lot every two months. Thus it was vainly hoped to baffle the cliques. A change with the same purpose, which was also a simplification, was made in the city councils. The cumbrous four were changed to two, more numerous and sitting a shorter term. Thus most reputable Guelf citizens might hope to hold at some time some office. It was democratic and congenial, but it demanded a too widely diffused political capacity even from the brilliant Florentines, and partly necessity, partly the innate tendency to form groups, soon led to a perpetual manipulation of the seeming chance of the lot.

For a while the new government prospered, achieving the subjection of small neighbouring towns, but they roused the fears of both their Tuscan and their Lombard rivals over their momentary acquisition of Lucca. Defeated and in danger, the Florentines in 1342 accepted the titular Duke of Athens, an experienced semi-French warrior, as their lord. His tyranny, which was based on the support of the mob and of the disfranchised nobles, set all men against him. He was overthrown, but the subject places were lost at his fall. The nobles, grown once more riotous and insubordinate, were crushed finally in furious street-fighting, and Florence returned to its popular government, guided by a mercantile class. In the same year there died her ally, the chief of the Italian Guelfs, Robert of Naples, with the Ghibellines unchecked and Sicily unconquered.

Meantime a competition of tyrants had been enacted in Lombardy. An attempt of Venice to acquire Ferrara had been baffled by the Papacy, and the chief aggressive powers were the Visconti of Milan and the Scaligeri of Verona, both Ghibellines in politics and both skilled in using and baffling the ambitions of German princes.

Matteo Visconti had the larger dominion, while Cangrande della Scala (1311-29), the friend of Dante, was the more stirring spirit. The leader of their foes was the Cardinal Bertrand du Pouget, legate of John XXII. A French invasion under Philip of Valois failed ignominiously and in 1324 Galeazzo Visconti (1322-7) routed the legate. The expedition of Lewis of Bavaria had little effect save the deposition of Galeazzo, and the Pope gained no ground on his side. In 1328 Cangrande annexed Padua; his successor Mastino (1329-51) was pressing on Brescia, when a new adventurer contrived to confuse the demarcation of Guelf and Ghibelline. This was King John of Bohemia, son of Henry VII, who came to the rescue of Brescia and was supported by the Pope. John, a reckless knight-errant, was joyfully made their lord by a number of cities, and began with the Pope's aid to aim at a Lombard kingdom. All the existing powers were alarmed, and before a general league in 1332-3 his dominion melted away.

The native Lombard Mastino could now make the same attempt at first with a measure of success and in the end with the same result. For two or three years he ruled from Lucca to Treviso. Then his neighbours combined against him. Venice, Florence and the Visconti headed the league, which by 1339 had won the day. Venice was the greatest gainer, for she annexed Treviso and became protector of the tyrant of Padua. Azzo Visconti acquired Brescia. The Scaligeri never recovered from this blow, which, however, did not change the essential grouping of Lombardy. That country fell naturally into an eastern, a central and a western division, and, now that the cities were losing freedom and independence, three corresponding states were in formation. In the east Venice succeeded the Scaligeri. It imported

a revolution in the position of the republic. Hitherto she had been safe amid the lagoons from the invasions and wars of the mainland, and enjoyed the freedom of action of a purely maritime power. Now she had indeed secured her food-supply by her commitment on the mainland, but she had also become vulnerable by land and by necessity involved in the perpetual struggles and dangers of Lombardy.

West Lombardy, or Piedmont, was far more feudal in character than the other divisions. Here the Counts of Savoy were building up a state of the second rank, far outshone in power and ambitions by the Visconti in the centre. The latter were founding the greatest dominion in Italy. The mild Azzo (1329-39) recovered and much enlarged their state after Lewis the Bavarian's passing outrage. His uncle, the Archbishop Giovanni (1339-54), ruled with craft and ambition cities from the Apennines to the Alps. He seized Bologna and threatened Florence, and the efforts of the Pope and his allies only availed to check his further progress.

The wars of these tyrants and republics were now waged mainly by mercenary troops. The tyrants wished their subjects disarmed, and even the citizens of republics were unwilling and unfit to take much part in campaigns where the expert man-at-arms was supreme. The mercenaries of all nations who thronged to Italy were not long in learning their own power, and in taking measures to defend themselves against disbandment and peace. They began to form Free Companies, which, under their own leaders and organized as petty states, sold their services to the contending cities and princes, and in days of comparative peace plundered far and wide on their own account. The first Free Company was defeated in 1339 by the Visconti, but its successors, ravaging and

blackmailing, wrought a fearful destruction. Even when the plague was checked by the action of Florence in 1359, the Free Companies, among which the English White Company was conspicuous, drove a thriving trade in war, which they carried on with ever-growing parsimony of their own lives and waste of the treasure of their employers. The foreigners were indeed edged out of the market by the competition of Italians and the remarkable success of the Italian Company of St George under Alberigo da Barbiano; but the system remained the same or grew worse. The *condottieri*, as the captains were called, hired out themselves and their companies to the highest bidder, acted like petty despots of peculiar faithlessness and greed, and developed a kind of warfare, in which the campaigns were long, the battles not bloody, the results indecisive and the waste enormous.

While a tendency for larger states to come into being was manifest in the north, the papal lands, and especially Rome itself, were lapsing into wilder anarchy than ever. So intolerable did the disorders of the Roman nobles become that the weak bourgeois class turned against them, and obtained for leader one of the most singular characters of the Middle Age, a harbinger of the Renaissance. Cola di Rienzo was an innkeeper's son, on whose imagination the remnants of classic literature and the ruins of imperial Rome acted like a charm. In this he was like others before him, but, whereas they had idolized the Roman Empire which they believed still existed in the German monarchy, Cola's dreams were of the Roman Republic and of its restoration to the leadership of Italy and Christendom. His eloquence gained the ear of the Romans, and in 1347 he carried through a revolution by which he became chief magistrate under the title of Tribune. Then began the strangest masquerade. Cola

ruled with theatrical pomp, and his policy was a continuous spectacle of illusions. He resumed the rights of the Roman people as lords of the world; he tried to form and guide an Italian federation; he defied the Pope, with whose concurrence he had governed at the first. Meanwhile he crushed the revolting nobles so roughly that they never quite recovered their former power. But his folly, almost his madness, alienated the Romans, and no Roman government could long withstand the determined hostility of the Pope. A riot overthrew the dream-bewildered Tribune, and he fled, leaving Rome to her former throes. His restoration under papal auspices some years later ended in his murder. Some alleviation was produced by the legateship of Cardinal Albornoz (1353-67)¹, who restored a central government and a degree of peace to the whole Papal State; but the forces of disintegration were too strong to be resisted. The Popes when they returned to Rome, soon to be crippled by the Great Schism, were quite unable to make headway against them².

The restoration of a Papal State was made possible, and the need for it was enhanced, by the disorganization of the kingdom of Naples after the sometime leader of the Italian Guelfs, Robert the Wise, had died, leaving his crown to his granddaughter Joanna I (1343-81). To ensure the succession against the claims of the Angevins who reigned in Hungary³, the queen had been married to her Hungarian cousin Andrew. But Andrew was unpopular, the queen voluptuous, the junior princes factious and the nobles out of hand. In 1345 Andrew

¹ See above, p. 437.

² See above, pp. 437-9, 442-3.

³ Descended from Robert's elder brother Charles Martel, whose son Carobert of Hungary was excluded from the Neapolitan succession by Clement V.

was murdered, it was suspected with his wife's connivance, and henceforward his elder brother King Lewis the Great of Hungary clamoured for revenge and claimed Naples for himself. In spite of papal prohibitions he twice effected a transitory conquest of the kingdom; but each time Joanna with her new husband, her cousin Louis of Taranto, returned to reign. Joanna was pronounced guiltless of Andrew's death in a papal judgement. Neither her reputation, however, nor the ruin wrought by the Hungarian troops and by the intolerable scourge of Free Companies which outlasted them, could be easily repaired. To stem the bewildering anarchy and ward off the renewed threats of Lewis of Hungary, she married for fourth husband a German, Otto of Brunswick, in 1376. At the outbreak of the Great Schism she had the unwisdom to quarrel with the Neapolitan Pope Urban VI and to declare the French prince, Duke Louis of Anjou, her heir. Pope and King of Hungary then combined to support an invasion by yet another cadet of the royal house, Charles of Durazzo, who ascended the throne as Charles III (1381-6) and soon after strangled the unhappy queen.

Charles III brought no peace to his kingdom. First a war with Louis I of Anjou, who succeeded Joanna in Provence (1382-4), and who died ruler of half Naples, then a struggle with the Pope and his own barons, then a momentary conquest of Hungary filled his reign. His youthful son Ladislaus (1386-1414) was practically dispossessed for years by the new Angevin anti-king, Louis II, till in 1400 the fickleness of the barons and the dislike of the Neapolitans for the French ruler and his French Anti-Pope restored him to his dominions. Thenceforward he combined a vigorous attempt to coerce the too powerful baronage with persistent aggression in central Italy. Rome he did finally seize from his unfortunate

papal suzerains, but he made little way for all his efforts in Umbria and Tuscany. When his dissolute sister Joanna II (1414-35) succeeded him, Naples became the prey of barons and *condottieri*. There was the favourite battle-ground of the two most famous *condottieri* of the day, Braccio and Sforza, who changed sides as they saw occasion. Joanna, attacked by Louis III of Anjou, adopted King Alfonso of Aragon and Sicily as her heir, and thus turned the dynastic quarrel into a competition between France and Spain for her kingdom. Then she adopted Louis in his turn and drove out the too powerful Alfonso. When she died René of Anjou (1435-42) succeeded, but Alfonso (1435-58) reinvaded the realm and won the day, his defeat and capture in a sea-battle by the Genoese and Visconti proving his salvation, for Filippo Maria of Milan suddenly changed his policy and allied himself with his captive. Meanwhile Naples and the papal lands were in constant turmoil, the happy hunting-ground of *condottieri*. Braccio and Sforza were followed by Francesco Sforza and Piccinino. Alfonso and the contemporary Popes, for all the obedience they acquired from time to time, reared their thrones on a quaking morass.

Foreigners and adventurers disputed for the sovereignty of the decadent south; the north was still independent and vigorous. The two naval powers, Venice and Genoa, monopolized the rich Levantine trade and fought one another for it with embittered fury. In resources and energy they were equal, but Genoa was clogged by the most complicated factions of the day. Thus when the two republics came to blows over the Black Sea trade in 1351, although the victories in the hard-fought sea-battles were equally divided, Venice under her matchless oligarchy lasted best, and Genoa was compelled to admit

the Visconti as her lords to secure the peace of 1355. She did indeed drive out her masters immediately after, but gained no rest thereby. The head of her government was now a doge, elected from among the wealthy merchant families who did not belong to the old nobility. Faction, however, did not cease, for the strife of the new men continued and mingled with the strife of the ancient houses. It was only the misfortunes of Venice which enabled Genoa to meet her rival on equal terms.

For Venice the command of the deeply indented eastern coast of the Adriatic sea was essential. Otherwise her fleets and shipping were always endangered by foes or pirates safely ensconced in its channels and ports. But the powerful kingdom of Hungary cherished a natural ambition to conquer an outlet to the sea in Dalmatia, and the Angevin Lewis the Great was resolved to wrest it from Venice. He found an ally in the Carrara of Padua, who longed not only for independence, but to succeed the Scaligeri as masters of eastern Lombardy. Venice was badly beaten by land and compelled to cede Dalmatia and to give up her protectorate over Padua in 1358. If she vanquished the Carrara once more and defeated a Hungarian army, she was yet weakened and assailable. Her rivalry with Genoa in the Black Sea and at Constantinople was as fierce as ever, and in 1378 her three foes, Genoa, the Carrara and Hungary, leagued against her. The war by sea was desperate and final. Venice, at first worsted, was besieged in her lagoons by the Genoese fleet and army established at Chioggia with the aid of the Carrara. Then the tide turned. Venice besieged her besiegers and compelled their surrender.

The duel between the two sea-powers was thus decided. Genoa never recovered the preponderance in the Levant. So torn was she by faction that for a while she submitted

to the sovereignty of the King of France (1396-1411) and later to that of the Visconti of Milan (1421-35). Wealth, trade and able men were hers in abundance; it was the continual civil strife which depressed her. Venice, on the other hand, was united and could repair her losses. The folly of the Carrara, who first called in the Visconti to share with them the Scaligeri towns, and then were cheated by their allies, gave her the means of recovering Treviso. The enfeeblement of the Visconti on Gian Galeazzo's death in 1402 enabled her to annex Verona and to conquer Padua from the Carrara. Dalmatia was bought back from Ladislaus of Naples when he was obliged to desist from the conquest of Hungary, and Friuli was seized in the subsequent war with the Emperor Sigismund King of Hungary. Thus a compact territory was acquired to provide her food-supply and to guard the trade-routes. Even a more threatening war, that with the Turks, then nearing Constantinople, began well with a naval victory in 1416. Venice did not foresee that she had undertaken too heavy a task. To battle with her rivals for land-empire in Italy, to encounter singlehanded, when Genoa was lamed, the enormous resources of the Turks who were slowly throttling her commerce, imposed a ruinous strain on the most securely-based of republics.

The strength and the fitness of the Visconti dominion in central Lombardy had been shown after the death of Archbishop Giovanni. Although his cities were divided among three nephews, soon reduced to two, Galeazzo II (1354-78) and Bernabò (1354-85), and these ferocious tyrants were constantly assailed by leagues of rivals, engineered by the Popes and long led by the redoubtable legate Albornoz, they lost little save Genoa and Bologna; the core of their state was solid. In a way, notwithstanding that these wars were waged by the mercenary

companies who worked their wicked will when it was possible, the Visconti represented a national resistance to the French Papacy. When Albornoz had founded a real Papal State and his death left its government to oppressive French officials, even Guelf Florence, the traditional ally of the Papacy, turned against the Church. For a while she seemed likely to head a national revolt from Gregory XI, but the Pope's resources, material and spiritual, were too great, and after an obstinate struggle Florence, finding herself all but alone, yielded on moderate terms in 1378.

Florence's internal dissensions were brought to a head by her defeat. After the crushing of the nobles in 1343 more political power had been given to the smaller tradesmen, but the wealthy merchants did their utmost to keep control by means of the machinery of the *Parte Guelfa* which they employed with gross injustice. They were successful in restoring Florence's dominion in Tuscany, but, in the struggle with the Pope, the lead was snatched from their hands by the chiefs of the more popular faction. The failure of that war only provoked these last to proceed to extremities. They had a dangerous ally in the artisans and the mob, whose petty guilds when they possessed them had no political power or part in the constitution. In 1378 their leader, the wealthy banker Salvestro de' Medici, founder of the greatness of his house, was drawn as Gonfalonier of Justice and introduced legislation to check the abuses of the *Parte Guelfa* and to injure those nobles who had become amalgamated with the new plutocracy. Riot and revolution were soon the order of the day. The *Ciompi*, as the artisans were nicknamed, burst into the public Palace and made their favourite Michele Lando Gonfalonier. For a moment they obtained the formation

of three new "Arts" of work-people. But violence and riot turned the traders of the "Minor Arts" to the side of the merchants of the "Major Arts"; Michele Lando showed both courage and sagacity; and order was restored on the old basis. In 1382 the new Arts were dissolved, and the plutocrats were back in power. Other means of wire-pulling less odious than those of the *Parte Guelfa* were put into action, but none the less the government was a stringent oligarchy. In Florence, in short, the attempt of the poorer classes to capture political power failed just as it did in Paris and England. They were too fickle, too ignorant and too undisciplined to maintain what they grasped by force of numbers.

The Albizzi family who guided the oligarchy had anxious times to face. The Schism, indeed, paralysed the Papacy, but the last attempts to unite Italy under a despot were being made. Gian Galeazzo Visconti (1378-1402) overthrew his uncle and partner Bernabò in 1385, and reunited the dominions of his house. He was the most astute and most ambitious ruler of his day, and the object of his ambitions was the kingdom of Italy he hoped to found. No soldier himself, he employed and kept subservient the best of the Italian *condottieri* who under Alberigo da Barbiano had already shown themselves superior to the ultramontanes. With their aid and still more by means of a diplomacy, singularly adroit and void of every scruple, his progress was rapid. He quickly annexed Verona and Padua, and if he was checked and lost Padua in a long war with a league headed by Florence and Venice, he consolidated his state into an organized despotism and made it semi-legitimate by purchasing the title of Duke of Milan from Wenceslaus, King of the Romans. The chief cities of Tuscany, save Florence, submitted to his yoke; in a

second war with Florence and her friends he defeated a German invasion under King Rupert¹, and conquered Bologna. He was hoping to subdue Florence herself and to be crowned King of Italy when he died of the plague in 1402. With him his great schemes vanished, for his sons were minors and the *condottieri* fought over their inheritance.

Florence could seize the opportunity to subdue her ancient rival Pisa in 1406, thus gaining a seaport and closing the northern entrance into Tuscany; but she was then compelled to resist another aspirant for the rule of Italy in the person of Ladislaus of Naples. When this competitor died a new war with Milan awaited her. The anarchy which succeeded Gian Galeazzo's death ended when his second son Filippo Maria (1412-47) inherited the duchy. In a few years he had put down his petty rivals, and renewed his father's schemes of expansion, but the annexation of Genoa in 1421 roused against him a ring of foes. The chief were Venice and Florence, Venice fearing for her new possessions and greedy for more, and Florence alarmed by the fate of Genoa and Filippo Maria's ill-concealed designs on Romagna and Tuscany. With intervals of peace and truce, the war between the rivals went on for many years, only being terminated by Visconti's death. On the whole he had been a loser, for Genoa revolted and Venice thrust her frontier westward to the R. Oglio. Both the length and the inconclusive results of the struggle were due to the predominance of the *condottieri*. Carmagnola, Piccinino, Fortebraccio, Francesco Sforza and their fellows betrayed and exhausted their employers, and fought or hung back for their own schemes, keeping Italy in disorder and gaining as a rule little for all their cunning.

¹ See above, p. 423.

As the hopelessness of an Italian kingdom became manifest, a new policy, that of a balance of power among the chief states, grew up. The first successful practitioner of this was Cosimo de' Medici, who converted the Florentine republic into a concealed tyranny. The Albizzi caucus had lost favour owing to an increasing incompetence, to defeats without and oppression within. It was not hard for Cosimo, the wealthiest banker in Europe, to reassume the leadership of the smaller traders and artisans which was traditional in his family. So formidable was he that, when his adversaries in fear banished him, the mere drawing of a favourable Signory was enough to ensure his recall and give him control of the city. The Albizzi clique fled, never to gain readmittance. Their methods of packing office and council were continued. The republic seemed to exist. But Cosimo (1434-64), a generous friend to his innumerable clients, was master of his caucus, and when any subordinate tried to rival his chief he fell.

A skilful foreign policy and the adroit use of his European banking business were two sources of Cosimo's power. On the death of Visconti, he made an alliance with Sforza, the new usurping Duke of Milan, to preserve the balance of power in Italy. To this result the medieval history of Italy had tended. The strongly marked provincial divergencies, the force of particularism, counted for much, but still more important was the heritage from Antiquity, the fact that Italy's natural political unit, her instinctive organization, was the city-state. The Holy Roman Emperors had striven to unify her in the interest of their universal Empire and its German kernel. Charles of Anjou and his heirs had striven to erect a feudalized despotism in the French fashion. The Visconti, foreshadowed by Frederick II in some degree, had aimed at

a scientific tyranny supported by a mercenary standing army. All failed against a national resistance, which in its protean forms might be communal, papal, Guelf, republican or particularist. In triumph, in humiliation and decay, the city-state remained the essential factor in Italian national development. It was abortive in the south, and the south degenerated. It was unbalanced in the centre, and the centre remained a shifting quagmire. It was deformed by German invaders and withdrawn from isolation by Nature in Lombardy, and Lombardy fell under a single city-tyranny. In Venice and Tuscany, it was better compounded and the chances of events were more in its favour. There it could show a more perfect development and display that civilizing energy which led the transformation of the Middle Ages into modern times.

SECTION 5. THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE

Italy's political history led apart from those ways which resulted in the states of modern Europe, but the development of her civilization stands in the direct route between the Dark Ages and the present day. Her propinquity to Constantinople, her natural affinity to the ancient Latins, which made her quicker to learn from the remnants of ancient literature and art and rendered her more susceptible to the spell of the Roman ruins in her midst, the prosperity that came to her from her commerce, and, not least, the stimulus and fuller life which were inherent in the city-state, all went towards that maturer thought, that riper outlook on the world, which formed the kernel of the Renaissance.

The Italian Renaissance was no revolution nor a sudden, new civilization. It was rather the next step forward from the point reached by Western Europe in the thirteenth century. Since the reigning ideas of the

thirteenth century had taken somewhat rigid forms in organization and thought, those forms had to be broken, but there was no more breach in the continuity of thought than there was in politics with the eclipse of Pope and Emperor. Even more than the earlier movement towards civilization was decidedly French, so was the later decidedly Italian, but closely related tendencies existed in more backward countries which at the close of the Middle Ages were ready to receive the Renaissance itself.

The most powerful instrument in this mental progress of the race was the study of the literature of Roman and Greek Antiquity, of *literae humaniores*¹, which was pursued with an understanding and appreciation not guessed at earlier. The pioneers were two Florentines, the poet Petrarch (1304-74) and the novelist Boccaccio (1313-75). Their main immediate work was the search for and rehabilitation of classics which were lying disregarded in monastic libraries, and still more the inspiring of a fiery enthusiasm in other students to do the like. But this was not all. They experienced themselves and fostered in others a general change of attitude towards the ancient world. Hitherto that world had been looked on as a preparation for the God-given scheme of the Holy Roman Empire and the Holy Roman Church. Christian times could not but be better in every way than the ancient heathen ages. Dante had placed his ideal in the twelfth century, or at earliest under Justinian. Whatever they believed as Christians, Petrarch and Boccaccio looked back, like Cola di Rienzo, to the glories of the Roman republic, and realized for the first time in medieval history the loss civilization had sustained. They felt it was their mission to bring

¹ Hence the names of humanism for the study, and humanists for its devotees.

back to knowledge the thoughts and powers of the sages of old and to rediscover their wisdom.

They were followed by an ever-increasing crowd of humanists. Ardent scholars spent their lifetime in the intensive study of the classics. Manuscripts of them were multiplied. The discovery of a lost classic work was a glorious and not infrequent event. Hardship and toil were worth enduring for so splendid an end. The recovery of Greek Literature in the West was one of the first consequences. In the fourteenth century the knowledge of Greek hardly existed in Western Europe; but Petrarch and Boccaccio could see that their beloved Latin authors looked on the Greeks as their masters in literature and art, and longed to enter into the sealed treasure-house of Hellenic genius. The times were propitious. Constant commercial intercourse took place between Italy and Constantinople, and the Palaeologi were driven by the danger they were in from the Turks to make continual proffers of a Union of the Greek and Latin Churches, and to woo the West and more especially Italy by every means in their power. Greek envoys and scholars, such as the famous Chrysoloras, passed into Italy. Greek could be learnt as a literary language and not as a trading lingo. It became comparatively easy to import the precious codices which contained the long-neglected masterpieces. There was just time in a busy eighty years, before Constantinople fell and the way was blocked, to reacquire Hellenism for the Western world.

Since the crusade of humanism was mainly carried on by grammarians and literary men, it was natural that a main preoccupation of the humanists should be with language and style. Latin was the literary tongue; Italian was but a corrupted dialect; to write masterpieces which should live it was necessary that the very

accents of Cicero and Virgil should be recovered once more from oblivion. The sonorous Low Latin of the medieval Church, consecrated by so many centuries, the intricate barbarisms of medieval law, and the vernacular intonations of medieval chroniclers, were all abandoned in the quest for classic style and form. The task was hard but in the end successful. By the year 1500 men could write like ancient Romans, and were putting into practice the lessons of taste, of organized reasoning and arrangement, they had slowly learnt from their models.

This progress would perhaps have been a barren pedantry or a limited advance, had not Italians themselves been undergoing a maturing change which enabled them to perceive and acquire the intellectual wealth which the classics offered them. That change has been called "the discovery of the world and of man." Greater security, greater personal freedom, greater wealth, greater leisure, the wreck of institutions believed immutable, the incessant activity of men's minds and energies for three centuries, had done their work. The centre of hope and thought shifted from the world to come to the world before them. Life was no longer a pilgrimage through the vale of tears, but a glorious possession to be exploited to the full by mind and body. An intense curiosity was born concerning the visible world, its denizens and their works, a curiosity which under the influence of the classics led eventually to criticism and experiment, and to science and the Reformation. Almost a new religion took birth from men's passion for the present world they knew. Instead of asceticism, the employment of every faculty became the ideal; instead of visionary holiness, beauty was worshipped and strained for; instead of a blessed hereafter, fame here among men to far posterity was the goal of ambition. All that, in the Church's despite, had

lived on decried in actual life, finding its utterance in dance-ballad or drinking-song, now took its place in the ideal of existence.

It was not only the promise of what would be done in the future under new impulses and with full-grown faculties. The actual achievement of the Italian Renaissance was a revelation. If the works of the humanists, which they admired with such a fond conceit, lie buried in their painful Latin and are remembered as tentatives and preludes only, their contemporaries, nay themselves at times, in vernacular literature and in the plastic arts, created masterpieces which vie with and surpass the moderns who derive from their inspiration. Petrarch and Boccaccio, as humanists venerable and unread, as vernacular authors are living literature, and literature which is modern in its thoughts and aims, in need of no commentator. For a while they found no adequate successors—humanism was too all-absorbing, the new age too doubtful of its mission, too unsure in its methods; but towards the close of the fifteenth century the time of assimilation was accomplished, and at the court of Lorenzo de' Medici at Florence a poet like Politian could write in the vernacular with exquisite freedom songs which were classic in their skill and taste, popular in their manner and theme. Thenceforward, slowly widening from Italian to all the nations of the West, the stream of modern literature has flowed steadily to our own day.






The plastic arts showed an even speedier evolution. Giotto, Dante's contemporary, brought moving life and dramatic energy into painting. Donatello, a century later, made sculpture real in a way that his predecessors, hampered by insufficient skill and lost in mystical dreams, could not do. By the year 1500 Leonardo da Vinci had painted his *Last Supper*, where Christianity is divested


of its purely medieval adjuncts, and art has attained a free power and delicacy in strength unimagined in the Middle Age.

Painters and sculptors, profoundly influenced as they were by the remnants of Antiquity, had Nature before them as their true guide and inspiration. Hence, perhaps, they were more successful than the architects. Noble as the neo-classic churches of the Renaissance may be, they are inferior to the Gothic and Romanesque creations of the Middle Age. The antique temple which they could not forget was not designed for Christian uses; the art of the Gothic church was born Christian and embodied not only medieval outgrowths, but the instincts of Christianity itself. It was the natural abode for Christian worship, and was ill-replaced by the cold and learned pomp of the new style in spite of its expanded domes and noble porticoes.

That humanism and the new adoration of life, of beauty and of capacity, clashed with the spirit of Christianity in the untrammelled and aggressive form they took, was a cardinal fact of the Renaissance. The humanists idolized the classics, and at first carried to their studies the habit of uncritical submission to authority they had learnt in the church. The sentiments, the opinions and the theories of ancient authors were to them venerable oracles belonging to true civilization in the greater past. But where they differed, they compared and discussed the antique philosophies. It was not long before they compared them with the tenets of the Church, and strove to adapt them to Christianity or Christianity to them. But few abandoned formally Christian doctrines, although Lorenzo Valla, himself a genuine sceptic, might, as a grammarian and historical critic, expose the forgery of Constantine's Donation and deal a staggering

blow to the secular claims of the Papacy. What mainly happened was the adoption of a new pagan ideal of life. The new paganism was inferior to the old, for it lacked the civic motives, the long-hallowed customary morality of the old. The individual man found himself freed from the bonds of custom, association and religion, and gave way recklessly to the appetites of mind and body. A whole class, the powerful, the wealthy and the learned, broke into a riotous carnival. The future, indeed, lay with the freedom they had won. The faint beginnings of a refinement of manners, even, were observable in their debauch. Christianity survived them, and assimilated their exploitation of life and the material world. But to medieval Christianity they acted as a mortal poison. In personal life the war against selfishness, luxury, oppression and greed, the ideal of self-renunciation and devotion, in the state the conception of united Christendom in Church and State organizing itself for good and right, disappeared in favour of appetite and will, of skill and power. It was time they did, for they had become hollow shows. The ancient forms were every day more moribund and inefficient. New were growing in their place, though not yet recognized by the generations which were shaping them.

- Domains of King of France 
- Domains of House of Burgundy 
- Lands of House of Luxemburg 
- Lands of House of Habsburg 
- Byzantine Territory 



EUROPE IN A.D. 1414

CHAPTER X

THE EAST AND THE TURKS

SECTION I. THE FOUNDATION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The immense extent and the loose tribal organization of the Mongol Empire were alike fatal to its long duration. Not only did the chiefs of the great subdivisions of the realm act in complete independence of their overlord in China, but also their own vassals were insubordinate. For some time, indeed, the very laxity of the central control prevented formal revolt from it. No one denied the authority of the Great Khan, whose real power was restricted to the dominions he ruled as Yuen Emperor of China. But he could not even make secure the desirable merchants who passed between East and West. As a result the sea-route was ever more favoured, and thus it came about that the wealth of Egypt and its Mamluk Sultans grew. Thither the Arab seamen brought wares from India and China. Thence the Venetians transported them to Europe. No difference was made in this traffic by the expulsion of the Yuen dynasty in 1368. Nor were the western Mongols much affected: their union had long been nominal.

The Il-khans of Persia came to grief before their theoretic suzerains. After 1336 the land was fought for and divided among rival Emirs. Rûm or Asia Minor was parcelled among ten petty dynasties, one of which was that of the Ottoman Turks. Its founder was Ertoghrul,

who, fleeing with a small clan from the Mongols, had taken service under Aladdin I of Rûm and had been rewarded with the fief of Sultanöni¹ towards 1250. His son Osman I (1299-1326) became a Moslem and then independent. From him his subjects took the name of Osmanlis or Ottomans; but he only slightly enlarged the bounds of his small state at the expense of the Greek Empire. This position on the frontier was one great asset—the Ottomans grew like any other border, fighting folk. Another incalculable advantage was the character of the ruling dynasty. For ten generations the house of Osman produced with barely an exception rulers and generals of first-rate ability, the longest series of such, perhaps, on record. For a time also their manners in peace and war did not compare unfavourably with those of their neighbours.

Orkhan (1326-60), Osman's son, more than doubled his dominions. He annexed the rival emirate of Karasi (Mysia), and conquered from the Byzantines almost all their possessions in Asia Minor, among them Brusa which he made his capital. In 1358 he seized Gallipoli, once the Chersonese, in Thrace, and the Ottomans thenceforward held the passage into Europe. The legislation, however, of Orkhan, which he promulgated under the advice of his brother and Vizier Aladdin, was of more importance than the extent of his conquests. The Turks had hitherto relied for their armies of horsemen on a semi-feudal, semi-clannish system. Under the new arrangement the Ottoman horseman, or *sipahi*, served in return for a fief, indeed, but it was not hereditary. Sons of a *sipahi* were given a minimum fief; its increase was personal, and depended on the Sultan's will. Thus a numerous and faithful cavalry was obtained. To

¹ In Bithynia.

them Aladdin added, what had not existed since the fall of Constantinople in 1204, a standing army of infantry. The means taken to raise it were evil enough. A race-tax of Christian boys was levied at regular intervals. They were educated as Moslems and trained in the main for soldiers. Deprived of home and kindred, under a stern discipline, and bred to fierce fanaticism, the Janissaries, or "new soldiery," formed an almost invincible infantry of many thousand men; and, being chosen for their strength and promise, they enriched the Ottoman race while the subject Christians were deprived of the best of their manhood. With such troops the Ottoman sultans could go far, and it was not till after the close of the Middle Ages that the system was corrupted and they found themselves at the mercy of an hereditary and mutinous army.

The frontier state of Brusa expanded at the expense of the hostile Christian religion, and was thus led almost at once into Europe. Murad I (1360-89) spent his chief energies in the conquest. The greater part of the wretched Byzantine Empire fell to him; Adrianople became his capital; and throngs of Turks settled in Thrace, renamed Rumelia. His sturdiest foes were the Serbs, then masters of most of the Balkans, and the Bulgarians. But Murad first routed them at the R. Maritza in 1371, and after many piecemeal conquests overthrew the Serbs in the decisive battle of the plain of Kossovo in 1389. Murad was murdered on the field of Kossovo. His son Bayezid I Ilderim¹ completed his task. Bulgaria was annexed, Serbia made a vassal. When Sigismund of Hungary led a crusade, in which French and German knights joined with the Hungarians, he was routed in 1396 at Nicopolis on the Danube. Early in his reign Bayezid had attacked

¹ "Lightning."

and annexed the rival Turkish principalities of Asia Minor. Only Constantinople remained of the Byzantine Empire, and the Sultan was pressing the siege, when he was called off from his prey by a mightier conqueror in the East.

Timur the Lame or Tamerlane was a Turkish chief of Transoxiana. Although the Khans of the line of Chagatay outlasted the Il-khans, their dominions, always invertebrate, were not less in a state of dissolution, and Timur, after an adventurous career as vassal, exile robber-chief, and rebel-invader, made himself master of the whole. He was elected Emir in 1369, although he allowed a nominal Chagatay Khan to subsist as suzerain for a while longer. But from the first he aimed at replacing the ancient Mongol federation by a strictly Moslem monarchy. The mollahs were his best allies; the remnants of Christianity and paganism disappeared, and Mongol tribal law gave place to the Koran. In this way the last links with the nomads to the east and north were snapped, and the Emir looked south and west for new conquests.

Persia was the first victim. From 1380 to 1393 Timur warred on the local dynasties with fearful slaughter, and reunited the domains of the Il-khans. Not less unfortunate were the Mongols of Kipchak, the Golden Horde, in the north. They too had fallen into anarchy and persistent inter-tribal warfare since 1358. Timur first assisted Toktamish, a pretender to the sub-khanate of the White Horde, to make good his claims. But Toktamish, having fought his way to the Great Khanate of the Golden Horde, championed the ancient Mongol ways, and attacked his benefactor in Persia. Timur retaliated by invading Kipchak. A second victory in 1395 broke the power of Toktamish and with it that of the Golden Horde. Timur thus became the eventual liberator of Russia.

Timur's fearsome raid on India in 1398 hardly concerns European history, save for the dispersion of the Hindu people of Gypsies through the West which seems to have been its consequence. His war with the Mamluks similarly only caused transient suffering in Syria. But his war with Bayezid gave time for the preservation of Greek literature and furthered the Renaissance. The two potentates fell out over their disputed frontiers. Their armies met in 1402 at Angora, and Bayezid's defeat and capture were the issue. The petty princes of Asia Minor were restored, the Ottomans were rent by civil war, and Timur was turning to a war with China when he died in 1405. Very soon his empire broke up like its predecessors. His death marks a fortunate epoch for Europe, for he was the last of those devastating conquerors who led the nomad hordes of Central Asia to spoil the West. From the days of Attila they had been the scourge of Europe and the ruin of the Near East. Yet their offshoot, the Ottoman Turks, remained to do infinite harm for centuries.

Civil war soon broke out among the sons of Bayezid who divided what was left of his kingdom. They were little molested by their neighbours and could fight the question out. How strongly established the Ottomans were was seen when Mohammed I (1413-21) overthrew the last of his brothers and reunited the realm. A few years of good government revived their power, and Murad II (1421-51) could again resume the path of conquest. In a few years he had annexed four out of the six Turkish principalities of Asia Minor, restored by Timur, and was able, undistracted, to meet his European foes.

SECTION 2. HUNGARY AND THE BALKANS

The check given to the royal power in Hungary by the Golden Bull¹ did not conduce to the orderly development of the country or its advance in civilization. The lesser nobles were too barbaric and undisciplined to use well the freedom they acquired. The peasantry were heterogeneous in race and oppressed by their lords. The townsmen were Germans and aliens. When the dynasty of Arpad became extinct in 1301, the decline of the kingdom seemed well under way. This was prevented by the Angevin line of kings. Charles Robert or Carobert, grandson of Charles of Anjou, was heir in blood of the Arpads, and after a prolonged civil war made good his claim. He devoted his reign (1310-42) with much success to the strengthening of the monarchy. He leant on the Church and the towns into which German colonists kept thronging. Trade and the order he enforced improved his revenue, and made him independent of the Diet, which he seldom summoned. His son Lewis the Great (1342-82) could scheme to dominate the east of Europe.

Lewis, however, was led, partly by the natural situation of Hungary, partly by the widespread connexions of his house, partly by the temptations offered him by the troubles of his neighbours, to dissipate his forces and energy. By nature, too, he was easy to discourage and he gave up his tasks half-way. The first interests of Hungary were a coast-line on the Adriatic, and a suzerainty over the Balkans, where the Turkish peril began to be threatening. Lewis conquered Dalmatia from Venice², and extended his suzerainty over Rumanian, Serbian and Bulgarian princes to the Black Sea. But he was

¹ See above, p. 301.

² See above, pp. 462-3.

continually diverted to his Italian wars¹, and he failed to protect his Balkan vassals when they came to death-grips with the Turks. Naturally his authority over them evaporated. The bait which had drawn him off at the last was the crown of Poland. This he indeed acquired in 1370. For the moment the Angevins seemed the greatest power in Europe. Yet it only needed the death of Lewis to break up his empire.

Lewis had chosen for his heiress his elder daughter Mary who had married Sigismund of Luxemburg. But the Poles refused to endure the union with Hungary any longer. They declared for Hedwig, younger daughter of Lewis, worsted Sigismund in war, and married her to Jagello of Lithuania. Nor did Mary and Sigismund easily obtain Hungary itself. Charles III of Naples, bred a Hungarian and next heir in the male line, seized the crown, and, although he was murdered and Sigismund succeeded (1387-1437), it was with loss of territory and shaken power. He repelled Ladislaus of Naples, but could not force Venice to abandon Dalmatia. Meanwhile the nobles had regained the whip-hand, and indulged in their wonted disorders which Sigismund was unable to check. His foreign policy was dynastic in the Luxemburg direction, as Lewis the Great's had been Angevin, and, while he was busied as Holy Roman Emperor, the all-important Turkish war received only a part of his attention.

The defence of the Balkans was carried on by the Balkan nations, the Rumanians, the Bulgarians and the Serbs. Of these the Rumanians or Vlachs were divided into two principalities, Wallachia and Moldavia, both of them originally under Hungarian suzerainty. Both were inhabited by barbaric pastoral nobles and peasants.

¹ See above, pp. 459-60, 462-3.

Wallachia, the stronger of the two, became independent. From 1386 to 1418 it was ruled by Mircea the Great. South of the Danube the second Bulgarian kingdom existed in a state of decadence. Its tsars were weakened by civil wars and local chiefdoms, and played a subordinate part to the greater rulers of Serbia. Urosh the Great (1242-76) first gave Serbia the lead of her neighbours; Milutin (1281-1321) conquered part of Macedonia from the Byzantines; Stephen Dushan (1331-55), statesman and legislator, made a bid for the succession to the Eastern Empire. He had nothing to fear from Bulgaria, his ally, and his campaigns extended his frontier to the Gulf of Corinth. In 1346 he took the title of Tsar. His death occurred while he was preparing to assault Constantinople. This was perhaps a misfortune for Christendom, since Dushan might have kept out the Turks. As it was Serbia broke in halves when he died, and neither half showed much inner cohesion.

It was on these divided states and turbulent tribesmen that the Turkish invasion came. In 1361 Murad I captured Adrianople from the Byzantines, and soon after made it his capital. Hostilities with the Balkan nations were not delayed. They knew their danger; Bulgars, Rumanians, Bosnians, and even Hungarians joined Vukashin of South Serbia against the Moslem. But their army was crushed in 1371 on the R. Maritza. Serbia was thrust back from the Egean Sea, and a few years of warfare extended Murad's suzerainty to the Danube. The struggle was not over however. Lazarus, Tsar of North Serbia, and Sishman, Tsar of Bulgaria, united once more against the common enemy. Each was conquered. Lazarus and his people were overthrown at Kossovo in 1389. Sishman, once pardoned by Murad, lost his kingdom to Bayezid Ilderim in 1393. South

Serbia was likewise annexed; North Serbia subsisted still as a vassal principality.

Sishman had been encouraged to revolt for the last time by the successful resistance of Sigismund of Hungary to the Turkish arms after Kossovo. Sigismund was now roused to greater efforts by the fall of his ally. He egged on Mircea the Great of Wallachia, who had been subdued by Bayezid, to refuse his tribute, and himself worked on the alarm of Europe to rouse a new crusade. Princes and knights of all nations met at Buda in 1396, but the nerve of the army was composed of Burgundians, Germans and Hungarians. At first the campaign prospered. The crusaders were besieging Nicopolis on the Danube when Bayezid gave battle, and inflicted on them a terrible defeat, due indeed to their own indiscipline and lack of generalship. This was the last real crusade, a posthumous offspring of dead ideals, and it failed for the old reasons, the anarchy and jealousy of feudalism which rendered vain the crusaders' splendid courage.

Sigismund was too weak and preoccupied to make much use of the breathing-space given him by Timur's invasion. True that Mircea remained independent till his death. But Murad II had the better of Hungary and reduced Wallachia to vassalage again. Sigismund's death in 1437 increased the danger of Europe. His son-in-law and heir was Duke Albert of Austria (1437-9), who by obtaining the Bohemian and Hungarian crowns and by his election as King of the Romans foreshadowed the eventual creation of the Austrian state. But he was disliked as a German and failed against the Turks. When he died, his kinsman Frederick III, the new-elected King of the Romans, was unable to make good the claims of the infant Ladislaus Posthumus either in Bohemia or Hungary. All his efforts only resulted in maintaining

a civil war which effectually lamed both kingdoms. Bohemia remained kingless, but mostly under the influence of the Utraquist noble, George Podiebrad. The most part of Hungary elected Wladislaw III King of Poland for its king.

In these anarchic circumstances Hungary owed her preservation to an heroic Vlach noble, John Hunyady. Belgrade, the key of the kingdom, was held against a siege; the Turks suffered a series of severe defeats. Murad II was glad to make the peace of Szegedin in 1444, by which he abandoned the suzerainty of North Serbia and Wallachia to Hungary. Murad, whose kindly nature made him uneasy on the bloodstained throne of Osman, then abdicated in favour of his boy-son Mohammed II. But his trust in the faith of the Christians was misplaced. Mohammed's youthful incompetence was too great a temptation. The papal Legate Cesarini absolved them from the oaths of Szegedin. The Pope and Venetians, the Byzantine Emperor were all to join in a renewed war, and it was hoped that their joint fleet would effectually cut in two the Ottoman dominions at the Dardanelles. It was a reckless proceeding, for Wladislaw and Hunyady could only renew the war in 1444 with a small army. Murad hastily resumed the throne, crossed to Europe with his forces by bribing the Venice-hating Genoese, while the papal fleet was somehow inactive, and gave battle at Varna in Bulgaria. Few Christians escaped from the rout, Wladislaw and Cesarini being among the slain.

Hunyady did not, however, give up hope. If the co-operation of Poland was lost by the king's death, the Austrian union might be restored by the recognition of Ladislaus Posthumus (1445-57), who was also nominal King of Bohemia. Hunyady was made regent of Hungary;

but his renewed offensive was shattered in 1448 by Murad in the second battle of Kossovo, and it was an unexpected deliverance when in 1456 he saved Belgrade from capture by Mohammed II. Thus at least the conquest of Hungary by the Turks was postponed for seventy years. Her career as defender of the Balkans and possible saviour of Constantinople was ended. The internal anarchy from which she suffered and the disputed succession were enough to make the task impossible.

The Balkan tribes, though broken and isolated, still defended where they could their freedom. Especially fortified by nature among their mountains were the Albanians, the direct representatives of the ancient Illyrians. Their chief was George Castriot or Skanderbeg¹, to give him his Turkish name which he had borne as a Janissary. After Hunyady's first victories he had escaped and revolted with his fellow-tribesmen in 1443. He vanquished the Turks time and time again. Murad II himself, who again abdicated and was again obliged to retake the Sultanate after Varna, was repulsed with heavy loss. Mohammed II was unable to subdue him, but, when Skanderbeg died in 1467, his dominions fell to pieces. In 1479 Skutari was carried, and Albania was thenceforth a Turkish province. Its tribal system continued, while many powerful septs turned to Islam.

Another breakwater of Europe was furnished by the Rumanian principalities, hampered as they were by their own jealousies and the persistent ambitions of Hungary. Vlad the Impaler (1456-62) freed Wallachia from the Turkish tribute for a while. When he was overthrown by his neighbour Stephen the Great (1457-1504) of Moldavia, the latter, made by his own act the next destined victim, took up the Turkish war. Beset

¹ "Lord Alexander."

on all sides, for the Tartars of South Russia, the Hungarians and the Poles were alike open foes or perfidious allies, Stephen held his own. He threw off Hungarian suzerainty. In spite of defeats he kept the Turks under Mohammed II and Bayezid II at bay. But when he died Wallachia had been long a Turkish vassal, and his son accepted the same position in 1510. Both principalities, however, retained their autonomy and their religion.

Hungary meanwhile enjoyed a respite. The hero Hunyady died in 1456 after the relief of Belgrade, and Ladislaus of Austria began his real reign. It was not a success, and, on his death in 1457, his sisters' rights were disregarded and his dominions chose native rulers. George Podiebrad had ruled Bohemia for years; he was now elected king (1458-71). In Hungary Matthias Corvinus (1458-90), son of Hunyady, was in like manner elected to the crown. Thus both kingdoms became fully elective, and continuity of policy and concentration of effort which they both needed were further endangered. George Podiebrad, in spite of his velleities for playing a decisive rôle in Germany, was somewhat fixed to a necessary task by events. He established a working compromise between Utraquists and Papalists, and governed well and wisely. But, although he baffled the lame attempts of the Habsburg Emperor Frederick III to lay claim to the succession, the Papacy contrived to raise up a more redoubtable foe in Matthias Corvinus. That brilliant, literary prince was greedily ambitious, and in the variety of his ambitions he dissipated the strength of his kingdom. Eager to enlarge it on all sides he attacked Podiebrad. On the latter's death the Bohemians proper elected for his successor Wladislaw of Poland (1471-1522), but Matthias was able to enforce

a peace in 1479, by which Moravia and Silesia were ceded to him. Frederick III, once a competitor for the Hungarian throne also, was then thrust from Vienna and his frontier lands by his successful rival. Great glory was won by the powerful Matthias. Yet the essential war with the Turks languished in consequence. He might win victories over them from time to time. Nevertheless their raids continued; Stephen of Moldavia was hampered or unsupported; and the conversion of the vassal principalities of North Serbia and Bosnia into Turkish pashaliks in 1459 and 1464 was not prevented or annulled. Venice, too, was unaided in her resistance to the Turk.

When Matthias died, the Hungarian nobles chose for king the indolent Wladislaw (1490-1522) of Bohemia. The election seemed to re-form a strong federated power, but it did not arrest the fate of Hungary. The nobles knew their man. In Bohemia Wladislaw had let power slip into the hands of the oligarchy of great nobles. In Hungary the numerous lesser nobility grasped the reins. Increasing disorder unnerved the two kingdoms. Therefrom and from their own sloth Wladislaw and his son Lewis II (1522-6) were incapable of building up alliances which should succour them from Turkish invasion, nor could the valour of the nobles prevent the fatal defeat of Mohacs (1526). Bohemia and the remnant of Hungary preserved the union which had been so long foreshadowed, but it was as parts of a German state under the politic house of Austria.

The Balkan peoples slipped back into completer barbarism under Turkish rule. Their country, rugged, split up and inclement, had never been easy to civilize. Only the strong rule of ancient Rome had been equal to the task. When the Slavs settled there, the nature of the land had been too favourable to tribal organization

and primitive manners for even the rule of a prince like Stephen Dushan to have any lasting effect. Governed by barbaric Turkish pashas, taxed of their best blood by the institution of the Janissaries, with the best land owned by Turkish *sipahis*, the Christian peoples, whether as oppressed Serbian peasants or as anarchic Albanian tribesmen, had no chance of sharing in the civilization of the West. Freedom, indeed, at least remained in one small district. The Serbs of Montenegro were never conquered by the Turkish armies.

SECTION 3. THE PALAEOLOGI: MOHAMMED II

The recapture of Constantinople¹ by the Greeks of Nicaea in 1261 did little towards the unity of the Balkans, and turned out to be disastrous for the Byzantine Empire itself. Michael VIII Palaeologus, intriguing, base and prodigal in vain pomp, was incapable of subduing the Latin and Greek princelings of the Balkans, and by his craven zeal for foreign aid damaged the prosperity and stability of his own dominions. By their privileges at Constantinople the Genoese absorbed the better part of the trade of that matchless emporium. What they did not obtain was grasped by the Venetians, and the intrigues, wars and concessions of Michael only succeeded in ratifying this division, while the commerce and navy of the Greeks waned year by year.

While Genoa possessed the Byzantine suburb of Galata and the lion's share of the Black Sea trade, her rival Venice was supreme in the Archipelago, where Crete, Negropont and other islands formed a secure basis for her power. Nor had the French local dynasties in Greece proper fallen with the Latin Empire. The principality of Achaia in the Morea and the duchy of

¹ See above, pp. 294-5.

Athens remained extant in a singular state of feudal and tribal disorder. Michael VIII only succeeded in extorting a fraction of Morea from its prince whom he took captive. There his progress stopped, and the gradual substitution of Italian for French dynasts in the fourteenth century tended to a very slight increase of peace and good government.

There were also remnants of the Greek Empire, other than the monarchy of Palaeologus. For a time the Despotate of Epirus subsisted. As its cohesion vanished the Albanian tribes resumed their wild feuds and soon attacked their neighbours. Much of Greece proper was settled by them in the fourteenth century, and their value as mercenaries led to their employment on all hands. From them Venice levied her formidable stradiots. Lastly, there was the little Empire of Trebizond on the Black Sea, to which the Genoese brought some commercial prosperity. For the most part tributary to its stronger neighbours, it was annexed by the Ottoman Sultan Mohammed II in 1461.

Whatever chances the renewed Byzantine Empire possessed were destroyed by the misgovernment of Michael Palaeologus and his successors. Justice was venal, government elaborate, inefficient and costly, and taxation crushing. Commerce was given over to foreigners, and pitiable ecclesiastical squabbles occupied the chief attention of the degenerate Greeks. Michael had begun his reign with an excellent native militia in Asia Minor. His suspicions of their attachment to the ward he had betrayed and blinded, John Lascaris, led him to desolate and disarm Bithynia on the suppression of a revolt. Henceforth the Empire depended on mercenaries to face its many dangers.

The chief object of Michael's fears was the ambition

of Charles of Anjou, King of Sicily, who was scarcely in possession of his conquered realm before he planned an Eastern expedition to revive the Latin Empire for his own benefit. Artful and unscrupulous diplomacy seemed to Michael the best safeguard, and thus began the long and never sincere negotiations for a reunion of the Greek and Latin Churches. Always a pure intrigue of state, hated by the Greeks who loathed Latin ceremonial and papal supremacy, these schemes were taken up when danger seemed pressing, carried through when the condition of the state was desperate, and renounced at the slightest gleam of hope. Even during their brief formal existence the Reunions had no real effect. The Greek clergy and people would have none of them, and hated the Emperors who brought them about. Michael's own Reunion was accomplished at the Council of Lyons of 1274¹. Good Pope Gregory X was delighted at this signal triumph, but the Greeks were furious at their Emperor's submission to the Pope and the Western Creed. All Michael's efforts of persuasion and persecution were in vain, and at last he was unable to gloss over the unreality of the Union to his papal protectors. Martin IV, who was for that matter a fervid partisan of Charles of Anjou, excommunicated him, and renewed the Schism. Michael owed his deliverance to the Sicilian Vespers².

Michael's death left the throne to his incompetent son Andronicus II (1282-1328). If the Greeks were more tranquil owing to the abrogation of the Union, the Empire was a prey to its own mercenary troops. These last were of all nations, including the Turks, but the most disastrous for the Empire were the Great Company of Catalans, who took service under Andronicus when the War of the Vespers ended in 1302. They soon fell out with the other

¹ See above, pp. 340-1.

² See above, pp. 344-5.

mercenaries and commenced a devastating civil war. The Emperor was unable to capture their stronghold of Gallipoli and had to thank the famine they caused by their ravages for their removal to Athens where for a time they seized the duchy. Meantime the Empire was in rack and ruin. Its navy had disappeared, and the wars of Venice and Genoa and the advance of the Turks had made the Archipelago a nest of pirates. Some relief, however, was given by the renewed energy of the Knights Hospitallers. With the Pope's aid they attacked and conquered in 1310 the island of Rhodes, one of the chief resorts of the marauders. Although the Empire lost a nominal province, the curbing of the Turkish pirates which the Knights effected was more than a makeweight.

A civil war of rival Emperors was now added to the misfortunes of the Empire. Andronicus III, grandson of Andronicus II, first forced his grandfather to associate him on the throne, and then in a later quarrel deposed him in 1328. The civil war gave the Ottoman Turks their opportunity. Already the larger part of the Nicaean Empire had been seized by the Seljuk states. Now Emir Orkhan undertook the conquest of Bithynia. In 1330 he defeated the Emperor at Philocrene, and a town or two were all that remained to the Byzantines in Asia. At the same time the ambition of Stephen Dushan of Serbia threatened the decrepit Empire, but the Byzantines were not sobered by their peril. When Andronicus III died in 1341 civil war broke out once more between the Empress-regent for his son John V and the chief minister Cantacuzene, who took the title of John VI. It lasted till 1347 when Cantacuzene was acknowledged senior Emperor, and commenced again in 1353 to be ended by his abdication in 1355. By then the Empire was weaker than ever before.

The treasury was empty; Thessalonica was isolated by Serbian territory; the Genoese had defied the Emperor from their suburb of Galata, and had fought their war with Venice in the Bosphorus.

A worse fate awaited John V (1355-91). Early in his reign the Ottomans seized Gallipoli and its peninsula, the key to the Balkans. In a few years Murad I had conquered the whole of Thrace, and defeated Serbs and Bulgars. Nothing could be done for the Empire by the Byzantines themselves. The sporadic crusades of adventurous Westerners had no result. As a last resort John V made a personal journey to the West, and submitted to the Pope to win his assistance. But no help came from powerless Avignon, and John, in despair, became an Ottoman tributary in 1373. Immediately afterwards he had to consent to the cession of Thessalonica, owing to the rash attack his heir Manuel made on a Turkish town. Internecine war for the scraps of the Empire followed. John had been arrested by his creditors at Venice, and his unfilial elder son Andronicus had refused to free him. Manuel had paid the debts, and been made heir. Andronicus soon revolted, and, in spite of being blinded at his first attempt, deposed his father for a while. At the last Murad divided their dominions between them.

The Greek princes now lived in miserable servitude till Manuel (1391-1425) dared to revolt on the occasion of Sigismund's crusade. While Bayezid ravaged the Morea, the son of Andronicus, John VII, laid siege to Constantinople at his instigation. Manuel, who was endowed with more patriotism and courage than the rest of his family, boldly accepted John as his colleague, and journeyed vainly to implore succour from the West. On his return in 1402 he found the terrible enemy a captive of Tamerlane. He at once deposed his nephew John,

and did his best to make his profit out of the wars of Bayezid's sons. Thessalonica and strips of coastland were the reward of his diplomacy.

Although in the days of Manuel the Empire was decrepit and the people corrupt, effete and worthless, there were signs of a national movement and an intellectual revival which link the Greeks to the contemporary West. Greek nationalism, in the last fragments of the ancient world, was naturally antiquarian in tendency. There were scholars to study earnestly the remains of ancient Greek literature and philosophy, men who prided themselves in being Hellenes. It was they from whom there came the Greek teachers of the Renaissance. For the most part, however, the Byzantines clung to the Empire. They were Romans. Their orthodox faith was the badge of their civilization and their race.

If the Greeks were effete, the Ottomans were becoming corrupt, while retaining the organized energy which led them to empire. It is a small count that Bayezid Ilderim introduced the hideous custom of each Sultan slaughtering his brothers on his accession instead of waiting to execute them after their inevitable revolts. He adopted impartially the worst vices of the conquered nations, and started the Ottomans on an abandoned luxury which was to sap at last their court and government. But his son Mohammed and his grandson Murad renewed the state and showed that in vigour it was still superior to its neighbours. On Mohammed's death Manuel tried once more to ruin his enemies by civil war. He failed, and Constantinople again underwent a siege in 1422. The Turks were repulsed, but John VIII (1425-51) purchased peace by a tribute and the surrender of territory. At the same time Thessalonica was sold to the Venetians and lost by them to Murad in 1430.

The miserable John saw approaching the ruin of his city and empire, now reduced to an island in the midst of Moslem territory, and he made the last bid for Western support by a proposal for reunion with the Latins. The times were not propitious. Not to mention the mutual hostility of the great states, there was the widespread discontent of men with the Papacy which was finding expression in the Council of Basel. None the less Reunion was his only hope, and it seemed he might get better terms owing to the rivalry of Pope and Council for the honour of closing the age-long Schism. With some insight he closed with the Pope's overtures, as those of the most efficient protector; but this also implied a complete surrender of the points of principle at issue. The reluctant Greek delegates, headed by Emperor and Patriarch, reached Italy in 1438. In 1439 at Florence they acknowledged the Pope's supremacy and accepted the Western "filioque" in the Creed. From his submission John returned to find it impossible to enforce the Union on his subjects. He had merely introduced a schism at home which went far to paralyse a government already unnerved. The Popes, on their side, did their best. The Crusade which was wrecked at Varna was largely their work, and they did not cease to urge a new.

To John VIII succeeded in 1449 his brother Constantine XI, the last heir of the ancient Caesars. Two years after Murad's son Mohammed II the Conqueror (1451-81) ascended the Ottoman throne. He was as brilliantly able and as ruthlessly ambitious as any of his line, and his heart was set on Constantinople, the natural capital of his realm. An excuse for war was easily found. Meanwhile Constantine desperately declared the Union once more and implored a rescue from the West. It did not come, while his unwarlike subjects found a good

pretext for sullen apathy in this ecclesiastical treason. When the siege began in April 1453, Constantine disposed of only 5000 Greeks and some 2000 Genoese, Venetians and others who traded in the Levant. For a time, it was just possible to run the blockade of the Turkish fleet which held the Bosphorus. But Mohammed brought a fleet by land behind the suburb of Galata and occupied the famous harbour of the Golden Horn. His artillery, both cannon and antique machines, kept battering the walls, and on the 29th May he delivered a general assault. The last Emperor fell gallantly fighting among his men, the city was carried, and Mohammed rode in triumph to turn Saint Sophia into a mosque and make Constantinople the capital of an Asiatic empire. A Venetian fleet, sent in relief, arrived the day after at Negropont.

Mohammed did not rely on conquest alone for the permanence of his dominion. He was wise enough to gain the support of the Greek Orthodox Church. Like most Moslem princes he was not a persecutor. The Christians were helpless, oppressed subjects, but their religion, language and customs were left untouched. Thus Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars, Albanians and Vlachs retained their national characters. Their ecclesiastical chiefs were made responsible for them. The Patriarch of Constantinople was invested by the Sultan, and the bitter hatred of the Greeks for the schismatic arrogant Latins made them welcome the rupture of the Union even at the cost of subjection to the Turk.

The remainder of Mohammed's reign was devoted to a series of conquests. Athens fell. The Morea, already devastated by Murad II, was subdued, all save some Venetian fortresses, in 1458-60. Trebizond was annexed in 1461. The last Seljuk principality of Rûm was extinguished when Karamania was overthrown in 1471. The

Mongol Khanate of the Crimea was made tributary in 1475, thus ensuring to the Ottomans complete supremacy in the Black Sea. No organized resistance was made by Europe in its imminent peril, though Pope Pius II vainly spent himself in the endeavour to lead a new crusade. Venice, whose Levantine possessions were in deadly peril, fought a gallant war against the overwhelming forces which Mohammed brought against her by sea and land. She was glad to obtain peace in 1479 with the loss of Negropont. The way was prepared for an invasion of Italy, and Otranto was seized by the Ottomans in 1480 as a base of operations¹. But an attack on the Knights of Rhodes failed, and to the joy of Christendom Mohammed died in 1481. Fortunately his son Bayezid II (1481-1512) was weak and peaceful, and the next conqueror, Selim the Grim (1512-20), turned his arms eastward to subdue the Mamluks of Egypt.

Cruel and degraded as was the character of Mohammed II, he is a great historic figure if only as a destroyer. He put an end to the Roman Empire founded by Augustus and to an ancient type of civilization which had lasted throughout the Middle Ages. Henceforth the Balkans were held in a general barbarism till our own time. As for the West, for Europe proper, it had lost its bulwark, so long preserved against the tide of orientalism by the marvellous organization of the Empire and the valour of the Crusades. It now had to meet and fight the Turk for its own preservation. In another way a new impulse was given to European enterprise. Constantinople under the capricious and aggressive Turkish government ceased to be the emporium and link between East and West of former times. The conquest of Egypt in 1517 cut asunder the ancient trade-route from China and India to Venice.

¹ Otranto was abandoned on Mohammed's death.

All the more was Christian Europe urged on to the accomplishment of the Cape Route to the East and to the discovery of the New World.

SECTION 4. POLAND AND RUSSIA

Although Poland was not reduced to vassalage by the Golden Horde, she was in a miserable state of ruin after the Mongol invasion. At first the prospect of recovery seemed remote. The land was divided into several autonomous principalities and within these small states the nobles had it all their own anarchic way. They were separating into two grades, the magnates and the gentry (*szlachcici*), of whom the magnates were supreme. Beneath them were peasant-serfs. Externally Poland was equally depressed. The Teutonic Knights were shutting her off from the Baltic. German settlers were transforming Silesia into a German land, and were permeating Poland proper with a burgher class, who did not cease to be foreigners while they gained possession of the towns and their trade. The acquisition of the crown by Wenceslaus of Bohemia in 1300 increased the danger, for it was his German subjects who profited. The dependence of Silesia on the Bohemian crown was another step in its Germanization.

But hatred of the Germans called forth a national spirit which vanquished Polish particularism. A prince of Cujavia on the lower Vistula, Wladislaw Lokietok—"the dwarf"—(1303-33), who had always opposed the Bohemian kings, took up arms to prevent John of Luxemburg, who succeeded to the Czech dynasty in Bohemia, from gathering in their Polish inheritance. He not only checkmated John, but united most of the principalities under his sway, and in 1320 was able to take the title of King. In 1331 he summoned the first national Diet.

Against the German settlers within the realm his measures were successful; the Slavs took the ascendant in the towns. Against those without he was less victorious. Bohemia retained Silesia, and he was unable to wrest Pomerelia from the Teutonic Knights.

Wladislaw's son, Casimir the Great (1333-70), saw the impossibility of reconquering the lost provinces. He ceded Silesia to King John and Pomerelia to the Teutonic Knights. But in compensation he looked towards the east, towards the formation of a great non-German power, and when in 1340 he annexed the Red Russian kingdom of Galicia, in spite of the efforts of Hungary and Lithuania, he had done much for his design. The prosperity and unity of Poland increased rapidly under his wise rule. Above and beside the officials of the provinces he placed a royal, centralized administration. In 1368 he consolidated the varying provincial customs in the common Statute of Wislica. The large royal domains made him independent of the national and provincial Diets. The nobles retained their extensive powers in a still more feudal form, but Casimir knew well how to manage and lead the oligarchy of magnates and prelates. The army was made more effective by being founded on military service for fiefs on the Western model instead of on ancient tribal nobility. Lastly, in the true spirit of the fourteenth century, thought and learning were given a national centre in the new University of Cracow, the capital of the kingdom.

Either a medieval desire of grasping too much, or a fear of disastrous succession wars, led Casimir to declare his nephew, King Lewis of Hungary (1370-82), his heir. Thereby he gave a severe shock to the new Polish monarchy, for Lewis was forced to buy the adhesion of the Polish nobles by the Privilege of Kassa in 1374, by which the

magnates were released from nearly all their duties to the king. Absenteeism on the part of the Hungarian monarch completed the erection of their oligarchy. When Lewis died the magnates promptly took control. They insisted on electing his second daughter Hedwig for their queen, thus separating from Hungary and Bohemia¹, and compelled their nominee to marry Jagello, the Grand Prince of Lithuania.

Lithuania, which in this way was linked to Poland by a personal union, was a state with a future as it seemed. The Lithuanians proper, with their capital at Vilna, were a race apart, hardly touched by civilization and still heathen. None the less, in spite of their sufferings and losses at the hands of the Teutonic Knights, they had shown political capacity. Their Great Princes, since the Mongol invasion, had conquered wide stretches of Russian territory as far as Kiev, and had entered into competition for the foundation of a Russian monarchy. It was Jagello who, rightly or wrongly, abandoned this tendency, and turned towards Poland and the civilization of the West. A condition of his marriage with Hedwig was his conversion to Christianity. He and his people became Catholics and Latins, and placed an impassable gulf between themselves and their Russian subjects of the Greek Orthodox faith. For a time the conditions were alleviated and their extreme consequences disguised by Jagello enfeoffing Lithuania to a vassal Great Prince Vitovt, who pursued the older policy; but, when Vitovt was routed by the Golden Horde in 1399, even he submitted to a westernizing tendency. His death in 1430 allowed the Polish union to have its full effect.

Jagello took the baptismal name of Wladislaw II (1386-1434) as King of Poland. He acknowledged with-

¹ See above, p. 481.

out resistance the oligarchy which had raised him to the throne. In 1413 Lithuania received institutions on the Polish model. The great families were given the same privileges as their fellows in Poland. The united state was more directed by the oligarchic Bishop of Cracow, Zbigniew Olesnicki, than by the king. With all defects of organization, however, the strength of the kingdom was shown in the national victory of Tannenberg in 1410 which broke the power of the Teutonic Order. Poland aspired to be the champion and chief of Eastern Europe; but Wladislaw III (1434-44) was slain at Varna¹, and Casimir IV (1447-92) was obliged to begin the work anew. His great achievement was the ruin of the Teutonic Order, which was consummated by the Peace of Thorn in 1466. Poland now possessed a sea-coast on the Baltic, and was no longer hemmed in by Germans². He contrived to bring Bohemia under the rule of his youngest son Wladislaw, who later obtained the crown of Hungary also. Stephen the Great of Moldavia was for a time his vassal.

These successes, however, were doomed to be ephemeral owing to the internal circumstances of the vast Polish kingdom. Casimir came to the crown determined to wrest power from the oligarchy. After a bitter struggle he did so, but the profit fell to the lesser nobles, the gentry or *szlachta*. Under his laws their deputies controlled the national Diet. Permanent monarchic institutions never came into being, and the state was ripe to become an anarchic republic of nobles under a fettered elective king.

As we look further eastward we see the Slav nations less and less under the imprint of Western Europe and Latin civilization. Poland was chivalrous and fervently devoted to the Latin Church. The greater part of

¹ See above, p. 484.

² See above, p. 429.

Lithuania was Orthodox and Russian, yet her aristocracy had a feudal tinge. Russia proper belonged wholly to the East and was the heir of Byzantium. In one respect, indeed, she was less typically Slavonic than Poland. The Slavs showed a natural dislike for a governmental machine and an incapacity to shape one. It was Byzantine influence and Mongol domination which produced in Russia an all-powerful autocracy.

The Khans of the Golden Horde demanded heavy tribute and military service from their Slav vassals, but, apart from the oppression they exercised, they did not interfere greatly in those vassals' internal government. Russia was left divided into several states ruled by descendants of Rurik, and one prince was invested by the Khan with the dignity of Great Prince. An abject submission was enforced by the Golden Horde, which divided Russia from the rest of Europe. Her old foes, however, were defeated and checked, when Alexander Nevski routed the Swedes on the Neva in 1240 and the Teutonic Knights on Lake Peipus in 1242. One of Alexander's sons received the appanage of Moscow, from which the Russian Empire was to grow.

The princes of Moscow showed a more continuous ability than their fellows, and they were free from the disorderly, aristocratic traditions of the older centres of Russia. Surrounded by powerful neighbours, exposed to the tyranny of the Horde, their *boyars*, or nobles, and peasants were absolutely dependent on them for safety, and an autocracy of the sternest kind was founded and prospered. An unheroic subservience to the Horde gained them the Great Khan's favour and support. They obtained from him the dignity of Great Prince, and Ivan I Kalita¹ (1328-41) obtained a far more valuable privilege.

¹ "The Purse."

The odious task of gathering the Russian tribute was conferred upon him. Thus his wealth increased, he became the protector of his nation, and he had every opportunity of depressing his neighbours with the Khan's aid. At the same time he made Moscow the spiritual centre of Russia by inducing the Metropolitan to transfer his residence thither from Kiev. It was an enormous advantage, for the Russian monks, like the Latin, were the pioneers of agriculture and colonization. All their new settlements in the vast forest-land looked to Moscow as their capital. Neither the rival princes nor the half-foreign Lithuanians, who attempted to unite Russia by the more chivalrous expedient of defying the Tartars, could counteract this tendency.

Meantime the Horde was breaking up, and Dmitri Donskoi (1363-89) thought the time was ripe for resistance. At first it seemed as though he were right. Two glorious victories, the last on the banks of the Don in 1380, re-aroused national self-respect. But the attempt was premature. The Great Khan Toktamish, who reunited the Horde with the aid of Tamerlane¹, burned Moscow and reimposed the tribute. Even when Toktamish fell before Timur in his turn, the Great Prince of Moscow thought it well to keep the peace. None the less, he was far more independent than before. His territories steadily increased. The dangers of the system of granting appanages to the younger princes of the house were overcome by Vassily II the Blind (1425-62) in long doubtful civil wars. The same Great Prince reaffirmed Russia's national spirit against the Latins. He refused the Union of Florence in 1439. While Lithuania was fettered to Poland and the West by Catholicism, Russia remained Orthodox and oriental.

¹ See above, p. 478.

It was reserved to Vassily's son Ivan III the Great (1462-1505) to crown the work of his predecessors. He brought the vassal Russian principalities to submission. He conquered Great Novgorod in 1479 and reduced that wealthy commercial republic to a provincial town. Poland-Lithuania was distanced in the race for supremacy. Casimir of Poland allied himself with the decadent Golden Horde, but Ivan was able to beat him off, and his own Tartar allies, among whom was the Khan of the Crimea, put an end to the Horde. Ivan himself annexed the once-formidable Khanate of Kazan.

Russia was now a great power under her absolute, half-Asiatic monarchy. The Tartars were vexatious but not dangerous. Russian colonists were increasing the realm to east and north. The wild Cossacks were her vanguard against the nomads to the south. Lithuania, paralysed by her association with the invertebrate Polish state, was fated to decline. With the fall of Constantinople Moscow became the true centre of the Orthodox Church, and Ivan by marrying a Greek princess seemed to claim to be the heir of the Palaeologi. But this vast realm was still remote from Western Europe and buried in barbarism. Only with extreme slowness was Russia to renew her relations with the West, to develop her enormous resources in men and wealth, and to play a leading part in European history.

CHAPTER XI

THE DESPOTIC MONARCHIES

SECTION I. THE CONSOLIDATION OF FRANCE

Charles VII, sluggish in youth and a rake in his old age, was far from being a great king, but he chose his instruments well and was wise and constant in his purposes. He relied chiefly, like his most successful predecessors, on business men and lawyers taken from the ranks of the bourgeois and lesser nobles, and with their aid built up again the fabric of the French monarchy. The monarchy was even more than before the defender of France from foreign aggression and domestic anarchy. It was thus able to extend still farther its long-practised methods and to develop institutions which were a firm basis for its absolutism.

The most important of these institutions was a disciplined standing army. Charles and his subjects had had enough of the Free Companies, the *Écorcheurs*, who desolated the country. In 1439 the States General gave the king the sole right to levy troops and to name their captains. In 1445 measures could be taken to carry the right into practice. A number of royal *Compagnies d'ordonnance* were levied from the lesser nobility, chiefly from soldiers selected from the disbanded Free Companies. This was the cavalry. The artillery was steadily improving in quality and was also wholly in the king's hands. Beside the two chief arms, a national infantry militia was also

raised in the *Francs-archers*, but it was never very effective, and was later replaced for the most part by Swiss mercenaries.

A standing army which was not to plunder must needs be regularly paid, and Charles made here his greatest innovation. The States General had long been obliged to vote subsidies for the war, since the income from the royal demesne and from the customs was naturally insufficient. The subsidies were raised by a poll-tax on the *roturiers* or non-nobles and were called the *taille*. After 1439 Charles VII felt himself strong enough to levy the *taille* and fix its amount without a vote of the States General. In this way he gained a full control over the finances of the state, and had a ready means at his disposal for filling his treasury according to need. By the end of his reign he was as wealthy as well-armed.

The resurrection of royal justice kept pace with Charles' other reforms. The Parlement of Paris recovered its ancient authority, keeping all in awe. As it was very nearly a close corporation, it acted as some check on the king himself, generally for the good of the realm. It already claimed the right, later so famous, of refusing to register royal edicts and thus to make them part of the laws, and, although overridden, its opposition made the government circumspect. Equally useful as a whole were the provincial *parlements*, of which the most important, that of Languedoc, was Charles' creation. The last judicial benefit of the reign was the decree that the numerous local customary laws should be written down, by which certainty was introduced, if confusion was left rampant. It was characteristic of the monarchy to make itself the only, but all-sufficient, cement of the incoherent provinces of France.

The predominance of the monarchy implied the

decadence of the States General. Too much divided by class-privileges and provincial jealousies, hampered by the internal disorder which made their assembling dangerous and burdensome to the deputies, and having always formed an excrescence on the national organization, they had failed, where the monarchy had succeeded, in providing a rallying-point against the invader. They had seldom indeed been united in one body. Charles VII held only one national assembly in 1428. He ceased to summon the States of Languedoil after 1439. The States of Languedoc became mere provincial States with ever more limited functions like those of other great and petty provinces. The fact was that the monarchy left no room for them.

To complete the edifice of royal power there came the subjection of the Gallican Church, impoverished and harassed by the war, and disorganized by the Schism and the Councils. Charles took advantage of the breach between the Council of Basel and the Pope in 1438 to obtain from a Gallican Synod at Bourges the approval of his Pragmatic Sanction, by which the Pope's power to nominate to benefices, levy taxes and hear appeals was severely restricted. His influence enabled him to carry the elections of such prelates as he favoured; at need he had no scruple in violating the Pragmatic Sanction when the Pope could be useful to him; and in result the Gallican Church became the humble instrument and victim of the monarchy.

The most serious difficulties of Charles lay in the remaining holders of great fiefs in spite of the steady pressure of the administration and their weakness induced by the long wars. The lesser nobility and the bourgeois were devoted to him, but the great vassals were still particularist and hostile. Chief among them was the

Duke of Burgundy, whose domains, within and without France, almost formed a separate realm. The Duke of Brittany, too, strong in Breton particularism, was rather an uncertain ally than a vassal; while the Dukes of Bourbon, Orleans, Alençon and Anjou, all princes of the blood, and the Gascon Counts were restive and formidable. Three times the great vassals leagued against the reviving monarchy, and in 1440 their rebellion, called in scorn the Praguerie¹, was dangerous, for they were headed by the king's graceless and able heir, the Dauphin Louis. But the loyalty of the towns and the prompt decision of the government carried the day. The rebels were pardoned easily and Louis was sent to his appanage. Later isolated rebellions all failed, and, as Louis persisted in a covert hostility, his father in 1456 invaded the Dauphiny and annexed it finally to the crown of France. During the rest of the reign the dispossessed Dauphin was a pensioner of Philip the Good.

Before the English were wholly expelled Charles had begun to make his power felt outside France. He showed the ancient desire to expand his dominion over the imperial lands on his eastern frontier, blent with the endeavour to prevent the Duke of Burgundy doing the same. With these motives he wooed the alliance of the Habsburg Emperor Frederick III, and, moved by the opportunity of getting rid of the terrible *Écorcheurs*, he sent the Dauphin Louis in 1444 to aid his ally against the Swiss. Louis gained one of the few victories won over the mountaineers; but thenceforward it became a cardinal point of French policy to keep on good terms with such formidable neighbours. Meantime the king's relations with the aspiring Duke of Burgundy grew yearly worse. War at the last was prevented by Charles' death in 1461.

¹ In remembrance of the Husite wars.

He had restored the influence of France abroad. The kingdom was armed; its wealth was renewed; and French traders, like the anachronous captain of industry, Jacques Coeur, carried the renown of their sovran to the Levant.

The Dauphin who succeeded as Louis XI (1461-83) was determined, first to exercise his government himself—"The council rode on his mule,"—and secondly to bring the great vassals completely to obedience, and if possible to annex their domains. Thus France would be united under his personal rule. He was well qualified for the task. Bold, adroit and cunning, invincibly persistent, unerring in his perception of the weak spots of his enemies, "the universal spider" was well fitted to hasten the manifest fate of feudal particularism. By prolonged intrigue he dug pits into which he knew his adversaries would rush at last. But he was not proof against mistakes and failures, of which his rashness and wilfulness produced a plentiful crop. It was not only the singular ability of this odious character which united France. He was singularly lucky, too, and worked as a junior partner of the inevitable.

The first years of Louis' reign were full of mistakes. He allowed himself at his accession to be almost patronized by his late host Philip the Good of Burgundy. He drove away the wise counsellors of Charles *le bien servi*. He restored traitors, and irritated the nobles great and small. Only the bourgeois and lesser folk were conciliated by the energetic government of a king who understood their interests. It was not long before the aggrieved parties combined against him. Their nominal chief was the king's brother Charles, who was dissatisfied with his appanage of Berry, but their real and natural leader was Charles of Charolais, heir of Burgundy. Louis had

recklessly resumed his father's policy of thwarting Burgundian expansion. He intrigued with the Liégeois, who were restive under the leading-strings in which Philip the Good held their bishopric. He redeemed Picardy and its important fortresses under the treaty of Arras. Duke Philip was old and at enmity with his son, but Charles, surnamed the Rash or the Bold, was ready to defy his future suzerain. In 1464 the League of the Public Weal was formed by almost all of the great vassals. In 1465, when Charles the Bold was reconciled with his father, war broke out. Louis found himself attacked on all sides; he was defeated at Monthléry, and submitted to his vassals' terms. Charles of Berry exchanged his duchy for that of Normandy, the Duke of Brittany received all but sovran rights, Charles the Bold recovered Picardy.

The monarchy had suffered a heavy blow, but Louis emerged more secure than before of the support of the bourgeoisie and lesser nobles, for the great vassals had unveiled the mere selfishness of their designs, and the plague of disorder was renewed. He immediately cheated his brother Charles out of Normandy, and began again his intrigues in Liège. The League revived, and was joined by Edward IV of England. Yet Louis subdued the Duke of Brittany while Charles the Bold, who succeeded his father in 1467, was preoccupied with Liège and his marriage with Edward's sister, and then hoped to stem the Burgundian invasion by a personal interview with Charles at Péronne. While he was there, the Liégeois revolted once more, and Charles kept the king prisoner till he consented to a further limitation of his rights as suzerain and to the compensation of Charles of Berry with Champagne. Louis was even compelled to march against the Liégeois with his captor.

The next few years were occupied with mine and countermine, with alternations of war and peace, in which Louis had the greater success. He gave his brother Guienne instead of Champagne, and was made safe at last by the prince's death in 1472. He checked Charles the Bold in Picardy, and subdued the remaining great vassals to his will. He perturbed England by engineering the restoration of Henry VI, and, when Edward IV did really invade France in 1475, he was bought off by an annual subsidy in the treaty of Picquigny. Louis XI, now master of his kingdom, could treat Charles as a foreign foe, not as the head of a French faction.

Louis was fortunate in the character of his adversary. Charles the Bold was blundering, obstinate and slow-witted, while the mutinous and straggling Burgundian lands required a finished and cool diplomat to hold them together. Philip the Good, though a pompous, selfish prince, had possessed a share of tact and prudence. He surrounded himself with a court of fourteenth-century chivalry, but he made the Netherlands the core of his dominions, and, though he had to subdue the republicans of Ghent and Bruges, he acquired a kind of national loyalty. Charles, too, tried to melt down his lands into a state. States General of the Netherlands met. A Parlement for justice and a *Chambre des Comptes* for finance sat at Malines. He continued Philip's foreign schemes also with a brutal recklessness all his own. Liège and Guelderland were annexed. He received Upper Alsace in pawn from the needy Austrian Duke Sigismund. In 1473, when he reached the high-water-mark of his power, he linked his Burgundian duchy and county with the Netherlands by forcing the young Duke René II of Lorraine to yield him military occupation of his strongholds. All seemed ready for the realization of Philip's

schemes by the re-creation of the ancient kingdom of Lotharingia. The *fainéant* Emperor Frederick III, however, supported by the Electors and worked on by Louis XI, refused at the last moment to crown his vassal, fleeing by night from Treves, their place of meeting, to evade compliance. Charles sought compensation in the annexation of the electorate of Cologne, but besieged in vain for a whole year its little town of Neuss.

His obstinacy in continuing the siege was his ruin. Edward IV, finding that no Burgundian aid was forthcoming, signed the treaty of Picquigny. The Alsatians rose against Burgundian tyranny. René II, Sigismund, the Free Towns of the Rhine and the Swiss, egged on in their turn by Louis XI, made a league against him. It was easy for Charles to drive René from Lorraine, but the Swiss were a more formidable foe. He was determined to vanquish them, for they were conquering Vaud from his ally of Savoy. Three times the invincible mountaineers, at Granson and Morat in 1476 and at Nancy in 1477, bore down the Burgundian knights and mercenaries. Charles himself fell at Nancy and the design of a middle kingdom perished with him.

Louis XI seized his opportunity with his accustomed cool and unscrupulous shrewdness. Charles left an only daughter Mary as heiress of all his dominions, and the States General of the Netherlands, in their particularism, destroyed at once Charles' central institutions, while the neighbouring princes advanced claims to much of her inheritance. The French king might, perhaps, have married Mary to his own heir the Dauphin, but he seems to have thought that so to gain the whole would be to arouse too many foes, and to introduce an incongruous nation into France. Defying the rights of the case, he determined to conquer from the helpless Mary her French or semi-French

possessions. He disposed of a fine army strengthened by several thousands of Swiss mercenaries, and struck at once. Picardy and Artois, both the duchy and the Franche Comté of Burgundy were seized. Then Louis met with a check. The Flemings would have none of the French dominion; Mary wedded the Emperor's heir, the Austrian Archduke Maximilian, and her new husband fought for her inheritance. In 1479 he won the victory of Guinegate over the French. His hold over the restive Netherlanders, however, was weakened by Mary's death in 1482, which left his infant son Philip the Fair titular Duke. The two Burgundies, which had risen in his favour, had meanwhile both been subdued again by Louis; and a compromise was rendered necessary. By the treaty of Arras of 1482 the Dauphin was to marry Margaret, infant daughter of Mary and Maximilian. Her dowry was to be Artois and the Franche Comté which were left in Louis' hands.

Burgundy was not the only great fief which Louis annexed to the crown. On the extinction of the younger house of Anjou in the persons of his uncle René, titular King of Naples, and René's nephew Charles of Maine, the king took possession of their French fiefs and of the imperial county of Provence. Thus the French frontier at last included all Languedoc, and another step had been made in the union of the French nation. With a like ambition the little county of Roussillon to the north of the Pyrenees was secured from the kingdom of Aragon by a long series of intrigues and wars. Louis XI could die in 1482 in the assurance that he had consolidated and enlarged the French monarchy and had fortified it within and without.

Fortunately for the continuance of Louis' work, the regency for his boy-son Charles VIII (1482-98) fell to his capable daughter Anne of Beaujeu and her husband

Peter, a scion of the house of Bourbon. In the States General of Tours in 1484 they contrived to baffle the attempts of the remaining great vassals, headed by the heir presumptive, Duke Louis of Orleans¹, to grasp the regency, at the cost of a few concessions of which the chief was a reduction in the amount of the oppressive *taille*. When the vassals took to arms in the *Guerre Folle*² they had the worst of the contest. War was resumed, but a brilliant victory over the Bretons in 1488, in which Orleans was captured, forced the Duke of Brittany to a peace, while his ally Maximilian of Austria was checked. The way was opened for the annexation of Brittany, the most particularist of all the great fiefs, which felt itself a separate nation. In 1488 its Duke Francis II died, leaving his eldest daughter Anne his heiress. The patriotic Bretons endeavoured to retain their independence by marrying her by proxy in 1490 to Maximilian; but he was far off engaged in an Hungarian war. The Beaujeu invaded the duchy in 1491, and compelled the Duchess Anne to marry Charles VIII. Although large concessions were made to Breton particularism, the last autonomous great fief, save Flanders, was united to the crown of France.

After the absorption of Brittany the influence of the Beaujeu declined. The young Charles VIII was filled with schemes of conquest and glory, and prepared for that invasion of Italy which wasted for years the best energies of France and ushered in a new era in European history. To secure France from interference in her aggression, he gave up some of his father's most valuable conquests. Ferdinand of Spain was bribed with Roussillon. To Maximilian were retroceded Artois and the Franche Comté. The cession was indeed just, for they

¹ Afterwards Louis XII.

² "The mad war."

were the dowry of Maximilian's daughter Margaret whom Charles had refused to marry. None the less he surrendered France's natural expansion to the east in order to gain an unprofitable realm south of the Alps.

The annexation of Brittany closes the medieval development of France. It had been a development of an absolute, centralized monarchy. The kings had reduced to order their own domain and formed a professional non-feudal administration. They had overthrown or absorbed the provincial dynasties headed by the Plantagenets, whose work in banishing anarchy had been little less important than their own. The government was furnished with organized institutions, such as the Parlement, and manned by a class of lawyers, lesser nobles and bourgeois, whose ideals and interests were all in favour of royal absolutism. With their aid the king's power was felt throughout France. Then came two enormous dangers. One was recrudescent feudalism expressed partly in the particularist great vassals of royal blood, partly in the aristocratic and showily chivalrous tendencies of the house of Valois. The other was the English invasions. Untold misery was the result. For a time it seemed as if the disappointed bourgeoisie in the States General would cease to support the monarchy. But under the patriotic impulse called out by their joint sufferings the old tacit alliance of king and bourgeoisie was renewed. The lesser nobles rallied to the crown. The great vassals, unable to appeal to national and patriotic emotions, and injured far more than the king by the decadence of chivalry, fell before the national kingship. Something of the same process, though varied in its forms, took place throughout the West, and the blots on the fifteenth century, its perfidy, greed, and heartlessness, had this good effect, that they deprived

feudalism and chivalry of their best moral inspiration, of their hold on the minds of men. And feudalism then meant stagnation and anarchy. The monarchy, deeply contaminated by contemporary vices as it was, drew its strength from other sources, from patriotism, from justice and security, from the unity of a conscious nation. Its ideals survived into modern times.

New enemies were now awaiting consolidated France. Burgundy, as a renovated Middle Kingdom, half-French, half-German, was gone, but the Netherlands remained. They had come under the rule of the house of Austria, and were thus become an outwork of Germany against French aggression. At the same time Spain became a united kingdom and a power of the first rank. She entered into a deadly rivalry with France for the leadership of Europe. By the marriage of Maximilian's heir with the heiress of Spain the Habsburgs united the Austrian and Spanish monarchies, and for a century held France locked close. But the solid organization of France and her national unity enabled her to hold the enemy at bay, and, when the disconnected Habsburg dominions fell apart, she became in her turn the dominating power of the West.

SECTION 2. THE WARS OF THE ROSES

The death of Henry V dealt a blow to the Lancastrian monarchy from which it did not recover. There was now no brilliant monarch to lead the nation and obtain the willing co-operation of Parliament. The lords were masters of the land. Under the influence of the French wars the customs summarized as "livery and maintenance" had become all-pervading. Supported by their swarms of retainers and dependent squires, the lords controlled the districts where their estates lay, perverted justice through

the fear or favour juries felt for them, and practically nominated the members of the House of Commons. A new feudalism had arisen which was in process of losing feudal virtues.

Factions, born of personal and family rivalries, were not long in breaking out. The late king had appointed his youngest brother Humphrey Duke of Gloucester to be regent of England for the infant Henry VI (1422-61); but the Council would only suffer him to be their president in the absence of the Duke of Bedford. Gloucester in discontent acted thenceforth in general opposition to the majority of the Council and in particular enmity to its most able statesman, his uncle Cardinal Beaufort, Bishop of Winchester. While Bedford lived he damaged the English cause in France by claiming Hainault and Holland from Philip the Good in right of his wife. When Bedford died he headed the unyielding war-party, while the Cardinal and his kinsmen began to see the necessity of making terms with France. The two factions struggled for the control of the king and the realm. They were not unequally matched. The Beauforts were illegitimate descendants of John of Gaunt, but, save for the succession to the throne, they had been legitimated by Act of Parliament. They were richly endowed with lands, their chief being Duke of Somerset, and they had a strong following among the barons. Gloucester was heir presumptive to the crown. Though his partisans were fewer in number, they were individually the greatest of the magnates, Richard Duke of York, second prince of the blood, and the houses of Neville and Mowbray being among them. Local feuds between the magnates throughout the country coalesced with these principal factions.

Henry VI, as he grew up, was no man to still the storm. He was a pious weakling, afflicted with a tendency

to insanity inherited from his grandfather Charles VI of France, and he was a puppet in the hands of the Beauforts. They overthrew the blundering Duke of Gloucester by convicting his second wife of sorcery, and, while mismanaging the French war, worked for peace with Charles VII. The retirement of the Cardinal left his nephew the Duke of Somerset and William de la Pole Earl of Suffolk to lead his faction. They obtained a truce with France by marrying Henry VI to Margaret of Anjou, daughter of the titular King René of Naples, and by the disgraceful cession of Maine. When the terms became known and Maine was lost, the popular dislike of Somerset and Suffolk increased. Both the Cardinal and Gloucester were dead, the latter perhaps murdered, and it only required the reconquest of Normandy by Charles VII from the incompetent Somerset to bring about an explosion which involved the dynasty.

Suffolk, who had engineered the French marriage, was the first of the duumvirate to fall. He was impeached in Parliament, banished, and murdered by his enemies at sea. Immediately afterwards there was a popular rising in Kent. It was led by a certain Jack Cade who claimed to be a Mortimer, and was directed against the ruling faction and its abuses of power. For a moment the rebels captured London, but they were soon cajoled and dispersed. Another enemy was more formidable. Richard of York had been heir presumptive to the crown and leader of the faction in opposition since Gloucester's death. He had been relegated to the government of Ireland, and felt his whole position imperilled, for Margaret of Anjou was no cipher like Henry, but an ambitious virago, and she was heart and soul on the side of the Beauforts. The latter were not only rivals of York for power; they were possible rivals for the throne, since a

packed Parliament might easily give them full legitimacy and place them before him in the succession. It was tempting to York to advance another claim, indefeasible hereditary right, since he was the heir through females of the Earl of March and through him of Lionel of Clarence, the elder brother of John of Gaunt. Right divine by heredity was, however, a dangerous and new claim in England, and York reserved it for his greatest straits. Yet the succession question was now always in the background, and the badges of the two factions, the White Rose of York and the Red Rose of Beaufort and Lancaster, became emblems of two ways of political thinking, the hereditary right of the monarchy, and the Parliamentary compromise of Henry IV.

The final loss of Gascony in 1453 and a fit of insanity which befell Henry VI in the same year brought the outbreak of civil war nearer. York, strengthened by the failures of his rival Somerset, and Queen Margaret, fortified by the birth of a Prince of Wales, strove for the regency. York obtained it, only to be ousted by the king's recovery. He took arms to defend himself against Somerset and won the first battle of the civil war at St Albans in 1455. Somerset was killed and the king taken, and for a time the Yorkists governed England. It was only for a time; the Red Roses, led by the Queen, recovered control during the uneasy peace. A first revolt of York in 1459 was vanquished. A second, which his abler nephew the Earl of Warwick contrived in 1460, gave York possession once more of the captured king. Margaret and her son were still at large, and York at last brought out against them the dynastic question which had hitherto lurked in the background. He claimed the throne by right of descent, and then accepted a compromise by which he was made heir apparent to the

exclusion of the Prince of Wales. Margaret, however, had gathered her forces in the north, and defeated and slew him at Wakefield.

The war, under Warwick's auspices, had already assumed a ferocious character. Old rankling feuds and the brutal passions unchained during the Hundred Years' War now took their full effect. Faith was neither kept nor trusted. Each faction was desirous of rooting out its foes, and massacred its prisoners of any importance. Yet the minor folk and non-combatants were little harmed till the Queen marched south with her fierce borderers. Their outrages revived the Yorkists. Warwick and Edward, York's soldier son, occupied London, and forced Margaret northward. They acted on the legitimist theory, proclaiming Edward king as Edward IV (1461-83). Then Edward pursued the Lancastrians to the north. At Towton he overthrew them. Henry who had been freed by his wife, Margaret and their son Edward of Wales fled into exile.

In the victorious faction Warwick, "the king-maker," was more influential than the king for some years. The luxurious Edward left to him the direction of affairs and the crushing of Margaret's rebellions in the Lancastrian north. As he became more secure, however, his attitude changed. He married a widow of no great rank, Elizabeth Woodville, and lost no time in forming out of her relatives a rival family group to that of the Nevilles. When the hapless Henry VI fell into his hands in 1466, he felt strong enough to choose the alliance of Charles the Bold of Burgundy in preference to that of Louis XI of France which Warwick urged on him. The king-maker, whose foresight in foreign policy was justified by the event, prepared for revolt. The struggle showed startling vicissitudes. At first Warwick and his son-in-law, the

king's false brother Clarence, captured Edward and took the control of the government. Then Edward in his turn, backed by the other Yorkist peers, suddenly drove Warwick and Clarence into exile. But Warwick now stuck at nothing. Instigated by Louis XI he patched up a reconciliation with his old enemy Queen Margaret in her French exile. Clarence was to be heir presumptive in case of the Lancastrian Edward's death. Together they made an unexpected invasion in 1470. The Lancastrian faction rose; Edward, deserted, fled to the Netherlands, and the captive Henry VI was once more placed on the throne.

The new arrangement could not last. The Nevilles and their new allies suspected one another; the Duke of Clarence was ready to betray both. If Louis supported Warwick, Charles the Bold aided his brother-in-law Edward IV. In 1471 the Yorkist king landed in Holderness with Burgundian soldiers and money. Gathering his supporters, including Clarence, as he marched, he out-generalled Warwick and seized on London and his puppet rival. At Barnet, where Warwick was defeated and slain, he broke the power of the Nevilles. At Tewkesbury the genuine Lancastrian lords were broken too. The Prince of Wales and the last males of the Beauforts were among the victims; Queen Margaret was a prisoner. It only remained for Edward to extinguish the house of Lancaster by the murder of Henry VI who lay captive in the Tower.

The rule of the house of York might now seem secure. All resistance was crushed. But the ferocity, the faithlessness and the unrestrainable ambition, engendered by long years of faction, feud and massacre, were not to be abolished by one of the criminals. Clarence had always been false and was open to suspicion. His brother

became wroth at the Duke's insubordination and the signs he showed of foreign intrigues and had him put to death in 1478. Edward knew by experience the danger he ran from the manoeuvres of his two powerful neighbours. At first he sided with Burgundy and invaded France. Charles, however, missed his opportunity, and Louis took the measure of his adversary. By the treaty of Picquigny Edward withdrew from the war on consideration of a handsome pension¹. It was a sign that the old hopeless schemes of the Middle Age were over.

The money was useful to Edward IV at home. His victories and his popularity, the destruction of the great nobles in the suicidal civil war and the longing of squires and burgesses for peace and order, made him practically an absolute monarch, but he was well aware that the less frequently he summoned Parliament and the fewer subsidies he asked of it the less chance there would be of a resurrection of the still living tradition of Parliamentary control. His best resource was an economical government, and he eked out his revenue by various shifts. His French pension, the enormous confiscations, a large subsidy for the popular French war, even trading ventures, all went to swell his receipts. In addition he invented the new tax of "benevolences." These were forced loans and gifts levied on individuals and for the time unfelt by the mass of the population. It seemed as if the strong king could reduce England to a new firmly-established monarchy like France, had the faction-fever and mania for power of the last century worn themselves out, or the king deserted his pleasures to root out the causes of them.

Livery and maintenance, however, survived, and so did claimants for the throne. When Edward left the

¹ See above, pp. 510-11.

crown to his son Edward V in 1483, his brother Richard Duke of Gloucester at once headed a faction to overthrow Queen Elizabeth's relatives. They were crushed and he seized the crown as Richard III (1483-5). The new king was a man of talent and courage, but he roused universal horror by perpetrating the murder of the boy-sons of Edward IV, whom he had wronged. It was the culminating crime of the Wars of the Roses, and he was never secure after it. Yorkists and Lancastrians looked about for a candidate to set against him. They found one in Henry Tudor Earl of Richmond. Henry was the heir of the Beauforts through his mother. His father was a Welsh gentleman, whose mother Catherine of Valois had in her first marriage been queen of Henry V. In this way, though he was without legal or hereditary claim to the throne, Henry was nearly connected with the extinct Lancastrian house and was their only possible successor. He promised to marry Edward IV's heiress Elizabeth; the regent Anne of France, hostile to the restless Richard, helped him; and in 1485 he landed in Wales sure of an insurrection in his favour. At Bosworth he defeated Richard who fell in the battle, and assumed the crown with general acquiescence. A Parliament acknowledged him; he married Elizabeth and thus united the two Roses.

Henry could afford to be merciful, which increased the disposition of the commons in his favour, but he was long beset with dangers, the embers of the Roses' War, within and without. As he held the only male Plantagenet, the Earl of Warwick, son of Clarence, a prisoner, pretenders were the order of the day. One, Simnel, who personated Warwick, was crowned in Ireland before he was defeated and captured. A second, Perkin Warbeck, who said he was Richard of York, second son of Edward IV, gained

a large adherence among malevolent foreign princes. He had little support in England, however, and when he put his fortune to the test was easily led prisoner. A later attempt of his to escape from captivity involved the young Warwick, whom Henry promptly put to death, thus extinguishing the historic house of Plantagenet which had ruled England three hundred years. It was Henry's merit that he established peace abroad. His heir married a princess of the new great power of Spain. After a time he won over the Habsburg rulers of the Netherlands. An adroitly-managed invasion, in the manner of Edward IV, led to a peace with France at Étapes, which included an annual pension. Scotland was drawn nearer by the marriage of the king's daughter to the Scottish monarch. Ireland was won over by conciliating her chief noble, the Earl of Kildare. Henry in short took up the position of an unaggressive, yet formidable, secondary power, and gained time for his work of recuperation.

That recuperation was Henry's chief work. The obstacles in his way were the disorder and disloyalty caused by the great nobles and their retainers. In his favour was the general longing for peace and justice under a strong, quiet king. He needed no standing army like the King of France. Most of the greater houses were extinct in the male line and the prestige of their names was gone. The remnant were exhausted and impoverished by war and confiscation. Henry took strong measures. He made livery and maintenance illegal and actively enforced the prohibition. His Court of Star-chamber, which revived the old powers of the King's Council, tried prepotent offenders and punished both interference with justice, the granting of liveries and private war. Once the great nobles had nominated the members of the House of Commons. Now the members were either

king's candidates or gladly subservient to him. He was the saviour of society, and his occasional Parliaments ratified his wishes.

Wealth was needed to make the new absolutism stable, and to gain it Henry did not fear to be oppressive. Confiscations and the customs on reviving commerce increased his normal revenue. Heavy subsidies for the threatened war with France, but still more the forced loans and gifts called "benevolences" and innumerable fines and exactions in the way of law and justice made him rich. They rendered the avaricious king odious, but men submitted. A heavy price was paid for peace and justice, but the goods were delivered by the unchivalrous Henry. England, like France, was consolidated into a despotism under a trained bureaucracy at the close of the Middle Ages.

SECTION 3. THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA

The disintegration of Germany reached its worst in the fifty years which followed the death of the Emperor Sigismund in 1437. Large portions of the borderlands were either drifting away from allegiance to the Empire altogether or were linked to it only by the loosest of bonds. The Netherlanders and Swiss were forming into separate nations; the Teutonic Order, weakened and despoiled, was a Polish vassal; Bohemia, without withdrawing from imperial suzerainty, acted as an independent Slav kingdom; and the little county of Holstein between the Baltic and the North Sea had been united by a personal union with the crown of Denmark and moved in a Danish orbit. The mass of Germany that remained was hopelessly subdivided. Even the more important states, those of the Electors and Princes, were scattered and fragmentary, and, if they were secular, were portioned among different branches of the ruling families. The numerous

Free Cities seldom possessed much territory. And towards the south-west existed a quantity of Counts, Barons and Knights, who held in chief of the Emperor and ruled mere shreds of territory.

The chronic disease of the dismembered realm was local war and private feud, the extreme of feudal turbulence unchecked. There was an Emperor or King of the Romans, duly elected, but neither army nor treasure nor central administration nor a judicial system. It was not that vassals and towns often possessed more theoretic rights than those of France, but their suzerain had no means of curbing them or enforcing his own rights, save what he drew from his own inherited fiefs which he had grown too wise to squander on a hopeless task. The Pope had more effective power, for by the Concordat of Vienna in 1448 he filled half the vacant canonries as well as the vacancies due to translation of bishops. Yet the Concordat restored the normal election of bishops to the chapters, and the sees became the prizes of competition among the neighbouring princes and nobles.

While the Emperor, as such, was powerless, the princes were by no means in full control of their territories. Their nobles and towns were insubordinate, and took long to bring to submission. The petty Parliaments, the local Estates, which they summoned, were a serious check on their actions and policy. None the less in their restricted sphere and in their own interest they could make progress. The larger states increased in size and grew more consolidated at the same time. The electorates naturally took the lead, for they possessed an indivisible electoral kernel which went by primogeniture. From them and a few better-endowed principalities the greater states of later Germany derived their origin. Such leading states, all more or less progressive as they tended more or less

to the establishment of primogeniture and the indivisibility of the land, were scattered throughout Germany. In the south there were the duchies of Bavaria, which, although much weakened, were on their way to reunion at the close of the century; the county of Wurtemberg gathering scrap after scrap of land round it; and the Palatinate of the Rhine although mangled by its prolific younger branches. The Landgraves of Hesse were extending their domains in the centre. In the north the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg were the chief rulers. Saxony was wealthier, but Brandenburg was establishing a strict primogeniture which was to serve her well.

For a long time the house of Habsburg had maintained its pre-eminence among purely German princes by its observance of the primogeniture established by King Rudolf. In 1379, however, the rule was abolished. Thenceforward there were two Habsburg lines, that of Austria proper, and that of the minor territories. The latter was soon subdivided further among its agnates, and the once formidable state was reduced to quarrelling fractions, which were unable to hold back the advance of the Swiss. A fortunate inheritance revived the power of the house. On the death of the last Luxemburg, the Emperor Sigismund, in 1437, his son-in-law, Duke Albert of Austria proper, obtained the kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia. At once he became the natural candidate for the imperial crown. The burden of the disendowed Empire was too heavy for the minor German princes. The heir of the Luxemburghs both was able to bear it, and was the obvious defender of central Europe against the oncoming Turks. Thus Albert was elected King of the Romans (1438-9), and began the series of Habsburg chiefs of Germany which was to last as long as the Holy Roman Empire.

Albert II might have done something to revive the central power of the Empire, had not his early death broken up his dominions¹ and reduced the Habsburgs to the level of other German princes. Even so the fact that his cousin Duke Frederick of Styria was natural guardian of his infant heir Ladislaus and might bridge over the time till Ladislaus grew up and renewed Albert's power, induced the Electors to offer the Duke the imperial crown. But Frederick III (1440-93) was the weakest of all the successors of Otto the Great. He was weak in character, for he was apathetic and indolent. He was weak in resources also; he had a hostile partner in his brother Albert VI, while a cousin, Sigismund, held the Tyrol and the westerly Habsburg lands. Hungary and Bohemia speedily shook themselves loose from his claims to the regency. Austria proper was unruly; his kinsmen Albert and Sigismund made mischief. The whole house had the worst of a Swiss war despite the help of France². When Ladislaus died in 1457 Frederick III's troubles increased. He failed to win Hungary from Matthias Corvinus; he was engaged in civil war with his brother Albert over Austria proper. When this was stilled by the death of Albert in 1463, the discontent of his subjects with the Emperor led to a series of revolts, in which Matthias Corvinus, indignant at Frederick's enfeoffment of Bohemia to the Polish Wladislaw, found his opportunity. He conquered Vienna in 1485, and the Emperor was reduced to wander in search of help from the imperial vassals in Germany.

Frederick was hardly entitled to the assistance of the German princes, for in Germany he had been the merest figure-head. Beyond journeying to Rome for an imperial coronation, and making grants like that of the title of

¹ See above, pp. 483-4.

² Cf. p. 507.

Archduke to the Habsburgs, he had been unwilling and unable to act as Emperor. Passive resistance was his forte. He checkmated a scheme to elect a coadjutor king who might be more active, and evaded the erection of the Middle Kingdom desired by Charles the Bold. He left it to individual princes and local leagues to stem the anarchy of Germany.

The death of Charles the Bold, however, in 1477 opened a new prospect to the house of Austria. Frederick's only son Maximilian was as energetic, active and scheming as his father was the reverse. He married the heiress of the Netherlands, and gained thereby territory, wealth and a new national mission for his house. Hitherto the Habsburgs had been the warders of Germany on the south-east alone: now they became its guardians on the west as well as against the perpetual encroachments of France. The full fruits of the acquisition were not gained at once. If Maximilian by his victory of Guinegate in 1479 checked the French advance, his position was weakened by the death of his wife Mary of Burgundy in 1482, and it was not till 1493 that he obtained the restitution of Artois and the Franche Comté to his son the Archduke Philip, chiefly owing to the misguided ambitions of the French King Charles VIII¹. Meantime he had had a hard struggle to retain the regency of the Netherlands, in the course of which he had fallen into captivity at the hands of the men of Bruges and had only been rescued by the Emperor's appearance with a German army.

Maximilian was delivered by an imperial force because in 1486 he had been elected King of the Romans in the hope that a stirring man with the Burgundian inheritance to back him would do something to restore peace and union to the Empire. Fortune at least favoured him in his

¹ Cf. pp. 512-14.

efforts for the house of Habsburg. The death of Matthias Corvinus in 1490 enabled him to recover the lost districts of Austria, and in the same year he reunited all the Habsburg lands by the cession of the Tyrol by Sigismund, who had vainly attempted to alienate his portion to Bavaria. When his father died in 1493 Maximilian ruled the widest territories in the Empire.

The reform of the Empire, however, missed fire. It was urged by a band of princes led by the Elector Berthold of Mayence, who saw that every Emperor in the existing state of things was bound to be the worst of particularists, for he had greater opportunities than other princes of sacrificing the Empire to the interests of his own house. They hoped to create an imperial administration in the hands of an oligarchic council of princes, to establish a supreme court of justice independent of the Emperor, a state-peace, a state-taxation, a state-coinage. The basis of the structure was to be the Imperial Diet which should meet annually. Little enough of these belated schemes came into effective existence. The Diet did indeed meet frequently and was more definitely organized. The Free Cities in 1489 made good their right to a summons and formed a third house beside those of the Electors and the Princes. But Maximilian, partly in the interests of monarchy, partly in those of particularism, in the end opposed and wrecked oligarchical reform. The oligarchic council was abandoned. State-taxation proved unworkable without it. The state-peace never put a stop to the feuds; the new districts or circles for the preservation of order remained undeveloped; the court of justice was effete from its birth and rivalled by the Aulic Council set up by the Emperor and dependent on him.

The future of Germany, in short, lay through despotic particularism, not through a national monarchy. The

greatest particularist state was Austria, since Maximilian's days compounded of two separate masses of territory. The eastern, already marked out by treaty and situation to be united to Hungary and Bohemia, was to form the present Empire of Austria, the heritage of one branch of the Habsburgs. The western was to be linked by the lucky marriage of Maximilian's son to the Spanish kingdom, the heritage of the second Habsburg branch. Thus the Austrian house became doubly a great power and could turn the old hostility of France and Burgundy into a new rivalry between Habsburg and Capetian which in its turn developed into a national enmity between Germany and France.

It was a disunited Germany that the Habsburgs led and defended with the aid of their foreign realms. But prosperity came to the consolidated major states, and national feeling was not absent. Art and literature and learning all revived under Maximilian. There was a German Renaissance and a German religious Reformation.

SECTION 4. SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

The rout of the Almohades at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212, and the restriction of the Moors to Granada¹, ended for two centuries the expansion of the Spanish kingdoms. Portugal, Aragon and Navarre had reached limits which they were not to exceed. Castile, which alone retained a Moorish frontier, was even more a victim to internal disorder than were her neighbours. Once the Moors had been shut up in a corner of Spain, the natural particularism of a land, so divided by mountain-range, by sterile plateau and by climate, and the turbulence bred in a race of bold adventurers who had seized on their possessions by the

¹ See above, pp. 196-7.

sword and had held to them by incessant fighting, came into play and resulted in long years of civil war.

Yet the Spaniards attained to methods of collective action early. Their Parliaments or Cortes were as old as any in Europe, reaching back to the twelfth century. The diversity of these in character and privilege expressed the divergent character of the several kingdoms. In Castile there were three Estates, the prelates, the grandees and the towns, the last represented in steadily decreasing numbers till in the fifteenth century only eighteen sent deputies. It is a curious fact that, although their grant was necessary for fresh taxation, and although their approval was sought for all important state affairs, their consent was not required for the promulgation of laws. The Portuguese Cortes were equally in a position of power and ill-defined functions. Aragon, on the other hand, possessed a working constitution marred by the habitual Spanish particularism. It was a federation of three states with varying institutions, Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia. The number of Estates in Aragon proper was raised to four by the admission of the lesser nobles; the others possessed the usual three Estates. They all shared in legislation as well as in taxation, and a permanent commission of them safeguarded the laws and the treasury from royal encroachment. A special royal officer, in Aragon proper the *Justicia*, watched over the administration of justice, and sometimes resisted the king himself. The constitution, in short, while remaining monarchical, was strongly modified by the influence of a compact oligarchy of nobles and towns.

The defect of medieval Spanish government, however, like that of other medieval states, lay in the indisciplined particularism and warlike turbulence of the nobles and towns. This was especially the case in Castile. Feudalism

there did not reach the rigid and logical and, so to say, constitutional form which it did in France. The grandees were rather great captains of war who disposed absolutely of the vast and straggling estates they or their ancestors had won by the sword. So loose was the tie of allegiance that they possessed the right of renouncing their vassalage at pleasure. If they were without the typical feudal powers of justice and tallage, they were none the less independent of and formidable to the crown, and they and the ecclesiastics enjoyed the customary freedom from taxation. It was not only the great families and the prelates which held these enormous domains and dangerous array of vassals. There were three religious military Orders, modelled on the Templars and Hospitallers, which enjoyed a portentous wealth and power. Thus once the Moorish danger was removed and a cause of strife provided, the kings were sure to find the utmost difficulty in curbing and pacifying their refractory subjects.

Causes of war there were in plenty. The four kingdoms of Spain, Castile, Portugal, Aragon and Navarre, were always at odds, over their rivalries, their unsettled frontiers and the dynastic disputes due to the constant intermarriages of the reigning houses. These inter-state wars were commonly linked with intestine commotions. The royal princes, the Infants, fought for the succession or for lands and power. The grandees sided with them or fought in prosecution of their own feuds and ambitions. There was resistance to royal reforms and to royal tyranny. There was the perpetual attempt of the chief nobles to control the central government from which in theory they subtracted so little authority. And mingling with all these there was the spirit of anarchy bred in the Moorish Wars and the incessant particularism of the several provinces.

In Castile, where these causes of disorder worked unchecked, the civil wars, although never really stilled, were at their worst at three special periods. Alfonso X the Wise (1252) was endowed with every gift save the gift to rule. His excellent schemes of legislation, his defeats in war and policy, his imprudent grants to the nobles, and his vain attempt to secure the Holy Roman Empire as heir of the Hohenstaufen¹, were all against him. When he tried to reform the law of succession by introducing the doctrine of representation, the civil wars began, for his second son Sancho demanded the throne to the exclusion of the Infantes de la Cerda, children of his deceased eldest son Ferdinand. Sancho won, but the wars continued on other grounds. In the midst of the fourteenth century the troubles which seemed abating were revived by the tyranny of Peter the Cruel (1350-69), which enabled and provoked his illegitimate brother Henry of Trastamara to rise against him. The fratricidal struggle merged in the great Hundred Years' War between England and France. Henry was placed on the throne by Du Guesclin and the French Free Companies; Peter was restored by the Black Prince and his English troops at the battle of Navarrete². The reviving fortunes of France gave Henry (1366-79) the final victory. He murdered his brother and founded a new dynasty which made head against the pretensions of the heirs of Peter. It was at the cost of wars and concessions, however, which left the house of Trastamara weak. Nor were its kings of a mettle to remedy their weakness. Matters reached their worst under Henry IV (1454-74), when the succession to the throne once more became doubtful. The king, already despised for incompetence, claimed the succession for his only daughter, who was nicknamed

¹ See above, pp. 328, 341-2.

² See above, p. 383.

La Beltraneja owing to the general conviction that she was really the child of Beltran de la Cueva, a noble of his court. Revolt after revolt was raised to force Henry to acknowledge his disgrace, and in spite of him his sister Isabella was proclaimed his heiress. In the midst of the civil broils Isabella married the heir of Aragon, Ferdinand. Her accession to the throne of Castile in 1474 and Ferdinand's to that of Aragon in 1479 united the kingdoms by a personal union. Thenceforth the two monarchs entitled themselves King and Queen of Spain and bent their efforts towards making the allied realms a great power.

Aragon, the smaller partner, brought to the alliance a vigorous government, a foreign policy and foreign connexions. Her liberties had been more substantial, her nobles, at least in Catalonia, more feudalized than the Castilian grandes; but her line of kings had been able, and her people had attained a practical political organization and a European outlook which were unknown in Castile. The kings had at first a hard struggle to establish their authority and with it some order and unity against the exuberant feudalism of their nobles and the republican spirit of the towns. Peter III the Great, the conqueror of Sicily, was obliged in 1283 to grant his General Privilege, not unlike the English Magna Carta, by which his authority was severely limited and the intervention of the Cortes in the government assured. King and oligarchy thereafter strove for the mastery of the state till in 1348 Peter IV the Ceremonious overthrew the League of the Cortes. He broke the habit of applying armed compulsion to the monarchy, but did not attempt to revoke the privileges of the nation. The king's power was left limited but efficient within its limits.

Meanwhile Aragon had become a Mediterranean power. The Catalans were seafaring and traded as far as the

Levant. King James the Conqueror (1213-76), by the recovery of Valencia and the Balearic Islands from the Moors, gave his subjects a firm hold on their corner of the sea. His son Peter the Great (1276-85) went farther afield. He seized Sicily for his house¹, and gave Aragon a temporary naval supremacy. The tedious conquest of Sardinia was next taken in hand, and, when the crown of Sicily was united to that of Aragon by the extinction of its local branch of the royal house, the Italian wars which were to end in the subjection of Italy to Spain were a natural sequel. Alfonso V the Magnanimous (1416-58) conquered Naples from the Angevin dynasty and left it to his illegitimate son Ferrante. Meanwhile his brother John II (1458-79) succeeded him in Aragon, from whose turbulent reign one advantage resulted, the marriage of the heir apparent Ferdinand to Isabella Queen of Castile.

The first task of Ferdinand and Isabella the Catholic was to restore order in Castile and to assert the royal authority. Aragon was too securely fortified in its liberties to undergo much change, although Ferdinand was there freer in the exercise of his prerogative than his predecessors had been and at least was able to abolish the worst grievances of the serfs. But Castile, like France and England, was weary of anarchy and not unwilling to accept the strong central government leading to despotism, which was the common need of the fifteenth century. That government was established by Ferdinand and Isabella. As in France and England the active part of the royal Council was composed of professional civil servants, mainly lawyers with a strong Roman ideal of monarchy. Hereditary offices were reduced to titles of honour. The lavish and ruinous grants of lands by the preceding kings were resumed. Open resistance and

¹ See above, pp. 344-6.

feuds were crushed, and justice was administered with a firm hand. The support which the townsmen were eager to offer was organized. For long the towns of Castile had defended themselves from the attacks and oppressions of the grandees and from the brigandage of the lesser nobles by the formation of local leagues called *Hermandades* or fraternities. A warlike spirit was common to all Spaniards, and the townsmen had often shown their mettle. Now they were united by the monarchs in a single Holy Brotherhood, the forces of which numbered 2000 horse. As a police force the *Hermudad* met with marvellous success. Order was restored. It formed also part of the growing royal army, which began to supplement and then replace the feudal levies. A further accession of much-needed wealth and men-at-arms was obtained for the crown through the three mighty religious knightly Orders. King Ferdinand was successively elected Grand Master of all three, and thenceforth they were never severed from the monarchy.

It remained for the monarchy to subjugate the Church, which in Spain was not only wealthy but powerful and independent, unlike in England and France where it was already a submissive ally of the national kings. The pious Isabella also desired its reform, for it had suffered from the corruptions and abuses of the time. It was now shorn of purely secular functions. Virtuous and learned prelates, of whom the chief was Cardinal Ximenes, Archbishop of Toledo, were appointed, and they speedily raised the Spanish clergy to a higher level than any other in the West. At the same time a terrible means to tame ecclesiastic and layman was invented in the Spanish Inquisition. A peculiarity of Spain was the number and wealth of the Jews, many of whom in search either of power or safety from persecution had long been outwardly

Christian. Yet the fanaticism, bred in Castile by the long Moorish wars, was always ready to be roused against them. Instead of the ancient Dominican inquisition Ferdinand and Isabella now set up a royal Inquisition, the Holy Office, which by its limitless jurisdiction and its secret inequitable procedure placed Spain under a permanent reign of terror. The Pope, in his fifteenth-century discredit, was forced to surrender all control; the ruthless Torquemada directed the tribunal; and Spain flamed with Autos de Fé (Acts of Faith) where concealed or relapsed Jews were burnt to death. The remnant of professed Jews was forced into exile, but the blood of the race was widely spread among Castilian Christians, and these remained at the mercy of the Inquisition and the crown. Streams of confiscated wealth flowed into the royal coffers, and the submission of the Spanish people to their rulers became ever more profound.

Spain, cut off from Europe by the Pyrenean barrier and absorbed in Moorish or intestine wars, had hitherto lived a life in some degree isolated. Ferdinand and Isabella not only erected a despotism, they completed Spain's frontiers and launched her into the main stream of European politics. The little kingdom of Granada had remained to the Moors, an oasis of the older Saracenic civilization in contrast to the rough barbarism of Christian Spain. It had survived owing to the incessant quarrels among the Christians. When Castile and Aragon were united and orderly, its doom was sealed. In 1481 Ferdinand and Isabella began the war. In 1492 after an heroic resistance Granada surrendered. The Moors remained a subject class, till they, like the Jews, were driven into exile or forced into Christianity by the Inquisition. To foreign conquest the Mediterranean dominion of Aragon pointed the way. Ferdinand entered Italy in

rivalry with Charles VIII of France and in aid of his relatives of Naples. He ended by perfidiously seizing Naples for himself and commencing the long-lived Spanish rule over Italy. The French wars gave him the opportunity, also, of annexing the part of Navarre which lay south of the Pyrenees; and thus the little kingdom, which had long been a feeble and distracted satellite of France, was absorbed in kindred Spain.

The two monarchs, whose collaboration united Spain and raised her to the position of one of the greatest European powers, represented the best and the worst of the fifteenth century. Both were masters of statesmanship, but, while Isabella displayed an almost saintly goodness, the wily, faithless, heartless Ferdinand was of the nature of Louis XI and Richard III. Their kingdom by a strange fate fell to the Habsburgs through the marriage of their daughter Joanna with the Archduke Philip the Fair. When the Habsburgs divided into two lines, the Burgundian heritage fell to the Spanish branch, and thus brought about the connexion of Spain with the Netherlands which conditioned two centuries of European history. Nor was the sway of Spain confined to Europe. In the year of the capture of Granada, with the aid and ships of Isabella, Columbus discovered for Spain the New World.

While Castile and Aragon were merged in a single Spanish nation, Portugal maintained a separate national existence, in spite of the frequency with which she was involved in Castilian wars and politics. Her kings had a different task before them than their neighbours. It was not the nobles, who in Portugal were less divided from their inferiors than elsewhere, but the Church which was the chief obstacle in the erection of a solid state. It was not foreign conquest, for which there was no great

opportunity, but the exploitation of a fertile soil which occupied the best energies of the people. The struggle with the clergy was carried on by the kings for generations with increasing success till in 1361 Peter the Justiciar made a final settlement in favour of the monarchy by the convention of Elvas. Equally persevering was the effort of a sparse population to get the best out of the land. King Denis the Husbandman (1279-1325) drained swamps, ploughed wastes and planted forests. King John (1385-1433), who warded off the Castilian attempts at conquest, promoted his subjects' dawning sea-trade. It was his son Prince Henry the Navigator who urged on that persistent attempt to voyage farther south along the African coast in search of gold and slaves, which ended in the erection of a commercial, colonizing empire. Of no little moment for Portugal's domination over the south-western seas was King John's own conquest of Ceuta and Tangier, which, as Spain already possessed Gibraltar, placed the outlet of the Mediterranean entirely in Christian hands. The Crescent was rapidly paling before the Cross in this last commercial crusade. But Portugal paid the penalty for her greed. The despotism, that necessity of the time, which was set up by John II (1481-95), was maintained by the wealth which flowed in from Africa and the new sea-route to India: and it was a corrupting despotism. The best blood of a scanty nation was drawn off to Indian adventure or the colony of Brazil. Its place was taken by kidnapped negro slaves, and the Portuguese, without knowing it, sank in the scale of European peoples. They, too, however, like the Spaniards, were now more closely connected with Europe than had been the case since the Arab conquest. Lisbon became the emporium of the Indian trade, and commerce was a more effective link with her Western neighbours

than had been the alliances, the wars and the travels of monarchs and crusaders.

SECTION 5. THE TYRANNIC PAPACY

The full development of the Italian Renaissance was contemporaneous with the decadence of Italy's political institutions. They had drawn their life from the city-state; now the city-state was vanishing. On the one hand, the cities had for the most part fallen under tyrants. Force and craft, unveiled and uninspired by anything save personal ambition, were dominant. On the other hand, Italy was affected by the universal tendency to the formation of larger states; but this coalescence was not national, it was regional and devoid of patriotic motive. The material causes of large despotic states were felt in Italy, the longing for security and better government, the attraction of the greater for the less; but not the longing of men of the same speech and character to stand together against the foreigner. The strong national pride of Italians was expressed in the unity of her civilization, not in political solidarity.

The impossibility of the formation of a nation-state, and the deadlock produced by the indecisive wars among greedy competitors for territory had produced the policy of a balance of power among the greater rulers, of which Cosimo de' Medici was a protagonist. It was the interest of those despots, who saw no probability of increasing their states, to try to maintain the *status quo*, to prevent the growth of the more aggressive powers and the consequent wane of their own safety and influence. Such were Cosimo de' Medici of Florence, the Aragonese King of Naples, and Sforza the usurping Duke of Milan. Two of the stronger powers were, however, differently minded. Venice still nourished extravagant hopes of conquest on

the mainland which might lead to a dominion over all Italy. The Popes, placed in the most turbulent and splintered part of the peninsula, were almost forced to be aggressors for the sake of self-preservation, and were tempted by the policy they pursued and the means they employed to become as egoistic in their aims and conduct as any contemporary tyrant.

The nominally papal lands were in fact the principal district in Italy which had not undergone a provincial consolidation. When Pope Martin V returned to Rome in 1420, he found his dominions absolutely without a central government. The eastern territories were under the sway of numerous city-tyrants, the Campagna and Rome itself were disputed by the feudal nobles, headed by the Orsini and Colonna. The whole was the happy hunting-ground of the chief *condottieri* of the time. Martin, shrewd and business-like, was able to restore some order with the aid of his kinsfolk, the Colonna. At his death he ruled the Campagna and Umbria, and was acknowledged farther afield. But his nepotism was extreme and the Colonna were a danger to the state. The next Pope, Eugenius IV (1431-47), a Venetian friar, broke with the insubordinate family. He was driven into exile, and anarchy was let loose in Rome. But Eugenius gained over Francesco Sforza, the ablest of the *condottieri* who were carrying on their bewildering warfare in his lands, by conceding to him the March of Ancona. He then sent as his vicar to Rome Cardinal Vitelleschi, a prelate who possessed the talents and the criminal nature of a tyrant. Vitelleschi's ferocious proceedings restored the Pope's authority. His murder, when he became too powerful, was connived at by Eugenius, but tyrannic methods had been definitely adopted by the Papacy, not to be abandoned for over a century.

A reaction was natural after Eugenius' reign of terror. His successor Nicholas V (1447-55) was an amiable upright scholar. Sforza, already half-conquered by Eugenius, abandoned the March to play for the duchy of Milan, and the peaceful Pope could devote himself to an ideal of humanism. Rome should be the glorious capital of learning and civilization, adorned with the arts and magnificent with ritual. A ludicrous, half-humanist attempt to restore the ancient Roman republic which was designed by Porcaro, a feeble imitator of Cola di Rienzo, hardly broke in on the Pope's dream. It needed the fall of Constantinople to the Turks to recall the Papacy to its political career. The Spaniard Calixtus III (1455-8) was ardently political for good and ill. He urged on a crusade against the Turks. He also embraced nepotism with passion. For the benefit of his nephews, the Borgia family, he refused on the death of Alfonso the Magnanimous in 1458 to recognize his son Ferrante I as King of Naples. Calixtus' own death produced another reaction. The new Pope, Pius II (1458-64), was less of a firebrand in the nepotism he did not renounce. He was a distinguished humanist, less of a scholar than Nicholas V and far more of an author and man of letters. As Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, he had taken an important part in the ecclesiastical diplomacy of the day, first siding with the Council of Basel, then with the neutral Emperor, and lastly with the Pope. He was consistent, however, in his conviction of the Turkish danger. He had a true zeal for the crusade he proclaimed and did all that diplomacy could do to set it going. But the princes of Europe, preoccupied with their national interests, were deaf to his appeals. The ancient zeal for the Holy War was long dead. The Apostolic See no longer possessed men's devotion, and Pius died just when the wretchedness

of the forces he assembled at Ancona convinced him of the futility of his schemes.

Italy, meanwhile, was, amid many throes, making towards the balance of power. On the death of Filippo Maria Visconti without male heirs in 1447, the political fate of central Lombardy was fought out. Many were the competitors. Venice hoped to extend her dominion on the mainland. Alfonso the Magnanimous of Naples schemed to renew the old ambitions of Charles of Anjou and the Hohenstaufen. A new design of French conquest was made by the Duke of Orleans, heir of the Visconti through females. Lastly, the re-erection of the independent duchy was the object of the *condottiere* Francesco Sforza, who had married Filippo Maria's natural daughter. If his dominion in the March of Ancona was being rent from him by the Popes, he commanded the best troops in the field, and in craft and ability was more than a match for his antagonists. Among the rivals the unfortunate Milanese made a last effort to recover liberty by reviving their commune. The attempt was hopeless, for each subject city, true to the autonomist instinct of the city-state, did likewise, and armed power was in the hands of the *condottieri*. Beset on all sides the Milanese elected the treacherous Sforza their general. He warded off their enemies, conquered their subject towns, and in 1450 after a harrowing siege compelled their own submission. In 1454 the triumphant usurper could sign the general peace of Lodi, of which the cardinal point was that the despotic duchy of Milan remained intact save for a few cessions to Venice and France.

The understanding between Milan, Florence and Naples was now established, but peace was not, for Alfonso the Magnanimous maintained his efforts to gain possession of Genoa. His ambition nearly ruined his family in Naples.

Genoa, harassed by him and sorely weakened by the loss of her Black Sea towns and trade, consequent on the capture of Constantinople, admitted once more French suzerainty. Thereby John of Anjou, the heir of King René, obtained, as French representative in Genoa, the base he desired for the reassertion of his father's claims on Naples, and, when Alfonso's natural son Ferrante I (1458-94) succeeded him in his Italian conquest, John prepared an invasion. There was always an Angevin faction in Naples, and the barons of the land were uncontrolled and fickle. On John's arrival there was a general defection to him. Ferrante was well supported by his allies, but only in 1463 after a victory at Troia could he drive out his rival. Fortunately for him Genoa had revolted from France and gave herself up to the easy protectorate of his ally Sforza. Thus the balance of power was preserved, and Italy during thirty years was left to herself. Louis XI of France had no mind to intervene, while the connexion of Naples and Aragon was temporarily severed by Alfonso's death.

There still remained one unconsolidated realm in Italy, the Papal State, and the struggles for its possession gave Italy little rest during this happiest period of the fifteenth century. Its anarchy and the lure of conquering it effected a tragic change in the character of the Popes themselves. Deprived of higher incitements by the hopelessness of a Turkish crusade and by the sturdy independence of the secular monarchs, long prepared for their final degradation by the inveterate and uncured corruption of the Church and the Roman Curia, and engrossed in political manoeuvres which became pettier every decade, the Popes descended to the lowest level of contemporary tyrants. They became a byword in Italy and soon in the rest of Europe as well.

The Popes had not only to contend against Roman

anarchy, they had also to maintain their monarchy against the Cardinals. The example of the German Electors had not been lost on the Sacred College. Kept in bondage by the stern Martin V, the Cardinals began the system of exacting election conditions with Eugenius IV. Their persons and privileges were to be respected, their share in the government of Church and State guaranteed. Thus fortified they always aimed at forming an oligarchy, while, as an increasing proportion of them were appointed from political or nepotistic motives, the character of the College grew steadily worse. The Cardinals were the wealthiest pluralists in Christendom. Their palaces became fortresses garrisoned by a discreditable following. Their schemes, intrigues, brawls and dissipation were notorious. A system of covert bribery by the gift of offices and benefices led to simony in its worst form, and resulted in pernicious elections to the Papacy. At Pius II's death they made a vigorous effort to establish a definite ecclesiastical oligarchy. By the capitulations before election, their number was limited and their prerogatives were further defined, while the ancient good and useless resolutions of reform received a decorous sanction. But Paul II (1464-71), who did little else, at least tore up his engagements. His successors did the like, and the papal monarchy, firmly based on its spiritual powers and its means of bribery, remained intact.

Pope Sixtus IV (1471-84) succumbed to the prevailing tendency and appeared openly as a tyrant of the usual type. He was a fierce, learned peasant who had risen high as a Franciscan friar. In him a determination to be master of the Papal State was combined with inordinate and unscrupulous nepotism. His nephews were his safest instruments and he was resolved to endow them out of the spoils. The ends were secular and few means were

repugnant to him. Of the nephews, one, a Cardinal, died of his excesses; another, Giuliano della Rovere, also a Cardinal, was later a famous Pope as Julius II; the third, Girolamo Riario, was destined by his uncle for a secular tyranny. The times seemed propitious. The seething Papal State offered endless opportunities for war and dominion. The alliance of Milan, Florence and Naples, on which the peace of Italy rested, began to shake. The imprudence of the young tyrant of Florence gave the first opening. Cosimo's son Piero (1464-9) had confirmed the domination of the Medici, but was soon succeeded by his brilliant son Lorenzo the Magnificent (1469-92). There was soon observable a *rapprochement* between Florence and Venice which kept pace with a similar suspicious friendliness between Naples and the Pope. An aggressive tendency in fact was replacing the policy of equilibrium.

The best guarantee of peace was destroyed by the murder of Francesco Sforza's son, Galeazzo Maria (1466-76) Duke of Milan, a brutal tyrant who had not lacked capacity. Milan grew weak from the competition for the regency for his infant son. Meanwhile Girolamo Riario, the Pope's nephew, was at variance with Lorenzo over his ambitions for a tyranny in the Romagna. In concert with the ambitious and discontented Florentine family of the Pazzi he contrived an attempt to murder the chiefs of the Medici. Only Lorenzo's brother Giuliano, however, fell a victim. Lorenzo escaped to experience open war from the Pope and Naples on the pretext of the execution of the Archbishop of Florence who had shared in the assassination. Florence fared badly in the war till Lorenzo suddenly rescued her by a daring visit to Ferrante of Naples his enemy. The king was converted once again to the policy of a peaceful Triple Alliance, of

which the shifty Lodovico the Moor, now regent of Milan, should be third partner. Peace was made in 1480 and even the Pope adhered to it under the just terror excited by the capture of Otranto by the Turks.

The renewed League was soon called upon to defend the balance of power it desired. The death of Mohammed II and the recovery of Otranto emboldened Sixtus to agree with the Venetians in an attack on his vassal the Duke of Ferrara. The Duke's lands were to be partitioned and Girolamo Riario was to have Ferrara. The alarmed Triple Alliance supported the Duke, and in the war caused the Pope to run sufficient danger to make him change sides. Venice still made a stout resistance, however, and even gained a little territory by the peace of 1484. Girolamo Riario remained merely the tyrant of two little towns, and Sixtus died of rage at the disappointment.

Sixtus' reign had debased the Papacy. He had connived at assassination, he had acted like the most turbulent and treacherous secular tyrants of his day. He left Rome in anarchy, largely provoked by his misgovernment and insatiable greed. The Cardinals and the Curia, vitiated by bad appointments and a blank absence of scruple, lost character yearly. Lorenzo de' Medici, who was no prude, could deplore the good times of his youth and describe the Roman court as a "sink of all iniquity."

Innocent VIII (1484-92), lazy and weak, was not the man to remedy this state of affairs, and at first he could not resist the temptation to make his profit from the troubles of the peninsula and endanger once more its tottering equilibrium. Naples was then the focus of revolution. King Ferrante was personally hated with good reason for his treachery, cruelty and greed, but his son Alfonso was far worse than he. Their very ministers were justly

alarmed for their own safety and conspired. When Pope Innocent broke with the king over the unpaid tribute due to the Holy See, revolt burst out. The Pope, however, was not successful in arms, while Lorenzo de' Medici did his utmost to keep the Triple Alliance intact and to restore peace. In 1486 a pacification was reached, which as a matter of fact, although not in words, left Ferrante free to deal with the rebellious barons as he chose. He chose the way of perfidy and revenge. With the destruction of his foes Naples entered the circle of the new despotic monarchies, for the barons, who through the long civil wars had been able to defy the kings and rule in petty independence, were henceforth in no position to resist. Against their vassals their feudal privileges were as formidable as ever; against the monarch they had small chance. Yet if the kingdom was submissive it was neither united nor strong. The old factions, Angevin and Aragonese, survived to welcome their foreign patrons, while the reigning house was profoundly detested.

The peace of 1486 left Lorenzo de' Medici not the arbiter, but none the less the guide and preserver of Italy. Pope Innocent, after the collapse of his adventure, surrendered himself with some docility to the Florentine's leading-strings. Another danger which threatened to undo the Triple Alliance Lorenzo warded off by unwearying diplomacy. The regent of Milan, Lodovico the Moor (1479-99), had really usurped the throne from his ward and nephew. He therefore feared that nephew's father-in-law, Alfonso of Naples. Both princes had to be kept surly friends by Lorenzo, a task which was rendered all the harder by the shifty, restless vanity of Lodovico, and the greedy ambition of both.

Without a sufficient armed force, and hampered by declining finances, Lorenzo the Magnificent mediated and

manoeuvred. At home his rule, in spite of some corruption and increasing despotism, formed a golden age. The city, prosperous and lightly yoked, could not have had "a better or more pleasing tyrant." Never was there such a patron of art and literature, for Lorenzo, himself a poet, was the finest and most inspired of connoisseurs. Politian was his poet and humanist, Botticelli his painter, Michelangelo his discovery. The many-sided prince was the type of the Italian Renaissance, a despot and a citizen, a critic and an author, industrious and festive, pious and profane. To free Florence was as far from his power as from his wish, but while he lived he preserved the brittle happiness of Italy.

When Lorenzo was succeeded by his incapable son Piero in 1492, and the listless Innocent was followed by the stirring and degraded Borgia, Alexander VI, in the same year, all hope of maintaining a balance of power in Italy disappeared. Naples was hostile to Milan. Venice and the Pope were bent on aggrandisement. The usurper Lodovico the Moor was in fear of ruin; he held the gates of Italy by land and sea, for he had re-obtained the lordship of Genoa for his house; and with overweening vanity he trusted to use and cancel the French invasion he provoked. But Italy divided among faithless princes and defended by nerveless mercenaries had no chance against the warlike foreigner. Forty years of a growing intensity of suffering ended in her subjugation to Spain. At the same time the sources of her wealth were failing. The discovery of the Cape Route transferred the oriental trade to Portugal, her manufactures were lamed by war and imitated abroad, and the Reformation deprived the Papacy of most of its foreign revenue. Rome ceased to be the capital of Europe. The primacy of European civilization passed away from Italy.

The Papacy was not to be the guide of Christendom in the new age. On the failure of the Conciliar Movement, it had regained in spite of national limitations its monarchy over the Western Church. It had endeavoured to lead the Renaissance and rule civilization as of old, but meanwhile Church and Curia remained unreformed and corrupt. At the last the Popes themselves declined in motives and methods to the position of petty contemporary tyrants. When discontent at flagrant abuses and the adult spirit of criticism caused a revolt from their authority, a united Europe was no longer at their obedience. The unity of Christendom in which the Middle Age had believed so fervently was broken, and with it the Middle Age itself came to an end.

SECTION 6. POLITICAL EPILOGUE. THE DISCOVERIES

The political history of the Middle Ages closes with nation-states and despotic monarchies. To that end the long struggle to evolve order and a working organization had reached. It was a compromise, so to say, between the desire to embody Christendom with its common religion and life and the facts that Christendom was wide and infinitely diverse, and that men were far too divided by class, by occupation and by character and too fettered to their native district, to work a complicated co-operative machine of government. It was a compromise, but more than a compromise, for behind it there were the strong passion of nationality and the strong craving for order and security. The Middle Ages had been fecund in political creations, and each creation in turn assumed the character of an ideal in an anarchic world where the most practical scheme could only be very partially given effect. And these ideals, born of the medley of a shattered past and a tumultuous, multifarious present, of a chaos of

instincts, traditions and interests, were at war with one another. The one which could graft itself on the easiest combinations, on the most abiding necessities, was the creation that won the day.

The first ideal to emerge, partly from the memory of the Roman Empire, partly from the unity of the Roman Church, partly from the mere absence of nationhood, was that of a unified Christendom. Almost immediately it branched into two hostile forms, the lay theocracy of the Holy Roman Empire and the priestly theocracy of the Holy Roman Church. Through its greater civilization, its greater organization and its spiritual appeal the Papacy was victor in its strife with the Empire, but it was so only by surrendering its loftier standard and by fostering other forces which were fatal to itself. Contrasted with the ecumenical idea of Christendom, all these forces were local and particularist, born of the facts of life which the earlier immature thinkers had naively underprized. They were three in number, kingship, feudalism and the city-state.

The kingship was the localized embodiment of the State, of civil society, as the Empire was its universal embodiment. The king was the mainspring of his land's machinery of government, the guardian and source of law and peace, sovran of his subjects as members of the State; the "grace of God" hallowed his authority, if not his person, *i.e.* he was in the nature of things. Feudalism in one aspect was the offspring and legalization of existing anarchy; in another it was the natural cure of anarchy, anarchy's parricidal child. The local strong man, possessor of lands, castles, arms and kindred, took control of his neighbourhood, defended it, oppressed it, and was himself entangled and controlled in a web-like, prolific growth of custom. The city-state, the society of trading

townsmen, was a younger development, for it needed for its first growth some lulling of the anarchic tempest, and kingship and feudalism which produced that comparative lull had the start of it. For the most part, too, constrained by their established power, it never reached its full stature. Only, as in Germany or Italy, where the monarchy died away and the nation never attained solidarity, could it gain the full functions of a State.

Last essential growth of all was the nation, that natural association marked off from other nations and cemented within by its language, its history, its character and its habits. Unconscious in its beginnings, faltering and weak in its confused awaking in the twelfth century, in the thirteenth century its blind and puzzled strength nullified the seemingly resistless authority of the Papacy. It had crystallized round the local kingship, and the persistent endeavours of Christendom to act as a single body thereafter were like attempts to renew an interrupted dream.

The kingship, backed by law and tradition and rooted in the nation it ruled, was irresistible, if undiverted from its task and capable of putting forth institutions of business. North Italy had no kingship of its own, while the German Emperors were diverted to their imperial schemes and were uncreative in their government. On the other hand the lands under Norman-French influence possessed domestic kings and developed, as if by instinct, organized institutions. The townsmen sought protection and found it. Feudalism, which was a system of fetters in its first principles, found its obligations real before kings, whose material resources had increased and who had national feeling behind them. But the national monarchies outgrew their strength in the fourteenth century, nor were the rival forces yet withered although subdued. The clash of hostile nations, the pettier par-

ticularism of the nobles, their own corrupt and cumbrous bureaucracies, the stagnation of a society, whose ideals had become formalities, produced a relapse; and the later Middle Age was preyed on by disorder, in which savagery and lawlessness seem baser than in more barbaric times. But the nations remained stronger and more self-conscious than ever before. They gathered once more round the kingship, this time in full surrender, not in bargaining partnership. Thus were formed the despotic monarchies of the fifteenth century, which with their efficiency and driving energy, with their all-pervasive power, make the transition to the states of modern times.

While the old order was passing away, the whole outlook and conditions of the Middle Ages were being transformed by the incoming modern spirit. By far the most essential agency in the change was the Italian Renaissance¹, but besides that spiritual renovation there were practical material inventions which took an enormous share in shaping new conditions for human life. Most political of these in their effects were the invention of gunpowder and the use of it to discharge solid projectiles. Cannon seem to have been known early in the fourteenth century. For long they were mere terrifying adjuncts of war, but in the fifteenth century the improvements introduced in their structure made them valuable even in the open field. It was, however, in sieges that their chief importance lay. They rent the walls of castles and towns that would previously have resisted a long blockade. The hitherto impregnable Constantinople was entered by the Turks through the breach made by their artillery. At the same moment the doom of the feudal castle and of the city-state was sealed. Independence and power henceforth rested on

¹ See above, Chap. ix, Sect. 5.

a large efficient army in the field, and such an army the mere city and the isolated baron could not produce. A further epoch-making change in the art of war was only foreshadowed in the Middle Ages. Hand-firearms, arquebuses, were indeed known in the latter fifteenth century, but were of slight importance. Early in the sixteenth century they became weapons of the first rank, and at the same time cannon improved in mobility and rapidity of fire. What the bow never effected, the abolition of the heavily-armoured horseman, was accomplished by their means. The infantry became the queen of battles, and moribund feudalism was deprived of its chief remaining source of vitality. Feudalism had acquired its first predominance through the strength of the castle and the invincibility of the man-at-arms. The castle had become obsolete; the man-at-arms, long before baffled by the bow and the pike, was now rendered useless. A light-armed cavalry, which succeeded him, however serviceable as a subordinate arm to infantry, could no longer be the basis of a social system. Only the national kings could monopolize artillery and could maintain large bodies of infantry. In war, as in peace, their supremacy was incontestable.

The discovery of printing by movable type, which took place in Germany on the Rhine at the middle of the fifteenth century, caused, though slowly, a peaceful revolution of higher value. Books became cheap and many. Knowledge, diffused beyond the narrow circle of clerks and humanists, could be acquired and collected with an ease hitherto impossible. And the new learning was practically indestructible. The preservation of a book no longer could depend on the fate of a few MSS. Its exemplars were dispersed in many countries, and it would go hard if there did not survive some copies. The

rapid reproduction of the printing-press placed the contents of books beyond the reach of the ravages of time. Not least of the results of printing was the mental stimulus which the accessibility of books afforded. The wealth of accessible ideas bred new ideas. Human thought moved more nimbly with the sureness and reasonableness of a wider mental experience. New thought, new ideas had a wider audience, a speedier appeal. Public opinion, slow and invertebrate once, attained a speedy activity and concentration. When at the close of the Middle Age the powers that were realized the danger to their authority their efforts were too late. No censorship reached over a sufficiently wide area among the sharply-divided states which composed Europe. What was checked in one country and under one ecclesiastical system had free course elsewhere. The freedom of thought, and what was more the persistence of thought in the face of powerful enmity, were secured.

In a third instance the discovery was old, but the accumulated experience of the Middle Ages and the new adventurous, exploring spirit of the Renaissance made it the instrument to transform the known world. In the twelfth century the magnetic needle was already known in Europe. By the end of the fourteenth it had developed into the mariner's compass and, together with the astrolabe by which the altitudes of sun and stars could be ascertained, it freed sailors from the timorous coasting voyages to which they had been restricted hitherto. The practical sailor's charts of the Italian cities attained a high degree of accuracy for the lands round the Mediterranean, and almost immediately adventurous Genoese captains sailed as far as the Canary Islands and the Azores. These were but isolated adventures, however, without result and speedily half-forgotten. It was

reserved for the Portuguese prince, Dom Henry the Navigator (1394-1460), to begin the era of systematic exploration.

Henry's motives were partly those of crusader. He was Grand Master of the Order of Christ which succeeded the Templars in Portugal, and he desired to carry Christianity to the still heathen negroes beyond the impervious Moslem belt of North Africa. The lands of the Niger and the Guinea coast were known of by a hazy overland tradition due to the regular caravan-trade across the Sahara Desert. Dom Henry hoped to turn the flank of Islam and reach them by sea. His other chief motive was more modern and commercial. Guinea was the source of fabulous wealth in gold and slaves. By the sea-route they might be conquered and thus Portugal become the richest of trading kingdoms. The difficulties in his way were enormous. At best the Atlantic was severe sailing for the small ships of the day. But superstitions gathered thickly round the unknown voyage. Even to those who held the correct tradition that the earth was a globe, the lands under the equator were uninhabitable for the heat and the sea boiling under the rays of the sun, while darkness covered the mysterious West. It took long for the ships he sent yearly out to round the Cape of Bojador, hitherto the southernmost point of European mariners. After they had once done so in 1434, progress was easier although slow. Step by step the Portuguese captains worked southward till in 1445 they reached the R. Senegal and the negro population. The battle had now been won. Slave-raiding and trade in gold and ivory went on apace. And now another motive came into play. Throughout the exploration there had always been a dim ambition of ascending the fabulous western Nile across Africa and thus eventually

reaching the Indian Ocean by a non-Moslem route. When after Cape Verde was passed the coast was found to trend easterly, this was succeeded by the project of circumnavigating Africa, now shown to have been rightly conceived in its general shape by the charts of the Italian merchants. King John II (1481-95) took up the scheme in earnest. Under his auspices Bartholomew Dias at last rounded the Cape of Good Hope in 1486 and the expedition was planned, which in 1498 under King Manuel the Fortunate led Vasco da Gama to the Arab trading-settlement of Mozambique and to the coast of India.

The progress of the Portuguese to the south of the Equator had dissipated the terrific legend of the Torrid Zone, and had practically proved the globular shape of the earth. The ardent scientific spirit of the Renaissance, the desire to probe the facts of the world uncontrolled by any elaborate traditional scheme of things, had thereby received an immense stimulus. Soon the idea emerged of travelling to India and Cathay by another ocean-route, to cross the Atlantic and arrive at Japan. There was a rumour of land to the west, founded in some degree on the Greek legend of the island Atlantis, but also on the fact that the Northmen *c.* 1000 A.D. had really sailed to a new land, which was not yet known to be North America. But the mythical terrors of the outer sea were not yet dead, and the real dangers of the uncharted voyage were sufficient to deter all but the boldest. Such tentative efforts as were made found nothing; men wandered for a half-way land in the vast Atlantic. It was the conviction of a Genoese shipman, long exercised in Atlantic navigation, that Cathay was only to be reached by sailing straight across the Atlantic to its shores, which at last led to success. Christopher Columbus was baffled for years in his attempts to gain support for his heroic project.

Portugal was preoccupied in her African route; all powers were doubtful. In the event Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain thought it worth while to take the risk and provide him with ships and men. In 1492, after a voyage of five weeks from the Canary Isles, Columbus landed on one of the Bahamas. Thinking till his death that he had completed the circuit to China, he had discovered the New World. His errors did not long outlive him, while the essential truth of his belief was proved. In 1513 the Pacific Ocean was descried from the Isthmus of Panama: in 1521 Magellan reached the Philippines, the first to circumnavigate the world.

The discovery of America by Columbus in 1492 forms the conventional date for the close of the Middle Ages. It has been chosen well. On the purely material side its effects, combined with those of the Cape voyage to India, were epoch-making. As if by the stroke of a magician's wand the routes of the world's trade and with them the European centre of gravity were changed. The Mediterranean and its states became, so to say, a subordinate blind-alley. Henceforth commerce flowed on the ocean routes to the havens of the Atlantic coast. The new despotic nation-states which possessed them, Spain and Portugal, France and England, received thereby wealth, the privilege of colonial expansion in new lands, and the primacy of European civilization. The leadership they were acquiring by military strength and unifying government was confirmed by commerce and the arts. How much the new advantage of geographical position was to count was shown by the Netherlands, which, at first a Spanish dependency, then a much-troubled republic, could yet in every sense be a great power through their alliance with the sea.

The social institutions of the Middle Ages also under-

went dissolution more speedily owing to the geographical discoveries. The gild-system, with its corporate action, its stable trade and minute regulations, which had already been undermined by the growth of capital, could not in the long run suit the new variable, speculative character of a complex world-wide commerce, and the individual, whose training and freedom had been a main result of medieval history, inevitably took the same position in mercantile life as he did in politics and culture.

Still greater was the victory of inquiry, of exploration, of testing the facts by experiment, in a word of the scientific spirit, over the authority of tradition. The medieval theory of the world, so neatly planned, once deemed invulnerable, crumbled at a touch. The revered decisions of the schoolmen and of the antique sages, were overthrown by the revelation of seas and continents and peoples of which they never knew. It was seen that the world was vaster and more wonderful, and that its secrets and wonders were to be discovered, not by the venerable deductions from imperfect knowledge and precocious theory, but by the acquisition of new knowledge and by induction from new-found facts. The spirit of the Renaissance received its charter and presides over modern times.

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